SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS IN NATO'S ISAF AWACS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000305

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/14/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS NATO MARR AF AJ IO AE ZK XF
SUBJECT: SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS IN NATO'S ISAF AWACS
DEPLOYMENT

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Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: NATO's efforts to deploy AWACS aircraft
in support of its ISAF operation in Afghanistan suffered a
serious blow on July 15 when Azerbaijan's Foreign Minister
indicated that overflight clearance would not be quickly
forthcoming. In a meeting of the North Atlantic Council
later the same morning, the Chairman of the NATO Military
Committee (CMC) reported that SACEUR was likely to remove the
one remaining AWACS plane from Konya, Turkey, because he was
becoming increasingly skeptical of the "northern route." CMC
discussed six possible AWACS basing options, arguing that an
agreement with the UAE was still the best option for quick
deployment. On the other hand, the Deputy Secretary General
pointed out that an agreement with the UAE was unlikely
unless the UAE significantly changed its position on
jurisdiction issues, or Allies--including the U.S.--changed
their position on this issue. END SUMMARY

Azeri Foreign Minister Evasive on AWACS
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2. (C/NF) During Azeri Foreign Minister Mammadyarov's
briefing to NATO's North Atlantic Council on July 15, several
Allies urged Azerbaijan to provide the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan with urgently-needed
access to its airspace for Airborne Warning And Control
Systems (AWACS) over-flights. The AWACS planes would travel
over Azerbaijan as they traveled to and from Afghanistan from
their interim base in Konya, Turkey. The PermReps stressed
that the safety of ISAF personnel depended on these flights
beginning soon.


3. (C/NF) Mammadyarov did not directly address the Allies'
questions, instead noting that while Azerbaijan was concerned
about the safety of ISAF personnel (including its own),it
had other "security concerns." Mammadyarov made a cryptic
reference to the military aid Armenia received from the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and assistance
Georgia received from NATO after the Georgia-Russia conflict
in August, 2008. He then lamented that, in contrast,
Azerbaijan was still using "Soviet-era" military equipment.
He went on to say that while Azerbaijan was "a part of the
community it was not yet a part of the family."

PermReps Dismayed
--------------


4. (C/NF) In the meeting of the North Atlantic Council which
immediately followed, Ambassador Daalder said he was very
disappointed in Mammadyarov's response. Other PermReps also
expressed their extreme dismay over what they had heard. UK
PermRep Eldon said that Mammadyarov's evasiveness might mean
that it was "the opening of the bazaar," but quickly added
that he thought it actually meant a no. Luxembourg's PermRep
made a similar statement. The Deputy Secretary General noted
that Mammadyarov had made similar points in their bilateral
meeting, adding that this "does not give place to much
optimism."

Konya Deployment Likely to End
--------------


5. (C/NF) In response to a direct question from Ambassador
Daalder, as well as other PermReps, the Chairman of the NATO
Military Committee (CMC) Admiral Di Paola provided an update

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on the AWACS situation. He said that he had held an
extensive discussion with SACEUR who was becoming increasing
skeptical that the "northern route" for AWACS was viable. As
a result SACEUR was likely to remove the one remaining AWACS
plane from Konya.

Basing Alternatives
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6. (C/NF) Di Paolo briefed PermReps on six possible basing
alternatives:

-- Kabul or Kandahar Air Field basing: the CMC called this an
"impractical non-option" due to costs, risks, and logistics.

-- Kyrgyzstan (Manas Air Base) or Tajikstan (Dushanbe): the
CMC similarly ruled out this option as impractical.

-- Any other nation: the CMC said starting negotiations from
scratch with a new potential AWACS basing country would
likely take longer than resolving the current over-flight
clearance problems.

-- Indian Ocean (i.e. Diego Garcia Air Base): Di Paola said
the flight routing from an Indian Ocean base was not
feasible, as the distance would further reduce AWACS time on
station over Afghanistan. The UK PermRep agreed, arguing
that it does not pay to go that far away.

-- Qatar or Oman: The CMC said basing out of Oman would
require bilateral negotiation by one Ally (UK),who already
had a base agreement there. British PermRep Eldon said the
chances were negligible that Oman would accept NATO AWACS
basing via the British bilateral arrangement.

-- UAE: Di Paola endorsed basing in the Emirates as the
"fastest track option" and the best location to ensure
maximum AWACS coverage in Afghanistan. Deputy Secretary
General Claudio Bisogniero reported that NATO Deputy
Assistant Secretary General for Operations, Ambassador Larry
Rossin, was in the UAE to continue negotiations on a basing
agreement. At the same time, he warned that the current UAE
position on jurisdiction issues was likely to be a
significant hurdle to concluding an agreement, adding that it
was also up to NATO nations to decide how flexible they would
be on the jurisdiction language.


7. (C/NF) Luxembourg's PermRep pointed out that none of the
alternative options would be workable if NATO did not secure
over-flight clearances from someone. He said NATO's past
tactic of deciding basing in principle and gaining host
nation agreement without simultaneously obtaining over-flight
clearances from other nations was ineffective in the Konya
case. He urged that NATO pursue any new options by
negotiating over-flight clearances from relevant countries
from the outset.

Comment
--------------


8. (C/NF) The Alliance as a whole faces significant hurdles
in finding a solution to the basing issue. We should
recognize, however, that the Alliance's efforts are often
further complicated by U.S. bilateral issues. In the case of
Konya, for example, the U.S. was unwilling to assist NATO's
efforts to press Turkmenistan on overflight clearance, citing

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delicate bilateral discussions we are already engaged in with
Turkmenistan. In addition, while the UAE may be an excellent
basing site from a military perspective, U.S. redlines on
jurisdiction will create a significant hurdle to reaching a
final agreement with the Emirates.
DAALDER