Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USNATO254
2009-06-12 14:54:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:
NATO-KOSOVO: EUSR FEITH STRESSES NEED FOR U.S. AND
how-toVZCZCXYZ0001 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHNO #0254/01 1631454 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 121454Z JUN 09 FM USMISSION USNATO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3069 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0034 RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0419 RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0229 RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY 3296 RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0855 RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0164 RUEHTI/AMEMBASSY TIRANA PRIORITY 4566 RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN PRIORITY 0076 RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB PRIORITY 5527 RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RHFMISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0924 RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000254
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV MOPS EUN BK KV
SUBJECT: NATO-KOSOVO: EUSR FEITH STRESSES NEED FOR U.S. AND
NATO PRESENCE IN KOSOVO
Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000254
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV MOPS EUN BK KV
SUBJECT: NATO-KOSOVO: EUSR FEITH STRESSES NEED FOR U.S. AND
NATO PRESENCE IN KOSOVO
Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: EU Special Representative Feith told NATO
Permanent Representatives on June 9 that, while he thought
conditions were appropriate for a KFOR drawdown, a continued
U.S. and NATO presence in Kosovo and the region would remain
critical. He advised that KFOR should retain the ability to
serve as third responder, particularly for upcoming local
elections, and preserve its current capability in northern
Kosovo. Allies supported his call for a proactive public
diplomacy campaign in support of KFOR's move to deterrent
presence. END SUMMARY
-------------- -
U.S. and NATO Presence in Kosovo Indispensable
-------------- -
2. (C) EU Special Representative (EUSR) Feith and EU Rule of
Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) Head de Kermabon on June 9
discussed the Kosovo political situation with NATO Permanent
Representatives in light of KFOR's impending move to
deterrent presence. EUSR Feith emphasized that, while he
thought conditions were appropriate for a KFOR drawdown to
deterrent presence, a continued U.S. and NATO presence in
Kosovo and the region would be critical for years to come.
Feith warned against replacing KFOR with an EU military
force, saying that what counts in Kosovo and the region is
U.S. engagement and military presence.
-------------- --------------
Security Situation Allows Cautious KFOR Reconfiguration
-------------- --------------
3. (C) Feith counseled NATO to consider the security
situation and wider prospects for a stable, multi-ethnic
society in Kosovo when making decisions about the
reconfiguration of KFOR. Feith and de Kermabon assessed the
security situation in Kosovo as calm but fragile. Pristina
was making good progress in standing up security institutions
that increasingly can provide public security.
4. (C) Feith cautioned, however, that Kosovo security
institutions could be overtaxed by specific incidents. As
such, KFOR should retain the ability to act as third
responder behind Kosovo Police and EULEX, particularly in
northern Kosovo. De Kermabon added that KFOR should retain
this capacity not just in the north but also in other hot
spots.
5. (C) In response to a query from Romania, Feith said he
believed that the Kosovo Police were ready to assume
responsibility from KFOR for protected religious and cultural
sites. However, he warned that the Serbian Orthodox Church
may resist KFOR's departure from these sites. De Kermabon
added that while the Kosovo Police were technically ready, he
questioned Pristina's will to take this step, as well as
Kosovo Serb readiness to accept it.
--------------
KFOR Must Retain Ability to Respond in North
--------------
6. (C) Feith assessed that KFOR downsizing could proceed
safely in most of Kosovo, but NATO should maintain KFOR's
current capability in northern Kosovo until the situation
there stabilizes. Stabilizing the north would take concerted
international efforts to help EULEX operate there, eliminate
parallel institutions, and promote two-way returns across the
Ibar river.
--------------
Serbia Remains a Nuisance
--------------
7. (C) Feith said that Serbia no longer constituted a
military threat to Kosovo. Belgrade was, however, a
political nuisance. Belgrade's level of cooperation with
EULEX remained unacceptable.
8. (C) France said dialogue with Serbia was critical to
promote cooperation. Greece objected to Feith's
characterization of Serbia as a nuisance and said much
depends on establishing cooperative ties between Belgrade and
Pristina.
9. (C) Feith said NATO and the EU should be more forceful in
exercising leverage with Belgrade. He called on NATO to push
Belgrade to cooperate in the north and said we had an
opportunity to work against parallel institutions because the
financial crisis was undercutting Belgrade's ability to fund
them.
--------------
KFOR Should Go Slow before Elections
--------------
10. (C) Feith said NATO should take into account local
elections in Kosovo, which would be key to integrating Kosovo
Serbs into the political process and institutions. He
expected elections to take place in November, arguing that
KFOR's ability to assist local authorities and EULEX should
not be reduced before this. France, supported by Greece,
said encouraging Kosovo authorities to pursue outreach to
Kosovo Serbs was critical to stability.
-------------- --------------
KFOR Drawdown Could Send Positive Signal to Region
-------------- --------------
11. (C) The Dutch PermRep expressed concern about the
implications for Bosnia of KFOR's move to deterrent presence.
Feith said he thought the political effects for Bosnia and
the wider region would be positive. He said that a KFOR
drawdown would be a signal of Transatlantic confidence in the
region and an encouragement to local leaders to take positive
ownership.
--------------
NATO Must Shape the Message
--------------
12. (C) EUSR Feith said Prime Minister Thaci supported a KFOR
drawdown but wanted to convey the need for appropriate
messages of continued Alliance engagement and support. Feith
added that KFOR reconfiguration should be preceded by a
coherent public information campaign. He said that NATO
needed to reassure the public that KFOR was not abandoning
Kosovo while also signaling to potential mischief makers that
their margin of maneuver continues to shrink.
13. (C) Italy and Germany stressed that the Alliance's
message on deterrent presence was critical. NATO should make
clear that KFOR was not leaving Kosovo; we are simply
changing our force posture to reflect the changing situation
on the ground in Kosovo. Denmark indicated that strategic
communications should be a joint effort that includes the EU
and broader international presences in Kosovo.
14. (C) In response to a query from Norway on the immediate
effect once Defense Ministers announce the KFOR drawdown,
Feith stated that what would be needed was immediate
distribution of a reassuring message. NATO would not rapidly
downsize; the drawdown would be staggered and deliberate.
--------------
NATO-EU Cooperation Key as KFOR Downsizes
--------------
15. (C) De Kermabon said he believed EULEX had established
its credibility in the north, a development he attributed to
fruitful work with KFOR. He expressed satisfaction with the
permanent cooperation between KFOR and EULEX. Turkey
endorsed his comments and said it was prepared to increase
substantially its contribution to EULEX.
16. (C) As KFOR downsizes, Feith said that a good
communications strategy and continued engagement between
KFOR, EULEX, and his office would be important. The
Secretary General concluded the meeting with a call to
continue the excellent NATO-EU cooperation in Kosovo.
DAALDER
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2019
TAGS: PREL NATO PGOV MOPS EUN BK KV
SUBJECT: NATO-KOSOVO: EUSR FEITH STRESSES NEED FOR U.S. AND
NATO PRESENCE IN KOSOVO
Classified By: Ambassador Ivo Daalder, Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: EU Special Representative Feith told NATO
Permanent Representatives on June 9 that, while he thought
conditions were appropriate for a KFOR drawdown, a continued
U.S. and NATO presence in Kosovo and the region would remain
critical. He advised that KFOR should retain the ability to
serve as third responder, particularly for upcoming local
elections, and preserve its current capability in northern
Kosovo. Allies supported his call for a proactive public
diplomacy campaign in support of KFOR's move to deterrent
presence. END SUMMARY
-------------- -
U.S. and NATO Presence in Kosovo Indispensable
-------------- -
2. (C) EU Special Representative (EUSR) Feith and EU Rule of
Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) Head de Kermabon on June 9
discussed the Kosovo political situation with NATO Permanent
Representatives in light of KFOR's impending move to
deterrent presence. EUSR Feith emphasized that, while he
thought conditions were appropriate for a KFOR drawdown to
deterrent presence, a continued U.S. and NATO presence in
Kosovo and the region would be critical for years to come.
Feith warned against replacing KFOR with an EU military
force, saying that what counts in Kosovo and the region is
U.S. engagement and military presence.
-------------- --------------
Security Situation Allows Cautious KFOR Reconfiguration
-------------- --------------
3. (C) Feith counseled NATO to consider the security
situation and wider prospects for a stable, multi-ethnic
society in Kosovo when making decisions about the
reconfiguration of KFOR. Feith and de Kermabon assessed the
security situation in Kosovo as calm but fragile. Pristina
was making good progress in standing up security institutions
that increasingly can provide public security.
4. (C) Feith cautioned, however, that Kosovo security
institutions could be overtaxed by specific incidents. As
such, KFOR should retain the ability to act as third
responder behind Kosovo Police and EULEX, particularly in
northern Kosovo. De Kermabon added that KFOR should retain
this capacity not just in the north but also in other hot
spots.
5. (C) In response to a query from Romania, Feith said he
believed that the Kosovo Police were ready to assume
responsibility from KFOR for protected religious and cultural
sites. However, he warned that the Serbian Orthodox Church
may resist KFOR's departure from these sites. De Kermabon
added that while the Kosovo Police were technically ready, he
questioned Pristina's will to take this step, as well as
Kosovo Serb readiness to accept it.
--------------
KFOR Must Retain Ability to Respond in North
--------------
6. (C) Feith assessed that KFOR downsizing could proceed
safely in most of Kosovo, but NATO should maintain KFOR's
current capability in northern Kosovo until the situation
there stabilizes. Stabilizing the north would take concerted
international efforts to help EULEX operate there, eliminate
parallel institutions, and promote two-way returns across the
Ibar river.
--------------
Serbia Remains a Nuisance
--------------
7. (C) Feith said that Serbia no longer constituted a
military threat to Kosovo. Belgrade was, however, a
political nuisance. Belgrade's level of cooperation with
EULEX remained unacceptable.
8. (C) France said dialogue with Serbia was critical to
promote cooperation. Greece objected to Feith's
characterization of Serbia as a nuisance and said much
depends on establishing cooperative ties between Belgrade and
Pristina.
9. (C) Feith said NATO and the EU should be more forceful in
exercising leverage with Belgrade. He called on NATO to push
Belgrade to cooperate in the north and said we had an
opportunity to work against parallel institutions because the
financial crisis was undercutting Belgrade's ability to fund
them.
--------------
KFOR Should Go Slow before Elections
--------------
10. (C) Feith said NATO should take into account local
elections in Kosovo, which would be key to integrating Kosovo
Serbs into the political process and institutions. He
expected elections to take place in November, arguing that
KFOR's ability to assist local authorities and EULEX should
not be reduced before this. France, supported by Greece,
said encouraging Kosovo authorities to pursue outreach to
Kosovo Serbs was critical to stability.
-------------- --------------
KFOR Drawdown Could Send Positive Signal to Region
-------------- --------------
11. (C) The Dutch PermRep expressed concern about the
implications for Bosnia of KFOR's move to deterrent presence.
Feith said he thought the political effects for Bosnia and
the wider region would be positive. He said that a KFOR
drawdown would be a signal of Transatlantic confidence in the
region and an encouragement to local leaders to take positive
ownership.
--------------
NATO Must Shape the Message
--------------
12. (C) EUSR Feith said Prime Minister Thaci supported a KFOR
drawdown but wanted to convey the need for appropriate
messages of continued Alliance engagement and support. Feith
added that KFOR reconfiguration should be preceded by a
coherent public information campaign. He said that NATO
needed to reassure the public that KFOR was not abandoning
Kosovo while also signaling to potential mischief makers that
their margin of maneuver continues to shrink.
13. (C) Italy and Germany stressed that the Alliance's
message on deterrent presence was critical. NATO should make
clear that KFOR was not leaving Kosovo; we are simply
changing our force posture to reflect the changing situation
on the ground in Kosovo. Denmark indicated that strategic
communications should be a joint effort that includes the EU
and broader international presences in Kosovo.
14. (C) In response to a query from Norway on the immediate
effect once Defense Ministers announce the KFOR drawdown,
Feith stated that what would be needed was immediate
distribution of a reassuring message. NATO would not rapidly
downsize; the drawdown would be staggered and deliberate.
--------------
NATO-EU Cooperation Key as KFOR Downsizes
--------------
15. (C) De Kermabon said he believed EULEX had established
its credibility in the north, a development he attributed to
fruitful work with KFOR. He expressed satisfaction with the
permanent cooperation between KFOR and EULEX. Turkey
endorsed his comments and said it was prepared to increase
substantially its contribution to EULEX.
16. (C) As KFOR downsizes, Feith said that a good
communications strategy and continued engagement between
KFOR, EULEX, and his office would be important. The
Secretary General concluded the meeting with a call to
continue the excellent NATO-EU cooperation in Kosovo.
DAALDER