Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09USNATO173
2009-05-05 15:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

SUBJECT: APRIL 28 HLTF: NATO ALLIES KEEN TO STAY

Tags:  PREL PARM KCFE NATO RS OSCE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHNO #0173/01 1251558
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051558Z MAY 09
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2923
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 6344
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUDKSR/EUCOM PLANS AND ANALYSIS STUTTGART GE IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USNMR SHAPE BE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USNATO 000173 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM KCFE NATO RS OSCE
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: APRIL 28 HLTF: NATO ALLIES KEEN TO STAY
ON MESSAGE ON CFE

REF: A. REF: A) STATE 41666 (28 APR 09 HLTF GUIDANCE)

B. B) STATE 43053 (RUSSIAN PAPER ON CFE)

C. C) STATE 41124 (U.S. NON-PAPER ON THE STATUS OF
THE ELEMENTS OF THE CFE PARALLEL ACTIONS
PACKAGE)

Classified By: Classified by: Ambassador Kurt Volker for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 USNATO 000173

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM KCFE NATO RS OSCE
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: APRIL 28 HLTF: NATO ALLIES KEEN TO STAY
ON MESSAGE ON CFE

REF: A. REF: A) STATE 41666 (28 APR 09 HLTF GUIDANCE)

B. B) STATE 43053 (RUSSIAN PAPER ON CFE)

C. C) STATE 41124 (U.S. NON-PAPER ON THE STATUS OF
THE ELEMENTS OF THE CFE PARALLEL ACTIONS
PACKAGE)

Classified By: Classified by: Ambassador Kurt Volker for reasons 1.4 (b
) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. At the April 28 High Level Task Force (HLTF)
meeting and on the margins Allies welcomed the U.S. read out
of Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller's April 24 luncheon
discussion of CFE in Rome with Russian Security and
Disarmament Director Antonov, including indications that
Russia is prepared to intensify efforts to find a CFE
solution building on the parallel actions package. Allies
were particularly interested that Russia had provided a paper
to the U.S. (The translation of that paper ) ref B - was
subsequently provided to Allies on April 30.) In addition, a
number of other issues figured prominently in the HLTF and
associated bilateral meetings:

-- Allies were appreciative of the U.S. non-paper on the
status of U.S.-Russia bilateral discussions of the parallel
actions package (ref C). Several said they considered it a
useful overview of the issues at play. Although comments on
the paper were minimal, Turkey was insistent that any
enlarged (from the bilateral) format discussion with Russia
on the package should include Allies on a non-exclusive basis
(meaning not just quad 1) and must address the entire
parallel actions package, not just selected issues, like the
flank. Turkey,s comments on the need to retain the flank
regime for Russia were unambiguous.

-- On the way ahead, Allies discussed the need to use key
upcoming opportunities to deliver a consistent and
constructive message on CFE. Turkey stressed that Allies
should use the May (TBC) NATO-Russia Council Ministerial as
an opportunity to raise CFE.

-- Allies intend to use the May 26-28 Oberammergau HLTF "Away
Day" to review in detail Russia,s position on the package
elements and agree on a calibrated Alliance message for the

June 10 German-hosted seminar on CFE and the future of
conventional arms control in Europe.

-- German Seminar: Allies view the latest version of the
German concept paper for the seminar much improved, but
remain uncomfortable with the potential scope and intent of
the seminar, and particularly of a planned discussion on
"options for the future." German rep Biontino struggled to
explain how Germany intended to manage a discussion on
stocktaking and to limit a discussion on "options for the
future" among such a broad group of participants, but he
indicated Berlin would distribute an annotated agenda in an
effort to manage expectations and structure the discussion.
END SUMMARY.

- - - - - - - - - - - -
CONTACTS and BILATERALS
- - - - - - - - - - - -


2. (C) HLTF Chairman Erdmann reviewed the post-Summit state
of play stressing renewed efforts to reinvigorate the
NATO-Russia Council, including in arms control. He noted an
Interfax news release that was highly critical of the Summit
declaration paragraph on CFE which Russia claimed indicated
Allies were not ready to engage in dialogue to resolve the
impasse. Erdmann remarked that this contrasted sharply with
the tone of an April 17 discussion with the RF delegation
during which Russia discounted the news release and claimed
readiness to intensify efforts. The highlight of the
contacts and bilaterals discussion was the U.S. read out and
the Russian non-paper (of which the Dutch, at least, were
already aware):

-- U.S. Rep Rich Davis reported briefly on A/S Gottemoeller's
April 24 START meeting with MFA Director Antonov in Rome
during which Antonov raised CFE over lunch and provided an
informal paper in Russian, indicating that Russia is prepared
to work off of the parallel actions package. Davis informed

USNATO 00000173 002 OF 005


Allies of the overall positive tone of the exchange and noted
that the U.S. was still having the Russian paper translated
and expected to share it with Allies as soon as possible.
(Note. The English version has since been distributed to
HLTF reps via NATO International Staff, ref B. End Note)
Davis emphasized that while, at first reading, the ideas were
familiar, reflecting well known Russian priorities and no new
concepts or ideas, at the same time it was useful that the
Russians had put their positions down on paper and that the
paper focused on the parallel actions package. Allies
welcomed news of the constructive tone of the meeting and
appeared particularly relieved that the parallel actions
package -- which many have described as "the only game in
town" (and which was very difficult to agree within the
Alliance) -- remained the focus of discussion.

-- Netherlands: Dutch rep Kleinjan (who had consulted with
the U.S. del just prior to the meeting to ensure the U.S.
intended to raise the paper) reported on a meeting in Moscow
with Russian expert Federyakov in which he claimed Russia
would share the paper provided to the U.S. with all the
members of the JCG during the first week of May. (Note.
Kleinjan was under the impression the paper laid out
specifics of a Russian two-staged provisional application
proposal but opted not to go into any substance in his
remarks. End Note.)

-- Slovenian rep Vidovic reported on an April 8 Foreign
Ministerial working level meeting in Moscow during which CFE
was not raised, but Russia,s European Security Treaty
proposal was discussed. He indicated FM Lavrov raised
familiar Russian points stressing that the NRC (which
amounted to 28:1) was not an adequate venue for discussions
on European security and noting his intent to attend the ASRC
in Vienna and the Informal Ministerial in Corfu. Vidovic
also reported that on Aug 30-Sep 1, the Slovenian MFA is
organizing the fourth event in a Bled Strategic Forum series
which will focus on the economic crisis, but will also
include a panel devoted to European Security.

-------------- --------------
THE WAY AHEAD ) AWAY DAY - STOCKTAKING, BERLIN, AND BEYOND
-------------- --------------


3. (C) NRC and CFE: In discussions on the way ahead, Turkey
suggested that Allies should consider the full calendar of
available opportunities to deliver a solid message on CFE to
Russia. Turkey stressed that Allies should use the
NATO-Russia Council Ministerial meeting to send a
constructive CFE message; otherwise Allies would risk Russia
misinterpreting the absence of discussion of CFE. On the
margins, Turkish rep Gun informed the U.S. that his Minister
would make a statement noting the positive dynamic is an
opportunity for progress, but also flagging that Russia,s
insistence on abolishing the flank regime would "kill Turkish
ratification chances." Gun urged that Secretary Clinton
should mention CFE in her remarks, as that would have "great
impact" and be useful to the overall process.


4. (C) U.S. Non-Paper Well Received with One Exception:
Allies universally welcomed the U.S. paper on the status of
bilateral discussions of each element of the parallel actions
package. Only one concern surfaced which stemmed from the
idea of using "variable geometry" for engaging Russia on an
issue-by-issue basis.

-- The Turks in particular do not like the idea of
U.S.-Russia- plus- Allies meeting to discuss specific issues.
They and others are concerned this might suggest that some
issues, like the flank, are of interest only to certain
Allies. Turkish rep Gun was adamant, and others agreed, that
any enlarged format discussion must address the entire
parallel actions package and should include a small to medium
(8-10) group of Allies (on a non-exclusive basis). The idea
of a larger group ) which would preclude a Quad plus Russia
format ) appeared to resonate with many.

-- No Ally spoke in favor of selective, issue-specific small
groups. The UK argued such an arrangement could give Russia
a veto on who participates; both Romania and Italy argued it
could give Russia an opportunity to drive wedges. (On the

USNATO 00000173 003 OF 005


margins, Romanian rep Stoica noted that Romania was
interested in "applying" to be part of any set, small group.)
Belgian rep van Meirvenne underscored openness to an
expanded format as long as it was not to the detriment of the
bilateral process; Turkey concurred with this.


5. (C) The HLTF Away Day in May: Apart from modalities,
Allies focused on what they wanted to achieve at the away day
in Oberammergau. Prior to learning of Russia,s paper on
revitalizing the CFE parallel actions discussion, key Allies
like Turkey envisioned a unitary priority for that meeting:
to prepare a unified NATO position for the German CFE
seminar. However, Allies agreed that the U.S. non-paper, the
Russian paper responding to the parallel actions package, the
German seminar concept paper (to which Russia had also
responded in writing) and the Czech paper from last fall
would all provide ample material for a thorough stocktaking
discussion. German rep Biontino repeated calls for more
"comprehensive" stocktaking to assess more broadly the
importance of conventional arms control, but the IS did not
bite at the notion of developing an additional paper on a way
ahead. Two key goals surfaced: to reach agreement on and
calibrate the NATO message to Russia for the June 10 seminar,
and to review in detail the Russian position on elements of
the parallel actions package.


6. (C) German-hosted CFE Seminar on June 10: On the margins
(see para 7) and in the HLTF itself, German rep Biontino
struggled to describe the goals and modalities for the Berlin
event. He said Berlin envisioned two parts in terms of the
agenda: "stocktaking and options for the future." Although
Allies consider the latest revision of Germany,s concept for
the June seminar much improved, it was clear that some
(France, Turkey, Canada, Czech Republic) are uncomfortable
with the potential scope and perceived Russian intent of a
discussion on "options for the future." These uncertainties
were reinforced by a Russian written response to Germany
(distributed to all) that appears to call for a broadened
discussion beyond CFE and for concrete, practical outcomes
for future steps.

-- French rep Raharinaivo (supported by UK rep Ford) was
strongest on this point. He reiterated French support for
the seminar and a positive dynamic, but underscored that
Allies should not be bashful about establishing red lines and
making it clear that there will be "no deliverables."
Germany gave assurances that there would be no negotiated
outcomes and noted plans to incorporate input from Russia in
a third revision of its concept paper and to also develop an
annotated agenda with the aim of structuring the discussion.

- - - - - - - - - - - -
MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS
- - - - - - - - - - - -


7. (C) On the margins of the HLTF, the U.S. met with quad
reps from Germany, France and the UK, and conducted bilateral
meetings with Turkey, Romania, Norway and Italy (and
informally with Canada.) For the most part, Allies previewed
and discussed the same points made in the HLTF plenary, but
the bilateral meetings also provided an opportunity for more
in depth discussion of the German seminar concept as well as
some of the elements of the U.S. non-paper:

-- Quad: Much of the quad discussion focused on the latest
version of the German paper and the Russian response, as well
as how Germany intends to address continued Allied concerns
about the scope and intent of the seminar. Several Allies
took note that the Germans planned to invite all potential
CFE participants to the meeting. (This was a major issue for
the Turks ) see below.) The U.S. and others pushed Biontino
to explain how "stocktaking and options for the future" would
work: stocktaking would inevitably highlight the Russian
suspension and the status of the parallel actions package,
which might produce maximalist statements of position on both
sides. This could not be useful. "Options for the future"
sounded too open-ended, if NATO,s common goal is to preserve
the CFE Treaty regime; the U.S. and UK warned that Allies
would not welcome such a discussion. Regarding the latter
point, Biontino said that he did not foresee a discussion of
substance under the rubric of "options for the future." The

USNATO 00000173 004 OF 005


focus could be on process. He envisioned a discussion of
whether Allies would engage Russia in a group larger than
just the U.S. and Russia. The U.S. and UK acknowledged that
"process" was safer than "substance," but pointed out it was
hard to imagine a limited discussion on format and process in
a group that Germany had said would include all potential CFE
participants -- the Balkans, the Nordics, the Austrians, in
addition to the current CFE members. Biontino admitted that
Berlin was still trying to sort through the plan, but would
distribute an annotated agenda with the next version of the
concept paper by the time of the "away day" in an effort to
manage expectations and structure/limit the scope of
discussions.

-- Turkey: In separate discussions with Turkey, Gun remarked
that Germany intended to invite Cyprus to participate in the
seminar and that if Cyprus does participate, Turkey would not
likely attend. Gun made clear in the HLTF plenary that
Turkey,s attendance was still subject to review.

-- Turkey, Romania, Italy and Canada: All welcomed the U.S.
non-paper and were encouraged by the positive tone of the
most recent U.S.-Russia meeting. Each expressed concerns
about the timing and intent of the German-hosted seminar as
noted in the plenary, but bilateral discussions generally
focused on some of the key issues in the U.S. parallel
actions package non-paper:

-- Flank: During bilateral discussions, Turkish rep Gun was
very firm in underscoring that Turkey could not take the
Adapted Treaty to its parliament if there was a question
about the status of the flank. He repeated concerns about
the suggestion that Russia might only resume implementation
of some (but not all) elements of CFE in certain conditions
) but not the flank limits. The Norwegians were also very
firm about the flank not being negotiable for them.
Norwegian rep Loken expressed concern that Germany was
interested in finding compromises and pushed for a U.S.
assessment of how a flank deal might be possible. EUR/RPM
Jennifer Laurendeau recalled that during the U.S.-Russian
bilateral discussion in December, Russia had focused on
political commitments as a substitute for the flank limits.
Loken said Norway liked having both ) the political
commitments (which exist for Russian equipment levels in the
north) and/and the legal limits ) as a "double safety
switch." Italian rep Farruggia, in an uncharacteristically
realistic assessment, stressed that if Russia,s flank
position (including the Baluyevskiy proposal) was not just
tactical posturing ) which Italy hoped that it was ) then
there would be a serious problem. He and Gun were both clear
about timing and sequencing: provisions of the Adapted Treaty
could not be changed before entry into force.

-- Moldova: On the margins Allies asked if the U.S. had
heard any definitive interpretation of the 2 1 statement from
the Moldovans, but none pressed this in the plenary. The
U.S. team responded that we had requested the formal Moldovan
view on the matter, but obviously the political situation in
Moldova had complicated prospects for receiving an answer.
UK rep Ford noted in the quad that for the UK the 2 1
statement "doesn,t change the price of fish" in terms of
host nation consent. Romanian rep Stoica (DG for Strategic
Affairs and former HLTF rep Micula,s replacement)
underscored that regardless of whether the Moldovans
considered the Russian peacekeeping presence illegal, Romania
did not want Russian forces on its border, and therefore
Russia,s implementation of its withdrawal commitment remains
critical for Romania. In this regard, Stoica reaffirmed that
Romania supports the Parallel Actions Package in principle
but not necessarily in the specifics. (Note: Romania would
like the package to include a date certain for Russia,s
withdrawal of forces and munitions. End note.)

-- Georgia: Several Allies welcomed receiving the text of
the U.S. proposals on Georgia that we had advanced in the
parallel actions context; there was little extended
discussion, just preliminary remarks. The Italian rep
suggested this issue was mainly a matter of bilateral
agreement between Russia and Georgia. Canada opined
separately that Russia had painted itself into a corner by
recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia, thereby complicating

USNATO 00000173 005 OF 005


matters. Both Canada and Romania remarked that Russia would
not likely withdraw TLE from either region. In plenary,
Czech rep Zvonkova suggested Allies devote time at the "Away
Day" on the issue of unresolved commitments to Georgia and
Moldova in developing a key message for the Berlin seminar:
these commitments should not be abandoned, but Allies must
find creative ways to deal with these issues in view of
current developments in the region.


8. (SBU) NEXT MEETINGS. The HLTF "Away Day" will take place
26-28 May at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany and
will be followed by the June 10 German-hosted seminar on "The
Future of Conventional Arms Control" in Berlin. Allies
agreed for the HLTF to then meet on July 9 to draw
conclusions from the preceding events and consider next steps
in light of any developments.
VOLKER