TAKING THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL FORWARD IN STORMY

S E C R E T USNATO 000157
NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2017
TAGS: NATO PREL MOPS GG RS
SUBJECT: TAKING THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL FORWARD IN STORMY
WEATHER

Classified By: Ambassador Kurt Volker for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (S/NF) SUMMARY: The Alliance has made great strides in
overcoming internal divisions over Russia and Europes East
leading to an emerging consensus on how to take NATO-Russia
relations forward. USNATO is working with Germany and the
Czech Republic on non-papers that provide a roadmap for
re-engagement with Russia. We plan to circulate these
non-papers prior to the April 29 NATO-Russia Council (NRC)
Ambassadorial meeting with the intent of seeking approval by
Ministers at the upcoming NRC Foreign Ministerial meeting
(proposed for May 19). Russian pressure to cancel
Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises in Georgia will test
the shaky emerging consensus within the Alliance on
NATO-Russia. Moreover, Russian Ambassador Rogozin may slow
down or reverse Russias stated goal of re-engagement in the
NRC and seek to distort our proposals. That said, our
strategic approach -- of seeking to cooperate with Russia in
specific areas of common interest, while pushing back in
areas where we disagree -- remains valid and serves as a
basis in keeping NATO united, even when Russia seeks to
pressure NATO, as it is doing with the PfP exercises. End
summary.

--------------
TIMELINE TO NATO-RUSSIA MINISTERIAL
--------------


2. (S/NF) Allies have agreed to hold an NRC Foreign
Ministerial before the June 11-12 NATO Defense Ministerial.
The NATO Secretary General proposed May 19 for this
ministerial in order to take advantage of the EU GARC (May
18-19) (Mission seeks Washington guidance for whether this
date is acceptable to Secretary Clinton). In preparation for
the Foreign Ministerial, we should re-assess what type of
engagement with Russia we desire in the NRC. To this end,
Post has brokered two non-papers on NRC reform with Germany
(the leader of the pro-reengagement camp),and the Czech
Republic (the leader of the Russia-skeptics camp). Both have
been emailed to EUR/RPM. These two papers illuminate the way
forward as follows:
-- An "Allied-only non-paper" establishes principles on
Allied discussions of Russia and reaffirms the inter-alliance
understanding on pre-coordination. We believe it will lead
to the development of a more coherent NATO policy towards
Russia. It is intended to put to rest fear that some Allies
(e.g., Germany) would block internal discussions about Russia
prior to NRC meetings.
-- An "NRC non-paper," intended for all NRC members,
including Russia, seeks to set priorities (Afghanistan,
disarmament, arms control, non-proliferation
counter-terrorism, and counter-piracy) and restructure the
NRCs committees to give greater flexibility to tackle agreed
priorities.


3. (S/NF) NRC timeline of events:
-- by April 23 - Czech Republic, Germany, and the U.S. will
circulate NRC and Allied only non-papers.
-- April 29 - NRC Ambassadors will discuss "taking the NRC
forward." Czech, German and U.S. Perm Reps will present our
NRC non-paper. Other Allies and Russia are also preparing
non-papers for this meeting.
-- May 7 NRC Chiefs of Defense (CHODs) - canceled by Russian
Military Representative Mazlov. Mazlov said today (April 21)
Russia wants NRC Foreign Ministers to give political guidance
to the military side before CHODs meet to discuss mil-mil
relations.
-- May 19 (proposed) - NRC Foreign Ministerial - we will seek
approval for the NRC non-paper from Ministers. In parallel,
we will seek NAC approval of the Allied-only non-paper.

--------------
COMMENT - NRC DESIGNED TO WEATHER THE STORM
--------------


4. (S/NF) NATO needs to walk a steady line of practical
cooperation with Russia where possible, while being free to
raise areas of disagreement with Russia. It is especially
important to maintain this line as Russia seeks to raise the
pressure on NATO. Allies instinctively divide into two camps
in the face of Russian pressure: the new Allies will be quick
to abandon NRC re-engagement to penalize bad behavior, while
the older Allies try to assuage every Russian tantrum, even
if the Russian demands are unreasonable. We have worked to
position the U.S. between these two groups and draw Allies
closer together toward a single, consensus policy.
Specifically, we are seeking to position NATO to pursue
mutually beneficial cooperation without retreating from
NATOs core values or shrinking in the face of Russian
pressure. Russian demands to cancel PfP exercises (reported
septel) are a test of the fragile consensus on NATOs nascent
policy towards Russia and the East. NATO should go forward
with the PfP exercises, while simultaneously advancing our
re-engagement in the NRC. Though turbulent in the
short-term, this combination of openness and cooperation on
the one hand, and consistency and push-back on the other,
offers the best chance of establishing a new, realistic
NATO-Russia relationship that serves our wider, long-term
interests in securing a Europe whole, free, and at peace.
End Comment.
VOLKER