MARCH 12 HLTF: NATO ALLIES PRESS U.S. TO LEAD ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000115

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2019
TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM PREL
SUBJECT: MARCH 12 HLTF: NATO ALLIES PRESS U.S. TO LEAD ON
CFE NEXT STEPS

REF: STATE 23176

Classified By: POLAD W. Scott Reid for reasons 1.4 (B)&(D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. At the March 12 NATO High Level Task Force
(HLTF) meeting, three main themes emerged from Allies'
comments on next steps regarding CFE: 1) Allied support for
U.S. leadership in engaging Russia on CFE; 2) support for the
Parallel Actions Package as the basis for engagement; and 3)
determination to preserve Alliance unity on CFE and reflect
that in NATO public statements and in talks with Russia. The
quote of the day came from Turkish rep Gun: "Any hint of
abandoning the NATO position in the Parallel Actions Package,
and I won't be able to go back to Turkey."


2. (C) Turkey offered a three-part proposal for next steps:
1) development of a NATO International Staff-U.S. non-paper
addressing the status of each element of the Parallel Actions
Package; 2) a stock-taking discussion based on the non-paper,
following the NATO Summit; and 3) a meeting in an expanded
U.S.-Russia format including key interested Allies to discuss
all elements of the "Parallel Actions Package." Many Allies
welcomed Turkey's call for detailed stocktaking - with some
calling for a more forward-looking consideration of options -
as well as HLTF chairman Erdmann's unexpected suggestion for
Allies to engage in CFE brainstormin at an off-site meeting
prior to the German-hosted seminar in June. Many expressed
concern about the German non-paper on the Steinmeier-proposed
CFE seminar, fearing that the meeting, as conceived, could
result in Allies airing differences in front of the Russians
and could complicate negotiations on the Parallel Actions
Package. Turkey and Romania raised particular concer
n about Germany's plan to discuss the "scope and parameters"
of a future negotiation to update the Adapted CFE. Almost
all, with the notable exception of Germany, emphasized the
need for a unified Allied position at the seminar. The
German rep dismissed much of the input from Allies as
"misunderstandings" of the specific language in the German
paper, but indicated Germany would attempt to clarify some of
the key concerns in the next version. He also made clear
that the paper was strictly a German concept (not an
Alliance-agreed document) that aimed to sustain the current
process while exploring complementary ideas in a positive
dialogue. Germany intends to seek input from Russia in the
near term and will brief Allies on the Russian reaction at
the next HLTF.


3. (C) On CFE language for the NATO Summit and the HLTF input
to the SPC paper on arms control, Allies quickly reached
agreement on outstanding issues in the current texts. Allies
from both sides of the NATO divide on Russia management
insisted that the December NAC text on CFE should be used,
unchanged, in the Summit Declaration, with only minor edits
if needed to avoid repeating language elsewhere in the
document. END SUMMARY.

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CONTACTS and BILATERALS
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4. (C) HLTF Chairman Erdmann introduced this agenda item
with a broad overview of Alliance Summit preparations. He
noted that Foreign Ministers had agreed to resume formal
contacts with Russia to include a NATO Russia Council
Ministerial that will take place following the Summit but
prior to late June. U.S. Rep Rich Davis (per reftel)
remarked on the brief exchange on CFE between Secretary
Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov at their March 6 meeting
in Geneva, noting that The Secretary indicated her interest
in continuing to work the issue. As expected, other reports
were at a minimum:

-- Romania: Romanian rep Micula reported on their Foreign
Minister's visit to Moscow on February 27, which included CFE
on the agenda. Nothing new emerged from a brief discussion
in which Romania reiterated the need for Russia to resume CFE
implementation and respond constructively to the Parallel
Actions Package, and FM Lavrov replied that the package was a
step in the right direction but insufficient.

-- France: French rep Raharinaivo noted that the French MoD
Director for Strategic Affairs met with MFA Director Antonov

in Moscow on February 9. The meeting touched on CFE, but the
dialogue was "fruitless" as Antonov criticized the Alliance
in general and would not engage constructively on process or
future steps. In meetings outside the HLTF plenary,
Raharinaivo's characterization of the meeting was more
evocative: it was demonstrated that the parties could speak
in loud voices, he noted.

-- Germany: German rep Biontino reported that a February 19
meeting between German Director General for Arms Control and
Disarmament Gottwald and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister
Ryabkov and MFA Director Antonov only served to reinforce
that Russia remains in a "wait and see" mode on CFE.

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THE WAY AHEAD - STOCKTAKING AND THE GERMAN SEMINAR
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5. (C) Turkey's Three-Part Proposal with a Brainstorming
Twist: In response to the HLTF Chairman's call for views on
how to best engage in stocktaking, Turkey strongly advocated
that the primary venue for engaging Russia on CFE should be
the U.S.-Russia channel and suggested a deliberate three-part
proposal to capitalize on expected positive developments
vis-a-vis Russia following the Summit, and to counter
Russia's claims that the U.S. is monopolizing CFE
discussions. Turkey suggested a series of next steps to
carry out before June: 1) the NATO I.S., together with the
U.S., should prepare a non-paper describing the state of play
on each of the issues contained in the parallel actions
package; 2) Allies should hold a stocktaking discussion after
the NATO Summit to review that paper; and 3) Allies should
then engage Russia in an expanded U.S.-Russia format
(including key interested Allies) to discuss all the elements
of the Parallel Actions Package. In a surprise to most
Allies, HLTF Chair Erdmann suggested an additional
"ingredient" to include in the "NATO Summit to Berlin seminar
continuum" by proposing another HLTF off-site event during
which Allies could conduct stocktaking on the Parallel
Actions Package and beyond, via a brainstorming session prior
to the June 10 seminar. Allied reaction to engaging in a
deliberate process was favorable. The Turkish idea of
engaging the Russians in an expanded U.S.-Russia format prior
to the German seminar was seconded by the Dutch rep, but not
further discussed.

-- Most Allies focused on the stocktaking idea. Some focused
exclusively on the Turkish idea of reviewing the status of
the elements of the Parallel Actions Package; others were
interested in a more open-ended, forward leaning discussion,
and some specifically suggested the need to consider
"options" which were not further detailed. U.S. rep Davis
(with the caveat of the challenges presented by both the
timing and process of the ongoing transition) welcomed the
suggestion for a more thorough discussion at a later time and
noted noncommittally that a paper might be useful to frame
such a discussion. He also underscored the utility of a
stocktaking exercise in preparing for the German seminar in
June. The UK, Netherlands, Norway, Italy, Hungary, Greece
and Romania agreed with engaging in a deliberate process.
Romanian rep Micula stressed that discussion should focus on
the Parallel Actions Package with the goal of "assisting our
U.S. friends in their tireless efforts to overcome the CFE
impasse."

-- Canadian rep Arpin - supported by the Czech Republic,
Bulgaria and Luxembourg - suggested it would be more useful
to go beyond a pure stocktaking exercise by exploring future
options though she did not elaborate any further.

-- German rep Biontino was open to a written assessment and
discussion of where we stand on the Parallel Actions Package
and how to continue the process, but also called for a
broader stocktaking context that would address the importance
of arms control to European security and the enormous loss
Europe would suffer if arms control went by the wayside.

-- The Chairman concluded there was consensus for a
stocktaking debate (and possibly a "stocktaking plus" debate
that would include addressing broader contextual issues and a
way forward) as well as agreement to hold a stand alone
brainstorming off-site HLTF. The proposition for an off-site

not only meshed with Turkey's proposal but also fit neatly
with Germany's June seminar. It appeared that most Allies
expect to use the off-site as a preparatory event to set
limits on - and establish Allied positions for - the
discussion at the June meeting. What remained less clear was
whether or not the IS/U.S. non-paper should only address
stocktaking or include a discussion on the way forward.

-- An element of Turkey's proposal lost in the discussion
was the idea of engaging the Russians prior to the German
seminar in an expanded format. Dutch rep Kleinjan noted
continued support for the idea of an expanded format, while
Romanian rep Micula suggested Allies should first engage in
the stocktaking and brainstorming discussions before
determining next steps such as the expanded format.
(Comment: It seems likely that most Allies are waiting for
U.S. reaction on the question of a U.S.-Russia meeting with
participation of key allies. End comment)


6. (C) German Seminar in Berlin: German rep Biontino
commented at length on the German concept for Foreign
Minister Steinmeier's proposed seminar on the Future of Arms
Control in Europe which will take place in Berlin on June 10.
Biontino said the intended purpose of the meeting is to
sustain the impetus of the current process (Parallel Actions
Plan) by reaffirming the importance of arms control and
encouraging Russia to engage through constructive dialogue
based on the topics in the German paper. Biontino assured
Allies that Germany believes any future conventional arms
control developments should be on the basis of CFE and
Adapted CFE, a point the Germans would make more explicit in
their paper. But Biontino appeared to reject the Allies'
universal message that a unified NATO position at the seminar
was essential. He made clear that the paper was not a
consensus document. It was intended to identify
complementary subject matter which would amount to
"converging elements" for a positive discussion in Berlin.
The idea of the seminar was not to compete with the current
U.S.-led approach, but rather to highlight areas to address
in terms of future conventional arms control arrangements
such as a regional approach to security issues, which
Biontino noted would include the flank.

-- In a lengthy tour de table almost all Allies present in
the meeting (TU, NOR, NETH, FR, UK, RO, Slovenia, Latvia,
BEL, CAN, HU, LUX, DN, US) with the notable exception of
Germany, underscored that it would be essential for NATO
Allies to have a unified position on all issues to be
discussed at the seminar. The French were particularly
effective in simultaneously endorsing the seminar, and
sketching the perils of an event where Allies disagreed on
core issues in front of the Russians.

-- All Allies who spoke politely welcomed the
Steinmeier-proposed CFE seminar, but expressed varying
degrees of concern about the German paper: common goals and
objectives would need to be defined and the event would need
to be structured in a way that clearly supported the Alliance
agreed approach in support of the Parallel Actions Package.
There should be no indication of an alternate process.

-- Several Allies inveighed against Germany's plan to define
the "scope and parameters" of a future negotiation to update
the Adapted CFE Treaty at their June seminar. Turkey told
the U.S. on the margins that if Germany focused on the
possibility of a post-Adapted CFE negotiation, the Russians
would have no incentive to work constructively to bring the
Adapted Treaty into force. Canadian rep Arpin noted it was
premature and Romanian rep Micula expressed concern that
Russia would misinterpret the paper as an opening to an
alternate offer which would only encourage a continued "wait
and see" approach and discourage any serious negotiations.
U.S. rep Davis cautioned that defining the "scope and
parameters" of future changes to the Adapted Treaty amounted
to identifying areas for renegotiation, would require senior
governmental decisions, and could seriously complicate
prospects for ratification.

-- The Turks opposed the "scope and parameters" language as
well as the notion of discussing CFE on a "non-discriminatory
basis," making clear that Turkey was not prepared to discuss
revising the flank limits. Turkish rep Gun also expressed


concern about the timing of the seminar when the priority
effort, he opined, should go to U.S. efforts and expanded
discussions on the basis of the existing package.

-- Slovenia and Latvia were uneasy about Germany's proposal
to explore new measures on a regional basis and called for
consideration of the impact of any regional measures on the
overall Alliance approach to security.


7. (C) In response to expressed Allied concerns, German rep
Biontino noted that the paper would be revised to take
account of comments made by Allies, but that it would NOT be
"an HLTF document" or an agreed Alliance text. It is
strictly a German concept, and not an Alliance position.
Germany also intends to seek input from Russia soon as the
paper should "reflect positions of all partners." Germany
will then brief the HLTF on Russia's reaction to the revised
paper and the overall concept.

-- Biontino said the paper was not intended to suggest an
alternate process or changes to the flank regime, but
stressed that regional approaches to arms control were
compatible with the indivisibility of security and could
serve to strengthen Alliance security. He concurred that
unity is important, but did not echo the call of others to
develop a unified NATO position for the seminar, arguing that
NATO Allies had a common view on all the issues on the table,
so there was no need for worry. He did acknowledge the value
of avoiding another polemical discussion between Russia and
others. Regarding the fear that a "scope and parameters"
discussion of future changes to the Adapted Treaty could
complicate ratification, Biontino pointed out that reviewing
the Treaty was already an element of the Parallel Actions
Package, and therefore, if the proposal was serious then
discussion should be possible. He did concede that he would
consider alternate wording for the German paper.


8. (C) Comment: Most Allies are not comfortable with the
German approach. On the margins several said that it was
essential for the U.S. to resume its leadership in engaging
the Russians on CFE, and shaping an agreed NATO approach.
The Turks were emphatic: "we can work with an enlarged format
if that will be helpful, but we want the U.S. to lead on this
issue." End Comment.

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CFE AT THE NATO SUMMIT
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9. (C) Communique: With regard to the CFE text for the
Summit Declaration, Canada, supported by Allies from both
sides of the NATO divide on Russia management (U.S., RO, GER,
NL, TU, CZ, UK, and Slovenia),insisted that the December NAC
text on CFE should be used in the Summit Declaration, perhaps
with a minor edit if needed to avoid repeating language
elsewhere in the document. Allies (with the exception of
Italy) did not agree with an I.S. effort to edit the document
in a way that dropped a call to Russia to end its suspension,
and a reference to commitments on Georgia and Moldova. They
insisted language on Russia's actions in Georgia be retained
until the Russia section of the Declaration is settled.


10. (C) SPC Arms Control Paper: Allies reached quick
agreement on the HLTF input to the SPC paper on "Raising
NATO's Profile in the Field of Arms Control, Disarmament and
Non-Proliferation." The U.S. team advanced suggested text
for paragraph 2 of the document which appeared to catalyze
agreement on the text as a whole (after weeks of painful HLTF
Deputies meetings). This was widely welcomed as there was
not much appetite to get into a line by line discussion of
the text.

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MEETINGS ON THE MARGINS
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11. (C) On the margins of the HLTF, the U.S. met with quad
reps from Germany, France and the UK, as well as conducted
bilateral meetings with France, Turkey, and Romania. For the
most part, Allies previewed and discussed the same points
that they made in the main HLTF meeting with a few
exceptions.


-- Quad: Most of the quad discussion reflected points made
in the HLTF; however, the U.S., UK and France used the
opportunity to go into more depth on concerns regarding the
German concept paper on the Berlin seminar. France provided
written commentary (in French) to Germany and highlighted for
the group that the primary thrust of the paper was that
Alliance solidarity would be the key to our success and
should remain our priority and guiding principle in the
coming months. The U.S. stressed that the outlined concept
seemed quite ambitious and may have the effect of putting the
current process on hold if the Russians determine it would be
more advantageous to explore the broader ideas referenced in
the paper, especially any implication that the flank regime
could be dropped altogether. German rep Biontino remarked
that he found it challenging intellectually to comprehend
both the Russian and Turkish positions on the flank in terms
of security policy: for the Russians, their discriminatory
issue with the flank is purely political; for the Turks,
their concern about stability in the Caucasus could be
addressed through steps other than the flank regime.
Discussion revealed that the Germans continue to view the
regional security challenges and possible solutions through
an arms control lens and seem intent on leading others to
their conclusion that more arms control will achieve
increased stability. They continue to distinguish between
CFE issues, such as the flanks and Georgia, which they regard
as "regional," and CFE as a whole, which they regard as
"strategic."

-- At the end of the quad meeting, France raised two issues
stemming from discussions in Vienna: the Russian proposal to
reopen Vienna Document 1999 (VD99) and Canada's intention to
propose a definition for Force Majeure. On VD99, the U.S.
recalled the Alliance position that NATO should not support
Russian efforts to replicate in the Vienna Document their
preferred elements of CFE. The UK noted the risk of
negotiating the document "to a lower result," while Germany
made a plug for considering proposals in a regional context
especially with regard to thresholds. On the Canadian idea
of defining Force Majeure, none seemed open to pursuing it,
and the French were adamantly against.

-- France: Prior to the quad, France had requested a
bilateral meeting with U.S. del to exchange ideas on the way
ahead on CFE in particular with regard to Georgia. The
French rep was quick to point out that their questions were
not a sign of impatience with the U.S. Administration's
transition, but rather an indication of the value they place
on U.S. leadership. France expressed particular concern that
Russian actions in Gudauta (in terms of reinforcing forces
and equipment there) could eventually "collide" with the
political solution in the Parallel Actions Package. The
French wanted to explore how the U.S.'s latest Georgia
proposal for the package could affect, or be affected by the
Geneva process. The U.S. del reviewed the specifics of the
Georgia proposal noting that conceptually it was feasible
that steps in the CFE context could assist with a positive
outcome in the Geneva process or that a sub-regional
mechanism stemming from the Geneva process could influence
the CFE process. The key, in any case, is to end the current
situation, where a continued Russian military build up takes
place without any limitation, level of international
oversight, or transparency on the ground.

-- Turkey and Romania: In separate bilateral meetings,
Turkish rep Gun and Romanian rep Micula each raised strong
concerns about the thrust of the German paper outlining
Berlin's thinking on the June CFE conference. In particular,
they objected to the idea of any attempt at this time to
define the "scope and parameters" of a future negotiation to
update the Adapted CFE Treaty. Each recalled this moniker as
the language of the 1996 mandate to renegotiate CFE and each
felt strongly that such an endeavor at this point would
distract from any serious effort to get a deal on the
Parallel Actions Package and get the Adapted Treaty into
force. Gun remarked that he feared the German seminar
proposal would "kill the established process." Both Gun and
Micula were clear in insisting that the only process they
support for engaging the Russians on CFE is the one led by
the U.S. that is based on the Parallel Actions Package, which
has been agreed by all Allies. (Comment: The subtext here is

that they do not trust the Germans. End Comment.)

-- The Turks previewed with the U.S. bilaterally the
proposal they would make in the HLTF, expressing willingness
to join with the U.S. and a small group of Allies in meeting
with the Russians to discuss all the elements of the package.
This is the first time the Turks have expressed officially a
willingness to directly engage the Russians in a CFE Parallel
Actions Plan discussion that would include the flank
(although Turkey does not wish to confine its role to
discussing just the flank, thereby indicating that this is
only a parochial Turkish concern). Turkey wanted to find
ways to enrich the parallel actions process by agreeing to
participate in discussions; Gun also suggested a review of
the package to explore the possibility of any additional
"sweeteners" with regard to defining substantial combat
forces, making ratification a priority, or anywhere on
Georgia or Moldova. Regarding the flank, Gun was clear that
Turkey had "stretched" just to agree to a post-ratification
discussion while Russia had given no ground. (Noting that
Russia stated its instructions were coming from Putin, Gun
clarified that his were not coming from "my mother-in-law.")
The U.S. del agreed that Russia has not negotiated
constructively, but also stressed that small gains would not
likely tip the balance. Moreover, offering some perspective
on the delicate balance of the package, the U.S. del stressed
that defining substantial combat forces is not something the
U.S. was prepared to do in the absence of a deal on the
package as a whole, and reminded Gun that other elements of
the package already went beyond what some Allies are
comfortable accepting (Romania, the Baltics). It would not
be easy to find new "sweeteners."


12. (SBU) NEXT MEETINGS. Allies agreed to meet twice
following the April 3-4 Summit and before the June 10
German-hosted seminar. These meetings will serve as
opportunities to take stock of the current situation,
consider options, and form a common approach for the June 10
seminar. The next HLTF is now set for April 28, 2009 and the
off-site brainstorming session will take place 27-28 May,
2009 at Oberammergau, which will address the key concern of
finding a venue that would allow for a sensitive, classified
discussion.
VOLKER