RFG: NATO-BELARUS SECURITY AGREEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L USNATO 000114

NOFORN
SIPDIS

PASS TO EUR/RPM AND EUR/UMB

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2019
TAGS: MARR NATO PGOV PHUM PREL BO
SUBJECT: RFG: NATO-BELARUS SECURITY AGREEMENT

Classified By: Ambassador Kurt Volker, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C/NF) This is a request for guidance. See paragraph 3.

The Issue
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2. (C/NF) Although Belarus signed a security of information
agreement with NATO many years ago as a member of the
Alliance's Partnership for Peace (PfP),the U.S. has blocked
the certification of the agreement. Without the
certification, the agreement can not come into force, leaving
Belarus unable to participate in most PfP courses and
activities. We have grown increasingly isolated within the
Alliance on this issue, particularly as Minsk has taken some
positive steps, such as the release of political prisoners,
and as the EU has adopted a more flexible approach in its
relations with Belarus. The issue has been raised twice in
recent meetings of the NATO Political Committee, with the
Chair making clear that he intends to raise it again in the
near future. The Czech PermRep, in his EU Presidency role,
has approached us directly on this issue several times in
recent days, as have the Lithuanians and Latvians. While
acknowledging the continuing troubled nature of U.S.-Belarus
bilateral relations, including the punitive actions taken
against our Embassy, we think that the time is right to take
a fresh look at our position on NATO-Belarus relations,
particularly as regards the information security agreement.


3. (C/NF) Request for Guidance: We request guidance by April
6, which we believe may be when the issue will next appear on
the Political Committee agenda, on whether we can now join
consensus to allow the certification of Belarus's security of
information agreement.

Background
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4. (U) NATO-Belarus relations began in 1992, when Minsk
joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (the forerunner
of today's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council or EAPC). In
1995 Belarus joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP),a
program aimed at increasing security and defense cooperation
between NATO and Partner countries. As a normal part of the
process of joining PfP, Belarus signed a security of
information agreement with NATO. These agreements allow for
the exchange of classified information between partner
nations and the Alliance and are required as a prerequisite
for participation in most PfP activities, courses, and
exercises. Despite the fact that Belarus signed the
agreement, it has never come into force. The U.S., citing
concerns over the human rights situation in Belarus, blocked
the NATO Office of Security (NOS) from traveling to Minsk in
order to carry out the required certification process. NOS
has made clear that this blockage is purely political. It
believes that Belarus would meet the technical requirements
required for certification. While Belarus tries to engage in
the PfP process, submitting an annual Individual Partnership
Programme (IPP) and joining the Planning and Review Process
(PARP),it can do little without the security agreement.

Arguments For a Change in U.S. Policy
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5. (C/NF) During our discussions on the subject, Allies make
the following arguments in an effort to persuade us to change
our policy:

-- The U.S. position is inconsistent with agreed PfP/EAPC
principles, specifically, the principle of inclusivity,
meaning that opportunities for political consultation and
practical cooperation will be open to all Allies and Partners
equally. This principle is enshrined in the Basic Document
of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, and by blocking
certification of the agreement, we block Belarus
participation in PfP activities, thus violating this agreed
principle.

-- NATO should be consistent in how it treats Partners: While
Allies agree that Belarus has a deplorable record on human
rights and political freedoms, they also point out that NATO
has a policy of engaging countries with similar records in an
effort to help transform them over time. In its 2009 report,
for example, Freedom House reported that two other Partners
-- Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan -- were among the eight
countries that received the lowest possible rating on their
scale. Belarus ranked in the category just above them. And
yet, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have certified security of
information agreements with the Alliance while Belarus does
not.

-- The Belarus military is exactly who the West should be
engaging: Most human rights abuses in Belarus are carried out
by the BKGB and the Ministry of the Interior, not the
Ministry of Defense and the military. If a change ever does
take place in Belarus, the army may play a leading role.
NATO would be investing in the future by engaging them now.
PfP is heavily focused on practical cooperation with Partner
countries' militaries.

-- PfP is Transformative: Many of the courses and activities
under the PfP umbrella were designed at the end of the Cold
War to help the countries of Eastern Europe transition to
democracy. The U.S. position prevents the Alliance from
using these transformative tools in its relationship with
Belarus. This is a particularly bitter pill for our newer
Allies to swallow, since PfP played an important role in
helping them make the reforms needed for their NATO
membership.

-- We should respond to the positive steps taken by Belarus
recently: While clearly not wishing to overstate their
argument, Allies note that Belarus has taken several notable
steps recently, such as the release of
internationally-recognized political prisoners. Allies argue
that the positive steps which have been taken by Belarus
would probably not have occurred without the more flexible
approach which some in the international community,
particularly the EU, are already using. In this regard, our
EU Allies have made clear that they seek consistency between
the NATO and EU approaches to Belarus.

-- Allies have other tools to shape the relationship: There
are other, less blunt, methods by which Allies can shape the
scope of NATO-Belarus relations. For example, Allies and
Belarus on a regular basis jointly develop and agree an
Individual Partnership Program. These two-year programs are
drawn up from an extensive menu of activities, according to
each country's specific interests and needs.

-- The U.S. policy could complicate NATO transit
negotiations: NATO is in the initial stages of negotiating a
transit agreement with Belarus as a part of a Northern Line
of Communication into Afghanistan. While Belarus has never
linked the transit agreement to the issue of security
agreement certification, some Allies worry that this might
become an issue. On the practical front, Allies have
wondered whether we actually could transit ISAF-related
materiel across a country with which we have no security
arrangement.

-- Don't forget about the Russia angle: While Belarus clearly
has many links with Moscow, the relationship is a stormy one.
Belarus has often been stubbornly independent. It has, for
example, refused to bow to Russian pressure to recognize the
independence of the Georgian regions of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. NATO engagement could be used to encourage this
independence, showing Minsk that it does have alternatives.
VOLKER