wikileaks ico  Home papers ico  Cables mirror and Afghan War Diary privacy policy  Privacy
IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
09USNATO106 2009-03-18 15:26:00 CONFIDENTIAL Mission USNATO
Cable title:  

MARCH 6 VCC AND EXPERTS: EXPERTS SEARCH FOR 2009

Tags:   KCFE NATO PARM PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2939
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNO #0106/01 0771526
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181526Z MAR 09
FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2782
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6300
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUDKSR/EUCOM PLANS AND ANALYSIS STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USDELMC BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY
RUEHBS/USNMR BRUSSELS BE PRIORITY
					  C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USNATO 000106 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2019
TAGS: KCFE NATO PARM PREL
SUBJECT: MARCH 6 VCC AND EXPERTS: EXPERTS SEARCH FOR 2009
AGENDA WHILE FRANCE PUSHES FORCE MAJEURE TO HLTF

REF: STATE 20411

Classified By: POLAD W. Scott Reid for reasons 1.4 (B)&(D).



1. (C) Summary. During the March 6 VCC and meeting of
experts, Allies echoed opinions expressed in Vienna -- that
the 2009 AIAM was livelier than the previous year but still
short on substance. Experts agreed that it was too soon to
propose an agenda for work in 2009 based on the results of
the AIAM. Claiming that the introduction of force majeure at
the AIAM had played into Russia's hands, France requested
that the VCC Chair forward the issue to the HLTF for
consideration. In the VCC and experts, as well as on the
margins, Canada strongly defended its paper on force majeure
and indicated it still planned to introduce it in the FSC.
Finally, France indicated it would begin notifying CFE
inspections in Russia during the next treaty year. End
Summary.

Experts React to 2009 AIAM with Guarded Optimism



2. (SBU) In the March 6 VCC meeting of experts Allies voiced
their initial perceptions of the 2009 Annual Implementation
Assessment Meeting (AIAM), which was held in Vienna 3-4
March. Though participation in the exchange was scant,
experts generally echoed sentiments expressed in Vienna--that
the 2009 AIAM, while still lacking substance, exceeded
Allies' expectations in terms of interaction between
participating States. Portugal, Norway, Denmark and Belgium
all noted a more lively discussion than in 2008, but Norway
also complained about the lack of expertise at the table.
Belgium also regretted that Allies had only introduced two of
five Allied-sponsored papers.

Looking for a Proactive role for Experts



3. (SBU) Drawing on experts' initial impressions of the
AIAM, the Chair (Weiderholtz) asked for opinions on what
experts should focus on in 2009. Wiederholtz asked, for
example, if experts should review Russia's AIAM paper
entitled, Food-for-Thought Paper--Analysis of the
Implementation of the Vienna Document 1999 (FSC.AIAM/2/09).
Norway, supported by Denmark and Belgium, suggested that in
addition to reviewing the Russian paper, experts should begin
a review of VD 99 in its entirety. Denmark agreed and argued
for a chapter by chapter review, claiming that 50 percent of
VD 99 is outdated. Denmark opined that experts should be
able to harmonize a technical review at experts' level with
political concerns in Vienna. The UK concurred, noting that
while Allies currently could not reach consensus on opening
VD 99, experts should be allowed to conduct a technical
review in order to have the advice available if and when the
political winds change.



4. (SBU) Canada reminded the group that experts are mandated
to look at on-going implementation issues for, inter alia,
CFE, VD 99 and Dayton, adding that there is no requirement to
reach consensus at the level of experts. France proffered
that discussion of issues at the level of experts can be
advantageous. For example, France noted that discussion
among experts can often assist in identifying and qualifying
Allied concerns on a particular topic in advance, which in
turn can make it easier to find consensus at the VCC or in
Vienna.



5. (SBU) Seemingly in search of consensus on specifics
agenda topics, Wiederholtz asked whether the group should
revisit the list of issues discussed last year. The U.S.
(Meyer) said it would be difficult for the U.S. to find value
in rehashing last year's discussions. Moreover, Meyer said
he doubted that the 2009 AIAM Survey of Suggestions (the
document from which Allies developed their list of issues in
2008) would prove significantly different from the 2008
version as there was very little new material presented in
this year's AIAM. Meyer also cautioned that experts might
find it difficult to attempt a review of VD 99, albeit at the
technical level, without sending unintentional political
signals. He concluded that it was too soon after the AIAM to
ask Allies to propose an agenda for experts based on AIAM
results.


USNATO 00000106 002 OF 003




6. (SBU) Norway agreed with the U.S., but reiterated that
experts should conduct a review of VD99. Canada also agreed
to the U.S. point on timing, but proposed that experts
consider a preview of implementation issues for ACFE. In the
end, experts agreed to wait for the OSCE to publish the 2009
Survey of Suggestions before considering an agenda.
Weiderhltz concluded the discussion by asking experts to be
prepared to discuss the survey at the next meeting in April.

France Asks VCC to Introduce Force Majeure at the Next HLTF



7. (C/REL NATO) At the VCC, France requested that the VCC
Chair (Miggins) forward the issue of force majeure to the
next HLTF. France claimed that the introduction of force
majeure at the AIAM had played into Russia's hands and
exposed the Alliance to criticism vis-a-vis Georgia's recent
declaration of force majeure against Russia. France argued
that, given the political considerations, the Alliance needs
to have a common position on force majeure before it is
introduced in Vienna.



8. (C/ REL NATO) Canada vehemently denied any inference that
Canada's paper, which it had announced it would table in the
FSC, had played into Russia's hands. (Note: Canada intended
to table a paper on defining force majeure at the AIAM.
Noting political and substantive concerns, the U.S. requested
that Canada not table the paper. Canada agreed to hold its
submission, but in response to questions in open forum at the
AIAM on why it had not introduced its paper, Canada responded
that it was still consulting in Ottawa and that it hoped to
introduce the paper in the FSC soon. End Note.) Recalling
that their paper was developed in response to an
implementation issue prior to the Russia-Georgia conflict,
Canada argued that the issues that the paper was developed to
address had not gone away, and Canada did not see the
connection to France's political concern.



9. (C/NOFORN) Prior to the VCC, both Canada (Davidson) and
France (Payen) discussed this issue with U.S. Del. Canada
met with U.S. Del (Meyer) at Meyer's request after the
Canadian verification agency voiced concerns at the AIAM over
the fate of their paper. Referring to a number of classified
emails, Canada made the following points:

-- Speaking for the Canadian verification agency, Davidson
said they felt that U.S. STATE had misrepresented the facts
behind the development of the Canadian paper when it issued a
demarche in Washington.

-- Davidson argued that in spring 2008 experts had
essentially validated the Canadian paper and agreed that
Canada should introduce the paper for discussion at the AIAM.
Subsequently, the IS drafted a working paper to which the
remaining discussion papers were annexed. It was this paper
that was forwarded to the HLTF for consideration. There was
no agreement in the VCC or experts that any of the papers
required HLTF approval prior to introduction at the AIAM.

-- Davidson complained that the U.S. had not raised its
concern over the implications of "fair-or foul-weather" for
VD 99. Davidson also explained that the select events
described in their operative paragraph such as riots where
not meant as a definition, but a list of potential
circumstances that could warrant the declaration of force
majeure.

-- Finally, Davidson claimed that Canada had discussed
post-conflict political considerations with France at the
HLTF, as well as with Russia, Georgia, France and others in
Vienna. (Note: Davidson thought Canada had approached the
U.S. del in Vienna. He was surprised when Meyer assured him
that Canada had not discussed the issue with USOSCE. End
Note.) At no time, Davidson claimed, had anyone objected to
the proposal on political grounds.

-- Responding to questions posed by the U.S., Davidson
admitted that Canada was more interested in improving
compliance than pushing their draft through the FSC toward a
decision. Davidson conceded that the term "definition" could
be problematic, and did not really capture the spirit of
their proposal. He also allowed that a Chairman's Statement

USNATO 00000106 003 OF 003


and/or the use of less restrictive constructions could be
acceptable.



10. (C/NOFORN) France had also approached U.S. Del
immediately prior to the VCC to report on their intentions
and ask for the U.S. position. Meyer noted that the U.S. had
some concerns over the Canadian paper, but was not in a
position to actively support France's call to forward the
issue to the HLTF.



11. (C/REL NATO) Following both Canada's and France's
interventions in the VCC, Meyer confirmed Canada's
recollection of the development of its technical paper and
confirmed that Switzerland, and not Canada, had introduced
force majeure at the AIAM. At the same time, Meyer referred
to earlier discussions in the meeting of experts where Canada
had noted that experts where mandated to discuss
implementation issues on a technical level. Meyer reasoned
that that while the Canadian paper represented technical
advice, others would rightly determine whether that advice
was actionable based on political considerations.

France to Notify CFE Inspections in Russia Next Treaty Year



12. (C/NOFORN) France (Payen) approached U.S. Del on the
margins to report that France intended to begin notifying CFE
inspections in Russia in the next Treaty Year. Meyer asked
Payen if France intended to notify an inspection before the
end of the current treaty year. Payen said that the foreign
Ministry had initially asked the verification agency to
notify this year, but the verification agency felt that it
was their responsibility to be prepared to execute the
mission in the unlikely event that Russia accepted. Payen
said that his agency could not complete the necessary
preparation in time to notify an inspection prior to the end
of the current treaty year.

Scheduling



13. (SBU) Allies were asked to confirm at the next VCC in
April whether Allies wanted the IS to plan a VCC Seminar in
October. During a brief discussion, Allies doubted that there
was sufficient material of substance to warrant a seminar
this year, and no Ally was interested in holding a seminar
consisting of presentations from verification agencies.
Absent further guidance, US VCC Del is prepared to join those
in opposition to holding a seminar in October on the grounds
that, at this time, there is no indication that Allies could
agree to a substantive agenda for such a meeting.



14. (C/REL NATO) Allies announced the following changes to
their verification schedules:

For VD 99 Evaluations:

--Norway to Kazakhstan moved from CW 13 to CW 14
--Luxembourg to Sweden moved from CW 14 to TBD

For VD 99 Inspections:

--Belgium announced it lost a planned inspection to Serbia
--Belgium to FYROM moved from CW 12 to CW 11
--Belgium to Tajikistan moved from CW 14 to TBD
--Germany to Kyrgyzstan from TBD to CW 31
--Hungary to Croatia from TBD to CW 11

For CFE Inspections:

--France to Russia (flank) from TBD to TB 16
--France to Russia (quota) from TBD to TB 34
--Portugal to Russia from TBD to TB 6
--UK to Ukraine moved from TB 16 to TB 15
ANDRUSYSZYN