WORKING WITH THE EU,S COUNTER-PIRACY HEADQUARTERS

S E C R E T USEU BRUSSELS 000206

NOFORN
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/ERA NDEAN, EUR/RPM PCHISHOLM, PM
JFREDERICK, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY FOR DGORDNER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS PHSA EWWT EAID PTER XI XO XW
ZR, EUN
SUBJECT: WORKING WITH THE EU,S COUNTER-PIRACY HEADQUARTERS

REF: A. SECSTATE 4610

B. SECSTATE 5934

Classified By: Pol M-C Christopher Davis for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C//NF) Summary: USEU representatives visited the EU's
counter-piracy Operational Headquarters (OHQ) on January 16,
where interlocutors described the EU's operations and
information sharing arrangements with the U.S. and NATO. To
make maximum use of a limited force, the OHQ collects
information about merchant ships transiting the Gulf of Aden,
conducts a risk-based assessment of each vessel, provides
advice to the merchant, and sends guidance to EU naval forces
on which commercial ships are at greatest risk. This
economy-of-force approach also ensures strong links to
industry. OHQ interlocutors described strong coordination
between U.S., NATO, and EU forces and headquarters,
expressing concerns only about technical obstacles to U.S.-EU
information sharing. They also described planning for
potential EU involvement in longer-term capacity building in
the region. We can leverage the structures and processes
that the EU's OHQ has designed to increase the EU's
involvement in counter-piracy, and to improve NATO-EU
cooperation. End Summary.


2. (C) The EU's naval counter-piracy operation, Atalanta,
launched in December 2008, has a one-year mandate to escort
World Food Program shipments to Somalia, to provide
protection to vulnerable merchant shipping, and to conduct
surveillance of the area. The UK is leading the operation
from its headquarters in Northwood, outside London. On
January 16, USEU representatives visited the UK-led
Operational Headquarters (OHQ) for Atalanta. The
operation,s chief of staff, assistant chief of staff, deputy
assistant chief of staff for intelligence, chief of plans and
policy, and political adviser described the OHQ,s approach
to protecting merchant vessels. Our interlocutors described
the conduct of operations, the OHQ,s links to industry,
liaison and information sharing with the U.S. and NATO, and
planners, early thinking about how else the EU could provide
counter-piracy support.
Creative Approach to Protecting Commercial Shipping

3. (C) Our interlocutors stressed that with only four to
six frigates ) one of which is almost always dedicated to
World Food Program escort duties ) and two maritime patrol
aircraft, EU naval forces cannot protect the hundreds of
merchant ships that move through the Gulf of Aden each day.
Instead, the OHQ has devised a Group Transit Concept, whereby
the OHQ collects information from merchant ships via its
website, then advises those ships on when they should transit
a pre-designated corridor. This allows EU forces to monitor
those vessels at greatest risk and to ensure that a number of
merchant ships are clustered when they reach particular areas
at particular times of the day. The group of merchant ships
can provide mutual reassurance, while EU naval forces know
where those ships are positioned so they can respond rapidly
to pirate attacks.
Reaching Out to Industry

4. (C) This approach relies heavily on cooperation from and
coordination with industry, something the OHQ ensures through
its Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa website
(www.mschoa.eu). According to our interlocutors, in its
first six weeks of operation, the website collected 4,700
registrations from 1,200 companies and ship operators. When
a merchant registers, it provides the EU with a description
of its vessel, its cargo and its destination. The OHQ uses
that information to perform a risk-based assessment, after
which it sends advice to the merchant ship. The OHQ also
alerts the forward Force Headquarters ) currently aboard the
Greek frigate Psara ) to the vulnerability of various
vessels. In this way, EU naval forces not only know which
merchant vessels are most at risk, they also encourage those
vessels to participate in the Group Transits described in
paragraph 3. (The EU does not provide industry with its
risk-based assessment, but uses it internally to evaluate
those ships it says are in the greatest danger.) While the
OHQ admits that it is too early to judge the effectiveness of
this system, the initial results are encouraging.

5. (S//NF) With growing cooperation from the shipping
industry, the Northwood OHQ has already laid the foundation
for the counter-piracy coordination center (CPCC) under
discussion in the Contact Group on Piracy Off the Coast of
Somalia (REF A). USEU contacts at the OHQ and the UK
Permanent Representation in Brussels stress that London could
probably agree politically to have the OHQ serve as an
interim CPCC, but security and bandwidth are concerns.
Specifically, with the Northwood base being home to EU, NATO,
and UK national headquarters, and with the base undergoing
significant construction, the UK is concerned about providing
access to all the countries in the Contact Group, especially
Russia and China. The lack of bandwidth may have a simpler
solution, with interlocutors at the OHQ suggesting that the
Contact Group could provide the funding to furnish sufficient
bandwidth.
Strong Cooperation With U.S. and NATO

6. (C) Our interlocutors described cooperation with the
United States as &extremely good,8 praising the meetings in
Bahrain earlier that week between the EU,s operation
commander, Rear Admiral Philip Jones, and NAVCENT commander,
U.S. Vice Admiral William Gortney. Our contacts also
described the integration of the EU,s liaison officer in
Bahrain into important meetings and briefings. The EU is
participating in shared awareness and deconfliction meetings
and may host the next such meeting at the Northwood
headquarters.

7. (C//NF) Our interlocutors, however, also mentioned the
limits on information sharing, specifically the lack of a REL
EU designation that would allow for the sharing of U.S.
information with all EU Member States. (Note: The Council
Secretariat expressed a similar concern when PolOff delivered
REF B letter on information sharing on January 22.) USEU
understands that NAVCENT and the EU are working through this
issue, and that the EU has dispatched a liaison officer to
the Combined Maritime Forces J2.

8. (C//NF) The OHQ has also established communication with
the collocated NATO headquarters and with JFC Naples, and
informal NATO-EU information sharing is taking place, but our
interlocutors suggested that this should remain below the
political radar. When asked directly, they said the OHQ had
no concerns about operating alongside Standing NATO Maritime
Group 1, should it be tasked with counter-piracy, as long as
NATO operations were fully coordinated with the EU.
What Next?

9. (C) The OHQ acknowledged that, for now, the EU has
adopted an &end date8 rather than an &end state8 for
Operation Atalanta, which is scheduled to end in December

2009. However, the OHQ,s plans and policy shop is
contemplating options for counter-piracy engagement ashore )
options which could theoretically encourage the Member States
to extend the EU,s engagement in the region, albeit with a
different focus. The OHQ is preparing a paper for the EU
Military Staff, entitled &Over and Above,8 that outlines
options for engagement on shore. There is currently no
political will to pursue kinetic military operations against
pirates ashore and no discussion at the political level of
extending the Atalanta mission, but planners suggest that the
EU may agree to pursue regional capacity building. Key
questions include how to work with all the players in the
region, what the role of the African Union should be, and
what kind of support the EU could bring to bear.

10. (C) Comment: We can capitalize on the OHQ's work being
done by encouraging the EU to use the OHQ as the foundation
for the CPCC under the Contact Group. This would deepen the
EU's involvement and provide the Contact Group with an
already-established capability, but would require that we
resolve the UK,s concerns about security and bandwidth.
Should we ask this of the EU, we should also emphasize our
commitment to a robust, informal U.S.-EU information
exchange, per REF B. We can also encourage the EU to
consider a longer-term capacity building role, which would
get the EU engaged in addressing the root causes of piracy
and may keep them involved after the mandate for Atalanta
expires in December 2009. In addition, as NATO contemplates
similar capacity building with the African Union, this would
be a good test case for NATO-EU cooperation. End Comment.
MURRAY
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