IAEA/IRAN: BOARD URGES TEHRAN TO COOPERATE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 UNVIE VIENNA 000093

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: BOARD URGES TEHRAN TO COOPERATE

--------------
Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (SBU) A joint six-country (P5 1) statement on Iran, the
first of its kind at an IAEA Board of Governors meeting, had
a salutary effect on the tenor of the March 3 Board
deliberations on Iran. This statement of unity took Board
members and Iran by surprise and the majority of the Board
welcomed the renewed diplomatic engagement, with four Members
explicitly noting it in their national statements. The Six
also captured international press headlines. A national
statement by China, the only one from among the Six, tracked
with the joint statement and did not distract from the focus
on P5 1 unity. Ambassador Schulte's opening statement to the
Board under an earlier agenda item the previous day touched
on Iran and expressed a renewed U.S. commitment to diplomatic
engagement and support for the IAEA and multilateralism.
Based on comments from other missions, the statement had a
positive and palpable impact on Board members and set the
stage for the Iran discussion. Overall, the tone of the
Board statements on Iran was stronger than in previous
Boards, with more Member States calling on Iran to cooperate
and more states noting serious concern about Iran's lack of
cooperation on key technical issues like the possible
military dimensions (PMD) of Iran's program and refusal to
implement Code 3.1 Modified of its Safeguards Agreement.


2. (SBU) The Director General's (DG) opening remarks to the
Board on March 2 highlighted Iran's lack of progress and
failure to meet UNSC and Board requirements and called on
Iran to "unblock" the situation. ElBaradei was encouraged by
the "apparent fresh approach" to dialogue (on the part of the
U.S.),which could give new impetus to resolve this
longstanding issue. Thirty of the thirty-five Board Members
spoke or were spoken for by the EU or NAM, and five non-Board
members spoke under Rule 50. The majority of statements
noted Iran's failure to comply with UNSC and Board
requirements, Iran's failure to cooperate or implement
additional transparency measures, such as the Additional
Protocol (AP),and Iran's blockage of the IAEA's
investigation into the PMD. In addition to the EU and
other like-minded States, Argentina, Switzerland, and South
Africa delivered strong statements critical of Iran.


3. (SBU) Not everyone was affected by the constructive tone
of the overture from the Six. The NAM statement again largely
reiterated the Tehran Ministerial declaration and the NAM
troika continued to play by the old playbook, with Egypt and
Cuba taking a decidedly unconstructive stance. Other NAM
members (Philippines and Iraq) delivered stronger statements
calling for Iranian cooperation. Statements from South
Africa, Argentina, and Switzerland stood out as unusually
constructive.


4. (SBU) The focus of Iran's statement seems to have
shifted somewhat. Rather than largely targeting the U.S.(and
the West generally , Iran more strongly criticized the IAEA
Secretariat. Iran argued that the IAEA is not acting in
accordance with its Statute, predominantly because it should
be focused on expanding peaceful uses of nuclear energy at
least as strongly as it verifies nonproliferation.


5. (SBU) As requested by France, the Legal Office presented
its view regarding Iran's continued refusal to implement Code
3.1 Modified and Iran's denial of IAEA access to the Heavy
Water IR-40 Reactor. The Legal Advisor declared that these
refusals are "inconsistent with Iran's obligations under the
Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement," while
also making obvious efforts to downplay the immediate
"noncompliance" implications. Ambassador Schulte reiterated
from a previous Board statement that "this is an apparent
breach of Safeguards and Iran's claim that it will not adhere
to early declaration/Code 3.1 Modified shows a willingness to
commit future breaches." The conventional call for public
release of the Iran report by consensus was successful, but
spurred a request (from opponents holding their fire on the
specific case) for an agenda item at the June Board on the
issue of "de-restricting" documents prepared confidentially
for the Board.


6. (SBU) Comment: Although Egypt's statements have become
more obstructionist, statements by formerly middle-ground
countries like Switzerland and South Africa were very strong
and helped to contribute to the overall pressure on Iran in
the Board room. The stronger overall tone may be due in part
to the DG's report being at least the third in a row that
shows no Iranian cooperation. Member States may also feel
less conflicted about pressuring Iran so long as it supports
the strengthened diplomatic efforts they see reflected in
U.S. and P5 1 statements. Some states may now be less
concerned that efforts to increase pressure in the IAEA may

UNVIE VIEN 00000093 002 OF 008


provoke precipitous military or other strong action they are
not ready to support. Several Member States in their
statements welcomed new positive "signals," and the
Philippines directly welcomed the U.S. statement on
engagement under agenda item two (septel). The DG's
straightforward approach in his opening statement and Iranian
Ambassador Soltanieh's aggressive line in the Board and the
previous week's technical briefing, may also have contributed
to the overall change in tone. End Comment.

--------------
DG Sets the Stage for the Iran Discussion
--------------


7. ( SBU) The Director General (DG) in his opening
statement to the Board on March 2, set the tone for the
discussion on Iran by highlighting Iran's lack of cooperation
and failure to meet UNSC and Board requirements. He
encouraged the "apparent fresh approach" to dialogue on the
part of the United States for giving new impetus to resolve
this longstanding issue. He noted that contrary to the
requests of the Board and the UNSC, Iran has not suspended
its uranium enrichment- and heavy water-related activities,
nor has it implemented the Additional Protocol (AP) or the
modified text of Code 3.1 of its Subsidiary Arrangements on
the early provision of design information. The DG also said
that it was regrettable that no progress had been made with
concerns about possible military dimensions (PMD) because of
the lack of Iranian cooperation. He explained that unless
Iran implements transparency measures and the AP, the IAEA
will not be in a position to provide credible assurances
about the absence of undeclar
ed nuclear material or activities in Iran. He called on
Iran to provide substantive information and access to
documentation, locations, and individuals in connection with
all of the outstanding issues, and urged the Member States
which have provided information to the IAEA to agree to the
IAEA's sharing of the information with Iran.

--------------
The Group of Six and China, Again
--------------


8. (SBU) France delivered a statement (text below) on
behalf of China, France, Germany, Russia, the U.K., and the
U.S., marking the first time that a jointly-agreed statement
by this sextet was delivered in the Board on Iran. No one,
including like-minded Board members, expected such a
statement of unity, which took all, including Iran, by
surprise. The focus on diplomatic engagement was universally
welcomed and most of the Board also echoed the sextet's call
on Iran to comply with UNSC and Board resolutions and
cooperate with the Agency on issues related to possible
military dimensions.


9. (U) Begin text of statement:

We thank the Director General for his report on the
"Implementation on NPT Safeguards and relevant provisions of
UN Security Council Resolution s 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1835
in the Islamic Republic of Iran."

We reaffirm our unity of purpose and strong support for the
Agency. We applaud the Secretariat for the professionalism
and impartiality with which it has pursued its verification
mission and reaffirm that the IAEA plays an essential role in
establishing confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of
Iran's nuclear program.

We call upon Iran to meet without delay the requirements of
the IAEA Board of Governors and to implement the resolutions
of the UN Security Council.

We note the serious concern expressed in the Director
General's report and in his introductory statement to this
Board about the continued lack of progress in connection with
remaining issues which give rise to concerns about possible
military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. In this
regard, we call on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA by
providing the Agency such access and information that it
requests to resolve these issues.

We further call upon Iran to implement and ratify promptly
the Additional Protocol and to implement all measures
required by the Agency in order to build confidence in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program.

We remain firmly committed to a comprehensive diplomatic
solution, including through direct dialogue, and urge Iran to
take this opportunity for engagement with us and thereby
maximize opportunities for a negotiated way forward.


UNVIE VIEN 00000093 003 OF 008


End text.


10. (SBU) Despite the efforts and suggestions by the
remaining five to refrain from national statements and let
the joint statement speak for itself, China, under
instructions from Beijing, delivered a separate statement,
which was stronger than past statements. Associating itself
with the joint statement from the six, China noted with
concern that Iran still had not implemented the relevant UNSC
resolutions and not cooperated with the IAEA in solving the
remaining issues. China advocated a negotiated solution to
the Iranian nuclear issue while recognizing Iran's right to
peaceful uses of nuclear energy as long as it fulfilled its
international obligations. China encouraged Iran to
implement Board and UNSC resolutions, strengthen cooperation
with the IAEA, and implement the AP.

--------------
EU and Like-Minded Deliver
Very Strong Statements
--------------


11. (SBU) As EU President, the Czech Republic presented a
very strong EU statement that noted the situation with Iran
had worsened since the November 2008 Board and encouraged
Iran to seize the current window of opportunity of the
announced U.S. engagement with Iran. The EU explained that
it was "deeply disappointed" with Iran's continued refusal to
cooperate with the IAEA and failure to comply with UNSC
requirements. The statement noted with "great concern" and
"alarm" that Iran has not permitted the IAEA to perform a DIV
at the IR-40 reactor at Arak and continues to unilaterally
suspend Code 3.1, which is not consistent with Iran's
obligations under its safeguards agreement. The EU "deeply
regretted" Iran's lack of cooperation on PMD and urged Tehran
to implement the AP and provide all requested information and
access to documentation, locations, and individuals, so that
the IAEA can clarify the character of its nuclear program.
The statement also underlined its "grave concerns" that Iran
is the only country in the world to build and possibly
operate a nuclear power plant without being party to the
relevant and important nuclear safety and security
conventions.


12. (SBU) Australia, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand all
delivered strong statements that noted it was essential for
Iran to promptly and substantively respond to the IAEA's
questions regarding PMD projects and meet all Board and UNSC
obligations, including suspension, implementing the AP, and
Code 3.1. Australia emphasized the DG's February report was
the fourth that indicated a lack of substantive progress and
that the Board should "not lose sight of the fact that these
possible military dimensions remain matters of serious
concern." Australia also encouraged Iran to take full
advantage of the "new opportunities for engagement." Canada
noted with "great concern" and "alarm" that Iran's actions
move in the opposite direction of the UNSC and Board
resolutions, as it continues to conduct enrichment-related
activities, including on the new generation IR-4 centrifuge.
Canada explained Iran's cooperation is long overdue. Japan
also stated that it was "deeply regrettable" that Iran
continues to expand enrichment-related activities, especially
mentioning the work on new generation centrifuges, and urged
Iran to return to the negotiation process based on the
comprehensive package proposed by the P5 1 without further
delay. New Zealand noted its concerns about the true nature
of Iran's nuclear program and said it was essential for Iran
to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing activities in
order to allay the serious concerns of the international
community.


13. (SBU) Albania, fully associating itself with the EU
statement, delivered a strong statement highlighting that no
real progress on outstanding issues had been made and that
the Board, the IAEA, and Iran were locked in a "vicious
circle" because of Tehran's refusal to cooperate. Albania
indicated that it was up to Iran to convince the world of the
"peaceful nature" of its nuclear program. The Swiss
statement, which was more constructive than in the past,
noted how similar the DG's February report was to the
previous two reports that Iran had not cooperated with the
IAEA on PMD and that it, Switzerland, feared this trend would
continue. Switzerland explained that the DG's report brings
forth new concerns, such as Iran's amount of low enriched
uranium (LEU) equaling one "significant quantity" if it were
further enriched to highly enriched uranium (HEU); the
continued refusal to allow a DIV at the IR-40 reactor; Iran's
production of fuel rods for the IR-40 reactor; and the
continued enrichment-related activities, including the work
on the new generation centrifuge. The Swiss said they were
encouraged by the "new approach" on dialogue, and called on
Iran to cooperate on the "alleged studies" as well as Member

UNVIE VIEN 00000093 004 OF 008


States to issue the documentation, as best as it is
advisable.

--------------
Turkey Trying to Balance
--------------


14. (SBU) Turkey's statement again was balanced, though
slightly better than at the last Board, but it did not
specifically make calls on Iran to act. Rather, it made
general statements on what should be done. Turkey began by
attaching importance to the effectiveness of the IAEA's
safeguards system and noted with satisfaction that the IAEA
has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of
declared nuclear material in Iran, but also noted that the
IAEA was not yet in a position to provide assurances about
the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in
Iran. Turkey considered it important that the outstanding
issues related to Iran's nuclear program be addressed in a
constructive and transparent way without further delay and
that the alleviation of the ongoing crisis of confidence with
regard to the scope and nature of Iran's program be resolved
through peaceful means. Turkey noted that it hoped once the
confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's
nuclear program is restored, the IAEA will be able to devote
more time, energy, and resources to its other statutory
functions.

--------------
GRULAC, Except Venezuela, Calls
for Cooperation
--------------


15. (SBU) Among the GRULAC Board members, Argentina's
statement was so strong that it compared favorably to those
of the like-minded. Argentina regretted the lack of
substantive progress since November and hit all the major
issues: violation of UNSC and Board requirements for
suspension; emphasis on the failure to implement Code 3.1
Modified and allow DIV inspections at Arak; the need for Iran
to provide substantive information and transparency on issues
related to PMD; and an appeal for Iran to undertake all
measures to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its
nuclear program, echoing the sextet statement. Argentina
did, however, call for member states to allow the provision
of documents to Iran.


16. (SBU) Mexico made a similarly strong intervention
calling on Iran to cooperate effectively and without delay
and underlined the obligatory nature of UNSC resolutions.
Mexico focused on Iran's refusal to provide access to Arak,
failure to respond to the IAEA's repeated requests on PMD
issues, and the need for additional transparency. In a terse
statement, Brazil noted that the current DG's report was no
different from the last and hoped that the DG could soon
report progress to allow the Board no doubts as to the
peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. Brazil urged the
Secretariat to find a way to break the deadlock but made no
call for Iran's cooperation or implementation of UNSC
resolutions, and ended with a call for direct engagement.
NAM member Ecuador's statement was weaker than its past
interventions and did not include a call for Iran to
cooperate or implement UNSC resolutions. Ecuador regretted
the deadlock on Iran that could undermine the credibility of
safeguards but noted information sharing by Member States as
an important step to unblock the issue.


17. (SBU) Chile and Venezuela both spoke under Rule 50. In
a forward looking statement delivered by the former Board
Chair, Chile hoped for constructive engagement by all parties
and stressed the unimpeachable legitimacy of UNSC and Board
resolutions. Chile also noted that the report made "crystal
clear" the need for cooperation and transparency. While
Chile acknowledged the NAM statement, "this was not the whole
story." Chile cited the concerns in the DG reports,
including the need for the AP, and called for Iran to
alleviate doubts as to its nuclear program. Venezuela,
predictably unhelpful, focused on Iran's "fulfillment" of its
legal obligations under its safeguards agreement and the
completion of the work plan. Venezuela singled out a small
group of countries for failure to provide documents to Iran,
and noted six years of unproven allegations.

--------------
NAM: Some Support Iran, Others
Call for Cooperation
--------------


18. (SBU) Speaking first under the Iran agenda item, Cuba
delivered a characteristically one-sided NAM statement
beginning with a verbatim recitation of the July 2008 NAM
Tehran Ministerial statement on Iran's nuclear program. The

UNVIE VIEN 00000093 005 OF 008


NAM statement went on to highlight the usual "positive"
aspects of the DG's report on Iran related to the
non-diversion of declared nuclear material, noted that the
PIV results were consistent with Iran's declarations, and
expressed satisfaction at 21 unannounced inspections at
Natanz since last year. There was no call for Iranian
cooperation, but the NAM still supported the DG's request for
Member States to provide "alleged studies" documents to Iran
as not doing so was an "obstacle" to verification. Finally,
taking into account the "completion of" the work plan, the
NAM statement looked forward to implementation of safeguards
in Iran in a routine manner. The statement concluded with a
usual call for diplomacy and dialogue.


19. (SBU) Among the NAM, Egypt and Cuba took the most
unconstructive stances, continuing to play by the old
playbook. Egypt cited the resolution of most outstanding
issues and cooperation by Iran within the scope of its legal
safeguards obligations while noting the "pitfalls and limits"
of asking for additional transparency. Egypt entirely
discounted the "alleged studies" as lacking in neutrality and
unverified information. The Egyptian statement also linked
denuclearization in the Middle East with "parallel" efforts
by Iran. Cuba's national statement was typically negative
and could have been written by Iran. Cuba began by
questioning why the issue continued to be on the Board's
agenda after the completion of the work plan, declared
safeguards should be routinized, and criticized UNSC
involvement as illegal. In addition to assailing the
"alleged studies" and the failure to provide documents to
Iran, Cuba suggested that the Board "legislate" on this
issue, i.e. pass a resolution requiring states (the U.S.) to
allow the IAEA to share all information with Iran. Cuba did,
however, welcome any endeavor toward dialogue, on the basis
of equality. In contrast to Egypt and Cuba, Malaysia, also
part of the NAM troika, was forward looking. Malaysia
encouraged cooperation by all parties, diplomacy and
dialogue, and welcomed the fresh initiatives of the Obama
administration while also calling for a Middle East NWFZ.


20. (SBU) South Africa, though associating itself with the
NAM statement, was even stronger than the last Board and was
the toughest of the NAM members that delivered national
statements. At the beginning of the statement, South Africa
noted Iran's provision of access to declared facilities, and
urged Iran to "continue" cooperation, but then listed a
number of concerns highlighted by the DG's report. South
Africa noted that the Secretariat was unable to conclude the
nature of Iran's program and whether there were undeclared
activities underway, that Iran had failed to abide by Code
3.1 and the AP, that questions about PMD were still
unanswered, and encouraged Iran to provide information and
access to help clarify those issues. South Africa also
called on Iran to take the "mandatory" steps required under
UNSC resolutions and called for Member States to provide
copies of documents to Iran.


21. (SBU) Most of the other NAM statements were a mixed
bag. The Philippines noted non-diversion, welcomed Iranian
cooperation and unhelpfully linked the lack of substantive
progress on PMD with the failure to provide Iran with
documentation, as did Ghana. However, the Philippines called
on Iran to implement the AP and Board and UNSC resolutions
and welcomed the fresh approach by the U.S. and direct
diplomacy. Ghana also called on Iran to implement the AP and
for "all parties" to cooperate. In a short statement, India
called on "all concerned" and "trusted" that Iran would
cooperate. India made its usual reference to the "supply
side" of nonproliferation in its usual jab at Pakistan.

--------------
Arab Group
--------------


22. (SBU) In addition to Egypt, Iraq also spoke, while
Board Members Algeria and Saudi Arabia were silent. (Libya
and Syria addressed the Board under Rule 50.) All associated
with the NAM and predictably called for a NWFZ in the Middle
East. Iraq began its statement by applauding Iran's
scientific achievement at Bushehr as a model for the region
and reiterated a balanced approach to the issue. Iraq called
for Iran's adherence to the AP, encouraged suspension until
confidence is restored, and urged that Iran address the
recommendations and concerns in the DG's report. In addition
to calling for Iran to provide substantive information on PMD
issues, Iraq also called for provision of documents.


23. (SBU) Syria indicated that there was no evidence to
date that Iran had violated its Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement and that it was regrettable that certain countries
have double standards when it comes to identifying and
supporting international obligations. Libya called on Iran to

UNVIE VIEN 00000093 006 OF 008


increase cooperation so that the IAEA can understand the
nature of its program, but also called on the international
community to deal with all issues on equal footing (i.e,
Israel).

--------------
Iran Aims Criticism at the IAEA
--------------


24. (SBU) As usual, Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh delivered
an impassioned statement, but he departed somewhat from past
practice by focusing more criticism on the IAEA, rather than
the West and U.S. in particular. He argued that the Agency
is not acting in accordance with its Statute, predominantly
because it should be focused on expanding peaceful uses of
nuclear energy as least as strongly as on nonproliferation.
Taking a different spin on his familiar argument that the
Board has become politicized, Soltanieh attempted to sow
discord by characterizing the Board as a battlefield between
"haves" and "have nots," rights and obligations, nuclear
suppliers and nuclear recipients, and aggressors and victims,
and could be summed up as a battle between "justice and
injustice." He noted that a few Member States are trying to
keep Iran on the agenda despite the completion of the work
plan and complained that the latest DG's report did not
reflect Iran's views on some of the issues or add in
information that Iran deemed critical, such as the fact that
the IAEA has found no evidence of nuclear material being
associated with the "alleged studies," citing these as
examples of how the Agency's credibility is compromised. He
also gave a new argument on Iran's failure to abide by Code
3.1 Modified, stating that Iran had implemented the modified
form only voluntarily starting in 2003, and thus when the
Majles prohibited voluntary cooperation with the IAEA, Iran
was forced to return to the original version from its
Safeguards Agreement. Soltanieh called for the DG to
immediately abide by the last paragraph of the work plan and
return Iran's file to "routine" status. Only then would Iran
return to its voluntary cooperation with the Agency to
resolve ambiguities, "if any." Iran also passed out a copy
of its March 2 letter to the DG (emailed to IO/T and ISN/RA)
which argued many of these points in detail.


25. (SBU) In the second section of Soltanieh's remarks,
which he notes as separate from his prepared statement and
usually lambastes the U.S., EU, and like-minded for their
remarks, Soltanieh focused only on France's legal questions
posed to the Secretariat about how it defined violations of
Code 3.1 and Iran's DIV obligations. In a significant
departure from previous Boards, Soltanieh made no directed
statements against the U.S. (Comment: It is unclear if the
absence of vitriol against the U.S. was meant to be a signal
or a response to the first U.S. statement at the meeting
(septel) and/or the joint P5 1 statement on Iran which noted
opportunities for engagement. The fact that the U.S. did not
give a national statement may also have denied Soltanieh an
opening he might otherwise have taken. Nevertheless, the
departure from past statements was notable and seems to
mirror at least one recent IRNA article which reported
positively on the P5 1 statement. End Comment.)

--------------
Legal Opinion on DIV and 3.1
--------------


26. (SBU) At a technical briefing the week before the
Board, Director of the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) Johan
Rautenbach refused to respond to France's query on the legal
implications of Iran's non-implementation of Code 3.1
Modified, the refusal to allow the IAEA to perform a DIV at
the IR-40 reactor, and the refusal to provide design
information for the nuclear power plant to be built at
Darkhovin. In the Board meeting, the French Ambassador
requested the Secretariat provide the Board with a formal
response. As agreed in follow-up discussions with the U.S.
and France, Rautenbach responded, in a prepared text, that
Iran's non-implementation of Code 3.1 Modified-which covers
the updated design information for the IR-40 reactor and the
submission of design information for the Darkhovin power
plant-is "inconsistent with Iran's obligations under the
Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement."
Rautenbach, however, sought to downplay the "noncompliance"
implications of his opinion by noting that "it is difficult
to conclude that providing information in accordance with the
earlier formulation in itself constitutes non-compliance
with, or a breach of, the Safeguards Agreement," based on a
comparison between States with Small Quantity Protocols
(SQP).


27. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte asked for clarification, in
which Rautenbach confirmed that Iran is the only state with a
comprehensive safeguards agreement that is not/not

UNVIE VIEN 00000093 007 OF 008


implementing Code 3.1 Modified. Ambassador Schulte also
reiterated from a previous Board statement that "this is an
apparent breach of Safeguards and Iran's claim that it will
not adhere to early declaration/Code 3.1 Modified shows a
willingness to commit future breaches." (Comment: It is
widely assumed among missions and Secretariat officials that
Rautenbach's comments soft-pedaling the "noncompliance"
implications were directed by ElBaradei.)


28. (SBU) Regarding Iran's refusal to provide the IAEA
access to the IR-40 reactor, Rautenbach replied that the
refusal "is inconsistent with its obligations under its
Safeguards Agreement," and the IAEA has a continuous right to
verify the design information which has already been provided
to it by Iran regarding the IR-40 reactor. He said that the
normal frequency of the DIV depends on safeguards
requirements, but in the case of Iran, both the Board and the
UNSC have requested suspension of heavy water-related
activities, therefore, the IAEA needs continued access.
Rautenbach also noted that it was up to the Board to consider
and determine if any action by a State that is inconsistent
with its Safeguards Agreement rises to a level where the IAEA
cannot verify that there is no diversion, in which case the
Board has the option to take the actions set out in Article
XII.C. (Comment: Mission rep overheard a subsequent
conversation on the margins of the Board room in which
Soltanieh complained about the IAEA legal analysis. OLA
officials attempted to persuade him that Iran should at least
allow access to the IR-40 for design verification given that
that obligation flows from the fact that Iran has already
declared the facility and provided design information.)


--------------
Chair's Summary
--------------


29. (SBU) In her summary, the Chair (Algerian Ambassador
Feroukhi) noted that several Member States expressed serious
concern that the Agency has yet to confirm the exclusively
peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, that there remain
a number of outstanding issues, and with Iran's failure to
comply with UNSC and Board obligations. In addition, several
Member States noted their concern about the absence of
Iranian cooperation and progress on PMD and the need for Iran
to implement the AP. The summary stated that several
members expressed regret that Iran has not provided
substantive responses to the outstanding issues, and urged
Iran to provide more information and access to the relevant
information, documentation, locations, and individuals in
order to enable the IAEA to clarify the nature of Iran's
nuclear program.


30. (SBU) The Chairwoman took note that several Member
States expressed concern that no progress has been made on
the IAEA's request to Iran to reconsider its decision to
unilaterally suspend Code 3.1 Modified and deplored Iran's
objection to the DIV at the IR-40 reactor, which they
stressed was not consistent with Iran's safeguards
obligations.


31. (SBU) The summary also reflected that several Member
States noted that he IAEA has reported the non-diversion of
declared nuclear material in Iran, although the absence of
undeclared material and activities in Iran was an ongoing and
time-consuming process. The Chairwoman also recalled that
several members requested that Member States which provided
the IAEA with documentation related to the "alleged studies"
should authorize the IAEA to share them with Iran, as it was
a matter that could impede the verification process. The
summary stated that several members expressed the view,
taking into account the implementation of the August 2007
work plan, that safeguards implementation in Iran be
conducted in a routine manner. Also, the issue of leakage of
confidential safeguards information provided to the IAEA was
raised as a matter of serious concern.


32. (SBU) Comment: In a notable departure from previous
Chair's summaries, Feroukhi entertained Iran's request to
have its comments reflected in the summary. The Secretariat
claimed that there was precedent for observers' views to be
reflected in the summary, but others disputed that this was
the case. The two citations of Iran's views in the Chair's
summary were a reference to the report not adequately
reflecting Iran's cooperation and an egregious and gratuitous
citation of Iran's argument that the UNSC was illegally
seized of the Iran issue. This effort by Iran to interject
its views may only be the beginning; Syria's comments were
subsequently reflected in the Chair's summary on the Syrian
agenda item. There is concern that the NAM troika's ultimate
objective in opposing public release of DG reports is to
strike a deal in which the target state would have its views

UNVIE VIEN 00000093 008 OF 008


reflected in the Director General's report as is the practice
in other UN agencies (where the views of the country
concerned appear in a separate addendum). This would
seriously detract from the Director General's report.
Furthermore, Iran regularly circulates Information Circular
documents reflecting its views so there is no need to do so
in the report. End Comment.

-------------- -
Public Release of the Report Up for Discussion
-------------- -


33. (SBU) After reading her summary and prompted by
Ambassador Schulte, Chairwoman Feroukhi stated that since no
objection had been expressed to the proposal (from Canada and
others) for the public release of the Iran report, it would
be released. Brazil stepped up and noted that while it did
not object to the release of this report, the Board should
consider this matter further sometime in the future, since
the DG's reports are written in confidence. Malaysia, Cuba,
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia all joined support for Brazil's
comments. Cuba requested a discussion on the public release
of reports at the next Board meeting, Egypt rejected the
"politicization" of the DG's reports, and Saudi Arabia noted
that public release undermined the confidential nature of the
IAEA's work. On the contrary, Iran asked that all/all
records of Board deliberations (such as a "recording") be
released, since there had been so many misunderstandings
about its responsibilities and cooperation with the IAEA.


34. (SBU) Canada responded and reiterated its request for
the reports to be made public, as it was a matter of
principle and transparency. Feroukhi concluded by repeating
that there had been no "official objection," so the report
would be released and referred the Board to past discussions
(1996) about the release of such reports.

--------------
Comment
--------------


35. (SBU) The joint P5 1 statement had the desired effect on
Board dynamics on the Iran issue. Our decision to keep the
focus on the P5 1 and issue no national statements will mean
increased attention/scrutiny to the next U.S. national
statement, presumably at the June Board meeting, when there
will be much higher expectation that the U.S. policy review
will be complete and that the U.S. statement will reflect its
conclusions. Mission notes that June will be ill-timed, from
the perspective of some like-minded states, for a Board
review of policy releasing DG reports on Iran (and Syria).
The June Board each year discusses the IAEA's annual
Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR),and the U.S. each
year argues for its public release. Some of our friends,
Germany and Japan, for example, argue against release of the
SIR document. Septel will offer our recommendations for
negotiating this June debate.
SCHULTE