IAEA/SYRIA: SYRIA OFFERS NO FURTHER COOPERATION TO

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000092

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

NEA FOR FELTMAN AND SHAPIRO, ISN/RA FOR NEPHEW AND DANIEL,
IO/T FOR GOLDSTEIN, NEA FOR MONZ, CIA FOR HORIO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PARM SY KN IAEA KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: SYRIA OFFERS NO FURTHER COOPERATION TO
IAEA BOARD

REF: A. 08 UNVIE 00635

B. UNVIE 00071

C. UNVIE 00084

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) The March 4 IAEA Board of Governors deliberations on
Syria broke down along similar lines as past Board discussion
of this issue. Although the Director General and a majority
of Board members (21 of 33 Board members) called for
cooperation by Syria, NAM standard bearers Egypt, Cuba and
Malaysia, abetted by Iran and Syria, sought to shift the
focus back to Israel, though without success. By contrast,
DG ElBaradei's introductory statement to the Board reflected
his written report, with a focus on uranium findings and the
need for Syrian cooperation and transparency in providing
access to information, locations and debris, themes echoed in
strong statements on the part of the EU, U.S., Canada,
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Argentina, Albania,
Switzerland, Ghana and the ROK. Many of the like-minded
questioned the correctness and completeness of Syria's
declarations under its safeguards agreement, and called on
Syria to implement the Additional Protocol. As is the case
on Iran, the NAM troika shielded Syria from calls for greater
transparency with a legalistic view of the cooperation
required by Syria's safeguards agreement, as did Russia.
China and Russia both had short statements lending lukewarm
support to the IAEA investigation but generally downplaying
the issue.


2. (SBU) Unlike his previous pronouncements on the subject,
ElBaradei made no mention of Israel's destruction of the
Al-Kibar (or Dair Alzour, as referred to by the Agency) site.
Lacking any substantive arguments, most of the NAM (with the
notable exception of Ghana) and Arab group resorted, as in
past meetings, to criticizing Israel for the bombing and on
Israel and "others," (the United States) for the late
provision of information to the Agency. NAM and the Arabs
charged that late provision of information hampered the IAEA
investigation, and made well-worn charges asserting a double
standard regarding Israel's non-NPT status. Iran took this
issue one step further by calling again for an IAEA General
Conference resolution condemning Israel's bombing of the
facility, which would be an implicit admission that the site
was nuclear-related. For its part, Israel expressed
"astonishment following statements accusing my country of
attacking a Syrian facility" and called for good faith
cooperation by Syria. As a further distraction, the NAM also
highlighted the issue of safeguards confidentiality and
leakage of information to the press, using this as a pretext
to block public dissemination of the Director General's
report so as to not "politicize" the issue. Canada,
Australia, the U.S. and EU argued for transparency but
stopped short of calling for a vote that would exacerbate
divisions on the Board.


3. (SBU) Speaking last, Syria underlined its willingness to
cooperate with the Agency pursuant to the routine provisions
of its Safeguards Agreement, but made clear that the June
2008 inspectors' visit to Al-Kibar was a one-time occurrence.
Syria stuck to its claim that the site was and is a military
installation unrelated to nuclear activities. Syria also
took the Secretariat to task for not informing it of further
analysis of environmental samples from Al-Kibar and repeated
its spurious claim that Israeli munitions were the source of
any uranium found at the site. In addition, he offered up a
refinement of his explanation on how the uranium came to be
at the site, claiming that perhaps Israeli missiles were
contaminated with uranium (rather than made of uranium),an
obvious attempt to rebut the Agency's "low probability"
assessment that the Israeli munitions were the source. In
addition to arguing that the report should not be released,
Syria hoped that the issue would not be on the June Board
agenda. In short, Syria persisted in its effort to sweep the
IAEA investigation under the rug -- but did not succeed. End
Summary.

--------------
DG Makes Compelling Case
For Continued Investigation
--------------


4. (SBU) The IAEA Board of Governors addressed the Director
General's report on implementation of the NPT safeguards
agreement (GOV/2009/9) in the Syrian Arab Republic for the
second time as a specific agenda item (see Ref A for Board
discussion of Syria in November, Ref B on the DG report, and
Ref C on the Secretariat's technical briefing to member
states ). The Director General's introductory remarks on
Syria at the March Board provided a compelling case for
continued investigations in Syria. His remarks were in line
with his recent report. He noted that additional uranium not
of a type in Syria's declared inventory of material had been
found in samples taken from the site. He also repeated the
"low probability" assessment that Israeli munitions were the
source of the uranium, noted that Syrian responses have been
inadequate, and repeated a request for additional information
and access from Syria. The DG also urged "Israel and other
States" to provide relevant information to the Agency and to
agree that the information be shared with Syria.


5. (SBU) Comment: DG ElBaradei did not repeat his remarks
from November that the unilateral force and late provision of
information "severely hampered" the Agency in its assessment
of the site. While repeating an appeal for states to provide
information, including imagery, he also did not directly
mention the lack of commercial satellite imagery immediately
following the bombing, a circumstance he described in
November as "baffling." This did not stop Syria's allies
from focusing on Israel's actions in their statements. End
comment.

--------------
Calls for Cooperation
--------------


6. (SBU) Of the Board's 35 members, all but three (Mexico,
Uruguay and Brazil) spoke on this item in a national capacity
or as part of group. Six statements were made under "Rule
50" by Member States not currently on the Board, South Korea,
Libya, Israel, Venezuela, Iran, and Syria. This was Israel's
first time to speak on Syria at the Board.


7. (SBU) Twenty-one board members called on Syria to
cooperate with the Agency's investigation by responding to
questions, requests for information, and access to additional
sites and debris. Switzerland made a strong statement noting
that Syria "needs to cooperate totally" with the Agency
without delay.

--------------
Cooperation, But With Restrictions
--------------


8. (SBU) Some states, however, were not as categorical in
their call for Syria to cooperate. Algeria, Egypt, South
Africa, Libya and Venezuela praised Syria for its cooperation
to date. NAM members Egypt, Algeria, and Malaysia called on
Syria to cooperate, but only within the limits of its
obligations pursuant to its Safeguards Agreement with the
Agency. (Note: Access to sites not on Syria's list of
declared facilities, including the Al Kibar site, is beyond
Syria's routine safeguards obligations. End note.)


9. (SBU) Japan, in an otherwise strong statement, noted that
Syria had provided a "certain level of cooperation."


10. (SBU) Syria, during its intervention at the conclusion
of the agenda item, stated its intent to "continue
cooperating with the Agency within its obligations under its
comprehensive safeguards agreement." Unlike Iran, Syrian rep
Othman was careful not to question the motives or competence
of the Secretariat.


11. (SBU) Echoing the DG's call for member states with
relevant information to provide it to the Agency, many
members called on others to cooperate with the Agency's
investigation as well, including Argentina, Australia, China,
Ghana, India, Iraq, Malaysia (making specific reference to
Israel),South Africa, and Turkey.

--------------
Concern Over Possible Undeclared Activities
--------------


12. (SBU) Like-minded countries (Canada, Czech Republic on
behalf of the EU, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Albania,
Switzerland ),as well as Argentina, Ghana, South Korea, and
Israel joined the U.S. in expressing concern over the
possibility of undeclared nuclear activities in Syria.


13. (SBU) The EU was particularly strong in recalling the
obligation "of each and every IAEA Member State party to the
NPT to declare all of its nuclear installations and according
to the modified code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements to
report also the planning and construction of any nuclear
facility to the Agency before the decision on its
construction is taken." (Note: Syria has accepted the
modified code 3.1., as does each Member State with
comprehensive safeguards agreements other than Iran. End
note.)


14. (SBU) Member States expressed concern in particular over
the Agency's finding of additional anthropogenic (or
chemically-processed) uranium particles during its June 2008
visit to Al-Kibar, uranium that was "of a type not included
in Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material," per the
Director General's report (ref B). Canada said that Syria
has not satisfactorily addressed the presence of uranium at
the Al-Kibar site. New Zealand noted the discrepancies
between Syria's response and the Agency's findings, which
need to be clarified. Although Turkey did not specifically
express concern, it said the uranium findings need to be
understood.


15. (SBU) Canada and the Czechs/EU, recalled the November
2008 DG report which stated that the features of the
destroyed building, along with connectivity of the site to
adequate pumping capacity of cooling water, are similar to
what may be found in connection with a reactor site.


16. (SBU) Ghana was the only NAM member to express concern
about the Agency's findings in Syria. In addition to noting
the additional uranium, Ghana asked Syria to provide "all
requested information" and access to the sites. The
statement noted the Agency's finding of uranium at the site
and asked for Syria to provide access that is beyond its
safeguards obligations. (Comment: Ghana's statement at the
March Board was stronger than its statement at the November
board, following an "outreach" lunch Ambassador held with the
Ghanaian Board Governor the day prior to the Board
deliberation. End Comment.)

--------------
China and Russia
--------------


17. (SBU) China and Russia maintained a low profile in their
statements, supporting the Agency's investigation but not
expressing concern regarding the Agency's findings thus far.
China encouraged Syria and others to strengthen cooperation,
Russia called on active cooperation with the Agency and
regretted the destruction of the facility, which led to
complications in verification. Notably, China backed off
from its statement in November that it supports the
investigation in accordance with Syria's safeguards
responsibilities.

--------------
Israel Defends Itself
--------------


18. (SBU) Israel's ambassador spoke on the Syria issue for
the first time in a Board meeting, expressing "astonishment
following statements accusing my country of attacking a
Syrian facility." Israel said that Syria's few friends
"stated that the facility was indeed a nuclear facility,
without even waiting for the IAEA investigation and
conclusions." Israel urged Syria's cooperation with the
Agency in order to close the file and noted that the Board
should consider "grave consequences" for any "total lack of
cooperation on the part of Syria." Israeli Ambassador
clarified after the Board that Syria's few friends want
international community to deal with Israel as if it bombed a
nuclear facility. Israel questioned the logic of referring
to the issue as non-nuclear regarding Syria and as nuclear
regarding Israel. (Comment: This is probably a reference to
Iran's implication that Israel violated the IAEA statue by
bombing a nuclear facility. After the Board adjourned, Iran
handed out copies of the Resolution 533 from October 1990 on
the prohibition of armed attacks against nuclear
institutions. That resolution resulted from Iraq's bombing
of the Bushehr reactor a few year's earlier during the
Iran-Iraq war. Although other NAM countries stated that
Israel's destruction of the facility reactor was a violation
of the UN Charter, no state other than Iran specifically

mentioned the IAEA resolution prohibiting the use of force or
threatened use of force against a nuclear facility. End
comment.)

--------------
Additional Protocol
--------------


19. (SBU) The EU, Australia, Japan and Albania called for
Syria to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol, with Japan
calling this "very important." Cuba noted with concern the
trend of certain countries seeking to impose the AP, calling
this "unacceptable," and saying that the AP cannot be turned
into a legal obligation.

--------------
NAM States Remain Strong Supporters
Of Syria
--------------


20. (SBU) Syria received support from the same group of NAM
countries that spoke on its behalf at the November 2008 Board
meeting. NAM standard bearers Egypt, Cuba and Malaysia,
abetted by South Africa, Algeria, Iraq, Venezuela, and Iran,
sought unsuccessfully to shift the focus back to Israel.
Iran took this issue one step further by calling again for an
IAEA General Conference resolution against Israel. Iraq,
Libya, and Venezuela raised the issue of double standards as
regards to Israel's non-NPT status.


21. (SBU) These same member states commended Syria for its
continued cooperation. Previewing Syria's remarks that its
cooperation be limited to its legal obligations, Malaysia
noted that measures that go beyond the comprehensive
safeguards agreement are purely voluntary. Cuba complained
that some states are pushing for cooperation which would make
Syria go beyond its obligations and divulge sensitive
information (Note: a reference to Al-Kibar being a military
site). Venezuela said that the investigation should be dealt
with in the framework of Syria's legal obligations. Malaysia
further supported Syria's posture by noting that it was the
sovereign right of any state to restrict access to military
facilities.


22. (SBU) As a further distraction, the NAM also highlighted
the issue of safeguards confidentiality and leakage of
information to the press, using this as a pretext to block
public dissemination of the Director General's report so as
to not "politicize" the issue.


23. (SBU) Egypt specifically said that Board reports should
not contain "unverifiable information," a likely reference to
the Agency's policy of pursuing leads contained in credible
all-source information, including intelligence.

--------------
Syria Responds to Concerns by Board
--------------


24. (SBU) Syria, following Iran's example, spoke last under
Rule 50. The statement was delivered by Ibrahim Othman, the
Director General of the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission.
Othman thanked the Agency for its professionalism and noted
the importance of the Agency's decisions to remain
"independent" and not become political. Othman reaffirmed
Syria will continue (sic) to cooperate with the Agency within
its obligations under its comprehensive safeguards agreement.



25. (SBU) Othman took on the issues that concerned board
members and offered an explanation. On the issue of
providing the IAEA additional visits to Syrian sites, Othman
said that the "memo of understanding" between the Agency and
Syria agreed to in May 2008 allowed for only one visit to
Al-Kibar. The visit would allow visual and environmental
sampling. Othman declared the visit successful, adding that
the Agency team had full freedom at Al-Kibar and surrounding
buildings.


26. (SBU) On the issue of partial and repetitive responses
as noted in the DG report, Othman said that Syria had
answered all the questions asked by the Secretariat. Those
questions not answered fall outside of the scope of Syria's
safeguards obligations. As for the point in the DG's report
on repetitiveness, Othman said that the responses provided in
the February letter were provided to the Agency for the first
time in writing, and were therefore not repetitive.


27. (SBU) Othman reaffirmed that Al-Kibar was a military
site and had "nothing to do" with nuclear activities.
Syria's response has been within its security requirements
and beyond its obligations under the CSA. He asked why Syria
should be expected to "indict itself" in response to baseless
accusations.


28. (SBU) Focusing on the leaks to the media, Othman said
the leaks were not accurate (presence of graphite leaked by
Secretariat) and harmful to the issue. He asked the
Secretariat to be cautious with its information, recalling
that the presence of uranium particles was leaked prior to
the issuance of the November 2008 Board report notifying
member states of the finding. Othman said that leaking could
be interpreted as steps to politicize the issue.


29. (SBU) Turning to Israel, Othman said that Israel's
response to the Agency (regarding Syria's claim that the
uranium found in samples came from Israeli missiles) was
"cynical and insulting." He also called the response no
surprise to the international community, adding that Israel
"killed and injured thousands of women and children last
month" (Gaza). Othman said that the Agency needs to
investigate further and verify Israel's response. In
addition, he offered up a refinement of his explanation on
how the uranium came to be at the site, claiming that perhaps
Israeli missiles were contaminated with uranium (rather than
made of uranium). (Comment: An obvious attempt to rebut the
Agency's "low probability" assessment that the Israeli
munitions were the source.)


30. (SBU) Othman complained that Syria was unaware the
Agency would continue testing the samples taken from
Al-Kibar, adding that it considered the results included in
the November report as "final." Syria was not informed of
the additional results until the March 2009 DG report was
issued.


31. (SBU) Othman said that the Agency must act within the
memorandum of understanding signed in May 2008 and that the
Agency should not disclose any information to the public
while the investigation is ongoing.


32. (SBU) Othman dismissed the point in the DG's report that
the uranium found at the site was "of a type not included in
Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material." He said
that the nuclear material in Syria is under Agency control
and has been periodically inspected since 1992. He claimed
all inspection results since 1992 have been satisfactory, and
again reaffirmed that the contamination came from Israel.


33. (SBU) Othman closed by objecting to the public release
of the Syria report, saying it would lead to
misinterpretations and complicate the issue. Othman was the
only speaker to say that Syria should not be on the Agenda at
the next session of the Board of Governors.

--------------
Board Chair's Summary
--------------


34. (SBU) The Board Chair's summary accurately recounted the
Board deliberations on Syria, but included Syria's request
for the Agency to verify whether the munitions used to
destroy the facility were uranium based or contaminated by
anthropogenic uranium. (Comment: Non-Board member
statements under Rule 50 are not normally included in Chair
summaries. Iran's statements, also made under Rule 50, were
similarly reflected in the Chair's summary for the first time
at this Board.) The Chair noted that "several members
emphasized that the Secretariat should refrain from
requesting Member States to provide information or take
measures that go beyond the States' safeguards obligations,
particularly those involving national security," an attempt
to undercut the next Board report.

--------------
Syria DG Report Not Released
--------------


35. (SBU) Canada requested the public release of the Syria
report, which was supported by Australia and the U.S. Egypt
spoke immediately after Canada and objected to the report's
release. Cuba and Syria also objected. After an

unsuccessful attempt by the Board chair to unilaterally
decide to not release the report, which drew an objection by
Canada, the Board Chair deferred the decision to the next
day. After consultations the following morning, the Chair
announced that she was unable to reach consensus on the
release since "a large number of states including the EU were
for the release and a large number of NAM states were
opposed." She expressed regret over the "split" Board, but
the report, therefore, was not released due to lack of
consensus. The Chair also noted in her written summary that
the Board had agreed to place on the agenda for its June
meeting an agenda item entitled "De-restriction of documents
of the Board of Governors." Adding this item to the agenda
for the June meeting was initially proposed by Cuba during
the discussion on releasing the Iran report (septel). Cuba,
Egypt, and Iran reiterated their objection to releasing the
Syria report. The Ambassador expressed regret at the lack of
consensus and reiterated the U.S. belief that, in light of
the apparent safeguards violation, the report should be
released to the public. Noting that Syria had gone to great
lengths to conceal the nature of the facility at Al-Kibar and
to sanitize the site after the reactor was destroyed, he said
that Syria should not be allowed to continue its cover up
effort by preventing the release of the Director General's
reports. He took exception to some member states'
mischaracterization of the report as biased and politicized,
and noted the importance to let the report speak for itself.
The Ambassador, joined by France and Germany, also made it
clear that we do not accept the outcome of this Board as a
precedent and will revisit the issue of publishing the report
in June.


36. (SBU) Note: In a short meeting in her office before
Board proceedings opened on March 2, Ambassador lobbied Board
Chair Ferouki on the appropriateness of public release of
both the Iran and Syria reports. Ferouki advised against any
vote on the matter. Ambassador Schulte noted that were Syria
to open Board statements by declaring that it would now agree
to provide the access and information the IAEA had requested,
the U.S. would welcome that statement and he would seek
instructions allowing him not to call for public release of
the report. Ferouki later informed the Ambassador that she
had informed Syrian AEC head Othman, but he told her that he
had no instructions to agree to the IAEA requests.

--------------
Comment
--------------


37. (SBU) Syria has decided on its story line and is
sticking to it. While Mission will continue to engage
closely with the Secretariat and other Board members in
support of rigorous IAEA pursuit of its Syrian investigation,
it seems clear that further meaningful Syrian cooperation
with the IAEA will not be forthcoming short of significant
new developments. Mission will send septel its thoughts on
how best to optimize the chances for increasing pressure via
the IAEA investigation in support of the broader diplomatic
effort to prompt a new cost/benefit analysis in Damascus.

--------------
U.S. Statement
--------------


38. (SBU) Madame Chair,

Syria's continuing refusal to cooperate with the IAEA
should be of serious concern to all members of this Board
and, indeed, to all supporters of the international
nonproliferation regime. We thank the Director General for
his latest report, which reflects the serious and sustained
attention the Agency pays to this important issue. We
applaud the Secretariat's professionalism in pursuing the
investigation of this pressing matter and hope that future
reports will reflect a decision by Syria to fully cooperate
and provide a full accounting of its clandestine nuclear
activities, both past and present.

Regrettably, as noted in the Director General's latest
report, Syria has not yet demonstrated the level of
cooperation and transparency needed by the IAEA to complete
its investigation. This is the second consecutive Board at
which the Director General has submitted a report noting the
lack of cooperation by Syria. The last report, submitted to
the November Board, stated that "Syria has not yet provided
the requested documentation in support of its declarations E
concerning the nature or function of the destroyed building,
nor agreed to a visit to the three other locations which the
Agency has requested to visit" as part of the investigation
into undeclared nuclear activities. Even more troubling, the
Director General reported that Syria denied the IAEA access
to sites and took immediate steps to sanitize the three
suspected nuclear-related sites upon receiving the IAEA's
request for access. Unfortunately, Syria has yet to address
any of these serious concerns or allowed the IAEA access to
the additional sites.

We note with regret that Syria's most recent response
to the IAEA's questions and concerns - included in a February
17 letter, according to the Director General's report - only
provided partial answers and did not address most of the
questions raised by the Agency. Syria has not yet provided
information about the past use and nature of the Dair Alzour
site. Syria has also thus far refused to allow the IAEA
access to additional suspected nuclear-related sites or
access to the debris and equipment removed from Dair Alzour.
As stated in the Director General's report, these measures
are "essential" for the Agency to complete its assessment.

This report contributes to the growing evidence of
clandestine nuclear activities in Syria, including the
revelation that additional anthropogenic (or chemically
processed) uranium particles "of a type not included in
Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material" were detected
in environmental samples taken at Dair Alzour. I note that
at the February 24 Technical Briefing on Syria, the
Secretariat reported that it had found still more uranium
particles in samples taken from Syria in addition to the
"significant" quantity of uranium particles reported to the
November Board. We must understand why such material -
material that was not previously declared to the IAEA -
existed in Syria, and this can only happen if Syria provides
the cooperation requested of it by the Director General. In
particular, as DDG Heinonen reiterated at the Technical
Briefing, it is essential that Syria provide inspectors with
access to the debris from the bombed facility. Importantly,
the Agency also notes in the report the "low probability"
that the processed uranium present in soil samples from Dair
Alzour could have come from the munitions used to destroy the
facility, as alleged by Syria.

Madam Chair,

I note with concern the statements Syria made last week
at the Agency's technical briefing on this issue. At the
meeting, instead of explaining why uranium was detected at
the Dair Alzour site, the Syrian representative claimed that
it would not "accept" any future evidence gained from
environmental samples. This comes on the heels of Syria's
earlier statements that it would not cooperate further with
the IAEA until it received the sampling results. We, as a
Board, must not allow Syria, or any state, to politicize the
objective work of the Agency's technical inspectors by
attempting to selectively discredit their scientific
findings.

Syria's continued efforts to hinder and discredit the
work of the Agency begs the question: What does Syria have
to hide about its nuclear activities?

By failing to declare the Dair Alzour site to the IAEA
and provide the required design information, Syria violated
its safeguards agreement. More importantly, however, Syria
undermined the very role IAEA safeguards play in the
international nonproliferation regime - to provide the
international community with the necessary assurance that the
reactor was part of a peaceful program. This is all the more
worrying as the configuration and location of the destroyed
reactor suggests that it was not intended for peaceful
purposes.

Given the gravity of this issue and Syria's refusal to
allow the IAEA to complete its verification activities, the
United States asks that all Board members join us in
demanding that Syria fully cooperate with the IAEA
investigation without delay by granting the IAEA access to
any information, debris and sites needed to complete its
investigation. Such cooperation will go a long way in
providing assurance to the international community of Syria's
peaceful intentions.

Madam Chair,

In order to maintain the high level of transparency for
which the Agency and Board are known, and to ensure that all
members of the international community are aware of the
Agency's work on this important issue, we call for the
Director General's reports on the Implementation of NPT
Safeguards in the Syria Arab Republic to be made available to
the public.

Thank you.
SCHULTE