IAEA/DPRK: SUPPORT FOR SIX-PARTY PROCESS AND

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000091

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

EAP FOR BOSWORTH AND KIM, ISN FOR GROMOLL AND MAHAFFEY, IO
FOR GOLDSTEIN, EAP FOR KELLY AND JOHNSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC IAEA KN KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/DPRK: SUPPORT FOR SIX-PARTY PROCESS AND
IAEA'S INVOLVEMENT CONTINUES

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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) North Korea has been on the agenda of every IAEA
Board of Governors meeting since inspectors were kicked out
of the country in December 2002. For the March 2009 Board
meeting no written report was issued by the Secretariat on
this item, and the Director General's introductory remarks
were notably short; he stated only that the Agency continues
to monitor and verify the shutdown status of Yongbyon nuclear
facilities and that fuel discharged from the reactor remains
under IAEA surveillance. Fewer Board members spoke on this
item than in previous Boards, due probably to the lack of
detail provided by the DG and the lack of progress within the
Six-Party framework in securing a verification mechanism or
completing "Phase II" actions as agreed among the six
parties. As in previous Board meetings, members delivered
statements strongly supporting the Six-Party process and
looked forward to the denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula and North Korea's return to the NPT and IAEA
safeguards. Most members also reiterated the importance of
the IAEA's participation in verification work in North Korea.
End Summary.

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DG Confirms Shutdown of Facilities
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2. (SBU) The Director General has reported on the status of
the implementation of safeguards in the DPRK, as requested by
the Board of Governors, since inspectors were kicked out of
Yongbyon in December 2002 (GOV/2003/14). Inspectors returned
to North Korea in July 2007, as requested by the Six Parties
under the February 13, 2007, Initial Actions Agreement, to
monitor and verify the shutdown of facilities at Yongbyon and
Taechon. The IAEA's mandate remains unchanged, although they
have unofficial observer status in the U.S.-led disablement
work, now comprised of the defueling of the 5-MW(e) reactor
at Yongbyon.


3. (SBU) In his introductory remarks, the DG confirmed the
shutdown status of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, and noted
that fuel discharged from the Yongbyon reactor remains under
Agency containment and surveillance, but did not comment
further on the DPRK. The DG has generally provided
additional comments during his introductory remarks,
including expressing his desire for North Korea to return to
IAEA Safeguards at an early date. He has noted in the past
that the IAEA has no role in disablement other than to
document and observe the activities. He also did not repeat
his call for clarification as to whether or not the IAEA
should consider the DPRK an NPT member. (Note: The DPRK's
NPT status has implications for how the IAEA implements its
treaty/safeguards obligations in the DPRK, even if the DPRK
is considered to have withdrawn from the Treaty.)


4. (SBU) Nine statements were delivered by Board members:
China, Japan, Canada, the U.S., Russia, Australia, the
Philippines, New Zealand, and the EU (representing nine Board
members, including associated state Albania). (U.S.
Statement in para 12). In addition, South Korea spoke under
Rule 50.

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Six Party Members Express Support
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5. (SBU) China spoke first, noting the important progress
made by the Six-Party talks towards the eventual
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. China expressed
its interest in achieving the targets set in the Joint
Statement of September 19, 2005 by the Six-Party members.
China committed to working with other parties to complete
Phase II actions without delay. Russia noted it stands by
the Six-Party commitments and the 2005 Joint Statement.
Russia called on all parties to abide by agreements and
expressed its hope that disablement will be completed soon.
Russia also expressed the "need" to make active use of the
IAEA in DPRK.



6. (SBU) Japan focused on the importance of establishing a
robust framework of verification, recalling that such a
framework was not achieved during the December 2008 Head of
Delegation meeting of the Six-Party talks. Japan reaffirmed
its commitment to "continue to work together with other
partners at the Six-Party Talks towards the full
implementation of the Joint Statement as a whole." Japan
also noted that the IAEA should play an important role in
North Korea, in order to make utmost use of its knowledge and
experience.


7. (SBU) South Korea, not currently on the Board, spoke
under Rule 50. ROK noted the importance of the multilateral
approach to effectively dealing with this issue, and
recognized that progress has been made. South Korea
expressed concern about North Korea's provocative statements
aimed at the South and at the North's preparations for a
missile launch. South Korea asked DPRK to not take actions
that would undermine the Six-Party Talks.

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Others Express Support and Urge
And Increase Role for the IAEA
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8. (SBU) Canada, the EU, Australia, the Philippines, and New
Zealand expressed support to the Six-Party Talks and the
IAEA's role in monitoring the shutdown of facilities. The EU
members expressed the hope that a legal framework based on a
safeguards agreement with the Agency will be implemented soon
and highlighted that the IAEA has a central role to play in
verification. The EU urged DPRK to provide a "complete and
correct" declaration of nuclear facilities and materials to
the IAEA and promptly allow for its verification. All
members stressed the central role of the Agency in the
verification process.


9. (SBU) Australia noted its concern at the slow pace of
disablement activities. New Zealand expressed its concern on
the lack of progress in the Six-Party Talks, saying that the
current situation has taken a step back from the positive
signs of a year ago.


10. (SBU) Japan, South Korea, Canada, and the EU joined us
in recalling UNSCR 1718 and South Korea and the EU also noted
UNSCR 1695. The EU in particular used the opportunity to
call on DPRK to refrain from any further related (missile and
nuclear) activities as noted in the Security Council
resolution. The EU expressed its deep concern regarding the
ballistic missile and nuclear activities of the DPRK, as well
as the proliferation activities of the DPRK in both these
areas,

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Overshadowed, and Just as Well
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11. (SBU) Comment: The Board's treatment of the DPRK issue
at this meeting was brief and business-like, acknowledging
that action on this matter and the IAEA's role in it must
flow from the Six-Party process. The safeguards verification
items on Iran and Syria, reported septels, commanded more of
the Board's attention and were contentious. Those two
countries figured prominently in discussions throughout the
four-day Board meeting, both inside the Board Room and out.
Interestingly, the only reference to the DPRK file outside
this formal agenda item was during the joint appearance of
the two candidates to succeed Director General ElBaradei,
when Japanese IAEA Governor Amano referred to resolving
"diverse" safeguards issues such as Iran and DPRK as one of
the Agency's highest priorities. Challenged by the Iranian
ambassador on whether the two cases were somehow similar,
Amano clarified that they were not, but reiterated they were
both challenges of great importance. End Comment.

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U.S. Statement
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12. (SBU) Madame Chairwoman,

Secretary Clinton, during her recent trip to Asia and her
first overseas trip as Secretary of State, stated that the
"most acute challenge to stability and security in Northeast
Asia" comes from North Korea and its nuclear program. At
that time, the Secretary reaffirmed that President Obama and
she are committed to working through the Six-Party Talks to
achieve the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula in a peaceful manner. Noting the U.S. belief that
we have an opportunity to move forward with denuclearization,
Secretary Clinton recalled that the DPRK committed in the
September 2005 Joint Statement to abandoning all its nuclear
weapons and returning at an early date to the
Nonproliferation Treaty. The DPRK also committed to return
to IAEA safeguards. On February 26, Secretary Clinton
announced the role of Ambassador Stephen Bosworth as Special
Representative for North Korean Policy and Ambassador Sung
Kim as Special Envoy for Six-Party Talks. Ambassadors
Bosworth and Kim are traveling to the region this week to
consult with our Six-Party allies and partners on the problem
of North Korea's nuclear and missile threats to the region.

President Obama has called for a strengthening of the
international institutions dedicated to finding common
solutions to common problems. In this connection, we feel
strongly that the IAEA should play an important role in the
DPRK's denuclearization, including in the verification of the
DPRK's initial declaration and in future dismantlement
activities. We believe such a role for the Agency is in the
best interest of all parties, including the DPRK. We look
forward to further cooperation with the IAEA as we move
toward our goal of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula.

Madame Chairwoman,

The United States appreciates and commends the IAEA's ongoing
work to implement the Agency's "ad hoc monitoring and
verification arrangement" in the DPRK related to the shutdown
and sealing of the five nuclear installations at Yongbyon and
Taechon. U.S.-led teams maintain constant coordination with
IAEA personnel working on the ground in the DPRK, which will
serve as a model for the future, deeper cooperation that we
seek. Our teams continue to make progress in disabling the
three primary nuclear facilities at Yongbyon. Eight out of
11 agreed disablement actions at the three facilities have
been completed, including the removal of more than 6,200 (or
about 75%) of the approximately 8,000 fuel rods from the
five-megawatt reactor. The United States urges the DPRK to
complete the remaining disablement activities expeditiously
in order to advance the denuclearization process and move
toward full implementation of the Joint Statement.

The United States continues to seek a Six-Party agreement on
verification. In October 2008, U.S. officials and their DPRK
counterparts conducted negotiations in Pyongyang and reached
agreement on measures to begin verification of the DPRK's
nuclear programs. The DPRK submitted an initial declaration
of its programs to the Chinese government on June 26, 2008.
The declaration package includes information about North
Korea's plutonium program, which has produced fissile
material for its nuclear weapons, and notes U.S. concerns
regarding North Korea's proliferation and any uranium
enrichment activities. Based upon the October discussions,
U.S. and North Korean negotiators agreed on a number of
important verification measures. All of these measures are
consistent with the July 12 statement issued by China, as
Chair of the Six-Party Talks.

The parties sought to reach a Six-Party agreement on a
verification text during the December 2008 Heads of
Delegation meeting, but the DPRK refused to formalize any
verification protocol in a Six-Party text. The United States
remains committed to achieving a Six-Party agreement on
verification, and we plan to work closely with our partners
in the Six-Party process to wrap up Phase II activities,
including disablement, in order to move quickly into Phase
III, during which the DPRK is to verifiably abandon its
nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.

The DPRK's verifiable denuclearization and fulfillment of all
its other commitments relating to the Joint Statement will
make possible the realization of the full range of benefits

envisioned in the Joint Statement. As Secretary Clinton
stated last month in Seoul, "If North Korea is genuinely
prepared to completely and verifiably eliminate their nuclear
weapons program, the Obama Administration will be willing to
normalize bilateral relations, replace the peninsula's
longstanding armistice agreement with a permanent peace
treaty, and assist in meeting the energy and other economic
and humanitarian needs of the Korean people."

The United States reiterates that UN Security Council
Resolution 1718 remains in effect. All Member States should
continue to abide by the requirements of this Chapter VII
resolution. The DPRK should avoid any provocative actions
that might aggravate tensions in the region and undermine
progress in the Six-Party process.

Madame Chairwoman,

The role of the IAEA, and full DPRK cooperation with the
IAEA, will be important as we move forward. We expect to
continue our close collaboration as we work toward the DPRK's
verifiable abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing
nuclear programs.

Thank you, Madame Chairwoman.
SCHULTE