Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA87
2009-02-27 11:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/INDIA - INDIA'S ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL: A

Tags:  ENRG IAEA KNNP MNUC PARM TRGY ETTC IN 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 UNVIE VIENNA 000087 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, ISN, SCA
DOE FOR NA-24 - SCHEINMAN; NA-243 GOOREVICH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: ENRG IAEA KNNP MNUC PARM TRGY ETTC IN
SUBJECT: IAEA/INDIA - INDIA'S ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL: A
LIMITED STEP FORWARD

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)

Summary
------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 UNVIE VIENNA 000087

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, ISN, SCA
DOE FOR NA-24 - SCHEINMAN; NA-243 GOOREVICH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2019
TAGS: ENRG IAEA KNNP MNUC PARM TRGY ETTC IN
SUBJECT: IAEA/INDIA - INDIA'S ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL: A
LIMITED STEP FORWARD

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d)

Summary
--------------


1. (C) The IAEA has added to the Board agenda for next week
an Additional Protocol (AP) for India. The document was
circulated for Member State consideration mid-day Thursday,
26 February. The draft text basically contains an obligation
to provide limited reporting on exports to non nuclear
weapons states (NNWS). It does not even go as far as the
AP's for Russia and China, the weakest among NWS, and is
viewed in the Safeguards Department and the Office of the
Legal Advisor as setting a bad precedent for not only
Pakistan, but Brazil. EXPO and the DG's office however,
defend it as the better than no AP. The document includes an
introductory note which describes the background to the
document, exchanges of letters between India and the
Secretariat, including the fact that the Secretariat
suggested India include measures that would serve the
objectives of safeguards effectiveness and efficiency. India
rejected this attempt and limited the text to providing for
reporting on exports to NNWS, the designation of and visas
for inspectors, and communications systems. Given heavy U.S.
involvement in getting India to this point, we should be
prepared to support India in the Board. We anticipate India
will expect us to make a statement noting that India is the
first non NPT/non-CSA state to conclude an AP, and urge Board
approval of the document. We have not yet heard of any State
wishing to object, but some are beginning to express concern
about the lateness of the document and its limited nature.
End summary


2. (C) In their January meting at the Munich Security
Conference, Indian NSA Narayanan underlined to DG ElBaradei
India's interest in concluding the India AP before the
Congress government goes to polls this spring. Underlining
that the GOI wanted to have the AP as part of its legacy,

regardless of what comes next, Narayanan reportedly promised
to keep the Indian bureaucracy moving towards completion.
Following further rounds of negotiations, DG ElBaradei spoke
on the phone with Acting Prime Minister Mukerjee, agreeing on
the text that was circulated February 26. Speaking with DCM
on February 25, Assistant Director Vilmos Cserveny
acknowledged that some would consider this a "Mickey Mouse
Additional Protocol." However, he underlined, this agreement
should be understood as another step forward in the ongoing
process of bringing India into the nonproliferation
mainstream.


3. (C) Secretariat officials in the Department of Safeguards
and Office of the Legal Advisor describe the negotiations as
very similar to those to conclude the India safeguards
agreement. They put a lot of work into drafting a text,
using the opportunity to set a good example, with the goal of
providing for safeguards on India's civilian nuclear program,
and eventually permit implementation of integrated safeguards
on the civil program, thus achieving efficient and effective
safeguards implementation in India. They now feel they
wasted their time. In the view of these officials, the
Indians approached the discussions trying to get away with as
little as possible. They stripped out much of what the
Secretariat had proposed. Operations officials are visibly
disappointed, and reluctant to discuss the matter.
Safeguards officials have confided their concern not only
that Pakistan, the most logical country, will eventually
attempt to follow India's example, but also Brazil. Brazil
objects regularly to the need to conclude an AP, viewing the
instrument as voluntary and only necessary as a confidence
building measure for certain countries.


4. (SBU) The text presented for Board consideration is the
most limited AP presented to date. Despite the fact that
India is not an official NWS, the AP does not go as far as
even Russia's or China's APs. It does not provide for
additional access to elements of India's civil nuclear
program that are not already under safeguards (no
complementary access),but substantively only provides for
reporting on exports to NNWS, not on activities involving
NNWS, R&D, or reporting on imports.


5. (C) Comment: It is likely many Member States had
expected a limited AP for India, but we should be prepared
should any express concern at just how limited this one is.

UNVIE VIEN 00000087 002 OF 002


The USG should be have remarks to express support for India
in the Board, should others criticize India, or suggest
delaying a Board decision due to limited time for review.
The Secretariat frequently provides AP's for Board
consideration at the last minute, but we anticipate some
arguing those AP's closely track the INFCIRC/540 model. We
could emphasize that the AP is not a requirement for
INFCIRC/66 states, that India is the first, and Member States
should expect the text to deviate from the model.
Our remarks should also emphasize we see this AP as just one
more step in the year's long process of bringing India into
compliance with international non-proliferational norms.
SCHULTE