VIENNA PERMREPS URGE U.S. ACTION ON CTBT,

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000086

SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, IO, AND ISN
DOE FOR NA-20
NRC FOR MDOANE AND JSCHWARTZMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2014
TAGS: AORC TRGY MNUC KNNP XF
SUBJECT: VIENNA PERMREPS URGE U.S. ACTION ON CTBT,
DISARMAMENT, AND ENGAGEMENT WITH NAM/G-77

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) Summary: In a series of recent lunches, eighteen
Vienna PermReps provided Ambassador their advice to the new
Administration on advancing the multilateral agenda here,
especially in the IAEA. Common themes and thought-provoking
perspectives, especially from NAM/G-77 counterparts, included:

-- The U.S. should ratify the CTBT and rally other
significant countries to sign and ratify. U.S. leadership on
CTBT, toward a verifiable FMCT, and on other issues can
"catalyze" others to action.

-- Serious engagement (in non-Vienna fora) on disarmament
per Article VI of the NPT would improve the atmosphere in
Vienna, and may even be held by some states as a prerequisite
to movement on parts of the IAEA nonproliferation agenda.

-- Resolution of the three disparate nonproliferation cases
Iran, Syria and the DPRK, but especially resolving Iran's
defiance of Board and UNSC decisions, is vital to the IAEA.

-- Selection of the next Director General is the greatest
factor in setting the Agency's future. The main difference
between the two candidates is on the question of "how
political" the IAEA should behave.

-- "Politicization" of the IAEA is inevitable because
interests, including commercial ones, are in play.
Politicization is bitterest over issues in the Middle East,
in part over the issue of NPT universality. The solution to
Israeli-Arab differences will not flow from Vienna; rather,
taking Middle East politics out of the agenda of this
"technical" agency is a decision that must be made and
enforced in capitals.

-- In other Vienna agencies, U.S. focus on narcotics in
Afghanistan and on combating human trafficking are especially
welcome and apt to meet with broad cooperation.

End Summary.


2. (U) Between January 27 and February 4 Ambassador Schulte
hosted four lunches with selected counterparts grouped by
region. The line-ups were:

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico
Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa
Afghanistan, India, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia
Czech Republic, Ireland, Philippines, Switzerland, Turkey

All these states currently sit on the IAEA Board of Governors
except Chile, Morocco, Nigeria, and the Czech Republic (EU
Presidency).


3. (U) In opening remarks on each occasion the Ambassador
stressed the new Administration's commitment to
multilateralism, U.S. support for the IAEA and UNODC, and the
ongoing review of our posture toward the CTBT. In "listening
mode," he solicited views on how the U.S. can work better
with others in Vienna organizations.

Change They Want to Believe In
--------------


4. (SBU) All counterparts welcomed the tone of the new
Administration and acknowledged an atmosphere of great
expectations (though acknowledging delivery would be more
difficult). Many echoed the statement of the Moroccan
ambassador: "Multilateral diplomacy cannot work without the
U.S." The Swiss Ambassador said many countries would adjust
national policies to U.S. actions and that the U.S. can "have
a catalyzing effect." Saudi Arabia's ambassador was among
the most effusive in praising the obvious "strong will to be
engaged," the fast start on Middle East diplomacy as well as
the appointment of Special Envoy Holbrooke. Mexico also
welcomed the "change in attitude" and hoped for greater
understanding by the U.S. for other countries' roles and
voices in multilateral fora. Brazil hoped there would be a
better understanding of the consequences of U.S. actions --
these consequences were all the more important, Chile's
ambassador added, as the U.S. moves in new policy directions.
Reflecting on the "change" message, Argentina's ambassador
said he was watching to see whether President Obama would be
a "Reformist Pope" or a "Luther."


5. (SBU) Counterparts' observations about the global
nonproliferation regime at this time of U.S. transition
included some cautionary and skeptical notes, as well, e.g.,:

South Africa: Sending Sen. Mitchell so early to the Middle
East sends a good signal. The Middle East requires a
comprehensive approach. The IAEA is not the place to settle
all these issues, but will "piggyback" on progress elsewhere
once the right signals are sent.

Egypt (DCM): The NPT is on "very shaky ground and could be
replaced," but in meantime it is all we have. In Vienna, we
suffered a "huge crisis of confidence" in recent years. Lack
of confidence can result from misperception or "actions";
overcoming distrust borne of actions is harder. On
nonproliferation, the U.S. has sent contradictory messages.
On one hand, we want more stringent measures to stop nuclear
proliferation. But there is a strong perception that in some
cases we "implement the opposite." The India deal is one
example, and we "find all sorts of reasons not to clear about
Israel."

Argentina: The India civil nuclear cooperation deal
demonstrated that the U.S. was prepared to throw out NPT
principles when it came to "good business."

Agenda of the IAEA
--------------


6. (SBU) Noting UN Ambassador Rice's comments on Iran,
Chilean Ambassador and former IAEA Board Chair Skoknic
welcomed the change and openness to a new approach. He cited
four long-term issues confronting the IAEA: fuel supply; the
Future of the Agency/budget; nonproliferation cases in Iran,
Syria and DPRK (though these are not the same in character);
and strengthening safeguards. The Chilean noted that fuel
supply assurance is linked to the nuclear renaissance and
said any fuel assurance mechanism needed to balance NPT
rights and nonproliferation.


7. (SBU) Addressing the future and structure of the IAEA,
both the Czech and Swiss ambassadors saw the selection of the
next Director General (DG) as the central discussion. Swiss
Ambassador Schaller observed that a "North-South" divide in
the Agency could not be ignored and required bridge-building.
The question of "how political the Agency should behave" was
what separated the two candidates to be DG, in Schaller's
view. While one (Amano of Japan) would emphasize the
Agency's technical excellence and service to Member States,
the other (Minty of South Africa) saw himself more as an
activist bridge-builder. Also on the Future of the Agency,
Brazil's ambassador stressed the necessity to look to the
future and not cling to notions that do not even "belong to
the present." The U.S. should be pragmatic, including as
regards safeguards and reliable access to nuclear fuel (RANF).


8. (SBU) Agency technical cooperation (TC) was, in the
Argentine Ambassador's view, not focused as it should be on
national capacity building (especially for those who are
starting from zero toward nuclear power or other
applications). The ambassador said Agency procurement is
"scandalous" (he did not expand on this). The debate over
doubling the budget should await the selection of the next
DG, he added, but we needed clarity on what we want, how to
implement, and how much it would cost. Malaysia, conversely,
welcomed the signal of U.S. intent to "double the budget" but
hoped TC would be a beneficiary. The Malaysian ambassador
asked for U.S. help in expanding the TC program, either in
its current extra-budgetary form or under the regular budget.
India's ambassador said doubling the budget was a long-term
task and should be discussed in the framework of Board Vice
Chair Kauppi's open-ended discussion rounds on the Future of
the Agency. Budget realities could not be separated from the
discussion of the Agency's mission.

Fuel Bank/Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel (RANF)
-------------- --


9. (SBU) Several counterparts picked up on Ambassador
Schulte's observation that the new Administration had
signaled support for an International Nuclear Fuel Bank.
Turkey's ambassador advocated a discussion involving all IAEA
Member States. As a country "on the verge" of a functioning
nuclear power sector, Turkey would be "very careful" in
addressing the issue. Ireland's ambassador characterized as
"underwhelming" the DG's written reply to the EU letter
announcing its fuel bank pledge. As reported in UNVIE 0047,
Brazilian Ambassador Guerreiro saw the fuel bank as a "thorny
issue", questioned the conceptual framework and goals of the
various proposals, and asked whether all the effort on RANF
is worth the trouble.


10. (C) Egypt's DCM exemplified NAM/G-77 suspicions by
asking rhetorically why "only now" when developing countries
were becoming serious about having nuclear power was there an
emphasis on internationalizing the fuel cycle. In a separate
luncheon, Philippine Ambassador Lacanlale hinted at the
remedy to these suspicions, saying that on too many issues
delegations "mouthed the same positions" because they did not
know the "nuts and bolts" of issues. We needed "awareness
raising" about the Agency, she said. Other delegations, she
acknowledged, posed the same questions repeatedly despite
getting answers; there had to be some honesty about why some
countries "deeply reject" certain issues. (See also below on
Middle East.)

Safeguards, Security, and Safety
--------------


11. (SBU) During the first of these gatherings, Ecuador's
ambassador emphasized the need to improve the environment and
create a less confrontational, more constructive atmosphere
for dialogue; Member States should not politicize this
technical agency. However, Brazil observed that what may be
a political issue for one member state may not be so for
another, citing the Syrian case of "possible non-compliance"
and the political and technical issues on Iran. Argentine
Ambassador Curia argued that the IAEA was, in fact, a highly
politicized agency with a "technical patina" because we deal
with nuclear issues that involve big business as well as
national security. Handling of Iran, Syria and DPRK would be
the test of whether change in the U.S. approach would be
"reformist or Lutheran," Curia said. But talk of
"depoliticizing the Agency" was meaningless, he continued;
every country had its national position. Ecuadorian
Ambassador Moreno replied that he sought more of a focus on
common interests and common goals.


12. (SBU) Regarding the Iran case in particular, Morocco's
ambassador hoped the new U.S. Special Envoy would come to
Vienna so states could share their ideas. Ambassador Zniber
said we should avoid waiting for a new Iranian president
after the June elections in Iran, but should send the message
that our policy is not determined by who is president in
Iran. Nigeria's ambassador encouraged the U.S. not to let
itself be distracted from efforts to build understanding with
Iran. Irish Ambassador Cogan echoed others when he said that
despite political divisions among Member States the Agency
could not avoid exercising its role on Iran and Syria.
Iran's obligations to the Security Council were clear, and on
Syria we needed assurance that safeguards obligations were
not being breached. The Czech ambassador went so far as to
say the "fate of the Agency will be determined" by how we
resolve the Iranian case and Iran's defiance. He asked if
individual NAM states could prevail on Iran to join a
constructive way out.


13. (C) On other safeguards matters, Chilean Ambassador and
recent Board Chair Skoknic said "politicization" stemmed from
the issue of NPT universality in the Middle East; without
addressing Israel's NPT status it would be difficult to
advance. European ambassadors regretted that the Middle East
Safeguards/Israel debate in the General Conference had become
repetitive and characterized by "hot air." Turkey's
Ambassador Ertay said the solution to the IAEA Middle East
discussion lay not in Vienna; we had to start early in
capitals to engage constructively. The Philippine Ambassador
also appealed for early, frequent outreach by developed
countries to individual NAM states on this and other
controversial matters. Many NAM positions, she noted, were
based in a sense that "double standards" applied. Engaging
with Iran as a fellow NAM state or taking a more moderate
line on Middle East safeguards matters were decisions that
had to me made at ministerial level in capitals. Delegations
from countries disinclined to support a hard-line position
would not speak up, within NAM counsels, for moderation or
cooperation without clear instructions to do so.

Disarmament
--------------


14. (SBU) Acknowledging that action on disarmament would
occur in other locales and fora, many Vienna PermReps saw the
issue as influential for the working atmosphere here.
Ireland's Ambassador said "new, fresh wind" was needed in the
NPT Prep Com discussions, and he and several others saw
prospective U.S. moves in bilateral disarmament and on the
CTBT and FMCT as positive impulses. Malaysia's and Morocco's
ambassadors were among several interested in the U.S. posture
on going to zero. Mexico sought more discussion of vertical
disarmament. The Swiss Ambassador said notions of linking
nonproliferation and arms control in shaping the IAEA's
future constituted a significant issue. A big debate would
ensue in his country, he predicted, on any proposal that the
IAEA be charged with "verifying" arms control obligations.
With a focus on Vienna and the IAEA General Conference,
Moroccan Ambassador Zniber said we needed to move soon to
start to rebuild confidence. Israel, Zniber said, "should be
treated on its own merits" in regard to nuclear issues and
the NPT. Morocco had signed the NPT with five Nuclear
Weapons States "and no more."


15. (SBU) South African Ambassador Gumbi spoke extensively
on disarmament: It is good to see discussion of "zero
option." NGOs/civil society will drive us forward in this
area. The U.S. change on FMCT is welcome. On new issues, we
will "watch closely and hold you accountable," especially in
terms of taking a leadership role. On missile defense, the
U.S. was "provoking" Russia. Here in Vienna, the fuel bank
issue can only move forward in linkage to progress on
disarmament, and cannot include any attempt to "re-write"
Article IV of the NPT.

CTBT
--------------


16. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte asked each group for patience
as the Administration and Senate work out priorities,
including action on the financial crisis and the economy,
confirming senior officials, and holding hearings on pending
treaties including the CTBT. The general response in every
discussion was "just do it," ratify already, and many
ambassadors asked about the timeframe of Senate action.
Several pointed out that the Article 14 conference in New
York in September would be an opportunity to demonstrate
strong support for CTBT. Nigeria's Ambassador called the
CTBT "uppermost in our mind," and he regretted it had "taken
forever" to move toward full entry into force. Turkey's
Ambassador said his government had supported the CTBT all
along and welcomed the "important shift of attitude" in the
USG. Malaysia's Ambassador regretted the U.S. posture toward
the CTBT in the past and hoped that beyond ratifying, the
U.S. would give an impetus to others to sign and ratify
(India, whose ambassador was present, being the intended
recipient of the message). India's ambassador argued that
the CTBTO Technical Secretariat should have the mandate to
identify events as nuclear tests based on objective evidence,
while the political decision of how to respond to the fact of
a test should lie with governments.

Comment
--------------


17. (SBU) These fairly open-ended conversations in the
Administration's early days, and preparatory to the
Ambassador's own Washington consultations, sometimes ranged
far afield of the agenda or mandates of Vienna-based
international organizations. They conveyed the context in
which other capitals weigh what happens in Vienna. We heard
clearly and frequently messages of willingness to engage with
the new Administration and to see the U.S. extending hands in
untested directions. This applied to objectives of high
policy such as bringing the CTBT into force, but also to more
detailed matters of overseeing management of the IAEA (and
UNODC) or addressing the dysfunctional dynamic of Middle East
issues in the General Conference. On the issue of RANF in
particular, Mission is acting on the Philippine ambassador's
advice by reaching out to NAM-member states we believe are
most ready to discuss the practicalities of the issue.
Despite the positive tones reported here, however, subsequent
engagement in the IAEA Board Room, in technical and informal
meetings leading up to the March Board meeting and the spring
budget process, have reaffirmed that Iran and its allies are
determined to disrupt and politicize IAEA deliberations
across the board.
SCHULTE