IAEA/SYRIA: DIRECTOR GENERAL REPEATS CALL FOR

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000071

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

ISN/RA FOR NEPHEW AND DANIEL, IO/T FOR GOLDSTEIN, NEA FOR
MONZ, CIA FOR HORIO

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PARM SY KN IAEA KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: DIRECTOR GENERAL REPEATS CALL FOR
SYRIAN COOPERATION IN MARCH BOARD REPORT

REF: 08 UNVIE 00612

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Summary
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1. (SBU) The Director General's February 19 report on
Syria's undeclared nuclear activities is more categorical
than his November report in re-focusing the Agency's nearly
year-long investigation on Syrian noncooperation. Most
importantly, the report debunks the Syrian red-herring
allegation that the man-made uranium particles came from
Israeli munitions. The technical analysis of the uranium
samples stipulates that there is a low probability this could
be the case and further notes that the uranium is not of the
type found in Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material.
With additional particles now detected, it will be more
difficult for Syria to deflect this issue. The report places
the emphasis back on Syria's failure to respond to Agency
requests for information and access to debris and locations,
as outlined in the November report. The DG underlines that
without Syria's cooperation, the IAEA will be unable to
complete its assessment. Taking a page from the Iranian
playbook, Syria delivered an eleventh-hour letter on February
17 attempting to demonstrate a degree of cooperation
immediately before the report's release. Helpfully, the
report also sees through this stratagem, noting that Syria's
"only partial answers" failed to address most of the Agency's
questions.


2. (SBU) Overall, the report is a clear improvement over the
November report but whether this will substantially change
the dynamic in the Board Room will also depend on the tenor
of the DG's opening remarks. Although it will be difficult
for NAM and Arab group defenders of Syria to applaud
"cooperation" on the basis of the report, a change in the
DG's tone at the Board or a development in the next week,
e.g. involving minimal cooperation by Syria, could prompt
some Board members to again rally behind Syria. Notably,
there is no broad condemnation of Israel's bombing in the
report, though the DG may again harken back to this in his
opening remarks and NAM/Arab Board members will certainly not
lose any opportunity to castigate Israel for violating
international law. Some Board members are also likely to
focus on the Director General's call, at the end of the
report, upon Israel and others to provide information and
satellite imagery, which the DG may also repeat in his
opening remarks as he did in November.


3. (SBU) Taken together, the two IAEA reports on Syria
provide a compelling technical case for continued
investigations into claims of undeclared nuclear activities
in Syria. As the evidence mounts, and if Syria continues to
stonewall, pressure will build for Board action. The
negative dynamics on the Board and the DG's stance do not
allow for consideration of a resolution on Syria's
noncooperation at this juncture. As the Israeli Ambassador
has noted, Syria does not present an imminent proliferation
risk but eventually the Board will have to respond to
maintain the credibility of Agency safeguards. Our immediate
objective in the March Board will be to solicit more forceful
national statements, which on the basis of this report should
be forthcoming, with exception of the NAM troika (Cuba,
Egypt, Malaysia). Mission will also support the public
release of this report and seek to undo the negative
precedent set in November when Cuba and Egypt blocked release
of the Syria report. NAM/Arab Board members would be
hard-pressed to bring this issue to a vote given that they
would lose, and blocking release lends the appearance that
Syria has something to hide. End Summary.

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Call for Syria to Cooperate
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4. (SBU) The Director General's report on the Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic
(GOV/2009/9),released on February 19, strengthens the case
against Syria and puts the onus on the need for Syrian
cooperation for the IAEA to complete its assessment. The DG
departs from his usual rhetoric that focuses on the
unilateral use of force and the late provision of information
concerning the building at Al-Kibar (referred to in the
report as Dair Alzour) and instead lists out the specific
areas in which Syria should cooperate, areas that have been
conveyed to Syria on numerous occasions. The list includes


provision of additional information and supporting
documentation about the past use and nature of the building
at the Al-Kibar site, information about the procurement
activities, access to other locations alleged to be related
to Al-Kibar, and access to sample destroyed and salvaged
equipment and debris from the Al-Kibar site.


5. (SBU) Taking a page from the Iranian playbook, Syria
delivered an eleventh-hour letter on 17 February attempting
to demonstrate a degree of cooperation immediately before the
report's release. The report notes that while Syria's letter
responds to "some of the questions" raised by the Agency, the
responses in the Syria letter "were only partial" and did not
address "most of the questions raised in the Agency's
communications." Syria did not receive the desired
recognition for its efforts in the report.

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Additional Uranium Identified in Samples
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6. (SBU) The Agency identified new uranium particles in the
samples taken during the Agency's visit to Al-Kibar in June
2007, in addition to the "significant number of natural
uranium particles" first identified in the November 2008
Board report (GOV/2008/60). These new particles are also
anthropogenic (or man-made). Furthermore, the Agency notes
that all the uranium particles identified to-date "are of a
type not included in Syria's declared inventory of nuclear
material." Press reports provide additional details
regarding the environmental samples not identified in the DG
reports; that the uranium was "uranium dioxide" according to
a senior UN official, and that graphite (although not
specifically "nuclear-grade" graphite) had been found in the
samples. (Comment: The U.S. assesses the nuclear reactor
under construction at Al-Kibar was a graphite-moderated,
gas-cooled reactor-type, which uses uranium metal fuel. End
comment.) The DG dispels the notion that the man-made
uranium, identified at Al-Kibar by numerous Laboratories in
the Agency's Network of Analytic Laboratories, was introduced
by Israeli missiles that destroyed the site in September

2007. The DG calls this a "low probability" due to the
isotopic composition, chemical composition, and morphology of
the particles, which are "all inconsistent with what would be
expected from the use of uranium based munitions."

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Unhelpful Element
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7. (SBU) In what appears to have been added almost as an
afterthought at the end of the report, the Director General
injects an element of unhelpful "balance" after calling for
Syrian cooperation -- a call on Israel and other States to
provide information and imagery. Some Board statements will
likely reflect this "balance" which detracts from the
report's focus on Syrian noncooperation, and some may also
harken back to conspiracy theories about the lack of
commercial imagery. U.S. and likeminded statements should
underline steadfast support for the investigation to mitigate
this unhelpful element.

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Procurement
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8. (SBU) Other than the new uranium findings, the only other
area in which the Agency continued to make progress was in
its review of Syrian efforts to procure materials and
equipment which could support the construction and operation
of a nuclear reactor. Additional details are not provided
about the specific procurements, although the February 17
letter from Damascus responded to some of the Agency's
questions in this regard, which the Agency is now assessing.

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Building the Case
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9. (SBU) This new report does not repeat the Agency's
analysis of satellite imagery and other information, as it
first reported in its November report. In November, the
Agency made a compelling case for continued investigations in
Syria with the uranium findings and its assessment that the
containment structure of the destroyed facility at Al-Kibar
"appears to have been similar in dimension and layout to that

required for a biological shield for nuclear reactors," and
the "overall size of the building was sufficient to house the
equipment needed for a nuclear reactor of the type alleged."
In addition, the November report noted the water pumping
infrastructure at the site had enough pumping capacity "for a
reactor of the size referred to in the allegation" as well as
"sufficient electrical capacity to operate the pumping
system."


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Comment
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10. (SBU) Despite the stark report, Syria will undoubtedly
seek to rally support by reminding Member States that Syria
has cooperated with the Agency as required by its Safeguards
Agreement. Its agreement to allow inspectors to visit
Al-Kibar, which it claims is not nuclear-related and,
therefore, not on the Agency's list of declared nuclear
sites, is technically considered going beyond the letter of
the law with its Safeguards Agreement. While the Agency
raises compelling and legitimate questions in order to
conclude there are no undeclared nuclear material or
activities in Syria, its hands are tied without Syria's
"goodwill" or invoking special inspections. In addition,
Syria refuses to sign the Additional Protocol while Israel
remains out of the NPT, which could also be an instrument for
the Agency to use to gain access to additional sites. Strong
member statements during the March Board urging Syrian
cooperation will be imperative to move the Agency's
investigation forward.
SCHULTE