Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA67
2009-02-18 16:57:00
UNCLASSIFIED
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA MARCH BOARD: PREVIEW AND ANALYSIS

Tags:  AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY 
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VZCZCXYZ0003
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0067/01 0491657
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 181657Z FEB 09

FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9018
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000067 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA, ISN/RA
NA-243-GOOREVICH/OEHLBERT, BRUNNS; NA-241 O'CONNOR, SIEMON;
NA21-CUMMINS, ILIOPULOS; NE- MCGINNIS, PEKO, CLAPPER
NRC FOR OIP - DUNN LEE, HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY
SUBJECT: IAEA MARCH BOARD: PREVIEW AND ANALYSIS

Ref: A) UNVIE 0047 and previous; B) Wickes-Timbie email 2/13/2009

----------------------
March Board Objectives
----------------------
UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000067

SIPDIS

STATE FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA, ISN/RA
NA-243-GOOREVICH/OEHLBERT, BRUNNS; NA-241 O'CONNOR, SIEMON;
NA21-CUMMINS, ILIOPULOS; NE- MCGINNIS, PEKO, CLAPPER
NRC FOR OIP - DUNN LEE, HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY
SUBJECT: IAEA MARCH BOARD: PREVIEW AND ANALYSIS

Ref: A) UNVIE 0047 and previous; B) Wickes-Timbie email 2/13/2009

--------------
March Board Objectives
--------------

1.(SBU) The March 2-6 IAEA Board of Governors meeting, the first
meeting under President Obama's Administration, will be a platform
to enunciate enhanced U.S. support for the IAEA and renewed
commitment to multilateral cooperation. Mission recommends that
U.S. interventions at the Board reflect an overarching objective of
building a robust IAEA that can effectively fulfill its nuclear
safeguards, safety and security mandate and promote peaceful use of
nuclear technology. Other delegations and the IAEA Secretariat will
also closely track U.S. statements for signals of policy shifts,
particularly on Iran and Syria. With this in mind, our objectives
should include:

-- Ensuring that the election of the next Director General is
conducted in a timely manner with minimal disruption while securing
Board support for DG term limits;

--Urging cooperation by Iran with the IAEA investigation, i.e.
Iran's blockage of the investigation while ramping up its enrichment
capacity is not an acceptable status quo, and such cooperation would
take forward momentum on diplomatic engagement and direct dialogue;


-- Signaling continued support for IAEA verification in Syria with
an appropriate technical focus on the need for Syrian cooperation
and access to debris and locations;

-- Seek preliminary Board discussion of an International Nuclear
Fuel Bank (INFB) and the Russian fuel assurance proposal with a view
toward approval by the June Board.

The Arab Group may seek to further politicize the Syria
investigation via counter-claims against Israel and raise the
alleged use of Depleted Uranium (DU) munitions in Gaza under the
Safety Review Agenda item or Any Other Business (reftel). USDEL
should be ready to deflate Arab Group efforts that go beyond the
mandate of the IAEA as a technical agency or that inappropriately
link the issue of depleted uranium in Gaza with natural uranium
found via the safeguards investigation in Syria.



2. (SBU) U.S. statements should take the high road and focus on the
Administration's support for the IAEA as an institution, including
in areas covered by the Safety and Nuclear Technology reviews, i.e.
safety, security and technical cooperation. Agenda items on nuclear
verification in Iran and Syria will be previewed septel upon the
issuance of the respective DG reports. Although largely a
placeholder, the DPRK agenda item affords an opportunity to reaffirm
the new Administration's commitment to the Six Party Process and
IAEA role in verification. Toward the end of the Board session, the
Chair will report on her consultations with Board members regarding
the candidates for Director General. USDEL should express support
for a timely and transparent process to elect the next DG and
strenuously oppose any effort to postpone the election process until
June. Although not yet on the Provisional Agenda, Geneva Group and
other delegations are formally requesting the addition of an item on
institutionalizing term limits for the Director General. An
International Fuel Bank (INFB) is also not on the current agenda but
Mission is consulting with the Director General on addition of an
INFB as an information item for the March Board. Whether under a
specific agenda item or "Any Other Business," the U.S. statement on
an INFB should focus on the need to move forward with the
establishment of an INFB, consistent with the Administration's
advocacy of this initiative. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
Agenda Item 1: DG's Introductory Statement
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) As is customary, the Director General will elaborate on his
reports to the Board on each agenda item. On DPRK, the DG's oral
remarks will substitute for a written report. Mission seeks to
encourage the Director General to support an International Fuel Bank
(INFB) initiatives in his introductory statement, in particular to
seek Board approval of an INFB by June. DG ElBaradei is unlikely to
comment on the election process for his successor. He may urge
Member State support for the proposed 2010 budget increase and the
Future of the Agency discussion in his remarks. No U.S. statement
is appropriate; any comments should be reserved for the particular
agenda item or AOB.
-------------- --------------
Agenda Item 2: Applications for Membership
-------------- --------------


4. (U) The Secretariat has not received new applications for IAEA
membership and the item is likely to drop from the agenda. Mission
will seek guidance if any new applications are forthcoming.

-------------- --------------
Agenda Item 3: 2008 Nuclear Safety Review
-------------- --------------


5. (U) The Safety Review agenda item will be the first time the U.S.
takes the floor in the Board under the Obama Administration. After
first noting that fact, the U.S. statement should begin with a broad
expression of support for a robust IAEA, including in the areas of
nuclear safety and security covered by the 2008 Nuclear Safety
Review, "Measures to Strengthen International Cooperation in
Nuclear, Radiation and Transport Safety and Waste Management"
(GOV/2009/2). This report is supplemented by two Notes: "Safety
related events and activities worldwide during 2008" (2009/Note 4)
and "The Agency's safety standards: activities during 2008"
(2009/Note 5). The U.S. should take note of all three documents and
highlight the following:

--Safety is Essential: The IAEA has developed the Global Nuclear
Safety Regime in these documents, underlining that nuclear safety s
an important global responsibility. It is essential that all Member
States take this responsibility seriously and ensure that all
activities involving radioactive materials or nuclear technology are
performed in accordance with the highest levels of safety. The U.S.
should commend the IAEA for its significant impact on improvement of
the Global Nuclear Safety Regime. The U.S. should encourage Member
States to continue to stress the importance of safety by enacting
rigorous legislation, establishing strong independent safety
regulators, and making nuclear safety a priority.

-- Continuous Improvement: The IAEA stresses the need for countries
not to become complacent about safety. Most of the more than 400
nuclear power facilities operating in the world today have
maintained very good safety records and statistics show that safety
worldwide has been steadily increasing. However, Member States
cannot become complacent and must continue to focus on safety. Many
nuclear plants are facing ageing issues since they are 40 years old
or older. The aging work force is also a concern, as experienced
plant operators, and safety regulators are reaching retirement age,
and there are large shortages of highly training qualified workers
to fill the gap. The U.S. should state that these issues require a
renewed commitment to keeping safety a priority. Member States
cannot rest on their laurels of past safety performance while facing
such large issues of maintaining an aging infrastructure. The U.S.
should encourage Member States to maintain vigilance on safety of
existing facilities by making use of IAEA peer review services,
seeking out the lessons learned from other Member States and sharing
operational feedback information, and by bi-lateral and
multi-lateral cooperation on safety issues.

-- New Entrants: The Safety Review refers to the large number of
countries that have expressed interest in nuclear power. The IAEA
stresses that the same high level of safety currently applied to
operating reactors must be applied to new and future reactors. High
levels of safety and quality cannot be rushed and adequate time must
be devoted to establishing a rigorous safety infrastructure to
support the planning, bidding and construction stage of any reactor
program. The nuclear industry is already seeing shortages of
qualified workers to support current facilities and Member States
must focus on capacity building. The U.S. should encourage Member
States to continue to fully integrate a focus on safety during the
planning and scheduling phases of any new facility; participate in
international safety cooperation and collaboration activities; to
increase safety infrastructures, and to sign up to the international
safety conventions.

--Safety Conventions: The 4th meeting of the Convention on Nuclear
Safety was held in 2008 and the next meeting of the Joint Convention
on Spent fuel will be held in 2009. The U.S. should encourage other
Member States to accede to Safety Conventions and praise the work
IAEA has done to promote these Conventions, thereby increasing the
safety and security of sources worldwide.


6. (U) The Safety Review also encompasses nuclear security programs.
The U.S. statement should underline the importance we attribute to
nuclear security and combating nuclear terrorism. We can highlight
specific U.S. initiatives on supporting nuclear and other
radiological security, emergency response, border radiation
detection, conversion of research reactors from HEU to LEU, secure
transportation of radiological sources and collaboration with the
IAEA on overall HEU minimization globally.


7. (SBU) Note: The Arab Group may raise its request for an IAEA
investigation of possible depleted uranium contamination in Gaza
under the Safety Review agenda item. Mission recommends that the
U.S. not engage this debate unless Arab Group members delve into
areas outside the IAEA's mandate, or make erroneous attempts to link
it to the Agency's safeguards function. A short contingency
statement should focus on the technical findings of previous IAEA
and UNEP depleted uranium studies, namely that DU has not caused any
significant health concerns. The U.S. should note that the IAEA
mandate relevant to DU does not extend beyond such health and safety
surveys. End Note.

-------------- --------------
Agenda Item 4: Nuclear Technology Review
-------------- --------------


8. (U) The U.S. statement under this agenda item should underline
support for research and development of peaceful uses of nuclear
technology, a priority for the G-77, and the essential role of the
IAEA in helping Member States understand how nuclear technology is
best applied. The Agency's Nuclear Technology Review 2009 Report
(GOV/2009/3) highlights the expansion of nuclear energy worldwide,
and notes that new endeavors will not only help the environment but
will also bring increased activity to many sectors of the world
economy. The U.S. should express support for Agency's continued
role in helping spread nuclear technology for development purposes
as well as its role in the nuclear energy sector. Under this agenda
item we should also update the Board on our bilateral and
multilateral work with countries or mechanisms, including the Global
Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP),which promote the use of nuclear
energy in a safe and secure manner.


9. (SBU) Comment: Although the report is very comprehensive as
regards nuclear power, there are some concerns. A chart on regional
comparison of nuclear power costs (Figure A-1) indicates North
America has the highest estimated costs whereas Asia has the lowest.
Cost estimates are extremely difficult to define and obtain,
therefore, a regional comparison may be meaningless. This chart may
create a false impression that American technologies are too costly.
Furthermore, under section A.4: Additional factors affecting the
future of nuclear power, in addition to "costs", the report does not
mention factors such as oil price volatility, energy independence,
energy security, and policies aimed at curbing CO2 emissions, which
also affect decision-makers' consideration of nuclear energy as a
viable and reliable energy source to meet growing energy demand.
End Comment.


10. (U) The 2009 Report also speaks volumes about the Agency's work
in providing Technical Cooperation (TC) to Member States to promote
development in areas such as human health, agriculture, water
management, and cancer therapy. The breadth and depth of the IAEA TC
contributions to the world's developing societies, environment and
scientific understanding would not be possible without the
substantial U.S. annual contribution to the Technical Cooperation
Fund. Given the Obama Administration's recognition of development
as one of the core pillars of our foreign policy, these aspects of
the IAEA's work should be highlighted along with our expectation
that the Agency plan and implement projects that assist Member
States in attaining commitments to global development. There are
many examples of how nuclear technologies are being used to reach
development goals in many regions throughout the world. One such
application is the eradication of the insidious tsetse fly in Africa
by sterilization of the pest using radiation and release of sterile
males into the wild population in order to reduce the prevalence of
human and livestock disease in large areas of Africa. The U.S. has
traditionally supported this project not only monetarily but also
through cost-free experts and it is one of the IAEA's TC success
stories. A second TC "success story" is the use of nuclear
technology in the development of nutritional therapies in combating
diabetes, heart disease, and HIV/AIDS, while increasing
understanding of how nutrition effects growth and human development
from conception to adolescence. The U.S. statement can draw on
these and other examples of our support to IAEA Technical
Cooperation for development purposes.

-------------- --------------
Agenda Item 5a Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements, APs
-------------- --------------


11. (U) The Board will have before it a Comprehensive Safeguards
Agreement (CSA) and Additional Protocol (AP) with Djibouti for
approval. The Secretariat indicates that an AP with Bahrain may
also be submitted before the March Board. We still see an India AP
as unlikely for March. Recommendation and Action Request: Mission
should join consensus in approving Djibouti's CSA and AP and any
other agreements. USDEL may consider a short statement welcoming
the conclusion of APs, noting implementation of the U.S. AP, and
encouraging other countries to follow suit.

-------------- --------------
Agenda Item 5b Staff to be Used as Inspectors
-------------- --------------


12. (U) The Board Chair confirmed on February 17 that this item will
be dropped from the agenda and considered at a subsequent meeting.


-------------- --------------
Agenda Item 5c DPRK
-------------- --------------


13. (SBU) Although no written report is expected on the
implementation of safeguards in the DPRK, the Director General will
again provide a brief oral update to the Board on the Agency's
activities in country. The DG's remarks on disablement were less
detailed in his November 2008 Board statement than in previous
statements, only noting that the Agency has been monitoring
disabling activities and left it to the Six Parties to brief on the
results of any deliberations as "the Agency is not part of this
process." We expect his March remarks to provide limited details on
disablement.


14. (SBU) Mission anticipates interventions from the Six Party Talks
participants (China, Russia, Japan, and ROK),as well as from
Australia, Canada, France on behalf of the EU, South Africa, Cuba on
behalf of the NAM, Switzerland, and New Zealand. We expect Member
States will express continued support for the Six Party process and
call for a substantive, comprehensive role for the IAEA in the
verification process. Recommendation and Action Request: As the
first meeting under the Obama Administration, Mission recommends the
U.S. statement reaffirm our support for the Six Party process and
the IAEA's involvement in all stages of the implementation of the
September 2005 Joint Statement. To the extent possible, Mission
recommends the U.S. statement provide any updates on the status of
discussions or negotiations in the Six Party talks. In addition,
the U.S. statement should provide an update on disablement, which is
especially important now that the DG appears to be moving away from
providing details in his opening statement. We also should again
voice our support for UNSCR 1718, noting that it remains in effect.

-------------- --------------
Agenda Item 6 Appointment of the Director General
-------------- --------------


15. (SBU) In accordance with the Rules of Procedure on Appointment
of the Director General, the Board Chair will report to the Board on
the outcome of her consultations with Board members regarding the
two candidates, Japanese Governor Yukiya Amano and South African
Governor Abdul Minty. She will indicate that there is no consensus.
Recommendation and Action Request: By the time of the Board, we
hope that the Board Chair will have announced the timing of a
Special Session to conduct a formal vote, most likely on March 26.
If she has not, the U.S., in consultation with other like-minded
Board members, should deliver a strong statement urging a timely and
transparent process for appointment of the next Director General.
The statement should request a Special Session in March and deflect
any effort to delay a vote until June, noting past precedent and the
fact that holding a first vote in June would not allow any time for
a new call for nominations should the Board be deadlocked on the two
candidates, i.e. if neither of them can command the required
two-thirds vote. The U.S. should seek an early decision so as to
not drag out the process and exacerbate divisions on the Board. Any
U.S. statement should be careful to portray this as a procedural
matter and avoid the appearance of partiality toward a particular
candidate. The U.S. can make a general statement acknowledging DG
ElBaradei's stewardship of the Agency and looking forward to the
continuation of this work by the next Director General.


16. (U) The U.K. is also preparing to send a letter with several
co-sponsors, including the United States, to request the inclusion
of an agenda item on term limits for the Director General in order
to initiate a preliminary discussion. While most of the signatories
are from the Geneva Group, we have actively sought G-77 support so
that this is not perceived as a Western initiative. Recommendation
and Action Request: The U.S. should deliver a strong statement of
support for a two-term limit, consistent with best practices in
other international organizations. We should be prepared to respond
to possible G-77 arguments that previous IAEA Directors General have
not been held to a two-term limit.

-------------- --------------
Agenda Item 7: Personnel Matters
-------------- --------------


17. (U) Consistent with the UN salary scale adopted at the 63rd
UNGA, the Board is asked to approve a revision to the salary scale
for professional staff and higher (including the Director General)
at the IAEA. The IAEA has provisionally implemented the salary
scale with an increase of 2.33 percent since January 1 and it will
be applied on a no loss/no gain basis. Recommendation and Action
Request: USDEL should join consensus in approving the salary scale.
No statement is necessary.

-------------- --------------
Any Other Business: INFB
-------------- --------------


18. (SBU) Mission participated in a meeting with Russian and IAEA
Officials February 13 previewing Russian intent to raise their
proposal for a fuel assurance mechanism at the March Board under AOB
(ref B). The U.S. AOB statement should welcome the Russian proposal
preview and urge the DG to report to the June Board on the
Secretariat's views of the proposal and accompanying model
agreements. We will also continue to seek Board approval of an
International Nuclear Fuel Bank (INFB) by June. Mission seeks to
encourage statements, particularly by potential recipient countries,
calling for a more detailed discussion of Reliable Access to Nuclear
Fuel (RANF) proposals at the June Board.


19. (SBU) The U.S. and other states, primarily those with enrichment
capabilities, have previously and repeatedly expressed support for
the implementation of a RANF mechanism under AOB. An INFB or other
fuel assurances mechanism would be intended to supplement the
existing commercial market for nuclear fuel and create an incentive
for states voluntarily to choose the market over the development of
indigenous uranium enrichment capacity. The IAEA has received
several proposals for fuel assurance mechanisms, most of which are
complementary. As reported ref B, the IAEA Secretariat has elicited
agreement from Russia to establish a fuel reserve in Russia's
International Uranium Enrichment Center at Angarsk and is developing
concepts for an IAEA-administered fuel bank with initial funding
generated through the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) challenge
grant. In the face of bitter opposition from the G-77 expressed in
the September 2008 Board, the Director General has been unwilling to
bring any of these concepts to the Board or to lead publicly by
spurring consultation among Member States. Recent developments with
the Russian proposal may allay ElBaradei's misgivings, however,
Mission still believes Member States will need to call on the DG to
lead on the issue. Mission has also floated at the working level
with donors Norway, the UAE, and the EU the idea of a joint
statement in the Board; however the Czech Republic as Presidency is
already drafting an EU statement (for use under AoB) to formally
notify the Board of its 25 million Euro contribution to an INFB and
call for Board discussion of a concrete proposal. Mission will at a
minimum urge the UAE to make a statement in the Board formalizing
its pledge (as Norway did in November 2008) and calling for progress
toward implementation.

20.(SBU) Recommendation and Action Request: The U.S. statement
should reaffirm support for the safe, secure,
proliferation-resistant development of nuclear energy as a means of
meeting growing energy demands while mitigating the negative impact
of carbon emissions. We should reaffirm our support for RANF and an
INFB initiative, the implementation of which would aim to provide
assured supply of nuclear fuel for states that wish to have the
option of such a mechanism as they consider making nuclear power a
component of their sustainable economic development and national
energy policy. The statement should highlight U.S. support to an
INFB, welcome Russian proposal preview, and call upon the DG and
Secretariat to provide information to Member States prior to the
June Board on Russian and NTI proposals so the Board can make
necessary decisions on model agreements or use of NTI challenge
grant funding.