Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA573
2009-12-17 12:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
UNVIE
Cable title:  

WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT: PLENARY REPORT DECEMBER 2-3

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R 171235Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0441
INFO RUCNWSN/THE WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000573 

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DOD ALSO FOR DIR DTSA/ST AND DIR DTSA/STP
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USDOC FOR BXA/EA/OAS AND BXA/EA/OSTFPC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019
TAGS: ETTC KSTC PARM
SUBJECT: WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT: PLENARY REPORT DECEMBER 2-3

REF: A. UNVIE 522 - GENERAL WORKING GROUP REPORT OCTOBER

B. UNVIE 559 - REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE ON PLENARY
DECISION ON EXTENSION FOR HEAD OF
SECRETARIAT

C. SECSTATE 123508 - GUIDANCE FOR DECEMBER
WASSENAAR PLENARY

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Geoff Pyatt, Reason 1.4 (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000573

SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/CATR, T, PM/DTC, PM/RSAT
DOD FOR OSD: PDASD/S&TR, DUSD/TSP
DOD ALSO FOR DIR DTSA/ST AND DIR DTSA/STP
DOD ALSO FOR USD/(A&T)/ODUSD(I&CP) AND USD(A&T)/IDA
USDOC FOR BXA/EA/OAS AND BXA/EA/OSTFPC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019
TAGS: ETTC KSTC PARM
SUBJECT: WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT: PLENARY REPORT DECEMBER 2-3

REF: A. UNVIE 522 - GENERAL WORKING GROUP REPORT OCTOBER

B. UNVIE 559 - REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE ON PLENARY
DECISION ON EXTENSION FOR HEAD OF
SECRETARIAT

C. SECSTATE 123508 - GUIDANCE FOR DECEMBER
WASSENAAR PLENARY

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Geoff Pyatt, Reason 1.4 (d).


1. (C) Summary: Changes to the controls lists continues to be
the strong success story of the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)
Plenary meetings. Russian intransigence on policy issues
remains the stumbling block to progress on Best Practices.
The Russian head of delegation (Grigory Mashkov) refused to
approve a one-year extension of the current head of
secretariat, surprising the assembly by instead asking for a
two-year extension, to be approved through a silence
procedure because extension needed approval from Moscow. On
a positive note, the Plenary approved a U.S. proposal to
conduct a briefing on changes to the control lists, after the
U.S. delegation obtained Russian agreement. End Summary.

Head of Delegation Pre-Meeting


2. (C) The WA Plenary began inauspiciously at a December 1
Head of Delegation (HOD) meeting called by the Plenary Chair
to determine whether there was agreement on a number of
General Working Group (GWG) proposals that in October were
close to agreement. In October only France had objected to
Japan's proposed Best Practices on Internal Compliance
Programs, but expected to resolve these issues by the
Plenary. Japan posted a revised text on November 19 that
contained minor grammatical fixes, but at the HOD meeting
Russian Head of Delegation Grigory Mashkov claimed it had
been "70% changed" and therefore Russia needed more time to
review. A Danish proposal on transportation of arms that had
been held pending U.S. clearance, but subsequently approved
by the U.S., was also blocked by Russia based on its view
that the proposal went beyond the WA's mandate.


3. (C) With respect to the Russian proposal on Best Practices
on Re-Export Control, Poland took the lead in saying it was

working on a revised text that it thought would take into
account the concerns of all parties. Mashkov responded that
the EU statement at the May GWG created problems, because the
statement was a "take it or leave it" proposition and as such
was unacceptable. Furthermore, Russia objected to having an
entity (the EU) that is not a member of the WA dictate policy
in Wassenaar. (Note: At the May GWG, the Czech delegation,
as then EU president, issued a statement saying all EU
countries that are members of the WA objected to the Russian
draft of the Best Practices document; instead they supported
the Polish edits. Ref. A, para 3. End note.) Russia
believes that licensed production is not a bilateral issue;
it is an export control issue. Russia wants to prevent
weapons of Russian origin (based on Russian technology) from
being used to kill Russian soldiers. Mashkov asked that the
EU renounce its statement from May; otherwise, it was not
worth continuing the discussion. He went on to say that
re-export controls would be an important element of an Arms
Trade Treaty and if the EU could not agree to a politically
binding document, it was unlikely to get agreement on a
legally binding Arms Trade Treaty that must include re-export
controls.


4. (C) The HOD meeting briefly touched on the question of
extending the current Head of Secretariat for one year.
Mashkov stuck to the position that names of possible
successors must be put forward before Russia would agree to
an extension. While belaboring the issue, Mashkov noted that
Russia felt this was an insignificant issue that had been
given too much attention and took time away from substantive
discussions. Mashkov then indicated Russia objected to a
one-year extension as that would mean changing the Head of
Secretariat in the middle of an Assessment year. He
suggested extending the current Head of Secretariat for a
longer period - possibly 18 months or 2 years. (Note: During
a pre-meeting bilateral with the U.S., Mashkov reported that
he had been demarched by the Swedish Ambassador on the
extension question, as had his deputy minister in Moscow. He
said that, though he was not making linkages, he pointed out
to the Swedish Ambassador that, while acting as the current

UNVIE VIEN 00000573 002 OF 004


EU president, the Swedish Ambassador was asking a favor of
him ) to agree to extend the current Head of Secretariat,
who is a Swedish diplomat ) when the EU had killed the
Russian proposal on Re-Export Controls. End note.)

Plenary Discussions


5. (SBU) After adoption of the agenda, Russia issued an
opening statement. Georgia was again Russia's primary
concern with a repeat of the claim that the conflict in
Georgia showed that the WA was unable to meet its primary
focus of preventing destabilizing accumulations of arms.
What is more, nothing was done to improve the situation and
WA Participating States were re-arming Georgia. Russia noted
it was not inclined to discuss the issue of Re-Export
Controls, based on the rejection by the EU of the proposal in
May. In summary, Russia felt that the WA had stopped being a
platform for discussion and if this did not change then
Russia would re-evaluate its participation.


6. (SBU) Agreement was reached to continue discussions on all
GWG policy issues in 2011. There were three successes at the
Plenary: 45 changes to the controls lists, including 20 U.S.
proposals, were agreed; a U.S. proposal for a seminar on
changes to the control lists for select non-participating
States, and a Russian proposal for a side discussion group on
the issue of destabilizing accumulations were both agreed to
on a trial basis. The general theme of the rest of meeting
was Russian recalcitrance.


7. (SBU) Sweden noted it was going to hold a meeting in
Stockholm in January 2010 to discuss how to move its proposal
on ammunition reporting. The Russian delegation noted at the
table that it did not see the point in informal consultations
if agreement could not be reached in Vienna; it was not worth
sending experts to Stockholm when Wassenaar had bigger
problems with regard to destabilizing accumulations, and
Russia did not want to divert attention away from major WA
issues. So, Russia asserted, unless there was agreement on
broader conventional arms issues, it was not willing to take
time to discuss ammunition reporting. The U.S. delegation
talked to Sweden on the margins to make it clear that the
U.S. could not support ammunition reporting, but indicated we
may attend the Stockholm meeting.


8. (SBU) The UK expressed the hope that progress could be
made in 2010 on its proposal for arms denial reporting and
denial consultation. It believed the proposal would
strengthen the organization. Russia responded that the
situation in Georgia showed that this idea would not work.
Due to concerns about the arms build-up in Georgia, the
Russian president issued an arms embargo on Georgia, yet
Participating States still sent arms to Georgia for political
reasons and did not consult with Russia. Also, the proposal
had commercial implications: without a 'no undercut' policy
agreed between producing countries, this proposal could
result in financial implications for exporters.


9. (SBU) Japan's proposal for Best Practices on Internal
Compliance Programs was also blocked by Russia. The Russian
delegation raised a number of questions that it had not
brought up at previous meetings. Russia said it was willing
to continue to work on the proposal in 2010.


10. (SBU) Denmark's proposal on Guidelines for Controlling
Transportation of Conventional Arms in Order to Prevent
Destabilizing Accumulations was blocked by Russia with the
claim that the proposal was outside the mandate of the WA
because it discusses transfers between third parties most of
which are outside the WA. Russia also pointed out that
Wassenaar does not deal with illicit trafficking. Rather,
its basic task is to prevent destabilizing accumulations of
arms in zones of conflict. There are other fora that discuss
illicit trafficking. Finally, Russia noted there was no
common definition of "brokering" so care needs to be taken in
using the word.

Re-Export Controls


11. (C) In an effort to try to mitigate the repercussions
from the May EU statement on the Russian Re-Export Control
proposal, Poland took the floor to announce it was working on

UNVIE VIEN 00000573 003 OF 004


new language for the proposal that will potentially meet the
concerns of all parties. However, work still remained before
the document could be shared with Participating States.
Romania and Bulgaria chimed in to say they looked forward to
constructive dialogue on the issue in 2010. This was a
coordinated response; the document was not ready to be
shared, because not all the countries most impacted by the
Russian proposal had yet agreed to the revised Polish
language. Some EU country representatives informally advised
the U.S. delegation that the five countries impacted by the
Russian proposal had been pressed by the EU to make progress
because the Czech-sponsored statement had significantly
impacted the work of the WA.


12. (C) Russia responded that it hoped that these assurances
(which had not come from all the countries that blocked the
Russian proposal) would lead to more constructive progress.
Russia also noted that there was movement away from the
"consolidated" position from May. Russia was offended by the
EU statement in May and expressed appreciation for the
Participating States that were "bold enough" to express
support for Russia's proposal. If agreement was not reached
soon there would be a serious implication for the future of
the WA. The Russian delegation also stressed that an
essential element of an Arms Trade Treaty ) which was being
promoted by many of the countries blocking the Russian
proposal ) would be re-export controls.

Plenary Success Stories


13. (SBU) Experts Group: The changes to the control lists
proposed by the Experts Group (EG) sailed through without
comment. The Plenary endorsed EG requests for mandates to
pursue controls on robotically controlled vehicles in 2010
and to continue to refine controls on night vision related
items. The Plenary also endorsed an EG request that the
Secretariat make control lists from previous years and the
list of changes each year available on the WA website.


14. (SBU) Technical Briefing: The U.S. proposal to hold a
briefing on changes to the control lists for select
non-Participating States reached consensus. The U.S.
brokered a compromise with the Russian delegation that the
briefing would be held on a trial basis to determine interest
in the briefing. The briefing would be held in Vienna in
conjunction with either the Spring EG meeting in April or the
EG intersessional meeting in June. Belarus,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, the Peoples Republic on
China, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kazakhstan,
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Serbia, Singapore and the United Arab
Emirates would be invited.


15. (SBU) Destabilizing Accumulations: Russia expressed
frustration that there was no discussion in the GWG on the
new agenda item of destabilizing accumulations. The Russian
delegation had proposed in May that the WA work towards
defining the term and look at how Participating States
reviewed applications for exports of arms to regions of
conflict. The U.S. counter-proposal noted that the WA had
attempted to define the term in 1998, but the consensus was
that the definition of what was "destabilizing" would change
depending on a specific situation. In reviewing the papers
from 1998, there did not appear to be any new arguments to
make. However, the U.S. delegation suggested having a
mechanism for convening ad hoc meetings to discuss crisis
situations when they arose. These meetings could be held on
the margins of a GWG; would not require or expect attendance
by all Participating States; and would be informal with no
official reporting back to the GWG unless agreed by
participants.


16. (C) At the Plenary, Russia proposed formalizing the
meeting process proposed by the U.S. by establishing an
open-ended ad hoc working group, and having the meeting
discuss how to define "destabilizing accumulations"; how
Participating States apply the basic principles of the WA;
and possibly prepare recommendations for the GWG. In making
its case, Russia repeated that the Georgia situation had
proven that the WA had not met its primary focus of
preventing destabilizing accumulations. Russia took this to
mean that Participating States did not want to discuss
Georgia and that States were trying to push Russia out of the

UNVIE VIEN 00000573 004 OF 004


region. However, the transfer of weapons to "hotbeds"
presents a grave danger; proof of this was the number of
Russian peacekeepers killed in the Georgia conflict. Russian
head of delegation then proceeded to read the list of Russian
soldiers killed as well as their birthdates, noting that some
were the same age as his son. The U.S. head of delegation
expressed her personal sympathy to the families who lost
service members in Georgia, as well as other conflicts.
However, speaking on behalf of the U.S., she indicated that
the Russian proposal needed more clarity before it could be
accepted, and sought a written proposal. Russia prepared a
written proposal and, after significant debate and
compromise, Participating States agreed to establish the ad
hoc working group on a trial basis for one year.


17. (SBU) Outreach: Discussion on 2010 Outreach activities
was limited. Russia again objected, asking why by Brazil,
India, and Peru were recommended for outreach when at least
Brazil and India have previously said they were not
interested. Argentina advised that Peru had expressed
interest, and compromise was reached to approach only Peru
and to leave open contact with the other two countries should
they express interest either to the Secretariat or to
Participating States on a national basis.


18. (SBU) Membership: The EU again read its statement
expressing support for Cyprus; the U.S. expressed support for
Cyprus' eventual membership; and Turkey again blocked Cyprus'
application. On the other applicant countries, Russia
questioned including Bosnia-Herzegovina and Chile in
countries targeted by the Friends of the Chair on Membership
(FOC-M) when neither had submitted an application. The FOC-M
chairman replied that both had sent letters saying they
intend to apply. Russia objected to including these two
countries because including them now showed Wassenaar was
more interested in rushing applications than in substance.
The Plenary agreed to add both countries to the FOC-M process
when their applications are received.

Administrative Issues


19. (SBU) Head of Secretariat: No candidates to replace the
current Head of Secretariat have come forward. Russia
continued to block agreement on extending the mandate of the
current Head of Secretariat without the identification or
nomination of potential replacements. (Note: U.S. delegation
understood that the UK and Japan were initially willing to
indicate they had candidates to put forward, but neither
country did so because of Russian posturing during the
pre-plenary meeting. End note.) Russia then objected to a
one-year extension, as this would require a change in the
Head of Secretariat in the middle of 2011, an assessment
year. As a way forward, Russia proposed extending
Danielsson's mandate for two years, but also required that
this recommendation be agreed to by a two-month silence
procedure, saying it needed its proposal approved by Moscow.
The Plenary Chair consulted Danielsson, who agreed in
principle to the extension, but was concerned that logistical
matters would be complicated if he did not have a decision
now. After further Russian objections and Plenary Chair
efforts at reconciliation, Danielsson agreed to wait to
mid-February for a decision on the extension. As reported
(ref. B),the Plenary has initiated a silence procedure until
February 15. If silence is not broken, then Ambassador
Danielsson will be extended for two years.

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