Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA570
2009-12-16 16:49:00
SECRET
UNVIE
Cable title:  

2010: VIENNA,S YEAR OF IRAN?

Tags:  PREL KNNP IR SNAR AF 
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VZCZCXRO8077
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHUNV #0570/01 3501649
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 161649Z DEC 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0431
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNNAR/VIENNA NARCOTICS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0313
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI IMMEDIATE 0085
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000570 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2023
TAGS: PREL KNNP IR SNAR AF
SUBJECT: 2010: VIENNA,S YEAR OF IRAN?

REF: UNVIE 566 NOTAL

UNVIE VIEN 00000570 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000570

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2023
TAGS: PREL KNNP IR SNAR AF
SUBJECT: 2010: VIENNA,S YEAR OF IRAN?

REF: UNVIE 566 NOTAL

UNVIE VIEN 00000570 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e)


1. (C) This is an ACTION request. Please see paragraph 14.

--------------
Summary
--------------


2. (C) As we enter a new year in dealing with Iran across
the UN organizations in Vienna, we thought it useful to take
stock of where we stand at the end of 2009 and how that will
affect the way forward.

-- The November Board resolution gave us momentum in the IAEA
Board of Governors for pressuring Iran on its nuclear
program, but maintaining that momentum depends on P5 plus 1
unity and additional new IAEA reporting that Iran is
increasingly defiant. Nevertheless, as Tehran takes the
pulse of the international community, the mood in Vienna will
certainly be noticed. In any case, pressure in Vienna almost
certainly will not result in full Iranian cooperation with
the IAEA.

-- We need to maintain our support for the Tehran Research
Reactor (TRR) deal, while making clear that it is Iran that
has dashed states' hope for that deal as a catalyst for
dialogue. That, and Iran's refusal to pursue engagement on
the nuclear issue with the P5 plus 1, leaves us no choice but
to ratchet up the pressure in hopes of prompting a change of
calculus in Tehran.

-- Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh may be struggling to hold his
position in Vienna after his role in the TRR negotiations and
IAEA Director General ElBaradei's circumvention of him to
reach Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head Salehi. He
will try to keep his head above water using his roles as
President of the UNIDO General Conference and as Chairman of
the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND),increasing Iran's
focus on these forums. Nevertheless, he may be replaced in

2010.

-- Iranian chairmanship of the CND will present opportunities
for the USG to pursue any remaining interest in engagement on
counterdrug and broader Afghan issues or to signal that all
issues are conditioned by Iran's responses in other areas.
End Summary.

--------------
Keeping the Momentum in the IAEA Board
--------------


3. (C) The November IAEA Board resolution on Iran placed a

united P5 plus 1 in support of the Agency and its need to
better understand Iran's nuclear program. Russia and China's
participation in formulating the resolution, including, no
doubt, our ability to point at China's hand in the drafting,
were key for both the support the resolution received and the
consequent pressure that Iran will feel. Iran's lashing out
at Russia in the wake of the resolution suggests that Tehran
understands the importance of this measure for the process in
New York and forward movement on the pressure track. We are
well placed to continue this pressure in Vienna in tandem
with preparations for UNSC action, which we expect will be
the next step. The broad support for the resolution and the
fact that even several countries who abstained from the vote
admitted that they had no qualms with the substance, but
disagreed with the timing, suggest that the general consensus
in Vienna is that cooperation is long overdue; even states
historically on the fence, such as India, South Africa or
even Egypt are tiring of Iran's games.


4. (C) That said, the prospects for continued momentum will
depend on our ability to keep Russia and China on board with
supporting factual DG reports detailing Iran's lack of
cooperation, and with statements that at the very least do
not show divisions or obvious kowtowing to Iranian pressure
or interests. As usual, China may be the weak link, as
evidenced by their nervousness at the November Board as
pressure mounted from the NAM troika and others that the
timing of the resolution could destroy the diplomatic opening
created by Geneva and the TRR deal.


5. (C) Further decisive Board action, such as another
resolution, would likely depend on new developments in
upcoming reports from DG Amano that reflect further Iranian

UNVIE VIEN 00000570 002.2 OF 004


efforts to shirk their safeguards obligations, or perhaps
reflect new revelations about the nature of Iran's nuclear
program. (Comment: For example, a formal report from the DG
noting serious concern regarding recently revealed
documentation purportedly related to neutron initiators for
nuclear weapons would certainly command Board attention. That
said, it is not clear at this time how/whether the IAEA will
report substantively on the suspect neutron initiator work.
End comment.)


6. (S) Adding to that pressure, in Amano's short tenure as
the new IAEA Director General he has hewed to his expected
course of focusing on the technical aspects of his job rather
than the more political contemplations ElBaradei often shared
publicly and with the Board. As required by the November
resolution, the new DG immediately informed the Security
Council of the Board resolution on his first day in office.
On the same day, he authorized a public IAEA statement that
the IAEA would be following up with Iran on its claim to be
building ten new enrichment sites at as yet undisclosed
locales. Citing Iran's obligations under Code 3.1 modified,
the Agency sent a letter to Iranian officials asking for more
information on the sites. If Amano discontinues ElBaradei's
practice of stating privately and in his reports that
countries need to provide original documents to Iran, as
noted in Ref A, then one of the key arguments Iran and its
apologists use in explaining away Tehran's noncooperation
with the Agency will be undercut.


7. (C) From Vienna, it appears that Iran will not agree to
the TRR agreement as conceived in Geneva, elaborated through
three days of negotiations at the IAEA under former DG
ElBaradei, and loudly ruminated upon for nearly ten weeks
since. Even former DG ElBaradei believes that the guarantees
offered in response to Iran's repeated requests are more than
sufficient and has said so publicly. At the November meeting
of the Board of Governors, several states cited their hope
that agreement could still be reached on the TRR proposal and
cited this as a reason not to pressure Iran via a Board
resolution, but as time continues to pass, such hope will
appear more and more far-fetched. Frustration with Iran for
dismissing the outstretched hand could increase willingness
among some Vienna delegations and their capitals to agree to
at least matter-of-fact support for the IAEA and its
attempted investigations. We need to make clear our
continued support for the TRR proposal, stress that it is
Iran that has dashed states' hopes for a breakthrough, and
note therefore that it is Tehran that has left the
international community no choice but to explore new means to
persuade Iran it cannot continue to defy its obligations and
the global desire for a diplomatic solution.

--------------
Opportunities on Counternarcotics?
--------------


8. (S) Iranian statements to the press and in the IAEA
Board suggest that Iran may feel a bit of whiplash from U.S.
efforts to balance an interest in possible engagement with
strong rhetoric on the nuclear issue. While Iran has
resisted pressure to cooperate substantively on the major
questions still posed by the IAEA and refused to come back to
the table with the P5 plus 1 if the nuclear issue is on the
table, Tehran has increased its focus on counternarcotics
efforts, both domestically and regionally, and has increased
its profile on the counternarcotics issue in Vienna through
UNODC. As our UNODC interlocutors make clear, Iran sees drug
control as a serious issue (largely for domestic stability
reasons),but still may be motivated to use counternarcotics
cooperation as a lever over the international community.
Domestic struggles over cooperation with the U.S. persuade us
Iran may not be able to make a decision in favor of
cooperation on counternarcotics even if in Iran's interest.
Nevertheless, Iran's interest in engagement with the West on
this issue (as described repeatedly by UNODC officials) paves
the way for limited gains if we choose to pursue them. In
addition, Tehran's actions in the wake of the elections have
reduced the pressure for the U.S. to work with Iran in this
venue, so doing so might appear magnanimous to some, but
could provoke sniping by the countries most insistent on
pressuring Iran. The position of the UNVIE Ambassador as the
U.S. representative to key international bodies on both the
nuclear and drug control issues also could show a coordinated
strategy on possible counternarcotics cooperation while
making clear that the USG is still clearly focused on Iran's
need to cooperate with the IAEA on its nuclear program.


UNVIE VIEN 00000570 003.2 OF 004



9. (S) Thus, Soltanieh's upcoming chairmanship of the CND
presents both a challenge and an opportunity for the USG.
While there may be limits on U.S. delegation activity at this
CND, we also have an opportunity to engage Iran in a forum
where many of our interests are coincident. Ambassador
Soltanieh also has a strong personal and professional
interest in leading the Commission in a manner in which he is
seen as an active and even-handed interlocutor, and to a
conclusion that is in Iran's interests. Under normal
circumstances, Mission would already have sought out
consultations with the CND chair to advance our plans for the
CND. Iran as chair is putting us behind that normal
timetable and will inevitably affect our ability to achieve
USG priorities. Presumably, if we engaged Iran, Soltanieh
likewise would need to seek guidance from capital, making an
early U.S. decision even more crucial. We expect that
Soltanieh would be interested in playing this role given his
penchant for the spotlight and his behavior surrounding the
TRR negotiations, including seeking out Deputy Secretary of
Energy Poneman to try shake his hand and make at least small
talk, necessitating Iranian Legal Adviser Asgari to pull him
away from the USDEL.


10. (S) Soltanieh's practical approach to chairmanship of
the CND might also allow the opportunity for
closely-controlled, higher-level engagement between
Ambassadors in a way that would make sense to Iran, could
achieve U.S. goals in the CND, and yet could maintain a
strong, focused line on the nuclear issue. Our experience
with the TRR negotiations suggests that we should not expect
Iran to have a coordinated policy at the beginning of any
interactions, but reducing the profile of any U.S. approach
by embedding it in the normal business of the CND could allow
Iran the time and space to explore forward movements while
reminding Iran that we will not waver from our clear path on
the nuclear issue.

--------------
What Next for Soltanieh?
--------------


11. (C) Ambassador Soltanieh seemed dejected at the last
Board meeting, much of the familiar passion of his Board
statements absent and replaced with a seemingly forced
evenness of tone. Many diplomats in Vienna believe Soltanieh
is on his way out after the failure to have Iran's file
removed from the Board's agenda was punctuated by his failure
to bring home a deal on the TRR and further amplified by the
overwhelming vote in favor of the Iran resolution at the
Board. The TRR negotiations were not the first time that
Soltanieh, driven by his own ego and penchant for
showmanship, has been out in front of the regime's nuclear
policy and been pulled back to a position more accordant with
Tehran, but it certainly was a very visible example and one
fraught with the baggage of the domestic infighting that this
issue drew. ElBaradei's repeated outreach to AEOI head
Salehi, circumventing Soltanieh, no doubt made clear to
Iranian officials in Tehran that Soltanieh is no longer an
effective interlocutor with the IAEA. In addition, the
departure of several officials from the Vienna scene,
including AEOI deputy Saidi, will leave a less experienced
crew navigating Iran's file, although Legal Adviser Asgari
and Deputy Chief of Mission Esmaeli presumably will remain
involved to provide some continuity and expertise.


12. (C) If Soltanieh is replaced, his successor could have
a measurable impact on how the Iran file plays here. A
charismatic replacement could allow Iran to hold onto support
from NAM stalwarts; alternatively, a more pugnacious
personality could present us a further opportunity to wean
some of the increasingly disenchanted NAM states away from
Iran's support structure. If a Soltanieh successor follows
the path of many other ambassadorial postings under the
Ahmadinejad administration, the replacement would probably be
conservative and less diplomatic in his approach than
Soltanieh, even factoring in Soltanieh's peculiarities and
outbursts.


13. (C) Soltanieh probably will cite his presidency of the
UNIDO General Conference and upcoming chairmanship of the CND
to show Tehran that he is an effective diplomat and bringing
greater international prestige to Iran and thus should stay.
Furthermore, he appears to be sinking much greater effort
into these new positions, perhaps because of the stalemate on
the nuclear file, the importance of drug control issues to
Tehran, the increasingly visible profile of the
counternarcotics issue in Vienna, and the possibility that it

UNVIE VIEN 00000570 004.2 OF 004


will lead to increased cooperation with the West which,
perhaps until recently, was an accomplishment many in Tehran
wanted to claim responsibility for achieving.

--------------
Action Request
--------------


14. (S) Mission seeks guidance on next steps with Iran in
Vienna, especially on whether and to what extent we can
engage Iran as the CND chair, including at the Ambassadorial
level. Early guidance would help Mission work to advance USG
goals for the March CND (keeping in mind that this meeting
will be shortly after the March Board of Governors session).
UNVIE would appreciate guidance on how to portray our
participation in the CND and the balance of that issue with
the nuclear issue, especially if clearance is given for some
interaction with Iran. In the meantime, we will continue to
take advantage of the arrival of a new IAEA DG more focused
on the IAEA's technical, fact-finding role to make clear that
Iran has a great deal of explaining still to do about its
past and present nuclear activities.
DAVIES