Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA564
2009-12-15 14:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
UNVIE
Cable title:
GUIDANCE REQUEST ON MONGOLIAN NWFZ
how-toVZCZCXYZ0008 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHUNV #0564 3491416 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 151416Z DEC 09 ZDK FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0418 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0964 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1306 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 1037 RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 1179 RUEHUR/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR PRIORITY 0082 RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1807 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0935
C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000564
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/MNSA, IO/GS, EAP/CM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA MG
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE REQUEST ON MONGOLIAN NWFZ
REF: MENOLD-PAPPAS EMAILS 12/09-11
Classified By: Ambassador Glyn T. Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d
C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000564
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/MNSA, IO/GS, EAP/CM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA MG
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE REQUEST ON MONGOLIAN NWFZ
REF: MENOLD-PAPPAS EMAILS 12/09-11
Classified By: Ambassador Glyn T. Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d
1. (C) Following the November Board session in which Mongolia
supported both the Board resolution censuring Iran and the
Russian LEU bank resolution, Mongolian Ambassador Enkhsaikhan
approached Ambassador Davies December 11 on the longstanding
issue of the establishment of a Mongolian Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone (NWFZ). Enkhsaikhan did not imply this as
"payback" for supporting U.S. positions in the Board; rather,
he highlighted that Mongolia seeks a closer relationship with
the U.S. as a counterweight to Russia and China. Savvy and
well-informed, Enkhsaikhan also shares U.S. concerns on Iran
and DPRK's nuclear programs and is not reticent about
breaking ranks with the NAM in the IAEA Board of Governors.
Still, Mongolia's quest for recognition as a NWFZ has been a
personal crusade for Enkhsaikhan, who remains the GOM's
coordinator and focal point on the issue (hence the demarche
in Vienna). He clearly hoped, citing the impact of the
President's Prague speech, that the Obama Administration
might re-evaluate the U.S. position on the Mongolian NWFZ as
it had the CTBT. Ambassador Davies could give no indication
of any such shift in our policy, but promised to "educate
himself" on the issue.
2. (C) Having championed this cause since 1992, Enkhsaikhan
is well aware of U.S. opposition to a single-country NWFZ in
Mongolia. When the Ambassador laid out the U.S. concern that
a Mongolian single-country zone would set an unacceptable
precedent, he took issue, asserting that Mongolia's unique
geographical position between two nuclear powers and
inability to join any regional NWFZ makes it a unique case.
Enkhsaikhan explained that Mongolia continues to seek legally
binding commitments (particularly from Russia and China),as
it views existing political security assurances by UN bodies,
cited by Ambassador Davies as impressive achievements, as
insufficient. Since 2006, Mongolia has pursued a trilateral
agreement on a NWFZ with Russia and China with an additional
protocol intended for the P3.
3. (C) Updating on recent negotiations, Enkhsaikhan reported
that meeting twice in Geneva in 2009, Russia and China
signaled no major issues with the agreement but requested
that the P3 also be "on board." He acknowledged it was more
likely the P3 might subscribe to an additional protocol
rather than a five-party agreement, which would be "too much"
to ask. Enkhsaikhan provided a copy of the draft agreement
and protocol for our comment (full texts emailed to
ISN/MNSA). The key provisions of the protocol commit parties
to contribute to full implementation of the NWFZ and to seek
immediate UN Security Council joint action should Mongolia
become the object of threat of the use of force, "including
nuclear weapons." Mongolia had not demarched the UK or
France, trusting that the U.S. would consult with the other
P3. Ambassador Davies agreed to seek guidance on the texts.
4. (SBU) Enkhsaikhan also noted the recent consensus adoption
of the UNGA resolution on "the Second Conference on NWFZs and
Mongolia," the title of which, he argued, reinforced
Mongolia's uniqueness, recognized by the UNGA and UN Security
Council since 2001. Mongolia hoped that this conference,
slated to take place just before the NPT Revcon, would be an
opportunity to take a second look at a Mongolian NWFZ, an
issue which Enkhsaikhan observed has been on the agenda for
17 years.
5. (C) Guidance Request: Mission seeks guidance in response
to Enkhsaikhan's demarche on the U.S. position regarding the
draft trilateral treaty with Russia and China and
accompanying additional protocol for the P3. Although we
recognize there may be legal impediments, a forward leaning
posture on this issue would help secure Mongolia's support
both on the Board of Governors, where Mongolia holds a
rotating seat until fall 2011, as well as in the context of
the NPT Revcon.
DAVIES
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR ISN/MNSA, IO/GS, EAP/CM
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA MG
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE REQUEST ON MONGOLIAN NWFZ
REF: MENOLD-PAPPAS EMAILS 12/09-11
Classified By: Ambassador Glyn T. Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d
1. (C) Following the November Board session in which Mongolia
supported both the Board resolution censuring Iran and the
Russian LEU bank resolution, Mongolian Ambassador Enkhsaikhan
approached Ambassador Davies December 11 on the longstanding
issue of the establishment of a Mongolian Nuclear Weapons
Free Zone (NWFZ). Enkhsaikhan did not imply this as
"payback" for supporting U.S. positions in the Board; rather,
he highlighted that Mongolia seeks a closer relationship with
the U.S. as a counterweight to Russia and China. Savvy and
well-informed, Enkhsaikhan also shares U.S. concerns on Iran
and DPRK's nuclear programs and is not reticent about
breaking ranks with the NAM in the IAEA Board of Governors.
Still, Mongolia's quest for recognition as a NWFZ has been a
personal crusade for Enkhsaikhan, who remains the GOM's
coordinator and focal point on the issue (hence the demarche
in Vienna). He clearly hoped, citing the impact of the
President's Prague speech, that the Obama Administration
might re-evaluate the U.S. position on the Mongolian NWFZ as
it had the CTBT. Ambassador Davies could give no indication
of any such shift in our policy, but promised to "educate
himself" on the issue.
2. (C) Having championed this cause since 1992, Enkhsaikhan
is well aware of U.S. opposition to a single-country NWFZ in
Mongolia. When the Ambassador laid out the U.S. concern that
a Mongolian single-country zone would set an unacceptable
precedent, he took issue, asserting that Mongolia's unique
geographical position between two nuclear powers and
inability to join any regional NWFZ makes it a unique case.
Enkhsaikhan explained that Mongolia continues to seek legally
binding commitments (particularly from Russia and China),as
it views existing political security assurances by UN bodies,
cited by Ambassador Davies as impressive achievements, as
insufficient. Since 2006, Mongolia has pursued a trilateral
agreement on a NWFZ with Russia and China with an additional
protocol intended for the P3.
3. (C) Updating on recent negotiations, Enkhsaikhan reported
that meeting twice in Geneva in 2009, Russia and China
signaled no major issues with the agreement but requested
that the P3 also be "on board." He acknowledged it was more
likely the P3 might subscribe to an additional protocol
rather than a five-party agreement, which would be "too much"
to ask. Enkhsaikhan provided a copy of the draft agreement
and protocol for our comment (full texts emailed to
ISN/MNSA). The key provisions of the protocol commit parties
to contribute to full implementation of the NWFZ and to seek
immediate UN Security Council joint action should Mongolia
become the object of threat of the use of force, "including
nuclear weapons." Mongolia had not demarched the UK or
France, trusting that the U.S. would consult with the other
P3. Ambassador Davies agreed to seek guidance on the texts.
4. (SBU) Enkhsaikhan also noted the recent consensus adoption
of the UNGA resolution on "the Second Conference on NWFZs and
Mongolia," the title of which, he argued, reinforced
Mongolia's uniqueness, recognized by the UNGA and UN Security
Council since 2001. Mongolia hoped that this conference,
slated to take place just before the NPT Revcon, would be an
opportunity to take a second look at a Mongolian NWFZ, an
issue which Enkhsaikhan observed has been on the agenda for
17 years.
5. (C) Guidance Request: Mission seeks guidance in response
to Enkhsaikhan's demarche on the U.S. position regarding the
draft trilateral treaty with Russia and China and
accompanying additional protocol for the P3. Although we
recognize there may be legal impediments, a forward leaning
posture on this issue would help secure Mongolia's support
both on the Board of Governors, where Mongolia holds a
rotating seat until fall 2011, as well as in the context of
the NPT Revcon.
DAVIES