Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA544
2009-12-03 15:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/IRAN: BOARD ADOPTS RESOLUTION IN RESPONSE

Tags:  KNNP AORC IAEA IR 
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FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0364
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 UNVIE VIENNA 000544 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2034
TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: BOARD ADOPTS RESOLUTION IN RESPONSE
TO THE ONGOING AND SERIOUS CONCERN THAT TEHRAN CONTINUES TO
DEFY UNSC AND BOARD RESOLUTIONS

REF: UNVIE VIENNA 000538

Classified By: Ambassador GLYN DAVIES for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 UNVIE VIENNA 000544

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2034
TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: BOARD ADOPTS RESOLUTION IN RESPONSE
TO THE ONGOING AND SERIOUS CONCERN THAT TEHRAN CONTINUES TO
DEFY UNSC AND BOARD RESOLUTIONS

REF: UNVIE VIENNA 000538

Classified By: Ambassador GLYN DAVIES for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) The IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution
censuring Iran's nuclear program on November 27 , marking the
first time since Iran was referred to the UN Security Council
in February 2006 that the Board has taken formal action on
Iran. The German-sponsored resolution had the support of all
P5-plus-1 partners, effectively a demonstration of our unity
of purpose on the Iran nuclear issue in a clear message to
Tehran. The overwhelming vote of 25-3 (6 abstentions and 1
absent) further underlined international concerns as to
Iran's nuclear intentions, and was in line with the 2006 vote
(27-3-5). Notably, the vote split the 13 NAM Board members
with six voting in favor (Burkina Faso, Cameroon, India,
Kenya, Mongolia and Peru),and only NAM hardliners (Cuba,
Venezuela and Malaysia) against, with four others abstaining
(Afghanistan, NAM Chair Egypt, Pakistan and South Africa).
Turkey also abstained in what it claimed was an effort to
preserve its neutrality in playing a potential role in the
Tehran Research Reactor deal. This tenth IAEA Board
resolution on Iran (the others dating back to 2003-2006)
urging Tehran to comply fully with its UNSC and Board
obligations, including by halting the construction of the
recently disclosed Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) near
Qom; engaging with the IAEA on resolution of all outstanding
issues, complying fully with its safeguards obligations on
early declaration of facilities, providing clarifications
regarding the purpose and timing of the enrichment plant at
Qom, and confirming that it has no other undeclared
facilities. It also requested the IAEA Director General to
report the resolution to the UN Security Council. (The IAEA
Secretariat subsequently confirmed to Mission that the
resolution was formally conveyed to the UNSC via a December 1
letter.)


2. (SBU) Adoption of the resolution followed the Board
debate on the Iran agenda item on November 26-27 (Reftel).

Pakistan, the U.S., India, Egypt, Venezuela, Cuba, Malaysia,
Brazil, and Germany also delivered explanations of vote
(EOVs) after the vote. India and Egypt delivered EOVs that
were more helpful than their statements during the Board
debate, critical of Iran's shortcomings per the Director
General's (DG) report and the existence of the FFEP, with
Egypt citing undeclared facilities as a regional threat.
Venezuela, Cuba, and Malaysia reiterated their opposition to
the resolution, which would have a counterproductive impact.
Iran also responded, characterizing the resolution as
"imposed on the Board by a few members." In an admonition to
the Board, Ambassador Soltanieh recalled how the Iranian
Parliament had suspended voluntary cooperation with the IAEA
in response to the 2006 BOG resolution reporting its file to
the UNSC, and noted that the passing of this resolution would
similarly jeopardize the current "conducive environment" and
cooperation with the IAEA. Adding emphasis, Ambassador
Soltanieh said that Iran will "never" bow to threats or
pressure and that Iran's peaceful uses of nuclear technology
will not be interrupted for "even a second." Tehran
responded with more bluster in the days following the vote,
including the widely reported announcement that Iran would
build ten more industrial-scale enrichment facilities. End
Summary.

--------------
Unified P5 1 Marshal Support
--------------


3. (C) Following P5 1 PolDir deliberations in Brussels
November 20, the P5 1 discussed and agreed to the
German-sponsored text in Vienna. Although China did not have
instructions formally to co-sponsor, the final text
incorporated Chinese language on a diplomatic solution.
Germany submitted the resolution to the Secretariat November
25 under a cover letter noting that it had been "discussed
and agreed" among the P5 1 (Note: There were no formal
co-sponsors. Russia and the U.S. spoke in support of the
resolution in our national statements at the Board while
China refrained from doing so. End note). Although privately
counseling against a Board resolution (see para 8),IAEA
Director General (DG) ElBaradei refrained from public
comment. Ambassador advised the DG that it was intended to
send a measured signal in light of Iranian backsliding on the
TRR.

UNVIE VIEN 00000544 002 OF 006




4. (C) The P3 and Germany led a concerted lobbying effort in
Vienna and capitals to secure the vote, and lined up support
from almost half the NAM members on the Board (Peru,
Mongolia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Kenya and significantly,
India.) (Comment: Mission has learned that during the NAM
Plenary, the UAE prevented the NAM from taking a formal
position of opposition to the German-sponsored resolution.
Mission also learned that UAE Ambassador Hamad Al-Kaabi took
this position following a lunch with DDG Safeguards Heinonen
in which Heinonen discussed the Iranian issue. Heinonen
(protect) told Mission in confidence that he came away from
the lunch with the impression that the Gulf states (i.e. GCC)
had "had enough" of Iran's defiance of its nuclear
obligations. End Comment.) Ambassador thanked Al-Kaabi for
speaking up under the Iran agenda item during Board
deliberations.


5. (C) Throughout the negotiations on the resolution, Russia
was steadfast, including with respect to Egypt's effort to
inject language on a Middle East NWFZ absent a commitment of
support. Ambassador engaged in extensive interactions with
his Egyptian counterpart in the days before the vote with the
goal of winning Cairo's "yes." This diplomatic offensive
included previews of the P5 1 position, an unconditional
offer to include preambular language on the Middle East from
the 2006 Iran resolution, and strong Washington/Embassy Cairo
engagement. Ultimately, Egypt walked away, claiming Minister
Abu Gheit would support a yes vote only if the P5 1
incorporated additional operative paragraph language that
would change the character of the resolution aimed at Iran.
The E3 agreed that such a change was unacceptable and all
P5 1 agreed before the vote to call time on the Egyptian
effort.


6. (C) While Brazil wavered in the wake of the Ahmadinejad
visit, Egypt refused to commit , and South African Governor
Minty kvetched about the scope of the resolution, it was
clear that the resolution had majority support for passage.
Pakistan informed us apologetically of instructions to
abstain. The Indian Mission worked with unprecedented
transparency to help ensure their yes vote. Indeed, we saw a
November 26 message warning that if forced to a vote that
day, India would have to abstain. The instruction to vote
yes came early on November 27. Turkey was the other outlier.
Ambassador delivered a tough message to Turkish Governor
Fidan as to the seriousness of this issue for the U.S., and
Fidan relayed the Turkish position that this was the wrong
time for a resolution as it would torpedo the TRR deal, in
which Turkey now had a stake. Turkey had no disagreement
with the text of the resolution, but had trouble seeing its
current utility if we still wished for a diplomatic
resolution to the issue, which Fidan said was Ankara's
priority. It was clear that Turkey was immovable off of its
"abstain" vote, although the Governor seemed a bit distressed
at the prospect of upsetting the U.S. just prior to Prime
Minister Erdogan's visit to Washington.


7. (C) Among the WEOG, the Swiss also wavered temporarily.
The Swiss Mission in Vienna had recommended support to Bern.
Upon receiving instructions to condition support on adding
unacceptable language on the sharing of Member State
information, the Mission advised Bern against this and the
language was shelved, the Swiss blaming an overactive officer
at their MFA for suggesting it.


8. (C) ElBaradei also sought Ambassador out at the outset
of the Friday Board and asked that the resolution on Iran be
withdrawn, saying it would provoke the Iranians to cease or
greatly diminish cooperation with both the P5 1 and the IAEA.
Ambassador reiterated the importance of sending Iran a
measured signal to reinforce the IAEA's efforts, as well a in
light of its backsliding on the TRR deal. ElBaradei
dismissed the comment and was clearly dejected.

--------------
The Vote
--------------


9. (SBU) As Cuba, Venezuela, and Malaysia had signaled
opposition during the Board debate, the Board Chair concluded
that there was no consensus on the Iran resolution. Venezuela
called for a roll call vote. Twenty-five countries voted in
favor as follows: Argentina, Australia, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan,
India, Kenya, South Korea, Mongolia, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Peru, Romania, Russia, Spain, Switzerland, Ukraine,
the U.K, the U.S., and Uruguay. Three voted no-Cuba,
Malaysia, and Venezuela. Six abstained-Afghanistan, Brazil,

UNVIE VIEN 00000544 003 OF 006


Egypt, Pakistan, South Africa, and Turkey. Azerbaijan was
absent for the vote. (Comment: According to a Russian
readout, the Azeri Ambassador had indicated that it would be
difficult for Baku to support the resolution, as a neighbor
of Iran. We attribute his absence to a diplomatic head cold,
but Azerbaijan inadvertently also missed the vote on Russian
fuel reserve proposal which followed. It later sent a letter
to the Board Chair, for circulation to all Member States,
stating that it would have supported the Russian resolution
of which it was a sponsor. There was no such letter as to
Azerbaijan's Iran vote. End Comment.)

--------------
Explanations of Vote
--------------


10. (SBU) After the vote, Pakistan, the U.S. (para 17),
India, Egypt, Venezuela, Cuba, Malaysia, Brazil, and Germany
delivered EOVs. Pakistan described its abstention as an
effort to avoid steps that could be viewed as confrontational
and threaten the opportunity for progress. Pakistan said it
was heartened by the recent positive engagement and believed
the progress should be preserved and carried forward.
India's intervention was very strong, certainly falling into
the catergory of that of the core like-minded, though it
came out against sanctions, and much more detailed than its
national statement (septel). (Note: The Indian Charge
explained that he had down-scaled his national statement the
previous day, as he had not received instructions at that
juncture). India explained its "yes" vote as a reflection of
all the negatives-no movement on outstanding issues and late
notification of the FFEP-in the DG's report, which were hard
to ignore. India also stressed the importance of continued
cooperation, encouraged all to carry forward with the recent
talks and opposed sanctions.


11. (SBU) Egypt delivered a solid statement that was
partially at variance with its pronouncements as NAM Chair
and its national statement the previous day (septel). Egypt
cited disappointment with Iran over the existence of the
FFEP, especially in light of Tehran's "repeated assurances in
the IAEA that nothing was being concealed from its members."
Egypt also noted undeclared nuclear facilities as a threat to
the region (i.e., indirectly equating facilities in Israel
and Iran.) Egypt chastised Iran for continuing to ignore
repeated calls by the IAEA for an early return to the
implementation of Code 3.1 modified. Egypt also complained
that the timing of the resolution was inopportune and ignored
the broader context in the Middle East, thus accounting for
Egypt's abstention.


12. (SBU). Venezuela restated its opposition to the
resolution as it will result in an "exacerbation of the
climate for a conducive environment." Cuba and Malaysia
likewise expressed their opposition to the resolution as it
would aggravate the political environment. Cuba regretted
that the sponsors did not listen to the opposition in the
Board room and was gratified the resolution was not approved
by consensus. Malaysia noted this move was counterproductive
and would be detrimental to dialogue. Brazil repeated a
portion of its national statement that said there was still
hope for the TRR deal and all Member States should refrain
from taking actions that could interfere with this process.

--------------
Germany Sends Strong Message and
Notes Openness for Dialogue Remains
--------------


13. (SBU) Germany, as the sponsor of the resolution,
delivered a statement that summarized comments made during
the Board and described the unfortunate situation in which
Iran, Ambassador Soltanieh specifically, threatens further
consequences in response to the adoption of the resolution
even though earlier criticizing those who "use the language
of threats." Highlighting points made by other Member States
in an effort to demonstrate broad support, Germany noted it
shared the same sentiment as Libya about threats not helping
the current situation and a Mongolian comment about the
resolution not being condemnatory or confrontational as
correct. Germany explained hope still remained for a
comprehensive diplomatic solution, as relayed in the
E3-plus-3 March Board statement and concluded that Iran
should take the hand outstretched by the E3-plus-3.

--------------
Iran's Criticism and Threats
--------------


UNVIE VIEN 00000544 004 OF 006



14. (SBU) Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh responded to the
vote on the resolution and the EOVs with, as with his
statement the day before, an unusually calm and even tone for
the most part. Soltanieh characterized the resolution as
"imposed on the Board by a few members" despite the
overwhelming more than two-thirds vote in favor of the
resolution. He again recounted Iran's cooperation with the
IAEA and said that the lesson he had drawn was that being a
party to the NPT results in pressure and threats, while not
being in the NPT and building nuclear weapons has benefits
(Comment: The Indian delegation took note of this snipe
which they saw as levied against India. End Comment). In an
admonition to the Board, Soltanieh recalled that the Iranian
Parliament had suspended voluntary cooperation with the IAEA
in response to the Board reporting its file to the UNSC, even
though he implored the Majles not to take this step. He also
noted that the passing of the resolution will jeopardize the
conducive environment such as that in which the Geneva
discussions took place and that he now doubted the good will
of the P5 plus 1 parties. Adding emphasis, he said that Iran
will "NEVER" bow to threats or pressure and that Iran's
peaceful uses of nuclear technology will not be interrupted
for "EVEN A SECOND."


15. (SBU) Soltanieh then attacked "Zionist state" Israel,
calling its intervention "shameful" and asking how they could
dare to speak on this issue. He cited Israeli threats as
forcing Iran to build backup facilities such as the FFEP. In
classic Soltanieh style, he said that Iran was ready to bear
the costs of a fact-finding mission to investigate Israeli
atrocities, such as the "war crime" of Israel turning the
women and children of Gaza into ashes.


16. (C) Finally, Soltanieh turned his attention to the
West, telling Germany that Iran responds poorly to the word
"must" and typically refuses anything so demanded of it. He
called the use of carrots and sticks an "uncivilized policy
from the colonial era" and said that the U.S. slogan of
change was a farce. "Today," Soltanieh crowed, the U.S.
proved that its words and its deeds are not consistent and
that it is not ready to extend its hand for cooperation.
Iran "for sure" will have a response to the resolution.
"This is not a threat," Soltanieh insisted, "just a reality,"
(an interesting observation given his long-winded soliloquy
on why the language of threats is always inappropriate).
(Comment: It is not clear why Soltanieh's tone was so
measured at the Board, although it was certainly possible
that his comments were being carefully watched in Tehran
given his propensity to go further than Tehran is prepared to
go, as with his support of the TRR proposal. Nonetheless,
his words found little resonance in the Board, much of which
is exasperated by Soltanieh and Iran. End Comment.)

--------------
U.S. Statement
--------------


17. (SBU) The U.S. delivered the following EOV, which was
not/not circulated to Board members. Board members and press
received the public statement.

Begin text of U.S. EOV (not for release):

We have adopted today a resolution on Iran - the first
adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors since 2006 - that
reinforces our serious concern that Iran continues to defy
relevant IAEA Board of Governors and UN Security Council
resolutions.

The United States continues to urge Iran to comply fully and
without delay with its obligations under UN Security Council
resolutions and to meet the requirements of the Board of
Governors, including by suspending immediately construction
at Fordow. We also urge Iran to engage with the IAEA on the
resolution of all outstanding issues concerning Iran's
nuclear program and, to this end, to cooperate fully with the
IAEA by providing such access and information that the Agency
requests to resolve these issues. We believe that the Board's
resolution underscores the imperative for Iran to live up to
its international obligations and offer transparency in its
nuclear program, if it wishes to demonstrate its exclusively
peaceful intent, rather than more evasions and unilateral
reinterpretations of its obligations. The United States
fully supports the IAEA in its efforts, particularly at a
time when the international nonproliferation regime is in
need of strengthening.

At the same time, President Obama has made clear the United
States' willingness to engage Iran and work toward a

UNVIE VIEN 00000544 005 OF 006


diplomatic solution to the nuclear dilemma it has created for
itself, if only Iran would choose such a course. But our
patience and that of the international community is limited.
To date, Iran has refused a follow-on meeting to the October
1 meeting with the P5 1 countries if its nuclear program is
included on the agenda. The U.S. strongly supported-and
continues to support-the Director General's positive proposal
to provide Iran fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor, a
proposal intended to help meet the medical and humanitarian
needs of the Iranian people while building confidence in
Iran's intentions. We will continue to pursue the diplomatic
solution we all seek, but Iran must understand that its
continued refusal to move with us down the track of serious
engagement leaves us no choice but to pursue a second track
of persuasive actions.

End U.S. Statement.

--------------
The Resolution
--------------


18. (SBU) Begin text of Resolution GOV/2009/82:

The Board of Governors,
(a) Recalling the Resolutions adopted by the Board and the
UNSC,

(b) Commending the Director General for his professional and
impartial efforts to implement
the Safeguards Agreement in Iran, to resolve outstanding
safeguards issues in Iran and to verify
the implementation by Iran of the suspension,

(c) Stressing the important role played by the IAEA in
resolving the Iranian nuclear issue and
reaffirming the Board's resolve to continue to work for a
diplomatic solution to the Iranian
nuclear issue,

(d) Reaffirming the inalienable rights of all the parties to
the Non-Proliferation Treaty to
develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes in accordance
with Article IV of the NPT,

(e) Commending the Director General for his proposal of an
Agreement between the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the Governments of the
Republic of France, the
Islamic Republic of Iran and the Russian Federation for
Assistance in Securing Nuclear Fuel for
a Research Reactor in Iran for the Supply of Nuclear Fuel to
the Tehran Research Reactor;
appreciating the intensive efforts of the Director General to
achieve an agreement on his
proposal,

(f) Noting with serious concern that Iran continues to defy
the requirements and obligations
contained in the relevant IAEA Board of Governors and UN
Security Council Resolutions,
Atoms for Peace

(g) Also noting with serious concern that Iran has
constructed an enrichment facility at Qom
in breach of its obligation to suspend all enrichment related
activities and that Iran's failure to
notify the Agency of the new facility until September 2009 is
inconsistent with its obligations
under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement,

(h) Affirming that Iran's failure to inform the Agency, in
accordance with the provisions of
the revised Code 3.1, of the decision to construct, or to
authorize construction of, a new facility
as soon as such a decision is taken, and to submit
information as the design is developed, does
not contribute to the building of confidence,

(i) Underlining that Iran's declaration of the new facility
reduces the level of confidence in
the absence of other nuclear facilities and gives rise to
questions about whether there are any
other nuclear facilities under construction in Iran which
have not been declared to the Agency,

(j) Noting with serious concern that, contrary to the request
of the Board of Governors and

UNVIE VIEN 00000544 006 OF 006


the requirements of the Security Council, Iran has neither
implemented the Additional Protocol
nor cooperated with the Agency in connection with the
remaining issues of concern, which need
to be clarified to exclude the possibility of military
dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme,

(k) Emphasizing the Director General's assertion that unless
Iran implements the Additional
Protocol and, through substantive dialogue, clarifies the
outstanding issues to the satisfaction of
the Agency, the Agency will not be in a position to provide
credible assurance about the
absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in
Iran, and

(l) Noting that the Director General has repeatedly declared
that he is unable to verify that
Iran's programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes,


1. Urges Iran to comply fully and without delay with its
obligations under the above mentioned
resolutions of the Security Council, and to meet the
requirements of the Board of Governors, including
by suspending immediately construction at Qom;


2. Urges Iran to engage with the Agency on the resolution of
all outstanding issues concerning
Iran's nuclear programme and, to this end, to cooperate fully
with the IAEA by providing such access
and information that the Agency requests to resolve these
issues;


3. Urges Iran to comply fully and without qualification with
its safeguards obligations, to apply the
modified Code 3.1 and implement and ratify promptly the
Additional Protocol;


4. Urges Iran specifically to provide the Agency with the
requested clarifications regarding the
purpose of the enrichment plant at Qom and the chronology of
its design and construction;


5. Calls on Iran to confirm, as requested by the Agency, that
Iran has not taken a decision to
construct, or authorize construction of, any other nuclear
facility which has as yet not been declared to
the Agency;


6. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts to
implement the Safeguards Agreement in
Iran, resolve the outstanding issues which give rise to
concerns, and which need to be clarified to
exclude the existence of possible military dimensions to
Iran's nuclear programme, and to implement
the relevant provisions of UNSC resolutions;


7. Further requests the Director General to report this
resolution to the UNSC; and


8. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

End Resolution.
DAVIES