Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA532
2009-11-23 16:06:00
SECRET
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/IRAN: BOARD MOVES TOWARD FIRST RESOLUTION

Tags:  AORC IAEA KNNP IR 
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S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000532 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR P,T, S/SANAC, ISN, IO, ISN/RA, IO, T
NSC FOR RYU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2019
TAGS: AORC IAEA KNNP IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: BOARD MOVES TOWARD FIRST RESOLUTION
SINCE 2006, RUSSIA SUPPORTS WHILE CHINA UNINSTRUCTED

Classified By: Ambassador Glyn T. Davies for reaons 1.4 b and d

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000532

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR P,T, S/SANAC, ISN, IO, ISN/RA, IO, T
NSC FOR RYU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2019
TAGS: AORC IAEA KNNP IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: BOARD MOVES TOWARD FIRST RESOLUTION
SINCE 2006, RUSSIA SUPPORTS WHILE CHINA UNINSTRUCTED

Classified By: Ambassador Glyn T. Davies for reaons 1.4 b and d


1. (S) Summary: At a German-hosted P5 1 HOMs meeting
November 24, Russia agreed to proceed with a Board of
Governors resolution on Iran based on the German elements
discussed in Brussels. In contrast to Russian flexibility,
Chinese Ambassador Hu was still uninstructed and was
surprised at the prospect of introducing a resolution as a
P5 1 co-sponsored text. Still he committed to seek
instructions by early November 24 whereupon the P5 1 could
inform the DG and Board Chair and begin broader consultations
with other influential Board members, including G-77 Chair
Argentina and NAM Chair Egypt. We would not expect this to
be consensus resolution as Cuba and Venezuela, which voted
against the last Board resolution reporting Iran to the UNSC
in February 2006, are likely to call a vote. Board members
will need formal voting instructions but especially if the
P5 1 remain united, there is nothing to preclude an outcome
similar to the 2006 vote (27-3-5 abstain) with a handful of
NAM abstentions or no votes. End Summary.


2. (S) Germany called a P5 1 meeting November 23 following up
on PolDir agreement to work on a Board resolution based on
the elements discussed in Brussels. Russian Governor
Berdennikov confirmed Russia's agreement to support the
German elements while China was still uninstructed. Chinese
Ambassador Hu nevertheless participated in the P5 1
discussion as he did not have instructions to the contrary.
Pressed by German Ambassador Ludeking, Hu committed to get an
answer from Beijing by early November 24 as Germany is
seeking to begin consultations with Board members to allow
time for instructions. China was surprised that the
resolution was being proposed as an E3 3 sponsored-text. Hu
had been under the impression that it would be sponsored only
by the E3, as in the past (i.e. before the P5 1 came into
existence). Germany clarified that pursuant to PolDirs
meeting in Brussels, the idea was to have the Group of 6
(G-6) as co-sponsors.


2. (S) In contrast to China, Russia seemed fully on board and
flexible. Berdennikov supported the German elements/text as

is and saw no reason to negotiate the elements that had been
agreed in Brussels. French Ambassador Mangin also said
France would refrain from making any substantive changes for
the sake of unity. Ambassador Davies agreed to follow suit.
Russia was similarly flexible as to the format of
co-sponsorship, whether it be the E3 or the G-6, as
Berdennikov noted was agreed in Brussels, or beyond the G-6.


3. (S) Most of the P5 1 discussion was about the format of
consultations. Germany proposed that the G-6 lobby as a
group, beginning early November 24 by informing ElBaradei and
the Board Chair. (Note: Ambassador Davies had apprised
ElBaradei of the prospect for a Board resolution November 20
after the PolDirs meeting. ElBaradei was not supportive as
this would divide the Board, he claimed, and he preferred a
non-binding P5 1 statement. End note) Russia suggested
working through Board Chair Arshad (Malaysia) to arrange
consultations with various groups but France, U.S. and
Germany did not see Arshad as adding value and could not be
assured of his neutrality. P5 1 Missions (pending China)
agreed that the cosponsors would meet on November 24 with
group chairs Argentina (G-77),Egypt (NAM) Canada (WEOG) and
Sweden (EU) followed by influential Board members India,
South Africa, Brazil and Pakistan, and hold any follow up
meetings November 25. Given time constraints, Germany
suggested the text could not be re-negotiated, but the G-6
text could reflect some of the input from consultations. Per
Board rules, the text must be submitted 24-hours in advance
of consideration at the Board session November 26 or 27.
(Note: We expect the Board could begin the Iran agenda item
late on November 26; though not necessarily desirable, debate
can be suspended until the next day. End note).


4. (S) Consulting privately with the U.S. after the meeting,
the E3 were not confident of getting China to co-sponsor.
Ludeking speculated that Beijing may agree to vote in favor
of the resolution but not to co-sponsor. If that is the
case, Germany and France still preferred a resolution to a
G-6 statement, as the latter has no real standing or effect.
Given that co-sponsorship by the E3 alone would be
interpreted as a step-backward (and would not include Russia)

and an E3 2 -sponsored resolution would be "awkward," they
suggested an ad hoc group of co-sponsors as a fallback - i.e.
introduced by Germany and cosponsored by EU, U.S.,
like-minded plus Russia -- the key being to retain Russia as
a cosponsor.


5. (S) Comment: While we are sympathetic to the view that
China should not be allowed to hold the resolution process
hostage, there is no guarantee Russia would agree to go it
alone with the E3, U.S. and a broader group of like-minded.
If Russia remains on board and China agrees (at a minimum)
not to block a resolution, Mission recommends allowing the
resolution effort to play itself out. This is especially
true as other delegations, including NAM, are aware that a
Board resolution is being discussed. A united front among
the P5 1 certainly would help secure broader support and
Russian support is indispensable to a resolution. Even with
Russia and possibly China, however, we will still have to
contend with NAM hard-liners and an unsupportive Board Chair
and Director General. As with the last Board resolution in
2006, the key will be to isolate unredeemable NAM such as
Cuba and Venezuela. Support from NAM Chair Egypt, Argentina,
Brazil, India and South Africa would be instrumental, nearly
all of which voted in favor of the 2006 referral of Iran to
the UNSC (except South Africa which abstained at the time but
has been more supportive in recent years.)
DAVIES