IAEA/IRAN: TECHNICAL BRIEFING LARGELY FOCUSES ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000530

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2034
TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: TECHNICAL BRIEFING LARGELY FOCUSES ON
QOM

Classified By: Ambassador GLYN DAVIES for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

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Summary
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1. (C) On November 18, Ops B Director Herman Nackaerts
provided Member States a technical briefing on the Director
General's (DG)November 16 report on Iran. The briefing
largely repeated the points covered in the report, but also
offered more details on the IAEA's inspection of the Fordow
Fuel Enrichment Plant near Qom. Nackaerts also restated that
Iran has not shown any cooperation on possible military
dimensions (PMD),has not suspended enrichment- and heavy
water-related activities, has not implemented the Additional
Protocol (AP),and reiterated that Iran's continued failures
on Code 3.1 modified were "inconsistent with its obligations
under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards
Agreement."


2. (SBU) Member states asked several questions during the
question and answer session about the Fordow Fuel Enrichment
Plant and the discovery of heavy water at the uranium
conversion facility at Esfahan. DCM queried the IAEA
regarding the newly declared underground laboratory at
Esfahan, and also asked about any safeguards implications
regarding the report that Iran is moving equipment from
Natanz to Fordow, as well as about IAEA plans for taking
forward the PMD investigation. Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh
again used the technical briefing as a platform to claim Iran
was cooperating with the IAEA as required by its
comprehensive safeguards agreement and to criticize the
IAEA's handling of the investigation and mishandling of
sensitive Iranian information, claiming the latter has led
Fordow to now become a military target of Iran's enemies.
End Summary.

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Nackaerts Describes Qom
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2. (C) On November 18, Safeguards Ops B Director Herman
Nackaerts provided Member States a technical briefing on the
Director General's (DG)November 16 report on Iran. As in
past technical briefings he repeated points covered in the
DG's report, but also described in additional detail the
IAEA's visit to the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) near
Qom, which he noted Iran designates as a production plant and
not a research and development (R&D) facility. Nackaerts was
very complimentary when describing Iran's cooperation with
the Qom inspection, stressing "Iran has really been
cooperative with us in providing unimpeded access to all
areas of the facility."


3. (C) Nackaerts indicated that the FFEP will house 2 units
of 8 cascades that will equal approximately 3000 centrifuges.
He said there will be one feed and withdrawal station per
unit. A 30 B cylinder will be used to feed the material and
a 12 B cylinder will be used to collect the product and
tails. After describing Iran's responses to the purpose and
time of construction of the FFEP, as reflected in the DG's
report, Nackaerts provided the following chronology of the
development of the facility from the IAEA's imagery findings:

--May 2002, tunneling activities observed
--June 2004 pause in tunneling activities
--October 2006 tunneling activities resume and auxiliary
openings observed
--February 2007 tunneling activities observed and concrete
batch plant seen
--December 2007 excavation of the service support buildings
--August 2009 entrance portals and service building
externally complete
--October 2009 IAEA performs DIV


4. (C//NF) In addition, Nackaerts noted that 3rd parties
had provided the IAEA with information that showed the FFEP
designs dated September 2006 as well as imagery of tunneling
activity also dated September 2006. Because the IAEA intends
to establish the clear precedent regarding Iran's obligation
to now allow regular access to the FFEP (the IAEA intends to
visit on a monthly basis),Nackaerts reported the IAEA will
perform a second design information verification (DIV)
inspection on November 19. Nackertts concluded with two
slides , the first listing areas in which Iran had
cooperated, the second listing (many more) areas in which
Iran had not. The first slide noted Iran's cooperation on
access to all operating facilities and to IR-40, preliminary
DIV on Darkovin and notification of the Fordow facility. The
slide on non-cooperation specified the continuing need for :

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clarification of timing and purpose of Fordow, written
confirmation as to no other undeclared facilities,
implementation of Code 3.1. modified, s
uspension of enrichment- and heavy water-related
activities,implementation of the Additionial Protocol, and
substantive engagement on PMD. (Comment: This effort to
appear even-handed gives grist to those on the Board who
argue that putting additional pressure on Iran could lead
Tehran to stop its current "cooperation." Soltanieh was
certainly playing to this audience during the question and
answer session when he threatened to reconsider Iran's
cooperation in light of the Secretariat's supposed
mishandling of sensitive information from Iran. End comment.)


-------------- -
Soltanieh Tells IAEA It Has No Right
to Be "Happy Or Sad" About Iran's
Nuclear Program
-------------- -


5. (C) After Nackaerts' presentation, there was a question
and answer session in which Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh
kicked things off with his usual breathless critical
commentary devoid of any actual technical questions.
Soltanieh's response to the Secretariat's briefing started
out in a relatively calm tone , but-true to form--became
increasingly agitated as his rant continued. He took issue
with the details contained in the report and the technical
briefing, noting that these details should be kept
confidential. He threatened that continued IAEA disclosures
might cause Iran to reconsider its level cooperation with the
Agency since, he claims, Iran is cooperating voluntarily and
beyond its obligations.


6. (C) Soltanieh said that revelation of technical details
has led to additional pressure on Iran and has put Iran's
"peaceful" nuclear facilities, including Qom and Darkhovin,
under threat of attack. (Note: It is not clear how Darkhovin
could be under threat since it has not yet been built. End
Note.) Soltanieh also argued that the Agency has no right to
pass judgment on the rationale/purpose of Iran's nuclear
program, that Iran's intentions are not subject to review
under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and thus, are
not subject to investigation by the IAEA. The IAEA should
not express that it is "happy or sad" about information or
what the inspectors have seen in Iran. Soltanieh said even
though the inspectors had no right to talk to Iranians about
their intentions for the program, he had instructed everyone
the inspectors spoke with to answer any questions that the
inspectors asked (thus demonstrating Iran's cooperative
attitude).


7. (C) Soltanieh again rejected Iran's Code 3.1 modified
obligations as described by Nackaerts, citing legal
differences of opinion with the Secretariat on the matter,
and said that Member States should be pleased with Iran's
early declarations on several facilities. "Give us back the
DIQ for Darkhovin and we'll resubmit in six to seven years,"
if you want us to follow the letter of our obligations,
Soltanieh scoffed.

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Member States Question Purpose of
Qom and Existence of Heavy Water at the
Uranium Conversion Facility
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8. (C) Tthe U.K., France, Italy, Germany, Greece, and the
U.S. asked technical questions following Soltanieh's opening
intervention. (Comment: The active participation and
implied concern shown by Italy and Greece was useful in
widening the circle of demonstrated concern beyond the usual
suspects. End comment.) The U.K. asked whether Iran had
granted the IAEA all the access it had requested to
information and people at the FFEP. Nackaerts' responded
that the inspectors were told the people present at the
facility had sufficient knowledge to answer any questions
for the IAEA. Soltanieh also again took the floor to
reiterate that there was indeed no need for inspector to talk
to anyone else - the project manager for the facility could
answer all questions. Furthermore, Soltanieh asserted, why
should Iran provide access to individuals when they will be
treated like terrorists and added to sanctions lists?


9. (C) Referencing the FFEP near Qom, France asked if such
an "advanced centrifuge facility" could be built in 1.5
years, as Iran claims, and if a 3000 centrifuge facility
could really "back-up" the 54000 centrifuge facility at
Natanz. Nackaerts responded that the IAEA cannot judge how

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quickly Iran could bring a facility online, and although the
cascade designs at the FFEP resemble those at Natanz, 3000
centrifuges cannot do the work of 54000 centrifuges.
Nevertheless Iran has stated Qom is intended to preserve
Iran's centrifuge capability in case of attack.


10. (C//NF) The recently arrived Italian DCM, who has
worked extensively with us on Iran matters, remarked it would
be more useful for the IAEA to perform the annual physical
inventory verifications (PIV) and have environmental sampling
results in hand before the DG's reports are written to inform
Member States' consideration of Iran's safeguards compliance
in a more timely manner. Italy also recalled the finding of
the additional low enriched uranium (LEU) at the November
2008 PIV at Natanz (i.e., Iran had procuced more LEU than
previously estimated),and noted much of the information in
the report on LEU production is an IAEA estimate based on
Iran's declarations. Nackaerts agreed that verified results
would be best to have in the reports, but noted that the
processes of the PIV and environmental sampling analysis take
a long time, and said all the results should be included next
time for the March Board. Italy asked where the heavy water
at the uranium conversion facility (UCF) came from and why
was it at the UCF? Nackaerts responded that Iran had pointed
out the heavy water out to the IAEA inspectors at the UCF,
but the IAEA still has to verify the material is really heavy
water and receive information from Iran about where it was
produced.


11. (C) Soltanieh intervened again to stress that Iran's
Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) at Arak is operating and
Iran is proud of this achievement, which is why it showed the
heavy water to the IAEA in the first place, as a matter of
cooperation and not an obligation. Greece followed up to
clarify where the heavy water came from since the DG report
questioned its origins. Soltanieh said Iran is the "master"
of heavy water production and any heavy water seen was
produced in Iran.


12. (C) In response to a German question about whether the
IAEA could draw conclusions about the purpose of the Qom
facility, Soltanieh shared - claiming, "even though I'm not
supposed to do so"-- -- that Iran had shown the IAEA a
document that lists the Passive Defense Organization's (PDO)
full plan for backing up strategic facilities. The PDO is to
be prepared to provide a location for a back-up facility for
every strategically important facility in Iran, he claimed.
Germany asked if the Gachin mine was in full operation.
Nackaerts responded that the IAEA does not visit Gachin
(given the lack of AP implementation),but the appearance of
samples at the UCF that Iran attributes to Gachin and imagery
of Gachin indicate production activities are taking place.
Germany also asked why, if the FFEP resembled Natanz, 16
cascades equal 3000 centrifuges at the FFEP, while 18
cascades equal 3000 centrifuges at Natanz. Nackaerts replied
such specific details would be inappropriate to reveal to
other Member
States.


13. (C) DCM asked for additional information on the
underground analytical laboratory at the UCF, and inquired as
to the IAEA's next steps with regard to possible military
dimensions . DCM also asked if the transfer of equipment and
materials from Natanz to the FFEP had any safeguards
implications and whether such movements took place under IAEA
monitoring pursuant to recently updated containment and
surveillance measures requiring the IAEA to present for
removal of "large items" from Natanz. Nackaerts said the
IAEA has asked Iran for additional information and
clarifications on the analytical laboratory, but the
inspectors visited the location of the lab and it is
currently empty. He said Iran remains unwilling to engage
the IAEA on PMD, but the IAEA continues to further analyze
the information already available to the Secretariat.
Finally Nackaerts said that the transfer of equipment and
materials from Natanz to the FFEP near Qom was not from the
production halls that are under containment
and surveillance, thus was not monitored by the IAEA. He
said Iran told the IAEA that there is no storage room at the
FFEP, which is why the equipment was located at Natanz first
and then transferred to Qom when they needed the equipment.


14. (C//NF) Comment: The technical briefing evolved along
familiar lines, with Soltanieh attempting to exercise an
almost point by point "right of reply." In so doing,
however, he did not appear successful in formulating
technical arguments that would appeal to members beyond
hard-core NAM. He may be more successful in intimidating
some states, and some members of the Secretariat, from taking
a hard line on Iran lest Tehran pull back the limited

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safeguards cooperation it is proffering.

DAVIES