IAEA/MARCH BOARD: LIKE-MINDED PERSPECTIVES ON IRAN

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000053

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/MNSA AND IO/T

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL AORC IAEA KNNP IR SY
SUBJECT: IAEA/MARCH BOARD: LIKE-MINDED PERSPECTIVES ON IRAN
AND SYRIA

REF: UNVIE 50

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 1.4 b, c
and d

Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (S) At an Australian-hosted meeting February 4,
like-minded Ambassadors (EU3, U.S., Canada, Japan, New
Zealand) saw little prospect of a Board resolution on either
Iran or Syria. No one is advocating a March Board resolution
on Iran so long as Russia and China's stances remain
unchanged. France reported that the EU3 3 PolDirs, in a
meeting that morning, had reaffirmed the unity of the Six and
that Russia and China shared the sense of urgency on the Iran
file. Australia shared concerns about ElBaradei's recent
comments to the press downplaying the Iran nuclear issue. No
one expected any surprises in the DG's forthcoming report;
Ambassador Schulte noted the reports had increasingly become
an accountancy exercise monitoring proscribed uranium
enrichment at Natanz. France distributed a chart
demonstrating that Iran is approaching an accumulated
production of enough LEU feed material that, if further
enriched, would constitute Iran's first Significant Quantity
of HEU, though the French timetable estimated that this
milestone would not be reached for four months. The
like-minded also agreed with France's suggestion of posing
technical questions for the record in the Board meeting, and
insisting (including via a vote if necessary) on public
release of the DG report on Iran, as has become customary.


2. (S) The like-minded acknowledged the significant downside
of pursuing a Syria resolution at the March Board, given
pressure to condemn Israel and the likelihood that the Arab
Group will seek to draw linkages to the Gaza DU issue
(reftel) Like-minded Ambassadors questioned the utility and
practicality of a Syria resolution at this juncture, though
they regretted the Board's failure to respond to Syria's
non-cooperation. Germany suggested reserving the option of a
resolution until it becomes operationally necessary, such as
a formal finding of noncompliance. While Syria presented a
less urgent case of nonproliferation than Iran, the
like-minded agreed that questions regarding the nature, scope
and international linkages of the Syrian program needed to be
addressed, and the IAEA's performance in this regard impinged
on the credibility of Safeguards system. The like-minded
agreed on the need to re-focus the Syria investigation and to
dispense with ancillary issues such as Israeli DU, a "gap" in
satellite imagery, and the discredited comments of an IAEA
inspector on the Syria case. (Comment: The opportunity and
momentum for a Board resolution on Syria's non-cooperation
upon the issuance of the DG's first report in November has
passed, and is now complicated by the Gaza issue. End
Comment.)


3. (C) The like-minded also discussed the Board Chair's
handling of the Director General election process (septel)
and the prospect of a Gaza debate at the March Board under
the Safety Review agenda item (reftel). The U.S. further
encouraged the like-minded to press for timely Board
discussion of the International Nuclear Fuel Bank. The
like-minded expressed serious reservations about the U.S.
pledge to double the IAEA budget, rejecting any increase in
their regular budget contributions in the near future
(septel). End Summary.

Iran
--------------


4. (S) Australian Ambassador Shannon called a meeting of
like-minded Board Ambassadors (EU3, U.S., Canada, Japan, New
Zealand) February 4 to discuss common approaches to the March
2-6 Board of Governors meeting. Beginning with Iran, Shannon
assessed that the factual situation was unchanged but that a
Board resolution was unlikely and no one was advocating one.
No one contradicted him, in that Russian and Chinese
resistance to a Board resolution persisted. German
Ambassador Luedeking suggested that the like-minded wait and

see the DG's report, but he too did not expect any surprises
therein. The possibility of an E3 3 statement was not
discussed, given the EU3 3 PolDirs meeting the same day.
Germany agreed with Ambassador Schulte's suggestion that
Vienna Missions can build from any common elements that
emerge from that meeting. France also suggested that
like-minded national statements in the Board include
technical questions posed heretofore at the informal
Technical Briefings, such as on Code 3.1 modified, so that
the Secretariat's responses would become part of the official
record of the Board meeting.


5. (S) Australia shared the general assessment that the
forthcoming DG's report was unlikely to differ from previous
ones except for more significant enrichment figures at
Natanz. French Ambassador Deniau distributed a chart
(emailed to Department) showing the increased rate of LEU
production since January 2008. The French assessed that
Iran, with approximately 1000 kg of LEU and a production rate
of 100kg per month, was four months away from possessing
enough LEU to serve as feed to re-enrich to obtain its first
Significant Quantity (SQ) of HEU. France estimates that
1400kg of LEU feed would be necessary. Shannon commented
that this was an impressive trend given the present
enrichment capacity at Natanz. Ambassador Schulte noted that
the one SQ line could be drawn lower, according to some
experts, and expressed concern that DG reports had devolved
into an accountancy exercise monitoring violations of UNSCR
suspension requirements. Like-minded Missions expected
release of the DG report the week before the Board. (Note:
Mission has heard from within the Secretariat that they are
seeking an earlier release. End Note.) France raised the
concern that NAM/Arab delegations could block the customary
public release of the DG report (requested by Canada in
previous Board sessions),as they had successfully done with
the last Syria report. Canada and Australia saw this as a
bad precedent and supported calling a vote if there is any
attempt to block release of the Iran report.


6. (S) France also provided an informal readout of EU3 3
PolDir discussions that morning and noted that the 3 3 agreed
to support dialogue, reaffirm UNSCRs and urge cooperation
with the IAEA. The meeting signaled the unity of the "Six"
and a common sense of urgency shared by all, including China
and Russia, on the status of Iran's program. France added
that Russia understood the "window of opportunity" presented
by the new U.S. Administration's extended hand. Shannon
noted that Iran's satellite launch also reinforced this sense
of urgency in the public's mind.

7.(S) Ambassador Schulte contrasted the EU3 3's perspective
with that of the DG. Faced with two blocked investigations
on Iran and Syria, ElBaradei was inclined to do nothing but
emphasize only dialogue and the need for a broader political
settlement. This left Iran effectively off the hook.
Ambassador Schulte argued that Iran's obligation to cooperate
with the IAEA cannot be conditioned on extraneous factors,
and that the DG should hear the message that the IAEA still
had to do its job. He advised that overall U.S. policy on
Iran was under review but referred to Secretary Clinton's
statements on tough and direct diplomacy accompanied by
consequences for noncompliance.

8.(C) Shannon questioned the motivation behind the DG's
unhelpful comments of late in a series of press interview
seeking to "un-hype" the Iran issue and prognosticating a
timeline of a "couple of years" before Iran could contemplate
weaponization. He also noted that the DG made no reference
to UNSC resolutions. Ambassador Schulte recalled that the
2007 work plan had likewise played into Iran's strategy of
taking the issue off the UN Security Council agenda.
Secretariat officials, he reported, are seeing ElBaradei
increasingly as "a part-time DG" as he assumes the
self-appointed mantle of global statesman.

Syria
--------------


9. (S) Australia expected no movement on the Syria

investigation. Shannon did not have firm information on the
conclusions of the sampling analysis at Al-Kibar but expected
this to be covered in the DG's report. He questioned the
utility and practicality of pursuing a resolution on Syria
despite lobbying by the Israeli Ambassador, who couched it in
terms of demonstrating the Board's potency. The Gaza debate
presented a further tactical difficulty, Shannon speculated,
which could spill over into a resolution under the Safety
agenda item. He acknowledged the normal pattern of
responding to inaction with a "scolding" resolution and that
even discussion of a resolution could exert some helpful
pressure. Shannon also did not rule out Syria taking some
last minute action, following Iran's "gameplan," and reported
that Board Chair Feroukhi was urging Syria to do "something,"
even to respond to the Israeli letter. (Comment: Talk of a
Board resolution without follow-though also has the opposite
effect of making the Board seem impotent. The Board Chair's
reported intervention is not exactly helpful. End Comment.)


10. (S) Most of the like-minded saw a clear downside to
attempting a Board resolution. Canadian Ambassador
Gervais-Vidricaire reiterated the concern from the last Board
meeting about pressure, especially in light of the DG's
stance, to condemn Israel's unilateral use of force in any
Board resolution. UK Ambassador Smith agreed that there
would be a choice between accommodating such peripheral
issues or seeing a resolution with exclusive focus on Syria
adopted by a bare majority, if even that can be achieved. He
questioned the utility of a "very nonconsensual" resolution.
While he regretted the fact that the Board had gotten out of
the "resolution habit," Luedeking also questioned whether the
Board could get any mileage out of a resolution at this
juncture. He recommended reserving the option of a
resolution until there was an operational need such as a
finding of noncompliance. Although the like-minded seemed
resigned to not pursuing a resolution, they shared Germany's
regret. New Zealand acknowledged that it make us look
"farcical" to do nothing and suggested a half-way measure
such as a choreographed Board Chair's Summary. However,
Australia acknowledged that there was no real half-way house
to a resolution, i.e. the Chair's Summary has no standing
(Comment: Board Chair Feroukhi is also not likely to be
receptive to our input. End Comment.)


11. (S) Ambassador Schulte was likewise cognizant of the
limitations posed by a divided Board and unhelpful DG
statements on Syria. The Ambassador noted that Syrian
President Asad seemed all too comfortable with the prospect
of sweeping the IAEA investigation under the rug. At some
point, however, Syria's non-cooperation becomes unacceptable,
Ambassador Schulte argued. Luedeking observed that this was
the third Board meeting where Syria's non-cooperation was at
risk of being swept under the carpet and that the term
"unacceptable" had become empty. He asked whether the
like-minded would deliver the usual harsh Board statements
but then "sit on our hands" until the next Board, as had
become the practice on Iran. Ambassador Schulte recalled
that in the Iran case there had been several violations prior
to the finding of non-compliance, which was based on reports
of sustained non-cooperation. Australia suggested that the
like-minded consider at what point the "markers" in the Syria
case rise to the level of non-compliance. France also
indicated that the EU was still working on a proposed INFCIRC
to define non-compliance more explicitly and hoped for EU
agreement on such parameters by mid-February.


12. (S) Somewhat reversing himself, Luedeking cautioned
like-minded counterparts against setting a deadline on which
we cannot deliver. In a sense, Israel had made its point, he
noted. Syria had understood the point and raising it again
now could be creating a problem where one no longer exists.
France and Australia strongly disagreed. Shannon maintained
that the integrity of the safeguards system was at stake,
while France cited three reasons for not closing the Syria
file: questions about the activities at Al-Kibar and more
broadly, the nature and scope of the Syrian nuclear program,
as well as international linkages, which the DG's last report
had not addressed. Australia noted that these linkages
indicated an illicit nuclear market still existed. While the

Syrian case may be less urgent than that of Iran, in terms of
the immediate proliferation concern, Ambassador Schulte
agreed that we cannot just allow it to be swept under the
rug. He also noted other "levers" that can be used against
Syria such as the EU Association Agreement.


13. (S) The like-minded further agreed on the need to
dispense with the "red herrings" that threaten to divert the
Syria investigation. Ambassador Schulte hoped that the DG
report would put to rest the issue of Israeli DU being the
source of the contamination and the "baffling" lack of
commercial imagery, which ElBaradei had highlighted in the
November Board. Australia also cited the unauthorized
interview by Safeguards inspector Abushady as a potential
problem. Ambassador Schulte noted that Abushady's analysis
was incorrect and had been discredited by the Secretariat.
Germany suggested that if anyone should raise Abushady's
analysis in the Board meeting, the like-minded refer the
question back to the Secretariat for comment. Luedeking
further advised that the like-minded focus their demands on
the need for access to the Al-Kibar debris. Shannon also
suggested asking questions for the record at the Board
meeting on the sampling analysis, as France had recommended
doing on the Iran agenda item.


14. (C) Canada and France expressed some concern about
whether the DG would issue a written report on Syria.
(Comment: We have confirmed as of February 6 that the
Secretariat is actively working on the report. The fact that
Syria is a formal agenda item also presumes the issuance of a
report. Except for the DPRK, verification agenda items are
normally accompanied by a DG report. End Comment.)

DPRK
--------------


15. (C) Australia took note of the deteriorating situation in
the DPRK, though Ambassador Shannon doubted that IAEA
inspectors were at any risk. He attributed the DPRK's
toughening stance to seeking a signal from the new U.S.
Administration. Ambassador Schulte reaffirmed U.S. support
for the Six Party Process.
PYATT