Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA524
2009-11-18 07:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/IRAN: DIRECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT HIGHLIGHTS

Tags:  KNNP AORC IAEA IR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 UNVIE VIENNA 000524 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2034
TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: DIRECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT HIGHLIGHTS
FAILURES ON QOM

Classified By: Nuclear Counselor Mark Scheland for reasons 1.4(b) and (
d)

-------
Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 UNVIE VIENNA 000524

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2034
TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: DIRECTOR GENERAL'S REPORT HIGHLIGHTS
FAILURES ON QOM

Classified By: Nuclear Counselor Mark Scheland for reasons 1.4(b) and (
d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) The Director General's (DG) November 16 report on
Iran identifies a number of new issues of concern, including
the disclosure of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)
near Qom, and highlights Iran's continued failure to abide by
UN Security Council and Board resolutions, including by
cooperating fully with the IAEA. In addition to the FFEP
near Qom, the DG's report also notes Iranian plans for a new
"underground" analytical laboratory at the Uranium Conversion
Facility at Esfahan, and reports that a previously unknown
cache of heavy water was found at Esfahan as well. The
report is significantly tougher than recent previous
installments of DG reports, in particular in regard to Code
3.1 modified and Iran's continuing refusal to make early
declaration of nuclear facilities. For example, the report
states that the Agency informed Iran that its declaration of
Qom "reduces the level of confidence" in the absence of other
nuclear facilities under construction and gives rise to
questions about whether there were any other nuclear
facilities in Iran which had not been declared to the
Agency." The IAEA sent Iran a letter seeking confirmation
that no such additional facilities exist, but Iran has yet to
respond. The report also notes in three separate paragraphs
that Iran's behavior was "inconsistent" with its safeguards
obligations ( the late declaration of Qom, the late
submission of design information for the planned Dharkovin
reactor, and a reiteration in a summary paragraph that lack
of early declaration is inconsistent with Iran's
obligations). The report reiterates that unless Iran
implements the Additional Protocol and, through substantive
dialogue, clarifies the outstanding issues to the
satisfaction of the IAEA, the IAEA will not be in a position
to provide credible assurances about the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.


2. (C) Although the report provides a good basis for those
willing to listen to the facts to conclude that Iran's

"transparency" with the Agency is decreasing and far less
than Iran asserts--despite Iran's UN Security Council
obligation to fully cooperate with the Agency--some IAEA
Board members almost certainly will continue to cite Iran's
"cooperation" with the IAEA by noting the IAEA's inspection
of Qom and its provision of design information for Darkhovin.
For example, Board Chairman Arshad told Ambassador on
November 16 that he was "glad to see there was nothing new in
the DG's report." Arshad's comment reflects the fact that
the Qom issue has lost some "shock value" since its September
disclosure. Also, the technical nature of the report--while
appropriate--makes the issue sound somewhat "routine,"
especially to NAM states who are biased in Iran's favor in
any case. We will want to work closely with like-minded
states to remind the Board and IAEA members of the underlying
issue of deep concern about a facility Iran launched in
secret and that is appropriately-scaled to support a nuclear
weapons program, but far too small to support even a single
nuclear power reactor. End Summary.

--------------
Iran Should Have Informed IAEA
Earlier on Qom
--------------


3. (SBU) A majority of the DG's November 16 report on Iran
focuses on the newly disclosed Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant
(FFEP) near Qom and how Tehran's failure to notify the IAEA
of the facility until September 2009 "was inconsistent with
its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its
Safeguards Agreement." The report confirms the FFEP
remains under construction and is designed to house
approximately 3000 centrifuges-with current plans to install
only the IR-1 centrifuge, but could be reconfigured to
contain the more advanced centrifuges should such a decision
be made in the future. Iran informed the IAEA it plans to
make the FFEP operational in 2011.


4. (SBU) While noting that Iran informed the IAEA that
planning and construction of the FFEP began in the second
half of 2007, after Tehran made its unilateral claim to have
withdrawn from implementing Code 3.1 modified, the report
highlights the "extensive information given to the Agency by
a number of Member States detailing the design of the
facility" was "consistent with the design as verified by the
Agency during the design information verification (DIV)," and
that these Member States allege design work on the FFEP

UNVIE VIEN 00000524 002 OF 003


actually started in 2006. The DG goes on to say that Iran's
explanation about the purpose of the facility, how it fit
into Iran's nuclear program, and the chronology of its design
and construction requires further clarification and requests
access to project managers, design engineers, and original
design documentation.


5. (SBU) In addition, the report specifies that the IAEA
told Iran "that Iran's declaration of the new facility
reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other
nuclear facilities under construction and gives rise to
questions about whether there were any other nuclear
facilities in Iran which had not been declared to the
Agency." The IAEA sent Iran a letter on November 6 asking it
to confirm that it has not taken a decision to construct
other facilities that have not yet been declared to the
Agency; Iran has apparently not yet responded.

--------------
Scale of Natanz Operation Idle,
But Additional Centrifuges Installed
--------------


6. (SBU) The recent trend of decreasing quantity of
centrifuge operations involving uranium hexafluoride (UF6)
gas at the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz, while
increasing installation of new machines, continued since the
DG's last report in August. As of November 2, Iran was
feeding uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas into 3936
centrifuges--a decrease from the 4592 that were being fed
with UF6 as of August. However, Iran maintained installation
of centrifuges bringing the total to 8692 centrifuges,
compared to 8308 installed as of August. Iran also has
produced a total of 1763 kilograms of low enriched uranium
(LEU) since the start-up of operations at Natanz, compared to
1508 kilograms as of August. In addition, the report notes
Iran's on-going work on its advanced generation
centrifuges-theIR-2 modified, IR-3, and IR-4-at the pilot FEP
at Natanz. (Comment: Mission notes that while the number of
centrifuges spinning with UF6 decreased, the FEP's
production rate was similar to previous reports.)

--------------
Other Items of Particular Interest
--------------


7. (SBU) In addition to the newly disclosed enrichment
facility near Qom, the report also describes a couple of
other new findings. The report indicates Iran informed the
IAEA in August 2009 it would install an analytical laboratory
in an underground location in one of the Uranium Conversion
Facility's (UCF) storage areas at Esfahan. The IAEA also
discovered a previously unknown cache of heavy water at the
UCF. The IAEA has requested Iran to provide additional
information regarding this new analytical laboratory and
explain the origins of the heavy water. (Comment: The
report of this prospective underground laboratory takes on
added suspicion when coupled with the report's assertion that
confidence has decreased about the absence of undeclared
activities and the report's confirmation that Iran still
rejects its Code 3.1 obligations. However, these items were
only briefly mentioned in the report without further comment
or assessment. End Comment.)


8. (SBU) Turning to reactor activities, Iran provide the
IAEA with preliminary design information for the planned 360
reactor at Darkhovin, stating its desire to cooperate rather
than a legal obligation. The report then describes its view
that Code 3.1 modified remains in force for Iran and its
failure to submit design information for the Darkhovin
facility until September was "inconsistent with its
obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its
Safeguards Agreement." The report notes that contrary to
what was requested in the IAEA's letter of 19 June, the
updated design information questionnaire (DIQ) for the IR-40
Heavy Water Research Reactor at Arak did not contain
information on the design features of the fuel assembly.



9. (SBU) The possible military dimensions (PMD) aspect of
the report is quite short but direct, reflecting the fact
that there has been no movement on these issues in well over
a year. The report does state, however, that "further
analysis of the information available to the Agency
underscores the importance of Iran engaging with the Agency
in a substantive and comprehensive manner, and providing the
requested access, so that the remaining outstanding issues
may be resolved."

--------------

UNVIE VIEN 00000524 003 OF 003


Comment
--------------


10. (C) On the face of it, the technical judgments in the
report and the conclusion that the failure to declare Qom is
inconsistent with Code 3.1 modified and reduces confidence as
to other undeclared activities in Iran provides sound basis
for Board action. However, we fully expect the NAM to
accentuate the few positive aspects of the report - non
diversion of declared nuclear material ( per usual),31
unannounced inspections at Natanz, and Iran's cooperation
with the Qom inspection. The Malaysian Board Chair's first
reaction to the report's conclusions was that "there was
nothing new," a point echoed in Iranian Ambassador
Soltanieh's press comments characterizing the report as
"routine and repetitive." While we do not expect such views
to gain currency among the majority of the NAM, this will not
stop vocal NAM hardliners from repeating them. Mission is
scheduled to meet tomorrow morning (November 18) with
like-minded states to consult on questions we should
collectively put to the Secretariat aboutthe report during
the technical briefing for Member States scheduled for later
in the day. We will seek to ensure that the question and
answer session highlights the message reluctant NAM states
seek to avoid hearing. End Comment.
DAVIES