IAEA/SYRIA: TOUGH DG BOARD REPORT POINTS TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000521

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (CLASSIFICATION)

SIPDIS

ISN/RA FOR NEPHEW AND DANIEL, IO/T FOR DETEMPLE, NEA FOR
ABELL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2034
TAGS: PREL PARM SY KN IAEA KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: TOUGH DG BOARD REPORT POINTS TO
POSSIBLE SAFEGUARDS FAILURES, SETS UP POSSIBLE MARCH 2010
BOARD ACTION

Classified By: AMBASSADOR GLYN DAVIES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (SBU) The Director General's Syria report (GOV/2009/75)
notes that "essentially, no progress has been made since the
last report to clarify any of the outstanding issues relevant
to the implementation of safeguards." The most significant
development is that Syria has provided new explanations for
the uranium contamination found at Syria's Miniature Neutron
Source Reactor (MNSR). This explanation includes the
revelation that Syria imported "previously undeclared" uranyl
nitrate.


2. (C) Comment: Mission's understanding of Syria's
safeguards obligations is that imported nuclear material,
even if only in the form of yellowcake, must be declared to
the IAEA (unless "specifically for non-nuclear purposes,"
which would not seem to be the case if used in experiments at
the MNSR). Note that this "previously undeclared" import is
in addition to the other domestically-produced uranium
compounds Syria used in its undeclared experiments.
Confirmation of the existence of undeclared nuclear material
certainly will be the focus of likeminded statements in the
Board and may influence the views of others. In a brief
conversation with the Ambassador today shortly after the
release of the Syria report, IAEA Public Affairs staffer Greg
Webb commented that he thought the Syria report was more
substantive and significant than the concurrently-released
Iran report. Webb argued that the Syrian report contains
previously unknown developments, whereas revelations about
Iran's previously covert facility
at Qoms date back to September.


3. (C) Comment continued: Despite the tough tone of the
report, there remain as well the usual throwaway references
to Israel (for NAM consumption). We fully expect that NAM
hardliners and some Arab states will continue to turn a blind
eye to the facts of the case, but the report also may
foreshadow a March 2010 Board report that explicitly confirms
safeguards failures. The IAEA is scheduled to visit Syria on
November 17 to sample the uranyl nitrate and domestically
produced yellowcake used in reftel experiments. The tone of
the report should sound a cautionary note in Damascus, as any
increased pressure in the wake of this report is set against
the prospect of a special inspection request if Syria
continues to block the IAEA's investigation. End Comment.


4. (SBU) The DG's report recalls that the IAEA took
additional samples at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor
(MNSR) and found more anthropogenic uranium particles at the
facility, but did not find the uranium in the standard
reference materials or on the shielded transport container
that Syria said were the possible sources of the uranium
particles. After being confronted with the IAEA's findings
on November 2, Syria provided yet additional explanations for
the source of the uranium, this time pointing to domestically
produced yellowcake and small quantities of "imported, but
previously undeclared, commercial uranyl nitrate." The
source of the imported uranyl nitrate is not identified, and
neither was the content of a document Syria provided to
explain the presence of the uranyl nitrate in Syria.


5. (SBU) The IAEA plans to visit the MNSR on November 17 to
take samples of the yellowcake and the uranyl nitrate, and
will visit the locations where the materials are stored and
used. The Safeguards Department will not have results of its
sampling in time to report at the technical briefing for
member states planned for November 18. The sample analysis
will likely be reported to the March Board. (Comment:


6. (C) Mission will plan to question the compliance
implications of the non-declaration of the uranyl nitrate and
of any material Syria produced in experiments that should
have been reported. We may also want to raise the same
question at the November 26-27 Board meeting. End comment.)



7. (SBU) With regard to the investigation into the destroyed
facility at Al Kibar, the IAEA notes its repeated requests
for substantive discussions and access to locations,
material, and information. However, Syria has not yet
responded to the Agency's requests. The report indicates
that Syria has not yet provided the cooperation necessary to
permit the Agency to determine the origin of the
anthropogenic uranium particles found in samples at Al Kibar
(Dair Alzour). In a thinly veiled reference to the prospect
of a special inspection request, the report says that the
Agency will continue its verification activities to confirm


Syria's statements "within the authority available to it and
subject to the cooperation provided by Syria." The report
also reiterates the IAEA's flat rejection of Syria's claim
that inspection of military sites is beyond its safeguards
mandate and again requests Syria to work out modalities for
managed access.
DAVIES