MIXED EXPECTATIONS FOR SALEHI'S RETURN TO IAEA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000497

SIPDIS

STATE FOR P, T, S/SANAC, NEA, ISN, IO, AND INR/B
DUBAI FOR IRPO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2023
TAGS: PREL AORC SA IR KNNP
SUBJECT: MIXED EXPECTATIONS FOR SALEHI'S RETURN TO IAEA
SCENE

UNVIE VIEN 00000497 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e)

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Summary
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1. (C) Atomic Energy Organization of Iran head, Ali Akbar
Salehi, previously served in Vienna as Iran's Permanent
Representative to the IAEA, thus many diplomats in Vienna
already know him well. Although at least one IAEA official is
optimistic that Salehi will bring greater cooperation from
Iran, others at the IAEA and in Vienna are less convinced and
more pragmatic about Salehi's ability to deliver on the
nuclear issue. In fact, Deputy Director General for
Safeguards Olli Heinonen is very pessimistic about Salehi's
entrance onto the scene and believes that other drivers will
lead Iranian decisionmaking. South African Governor Minty
described a mixed personal relationship with Salehi and
warned that a Western focus on Salehi will weaken him in
Tehran and torpedo any ability he has to influence Iranian
officials to cooperate on the nuclear file. All described
Salehi as an intelligent and skilled interlocutor and prefer
dealing with him than some other Iranian officials.
(Comment: Mission's experience onthe Tehran Research Reactor
negotiations does not give us any confidence that Salehi will
be able to deliver cooperation on long outstanding issues.
End Comment.) End Summary.

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At Least One IAEA Official Optimistic About Salehi...
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2. (C) Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) head, Ali
Akbar Salehi, previously served in Vienna as Iran's Permanent
Representative to the IAEA from 1999-2003, thus many
diplomats in Vienna already are well acquainted with him. On
September 30, IAEA Office of External Relations and Policy
Coordination Director Vilmos Cserveny and the Director
General's Special Assistant for Science and Technology Graham
Andrew shared their views on Salehi with visiting Iran
Regional Presence Office Director Alan Eyre, IRPO Off, and
Msnoffs. Cserveny started off the conversation by relaying
his opinions on the Iranian nuclear file after the revelation
of the enrichment facility at Qom, noting that this discovery
does not produce necessary confidence in the nature of Iran's
program and that Iran could have only this "backup facility,"
as Salehi described it to him. On the other hand, Cserveny
continued rhetorically, Iran could have "four more." He also
claimed that the IAEA would not abandon its investigation
into pas
t aspects of Iran's program, and that the IAEA needs to know
the details of the past because these issues bear on Iran's
present program. (Comment: Cserveny presumably was
referring to issues such as Iran's work to adapt a missile
re-entry vehicle to carry a nuclear warhead. End Comment.)


3. (C) Turning to Salehi, Cserveny called him a "good
ambassador in a different time," but acknowledged that Salehi
had been involved in the inception of the nuclear program in
the post-Shah era and had been close to Supreme Leader
Khamenei when Khamenei was Iran's president and relied on a
number of advisers. According to Cserveny, Salehi had helped
to convince the Islamic government to pursue the nuclear
program. Cserveny was optimistic about Salehi's appointment,
noting that he had been helpful in Vienna on the nuclear
file. For example, Iran signed the Additional Protocol (AP)
under Salehi's tenure in Vienna, an act for which Salehi was
instrumental, according to Cserveny's account. However, he
continued, many inside Iran were upset that the government
had signed the AP, forcing Salehi to explain the reasoning
behind the decision on television.


4. (C) On Salehi's short stint thus far as AEOI head,
Cserveny highlighted Salehi's public and private statements
about wanting a "fresh start" and to increase Iran's
cooperation. Cserveny said he had been told that Salehi had
personally "made happen" the recent agreements to improve
safeguards at Natanz. Cserveny argued that Iran needs to
abide by the AP and that Salehi might be the person necessary
to "stand up and ask the government to implement" it. In
contrast, Cserveny noted that he met with Majles Speaker Ali
Larijani in February, who threw up his hands at the idea of
implementing the AP because Iranian officials do not want to
abide by it. Cserveny said that the conversation with Iran
had already become easier and that Salehi is less rigid than
Aqazadeh, making direct conversation possible. Cserveny also

UNVIE VIEN 00000497 002.2 OF 004


had positive things to say about current Ambassador Ali
Asghar Soltanieh, calling him a popular figure in Vienna whom
many respect: Cserveny acknowledged he was not sure what the
relationship between Soltanieh and Salehi was like, other
than the fact that they work closely together. (Comment:
More often, Mission hears other delegations refer to
Soltanieh as a clown and many are tired of his rants and
repetitive diatribes. End Comment.) There are some rumors
of a rivalry between the two officials, but Cserveny cannot
confirm those stories, and Soltanieh is likely to implement
decisions that will be forthcoming from Salehi. Cserveny
also called it "clear" that Salehi works for the leadership
and reports to the president.

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Others Not So Positive
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5. (C) In the same meeting with Cserveny, the DG's Special
Assistant Graham Andrew described Salehi as sophisticated and
prescient and complimented his substantive expertise, but was
less optimistic about dealing with him than Cserveny, noting
that his own perspective was colored by a presentation that
Aqazadeh made on Kalaye Electric during Salehi's tenure in
Vienna that was "a set of direct lies." Andrew also noted
that Salehi's demeanor is quite different from the joking
nature of Soltanieh. In contrast, Salehi is cautious and
reserved. He has been helpful so far on technical issues,
but Andrew was skeptical, saying that one could not be sure
the cooperation was not "for a different end." Nevertheless,
Andrew thought that an agreement on the Tehran Research
Reactor (TRR) could "change the mood music" but the ball on
this was in Tehran's court and it was not clear whether the
Iranians would take advantage of the offer or "miss the boat."


6. (C) Both Andrew and Cserveny expressed general
frustration over dealing with the Iranians, pointing out the
fact that it is acceptable for Iranians to lie if in their
interests, the bargaining culture, and, as Cserveny noted,
their "arrogant" approach to the issues such as the work plan
where the Iranians think that they are clever in disputing
the agreement when all the parties know that Iran's
interpretation "is not what the IAEA intended." Furthermore,
Cserveny described the revolutionary generation as guarded.
They want to be transparent, in his opinion, but not too
transparent. At the same time, it is difficult to encourage
the hardliners to cooperate because they are empowered by
isolation.


7. (C) On October 8, IAEA Deputy Director General for
Safeguards Olli Heinonen added his views on Salehi, which
included even more pessimism than Andrew. He acknowledged
the more positive views of Cserveny and Andrew and said they
were influenced by Salehi's "ability" to facilitate an IAEA
visit to Natanz in 2003 after it was publicly outed as a
nuclear facility. However, Heinonen attributes this
"cooperation" more to pressure the Iranian government felt
over U.S. military action in neighboring Iraq than to
Salehi's good nature and political faculties. Heinonen
questions whether Salehi was really trying to "solve the
problems" or delay. Heinonen said he had been working with
Khatami for half a year to get access to the facility and did
not think that Salehi was notably helpful. Nevertheless,
when the IAEA found contamination at Kalaye Electric, Salehi
was astute enough to realize that these were questions that
needed to be addressed; Salehi clearly tried to get answers
for the IAEA without delay. Hei
nonen's perception is that Salehi was pulled from Vienna at
the end of 2003 because Nuclear Negotiator Hasan Ruhani was
given the nuclear file, and he was taking a new approach. At
that point, for the first time, Heinonen was having meetings
with Iran that did not include any AEOI officials. After
Salehi left Vienna, he essentially dropped off the map, but
Heinonen heard from Iranian colleagues that Salehi had tried
to get the position of AEOI head in 2005 when Ahmadinejad
came into power because Salehi believed Aqazadeh had
mismanaged the nuclear file. Currently, Heinonen summed up,
he cannot be sure about Salehi's level of influence in the
regime and with the president, and said while it is clear
that Salehi is "good at speaking," it's not clear whether he
can "deliver."


8. (S) Heinonen also related Salehi's history with the
Iranian nuclear program as it is detailed in his notes.
Although it has not been confirmed by Iran, there is
information that Salehi was one of the Iranians who attended

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a radioisotope exhibition in Pakistan in 1986. Iran has said
that this group was in Pakistan, but for another purpose.
(Note: Heinonen said that this information is in the now
famous IAEA "annex" on Iran. End Note.)

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And Minty in the Middle
--------------


9. (C) South African Governor to the IAEA Board of
Governors Abdul Minty added his thoughts on Salehi on October
15, expressing a generally favorable but measured opinion.
He began his comments by stating that any Iranian official's
influence is based on what slot he fills in the complex
decisionmaking system and describing the difficulty that
officials have in gaining influence since different "cliques"
vie for influence and it is easy to fall out of a clique.
This kind of system makes it difficult for Iran to take part
in diplomacy as we know it, especially since the Foreign
Ministry has very little influence. We need to understand
this system to understand why Salehi himself is irrelevant as
a person, he is a product of the Iranian system.


10. (C) Minty described Salehi as very unreasonable in
their first two meetings long ago in Vienna, causing Minty to
wonder if he or Pretoria had done something wrong. Then,
Salehi leaned too far in the other direction and was
exuberantly collegial, leading them to work well together for
the remainder of Salehi's tenure in Vienna. He described
Salehi as having the capability to look at issues logically
while many other Iranian interlocutors "override logic." He
also is able to look above the issues at the broader
landscape. Although he had heard many colleagues say that
they thought the appointment of Salehi was designed to show a
positive signal to the West, Minty was not convinced. He did
not speculate as to the true reason Salehi was appointed but
argued that "lots could be going on." Minty also warned that
it will be difficult for the West to play on Salehi's
positive qualities because he is being watched. He predicted
that it will be nearly impossible to be able to talk directly
and honestly to Salehi because he will never be alone.
Furthermore, focusing on Salehi could make him more
vulnerable in Tehran, so we need to be careful to not
personalize our approach. We need to talk about the Iranian
government and what they need to do, not about what Salehi
himself can accomplish. The language we use, Minty
explained, will be very important in how Tehran responds and
the amount of influence Salehi will be able to build or
preserve. In dealing generally with Iran, Minty believed
that many interlocutors do not understand how offensive it is
to the Iranians to pressure them or "be tough" publicly. In
Iranian culture, such tough messages should only be relayed
privately.

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He Needs to Prove It
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11. (C) Comment: Although there is much talk in Vienna
about the signal that Salehi's appointment sends and whether
this means that Iran is more serious about cooperating,
reviews of Salehi's ability - and even willingness - to
resolve the outstanding issues in Iran's nuclear program are
much more mixed. Likeminded states are generally pragmatic
about this appointment, noting that it means nothing for the
progress of the Iran file and the obligations Iran is under
to clarify and suspend proliferation-sensitive aspects of its
nuclear program. We should not buy it if other states
plead for more patience on the Iranian nuclear issue in order
to allow Salehi to help resolve these issues. Mission will
remind states that Iran's cooperation is long overdue and,
though we would appreciate any efforts by Salehi to resolve
outstanding issues, there should be no delay in doing so.


12. (S) Similarly, Mission's experience on the TRR
negotiations - in which Director General ElBaradei reached
out directly to Salehi because he is optimistic that Salehi
could be a positive influence - does not give us great
confidence in Salehi. Either Salehi directly lied to the DG
about his intentions or he does not have the necessary
influence to deliver on his promises of a cooperative and
positive approach. Given Salehi's warning to the DG that he
was receiving criticism in Tehran for being "soft," it is
possible that he was directed not to come to Vienna to
participate in the TRR negotiations because of worries about
his reliability (although there are other possible reasons to

UNVIE VIEN 00000497 004.2 OF 004


have held Salehi in Tehran). If so, ElBaradei's focus on him
throughout the negotiations probably further weakened him in
Tehran and we should not be confident that he will be willing
or able to deliver increased Iranian cooperation on nuclear
issues. Meanwhile, ElBaradei's decision to cut out Soltanieh
in working directly with Salehi likely portends further
complications in that Tehran-Embassy relationship. End
Comment.
DAVIES