Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA478
2009-10-16 16:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA: AMANO READY FOR PRIME TIME

Tags:  AORC PREL KNNP IAEA 
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VZCZCXYZ0030
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0478/01 2891612
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161612Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0209
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000478 

SIPDIS

FOR T, IO, ISN, EAP, AND INR/B
DOE FOR NA-20, NE-6
NSC FOR SAMORE, SCHEINMAN, HOLGATE, CONNERY
NRC FOR OIP
TOKYO FOR PEKO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA: AMANO READY FOR PRIME TIME

REF: A. STATE 91301

B. UNVIE 472

C. UNVIE 476

Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000478

SIPDIS

FOR T, IO, ISN, EAP, AND INR/B
DOE FOR NA-20, NE-6
NSC FOR SAMORE, SCHEINMAN, HOLGATE, CONNERY
NRC FOR OIP
TOKYO FOR PEKO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2019
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA: AMANO READY FOR PRIME TIME

REF: A. STATE 91301

B. UNVIE 472

C. UNVIE 476

Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (SBU) In several meetings with USG officials before he
departed Vienna at the end of the IAEA General Conference,
DG-designate Amano displayed remarkable congruence of views
with us on conducting the Agency's missions in safeguards
verification, nuclear security, and promoting peaceful uses
of the atom as well as on reforming Agency management.
Latest information from the Japanese Mission is that Amano
will return to Vienna in late November and occupy an office
in the IAEA during his final, intensive preparation to assume
office December 1. This report responds directly to
instruction ref A. End Summary.

DG of All States, But in Agreement with Us
--------------


2. (C) In a meeting with Ambassador on the eve of the
two-week Board of Governors (BoG) and General Conference (GC)
marathon of mid-September, IAEA Director General-designate
Yukiya Amano thanked the U.S. for having supported his
candidacy and took pains to emphasize his support for U.S.
strategic objectives for the Agency. Amano reminded
Ambassador on several occasions that he would need to make
concessions to the G-77, which correctly required him to be
fair-minded and independent, but that he was solidly in the
U.S. court on every key strategic decision, from high-level
personnel appointments to the handling of Iran's alleged
nuclear weapons program.


3. (SBU) Amano shared with Ambassador Davies his public
stance on the role of the IAEA and the Agency's contribution
to the global issues of proliferation, security, power, human
health and water management. More candidly, Amano noted the
importance of maintaining a certain "constructive ambiguity"
about his plans, at least until he took over for DG ElBaradei
in December. With a bow to the G-77, Amano felt obliged to
emphasize the importance of "balance" regarding the Agency's
work in peaceful uses of nuclear technology. For staff
morale reasons, Amano planned to work on improving the

quality of management while publicly praising the current
standards and commending staff members for their dedication.


4. (SBU) In the course of conversation, Amano was careful to
highlight the April 12-13 Nuclear Security Summit in
Washington as "the biggest event for me in the coming
months." The Summit coming in spring would drive his winter
agenda, including events in Davos and the IAEA's March
meeting of the Board of Governors. Again for political
considerations, Amano said he would balance visits to the
U.S. with trips to South Africa, Egypt and Malaysia. Were he
not to secure the cooperation of these countries, Amano felt
he would make little progress on top priorities upon taking
office. While acknowledging the increasing polarization
between IAEA Member States, Amano was quick to point out
areas of agreement, such as the need to upgrade the
Seibersdorf laboratory complex, promote cancer therapy and
safely introduce nuclear power. Amano promised to "treat
Iran with dignity," but followed up firmly with the claim
that he had been granted the post of Director General "to
implement safeguards." He emphasized that Iran had specific
obligations which the IAEA would enforce; he did not see
himself as an intermediary between Iran and the rest of the
world.

Shaping IAEA Leadership
--------------


5. (C) On staffing issues at the Deputy Director General
(DDG) level, Amano stressed his pleasure that DDG for
Management David Waller had agreed to stay on in his current
position. Amano described Waller as "an old friend, an
effective manager and a good speaker." Referring to his
long-standing acquaintance with DDG for Safeguards Olli
Heinonen, a manager he described as "reliable and
professional," Amano had also planned to retain Heinonen in
his current position. He also intended to appoint another
Russian to replace DDG for Nuclear Energy Sokolov. Amano
noted that DDG for Security and Safety Taniguchi would be
leaving during the summer of 2010 (when his contract expired)
and said he hoped to identify a "reliable person from a
reliable country" to succeed Taniguchi. Amano acknowledged
that finding replacements for DDG Cetto (Technical
Cooperation) and DDG Burkart (Nuclear Applications) would be
trickier, as the jobs were rife with G-77 political
considerations and he needed at least one DDG from a
developing country. Amano described the complex issue of
staffing at the IAEA - from technical expertise to
geographical representation and gender balance - as a "jigsaw
puzzle." He planned to appoint only one advisor from Japan,
someone who was "not too visible." (Note: From subsequent
USG-GOJ consultations in Tokyo we know the individual in
question to be Satoshi Suzuki, whom we expect to serve as
Special Assistant to the Director General for Management.
End Note.)

Holding Agency to Verification
Responsibilities, Not Politics
--------------


6. (C) Subsequently, White House WMD Coordinator Gary Samore
and NSC Senior Director Laura Holgate met with Amano on
September 15 on the margins of the General Conference. Amano
noted that he knows everyone will be focused on the March
2010 Board of Governors meeting, his first as the new DG, to
see what he does and says about Iran and Syria. He affirmed
it was most important for the IAEA to stick strictly to its
verification responsibilities and not offer political
"proposals" or "negotiations." Amano said that he would
insist Iran to implement fully all Safeguards obligations and
extend full cooperation with the IAEA, although he does not
believe Iran will completely change its current position of
stalemate.


7. (C) Amano indicated he had begun reaching out to key
individuals in the IAEA, seeking their advice on managing
tough issues. He said that, in particular, he had spoken to
DDG Safeguards Olli Heinonen about whether or not the IAEA
needed to change how the Iran and Syria reports were written.
Amano also reaffirmed to Dr. Samore that he plans to keep
DDG Management David Waller and Heinonen in their current
positions, especially as it is important to maintain some
level of consistency and continuity with the turnover of a
new DG.


8. (C) Amano echoed these themes in a September 16 meeting
with U.S. NPT Special Representative Susan Burk. Citing his
own election, Amano noted warmly that "if you are determined,
the U.S. can do anything!", and he hoped the U.S. also be a
driving force in the NPT Revcon. Asked about the need for
increased IAEA authorities, Amano affirmed his commitment to
keep pushing on the Additional Protocol. He also argued for
greater work on the back end of the fuel cycle, suggesting
that it would be useful to develop something analogous to the
IAEA multilateral fuel assurances arrangement that deals with
waste issues while reassuring developing countries that "it's
not just about new restrictions to be imposed."

Winning 'em over, gradually
--------------


9. (SBU) Comment: By the time he departed Vienna with the
GC's confirmation of his appointment, Amano appeared
comfortable in his "Director General" shoes. He speaks with
increasing confidence and clarity, having mastered his
talking points and grown accustomed to his new title.
Apprehensions linger among IAEA staff and diplomatic missions
regarding his communications and leadership abilities, but
with his performance during the GC he made progress in
winning over skeptics. His wisdom in downplaying Japanese
visibility among his senior advisors will also assuage staff
fears that Amano would subvert the Agency with a Japanese
corporate management style. On a grander stage, Amano's
global political savvy was clearly in evidence, and his
willingness to speak candidly with U.S. interlocutors on his
strategy and various balancing acts bodes well for our future
relationship. For example, his description of President
Obama's Nuclear Security Summit as the biggest event of his
early tenure was a deliberate and gratifying gesture.


10. (U) Amano's conversations with Energy Secretary Chu and
NRC Chairman Jaczko are reported refs B and C.


DAVIES