Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA462
2009-10-08 07:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
UNVIE
Cable title:  

UNODC OPERATING ENVIRONMENT IN IRAN TOUGHER AFTER

Tags:  PREL IR AF PAK SNAR 
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FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0167
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUCNNAR/VIENNA NARCOTICS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0320
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0307
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI IMMEDIATE 0078
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 UNVIE VIENNA 000462 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2023
TAGS: PREL IR AF PAK SNAR
SUBJECT: UNODC OPERATING ENVIRONMENT IN IRAN TOUGHER AFTER
ELECTIONS

UNVIE VIEN 00000462 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e)

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Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 UNVIE VIENNA 000462

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2023
TAGS: PREL IR AF PAK SNAR
SUBJECT: UNODC OPERATING ENVIRONMENT IN IRAN TOUGHER AFTER
ELECTIONS

UNVIE VIEN 00000462 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 (c) and (e)

--------------
Summary
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1. (C) UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Tehran Program
Head Antonino de Leo emphasized recently that it is more
difficult for him to carry out his job in Iran following the
presidential elections. In addition to the challenges posed
by international wariness regarding continued funding for
Iran given the human rights and democracy implications of the
recent elections, de Leo has also been faced with Tehran's
refusal to grant a UNODC German project coordinator entry
into Iran, thus undermining de Leo's efforts to augment his
staff. At the same time, de Leo is also concerned that
keeping too high a profile will compromise UNODC's ability to
implement programs in Iran. De Leo planned to try to reach
back out to contacts upon his return to Tehran in late
September and was hoping that he would be able to expand his
reach into the Office of the Supreme Leader. De Leo also
stressed that Pakistan's hesitancy in participating in the
Triangular Initiative could inhibit what was becoming a
successful regional program. He asked the U.S. to encourage
Pakistan to send appropriate representation to the October
27-28 Triangular Initiative Ministerial meeting in Vienna.


2. (C) De Leo, who was in Tehran for the presidential
elections, called the post-election environment "complete
madness." He relayed that President Obama's letter to the
Supreme Leader may have inadvertently resulted in the strong
Iranian government response to the riots, which included a
severe crackdown on former regime officials such as former
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander Rezai. End
Summary.

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Elections Force UNODC to Ground
--------------


3. (C) In a September 22 meeting, UNODC Tehran Program
Head Antonino de Leo stressed that his job in Tehran had
become much more difficult since the June presidential
elections. De Leo said that he was unable to talk to any of
his contacts during the unrest for fear of making himself a
target of the government. De Leo said that he now avoids
emailing or otherwise directly circulating stories on

government drug control efforts (even good news stories) and
asks that any such information be passed from UNODC
headquarters in Vienna. Noting that, in order to avoid
drawing attention to himself and the office, he has taken
steps to ensure that his work in Iran is "behind the scenes,"
de Leo strongly lamented that this new lower profile has
reduced the effectiveness of the groundwork he laid over the
previous three months in the job. For example, he had to
cancel a briefing for the Mini-Dublin Group ambassadors by
the head of Iran's Judiciary scheduled for the week of 26
June as a result of Iran blaming the UK and others for the
election-related unrest. Further, de Leo recounted how a BBC
journalist who was planning to write "good news" stories on
Iranian counternarcotics efforts was kicked out during the
unrest, closing a possible avenue of raising public awareness
on such efforts in Iran. Nevertheless, the Celebration of
World Drug Day in Iran went well, noted de Leo, and his
speech was acknowledged and appreciated by both Iranian
Permanent Representative to UN Organizations in Vienna
Soltanieh and Head of Iran's Drug Control Headquarters
Moghadam. De Leo believed that the P5 1 talks in Geneva on
October 1 would be the key to moving back toward a
collaborative relationship on the ground. He noted that
there was a lot of interest in Tehran in the talks.


4. (C) Currently, de Leo explained, he is able to meet
with his regular Judiciary contacts and even in the very
tense time directly after the elections, he was still able to
work with the Iranian government on its corruption
self-assessment. Thus, de Leo confirmed, in mid-September,
the computer-based training module for anti-money laundering
was installed and training has commenced. Although the
entire government is not supportive of either UNODC efforts
or cooperation with UNODC programs, noted de Leo, pockets of
"serious individuals" who want to tackle money laundering,
organized crime, and corruption exist, so it is critical to
reach out to these individuals to make progress on these
issues. Although he has not yet reached out to other
contacts, de Leo explained he planned to do so in late
September upon his return to Iran. De Leo added that he is
also trying to strengthen his contacts with the Office of the

UNVIE VIEN 00000462 002.2 OF 003


Supreme Leader, given the importance of those officials in
decisionmaking circles. Despite these positive steps, de Leo
warned that his staffing level remains far too low, primarily
because of funding constraints; if he loses his Italian
project coordinator, de Leo stressed, he "won't be able to
continue" his work in Iran. His staffing posture was not
enhanced, de Leo emphasized, when Iranian authorities refused
to allow his newly-hired German project coordinator to enter
Iran, claiming he was on a "black list." De Leo stressed
that although there is significant funding for
Afghanistan--an issue on which Belgium is becoming a key
funding partner--donor funding for Iran remains sparse. He
added that donors' concerns about human rights and democracy
issues in Iran since the elections had further constrained
funding for UNODC programs in Iran. On a positive note, with
regard to regional efforts, de Leo reported that UNODC has
1.25 million dollars available for the Triangular
Initiative's (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran) Joint Planning
Cell as soon as Iran signs the agreement, but de Leo is
waiting for "the dust to settle" before he approaches the
government on the issue.


5. (C) According to de Leo, the Triangular Initiative was
going well from the Iranian perspective, but Pakistan viewed
it less favorably. Tehran was pushing to do a third joint
operation, this one with Pakistan, but Pakistan remained
hesitant. In addition, de Leo added, Islamabad had agreed to
post a full-time drug liaison officer (DLO) to the Joint
Planning Cell, but no officer has yet arrived. The Pakistani
government asked UNODC to fund the DLO position, de Leo
noted, but de Leo told Islamabad that this officer should be
funded by Pakistan as a permanent position. De Leo believed
that Pakistan was slow to cooperate because there was a sense
in Islamabad that such cooperation only benefits "some" in
the government; he did not think Islamabad was worried about
recent Iranian activities along the border. De Leo called
the proposed Triangular Initiative ministerial meeting to be
held on October 27-28 a decisive occasion, but noted that if
Pakistan is not willing to send an official at the
ministerial level, Iran would downgrade its own
representation from its current plan to send Moghadam. De
Leo asked for U.S. help in encouraging Pakistan to send the
appropriate-level officials. (Comment: UNVIE can raise this
issue with Pakistani counterparts in Vienna but also
recommends Washington consider raising in Washington or
Islamabad. End Comment.) De Leo added that there will be a
one-hour extra session with Major Donors at the ministerial.

--------------
Post-Election Atmospherics
--------------


6. (C) De Leo further elaborated on the post-election
environment in Iran, calling the fallout "complete madness."
He said that the Russians were the only ones who predicted
riots following the elections and that the regime had become
even more militarized in the aftermath. According to de Leo,
one of his contacts inside the Iranian government told him
President Obama's letter to the Supreme Leader may have
provoked in part the tough government response to the riots.
The contact, who leaned toward the moderate, explained "we
don't need this letter." De Leo also noted that it has
become even harder to "check sources" in Iran since the
elections, citing a war of information in which everyone is
afraid to take a side. In any other country, stressed de
Leo, former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander and
presidential candidate Rezai would be a "big shot," but in
Iran he was suffering the fate of the regime. De Leo
recounted how one of Rezai's advisers' sons had disappeared
and no one knew what had happened to him; finally, the dead
body was delivered to the family and family members it were
informed that any mourning would have to be done in private.
Other Iranians have noted, added de Leo, that the family was
"lucky" that the son was dead because at least family members
now know where he is, unlike so many others who have
disappeared after the elections. Now, de Leo argued, it is
clear who is in charge in Iran and that additional sanctions
will strengthen the regime.

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Comment
--------------

7 (C) UNODC officials based in Tehran continue to provide
valuable first-hand information about the situation on the
ground in Iran. Despite the negative implications of the
Iranian elections, UNODC continues to try to work with Iran
on narcotics and crime programs, particularly those related

UNVIE VIEN 00000462 003.2 OF 003


to Afghanistan counternarcotics efforts. The Triangular
Initiative is a symbolically important step towards regional
counternarcotics cooperation, and we should consider
encouraging Pakistan to participate more fully. End Comment.
DAVIES