Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA46
2009-02-03 15:31:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNVIE
Cable title:  

HELPING UNODC TO HELP AFGHANISTAN

Tags:  SNAR KCRM PREL PINS PTER AF 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0046/01 0341531
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 031531Z FEB 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8971
INFO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0257
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1468
UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000046 

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR KCRM PREL PINS PTER AF

SUBJECT: HELPING UNODC TO HELP AFGHANISTAN

REF: A) KABUL 00179, B) UNVIE 0033

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SUMMARY
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UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000046

SENSITIVE

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SNAR KCRM PREL PINS PTER AF

SUBJECT: HELPING UNODC TO HELP AFGHANISTAN

REF: A) KABUL 00179, B) UNVIE 0033

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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) Among issues handled by the UN Organization for Drugs and
Crime (UNODC),none looms larger in the U.S. national interest than
the Afghan narcotics trade and its impact undermining stability and
contributing to terrorist activity in the region. UNODC's
Afghanistan strategy compliments and supports the U.S.
counternarcotics strategy. US's leadership in establishing the
Paris Pact initiative in 2003 has brought together 56 countries in
regular dialogue to produce recommendations to strengthen the fight
against Afghan opium and has helped raise the profile of the Afghan
counter-drug issue. The Paris Pact meetings have also provided a
venue for the Mission to promote USG interests, such as the Good
Performers' Initiative (GPI). Mission's encouragement of UNODC's
longstanding advocacy for greater ISAF engagement on
counternarcotics in Afghanistan contributed to UNODC Executive
Director Antonio Costa's presentations to NATO which in turn led to
the October 2008 decision of the NATO Defense Ministers to permit
ISAF, in conjunction with Afghan forces, to strike drug facilities
and facilitators supporting the insurgency.


2. (SBU) On a program level, we should work with UNODC and the
government of Afghanistan to encourage the GOA to take a grassroots
approach to incentives such as the Good Performers' Initiative
(GPI); encourage UNODC's expansion of its provincial and local
programs in Afghanistan, including building on the relevant
commitments of our allies; promote UNODC's regional approach to
combating counternarcotics, including possible assistance to its
activities in East Africa; help UNODC build upon its successes in
interdicting precursor chemicals; strengthen its efforts to help
Afghanistan to fight corruption in the country and encourage it to
establish programs to help countries to implement crime conventions
that could serve to disrupt the vast underground economy fueled by
drug money. UNODC depends on voluntary contributions to fund 85-90%
of its activities. USG contributions have been made on a
year-to-year basis. A longer time frame for such contributions
could give UNODC critical stability. END SUMMARY.



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Working the Provinces
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3. (SBU) Per Ref A, UNODC plans to broaden local operations in the
south and southwest, specifically Herat and Nimroz provinces.
Canada, which has become the largest donor to UNODC's Afghan
programs, intends to focus on Kandahar with its next tranche of
donations of Cdn$25 million for two years starting 4/1/2009. (Note:
Canada gave Cdn$27 million to UNODC for its Afghanistan programs
over the two years 2007-2009. End Note.) We should support UNODC's
efforts in those three provinces. UNODC's local operations could
improve border control between Heart, Nimroz and Iran. Nimroz and
Kandahar are among the five southern provinces which account for 90%
of Afghanistan poppy production. We could build on Canada's efforts
to have UNODC expand its activities in Kandahar province which
shares a long border with Pakistan.

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Continuing Regional Efforts
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4. (SBU) UNODC's regional strategy reflects recognition that there
are many countries that lie between Afghanistan and the market
countries in western Europe. The UNODC first focused on improving
control of the long border between Afghanistan and the Central Asian
states, such as mobile interdiction teams and border liaison
offices. In 2006 it started the Central Asian Regional Information
and Coordination Center (CARICC) to strengthen the analytical
capability of the border control agencies. With ratification of the
CARICC MOU from four of the member states, CARICC will formally
enter into force in 2009. In 2007, UNODC also launched the Triangle
Initiative among Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. USG support for
such regional initiatives will help to stem the export of Afghan
opium. UNODC has also made forays into Eastern Europe and East
Africa, seeking ways to disrupt these trafficking routes. Given the
excellent law enforcement and counternarcotics infrastructure and
abundant resources in Europe (e.g., EC, EUROPOL),the U.S. may want
to direct resources to East Africa, where the Europeans have
displayed less enthusiasm.

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REWARD SUCCESS IN PRECURSOR INTERDICTION
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5. (U) UNODC, with the cooperation of a number of countries,
including the United States, helped Afghanistan and the surrounding
countries to launch Operation TARCET in late 2007-early 2008.
TARCET aims to disrupt the flow of precursor chemicals (acetic
anhydride and others) into Afghanistan, which is needed to convert
opium into heroin. The program trains law enforcement officers in
detection techniques and methodology and promotes
information/intelligence sharing among the countries. The results
have been impressive -- with seizures in 2008 of 19 tonnes of acetic
anhydride, and over 20 tonnes of other chemicals in Iran, Pakistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan.


6. (SBU) According to UNODC, recent intel operations suggest that
most chemical precursors enter Afghanistan from the Republic of
Korea and EU countries, especially the Czech Republic and Hungary.
The government of Afghanistan in December notified the International
Narcotics Control Board (INCB) that there were no legitimate
requirements for acetic anhydride in Afghanistan. The announcement
renders all shipments of the chemical contraband, which should
improve interdiction.


7. (SBU) The next phase of Operation TARCET would focus on
intelligence-driven operations to facilitate "backtracking" of
chemicals across borders, building forensics capacity, and fostering
greater cooperation among key players like India, China, the UAE (a
major transit country),and the ROK. Recently the USG contributed
more than $370,000 to UNODC for such purpose (Ref Paris Pact cable).
USG should reward UNODC's success in chemicals interdiction by
further financial contributions to TARCET, and support UNODC
programs to build forensics capacity in Afghanistan to analyze drug
seizures.

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Drugs, Money, and Crime
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8. (SBU) In a recent meeting with Ambassador (Ref B),UNODC
Executive Director Antonio Costa highlighted the "unexplained
economy" worth billions that results from the link between drug
trafficking and organized crime. In fact, in a recent press
interview, Costa claimed that drug money had entered the legitimate
capital market to provide liquidity in times of financial crises.
In his view, there is lagging implementation of the existing crime
treaties. Paris Pact members at a recent meeting agreed to a new
action plan to address financial flows related to Afghan drugs.
U.S. support for programs to strengthen legal capacity of nations to
implement the crime treaties (e.g., the UN Convention against
Corruption, and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime) and to the Paris Pact action plan would contribute to
progress in this regard.

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Fighting Corruption
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9. (SBU) Afghanistan became a party to the UN Convention on
Corruption (UNCAC) in December. This opens the door for us to work
with UNODC to develop an overall anticorruption strategy. UNODC has
a $3.2 million program to provide practical assistance to build
Afghanistan's capacity to fight corruption which is not fully
funded. Main beneficiaries include the newly formed High Office for
Oversight and the Supreme Court. UNODC is also conducting an
analysis to identify the large gap between UNCAC requirements and
national legislation. The emphasis is on the reform of the
judiciary and prosecution services and on legal and administrative
reforms. USG financial support for this program may now be
appropriate.

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COMMENT
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10. (SBU) UNODC receives 85% to 90% of its operating budget from
voluntary contributions. Most of its Afghan activities are subject
to voluntary funding. The USG has made contributions on
year-to-year basis because of own budgeting process. Any
contributions on a longer time frame would provide UNODC with some
financial stability critical for its long-term planning in
Afghanistan. End Comment.


SCHULTE