Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA457
2009-10-02 15:20:00
CONFIDENTIAL
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/IRAN: CONSULTING BOARD MEMBERS ON QOM

Tags:  PREL AORC KNNP IAEA IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000457 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR P, T, ISN/RA, IO/GS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019
TAGS: PREL AORC KNNP IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: CONSULTING BOARD MEMBERS ON QOM

REF: A) UNVIE 447 B) STATE 100153

Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000457

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR P, T, ISN/RA, IO/GS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019
TAGS: PREL AORC KNNP IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: CONSULTING BOARD MEMBERS ON QOM

REF: A) UNVIE 447 B) STATE 100153

Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary
--------------

1. (C) Following outreach to JUSCANZ (ref a) and EU
Ambassadors earlier in the week, P-3 Ambassadors/Charges
continued consultations on the disclosure of the Qom
enrichment facility September 30-Ocotober 1 with the majority
of Board members, the Egyptian NAM Chair and Malaysian Board
Chair Arshad. The first questions on everyone's mind
concerned the timing of an IAEA inspection of Qom, whether
this would warrant a Special Board meeting prior to the
regularly scheduled November 26 Board session, and if so what
outcome (i.e., a resolution) we would expect from the Board.
Board members, including the Board Chair and NAM Chair, fully
supported IAEA inspections as soon as possible. Board
members agreed that this was prima facie a Board issue and
many felt the Board must react in some manner, though there
were differing views as to the need for a Special Board.
Ambassador Davies noted that the November Board meeting was a
long way off and P-3 counterparts left open the possibility
of a Special Board without committing to one. The P-3 also
sought to steer the discussion away from legalistic debate as
to the applicability of Code 3.1 modified to the more
fundamental questions raised by a covert facility as a breach
of confidence and violation of five UNSCRs and nine Board
resolutions. All of these discussions occurred against the
backdrop of the October 1 P5 1 - Iran talks in Geneva, with
Board members anticipating the impact of those talks on how
we proceed in Vienna. Expectations were low as to a
breakthrough in Geneva but regardless of the "grey smoke"
arising from the talks, all agreed an IAEA inspection must
proceed. Mission will follow up with Board members
post-Geneva and informed by DG ElBaradei's Tehran visit.


2. (C) Meanwhile, Egypt and other NAM members expected Iran
would use the opportunity of a previously scheduled October 2
NAM Plenary to plead its case as to reporting the facility to
the IAEA. According to an Egyptian readout, Iran addressed
the issue under Any Other Business in response to questions

from other NAM members. Holding up a copy of Iran's letter
to the IAEA, Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh bitterly complained
that after he informed ElBaradei and DDG Heinonen, the letter
was referenced in the press two days later; he argued that
something must be done about this breach of confidentiality.
The press leak makes it more difficult domestically, he
added, to settle on a date for an IAEA inspection but Iran
hoped to "clarify the issue" before the November Board
meeting. Soltanieh reportedly also made familiar arguments
as to the Secretariat being notified of the facility even
earlier than the obligatory six months (prior to introduction
of nuclear material) under the old Code 3.1, and explained
that it was built in a mountain because of documented threats
of attack against Iran's nuclear facilities by the U.S. and
Israel in the past six years. Soltanieh reportedly made no
reference to the outcome of the Geneva talks the day before.
End Summary.

Inspections ASAP
--------------


3. (C) In a September 30 conversation with UK and U.S.
ambassadors and French Charge d'Affaires, IAEA Board of
Governors Chairman Arshad (Malaysia) agreed that the sooner
inspectors are given access, the better, and pledged that as
a NAM member country Malaysia would encourage Iran to
facilitate this so as to "defuse tension." In separate
conversations, India and The Philippines expressed concerned
that Iran would use a pre-scheduled October 2 NAM Plenary to
plead its case as to having reported the facility in
compliance with its IAEA obligations. The Philippines, which
recently left the Board, committed to using its voice in the
NAM and G-77 to counter any "business as usual" response to
the Qom disclosure and stressed the need for outreach to
pro-Iran Board members. NAM Chair Egypt fully agreed with
the P-3 that the next step was an IAEA inspection and would
await the results of an IAEA probe, as it had nothing but
news reports on the Qom facility. Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi
reiterated Egypt's firm opposition to any non-peaceful
Iranian program, seemed genuinely appreciative of being among
the first to be consulted by the P-3, and said he would
immediately report to capital.


4. (C) The broad consensus among Board members, including
many NAM countries, was that an IAEA inspection should take
place as soon as possible. India expressed concern that Iran
would seek to delay using the military nature of the site as
a pretext. Afghanistan affirmed that if Iran is sincere, it
would be possible to have an IAEA inspection and Board report
before November, adding that the IAEA/Board must react "as a
matter of principle." In a larger group meeting, Mongolia
and Brazil noted that much would depend on the nature of
Iran's response to the IAEA request for inspections, when the
inspection(s) would occur (now or in six months) and what
conditions Iran would attach. Argentina was willing to
countenance a two to three-month delay while the IAEA works
out the details of an inspection, and the P-3 pushed back on
this point.


5. (C) Most NAM Board members seem to acknowledge the gravity
of the Qom disclosure while awaiting confirmation on the
basis of an IAEA report. According to a UK readout, South
African Ambassador Gumbi affirmed that construction of the
Qom facility was a direct violation of UNSCRs. New to the
Board, Azerbaijan was among the least constructive NAM
members, towing the Iranian line. Recalling its opposition
to the February 2006 referral of Iran to the UNSC, Azerbaijan
likened the Qom disclosure to that of Natanz and allowed that
inspections could prove that all is well, "as with Natanz."
Azerbaijan further questioned the purpose of any Special
Board meeting, noting divergent views on the Board. The new
Pakistani Ambassador professed to be a "blank slate" on the
Iran nuclear file (despite having just served in Tehran for
three years) according to a UK readout, and the UK was not
convinced Pakistan would play an active role on the Board in
this matter. (Note: P-3 consultations did not include
pro-Iran NAM members Cuba and Venezuela, whom Safeguards DDG
Heinonen plans to brief directly. End Note.)

Some Caveats - Code 3.1, Information Sharing
--------------


6. (C) During our consultations, the P-3 were careful to note
that the disclosure of a clandestine enrichment facility
should not be obfuscated by legal technicalities as to the
applicability of Code 3.1. modified of the Subsidiary
Arrangements to Iran's safeguards agreement (requiring Iran
to notify the IAEA upon taking a decision to construct a
nuclear facility). Without prompting, Egyptian Ambassador
Fawzi reminded that Egypt's statement at the September Board
called on Iran to implement Code 3.1 modified. By contrast,
Board Chair Arshad argued in his separate meeting with the
P-3 that the IAEA Legal Advisor's "opinion" on Code 3.1 could
be challenged. However, Arshad acknowledged Ambassador
Davies's point that in March 2007 the IAEA had formally
rejected Iran's unilateral claim as to having reverted to the
earlier version of Code 3.1. Among Latin Board members,
Argentina was the most querulous as to Code 3.1, having heard
DG ElBaradei's statement in a CNN interview that Iran was "on
the wrong side of the law." Argentine Ambassador Curia
questioned whether there was a grey area with respect to the
applicability of Code 3.1 to new facilities, but also
recognized that this would be a moot issue if construction of
the Qom facility began before March 2007.


7. (C) In what may be a preview of other potential NAM
arguments, Board Chair Arshad also unhelpfully focused on the
lack of timely information sharing with the Agency, i.e.,
that the IAEA was not taken into confidence earlier when
information was known about the Qom facility for 2-3 years.
Going further, Arshad drew parallels to the late provision of
information to the IAEA in the Syria case. A senior
Secretariat member present in our meeting also unhelpfully
chimed in that his colleagues felt blind-sided by such late
disclosures. The UK referred to the information-sharing
methodology in the DG's last Iran report and the need for a
judgment call as to providing information to the Agency in a
useful manner. Ambassador also stressed "not to shoot the
messenger" but to keep the focus on Iran's action, apparently
over many years, of constructing something in secret that it
now states will be an enrichment facility. The French Charge
added that Iran's letter provided confirmation of our
information - it was not just "allegations." The P-3
similarly explained the decision on information sharing to
other Board members but no one else raised this issue in our
consultations thus far.

Next Steps: Special Board or Not?
--------------

8.(C) The P-3 assured Board Chair Malaysia and Board members
that we were not seeking an immediate Board meeting but
cautioned that the November 26 Board may be too long a wait
given the seriousness of the issue. Allowing for various
scenarios, the UK anticipated a Special Board would be
especially warranted should Iran not grant inspectors
immediate access. The French held out the possibility that
timely inspections, followed by an IAEA report (including an
action plan for safeguards) could take us into November.
Board Chair Arshad was not supportive of a Special Board
absent an IAEA report, as this would be "nothing but a blame
and shame exercise." Other NAM, including South Africa, did
not rule out a Special Board once the IAEA had something to
report. Mongolia saw a role for the Board in either
scenario, whether Iran cooperates with inspections or not.


9. (C) The prospect of convening a Special Board prompted
pertinent questions as to what outcome one might expect.
Brazil argued that there would be no point to a Special Board
without a Board action (though Brazil did not endorse
particular Board action in advance). Pending the outcome of
the Geneva talks, Ukraine supported firm Board action.
Argentina was skeptical and cautioned that any Board
resolution should garner at least as many votes as the 2006
referral of Iran to the UNSC. (Comment: This standard is a
bit specious since the Board composition has changed since

2006. End Comment.) Others, including Peru and Ukraine,
asked if there was any chance of UN Security Council action
prior to a Board meeting. Ambassador Davies advised that for
now, everyone was looking to the IAEA to address the Qom
disclosure.


10. (C) Comment: In light of Iran's commitment in Geneva to
an early inspection of Qom, Board members will now likely
expect the normal sequence of an IAEA inspection followed by
a Board report. As developments warrant, we should not
exclude the possibility of a Special Board, especially if
Iran reneges on its commitments in Geneva.
DAVIES