IAEA/SYRIA: DG RECEIVES MIXED SUPPORT AMONG BOARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 UNVIE VIENNA 000441

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

ISN/RA FOR NEPHEW AND DANIEL, IO/T FOR DETEMPLE, NEA FOR
ABELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2034
TAGS: PREL PARM SY KN IAEA KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: DG RECEIVES MIXED SUPPORT AMONG BOARD
MEMBERS ON AGENCY'S REQUESTS OF SYRIA FOR INFORMATION AND
ACCESS

REF: UNVIE 00414

Classified By: AMBASSADOR GLYN DAVIES FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary. Despite a highly critical report by the
Director General, Board members remained divided on the Syria
agenda item at the September Board of Governors meeting.
Like-minded countries' criticism of Syria for "severely
impeding" the investigation and repeated calls for Syria to
provide the access requested by the IAEA were counterbalanced
by NAM/Arab countries' "welcoming" Syria's cooperation thus
far and continued focus on Israel's act of aggression and the
United States' "late" provision of information to the IAEA.
The NAM/Arabs willfully ignored a key finding in the DG's
report on Syria, which stipulates for the first time that
military sites are not off-limits to the IAEA in accordance
with Syria's safeguards agreement. Syria made its position
clear in its response under Rule 50 when it stated that it
had "fulfilled its obligations towards the Agency."
Like-minded countries, as well as Turkey, Argentina, and,
notably, Russia, called on Syria to cooperate with the IAEA's
requests. Canada and Israel said that the Agency should be
prepared to invoke additional authorities should Syria not
cooperate. The Board debate was a placeholder, as many Board
members looked forward to the results of samples recently
taken by the IAEA at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor
(MNSR),the only declared/safeguarded site in Syria. While
several Board members expressed satisfaction with Syria's
cooperation with respect to the MNSR, like-minded Board
members noted that this should not be conflated with the
investigation of Al-Kibar and related sites on which Syria is
rejecting any further IAEA access.


2. (C) Comment: Syria was on the Board's agenda for the
fourth time and with little progress to show in regard to
Syrian cooperation. The potential for "Board fatigue" is a
growing concern absent new developments. The Director
General's reports have raised more questions than answers and
despite their critical tone give no direct indication of how
to break the impasse with Syria. Without a more assertive
stance by this Director General or his successor, it is
unlikely the divided Board will call Syria to account. The
IAEA should receive soon the full results from environmental
samples taken at the MNSR reactor. Should those samples
confirm again the presence of anthropogenic uranium, it could
set the stage for the Secretariat to press Syria harder for
the access it feels it must have in Syria.
End summary and comment.

--------------
Syria an Agenda Item for Fourth Time
--------------


3. (SBU) This marks the fourth consecutive quarterly meeting
at which Syria was on the Board's agenda and, while the Board
remains focused on the issue, little has changed in the tenor
of the Board debate, which is becoming more and more scripted
as it reflects the lack of progress in the IAEA investigation
due to Syria's non-cooperation. Fourteen Board members spoke
in addition to the NAM and EU statements: Malaysia,
Argentina, the U.S., Canada, Australia, Russia, New Zealand,
Japan, Algeria, Cuba, Switzerland, Egypt, South Africa, and
Turkey. Seven non-Board members spoke under Rule 50; Israel,
South Korea, Libya, Indonesia, Venezuela, Iran, and Syria.


4. (SBU) The Director General's opening remarks focused on
Syria's lack of cooperation, saying "Syria has cooperated
with the Agency in its verification activities at the

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Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) in Damascus.
However, Syria has not yet provided the necessary cooperation
to permit the Agency to determine the origin of the
anthropogenic natural uranium particles found in samples
taken at the Al-Kibar site (referred to by the IAEA as Dair
Alzour). Syria has not cooperated with the Agency to enable
the Agency to confirm Syria's statements regarding the
nonnuclear nature of the destroyed building on the Al-Kibar
site, nor has it provided the required access to information,
locations, equipment or materials." The DG urged Syria to
cooperate with the Agency, saying it was in Syria's best
interest, but he did not reiterate, as is stipulated in the
report, that military sites were not off-limits.

--------------
Concern Expressed by Some Board Members
--------------


5. (SBU) The EU, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
Switzerland and, under Rule 50, Israel and South Korea
expressed concern over Syria's lack of cooperation with the
Agency by not providing the requested access and
documentation related to the anthropogenic uranium found at
Al-Kibar and by not engaging in substantive discussions with
the IAEA concerning the nature of the destroyed building at
Al-Kibar. Canada expressed deep concern about the possible
undeclared nuclear activities in Syria, including the
cooperation with North Korea. Canada highlighted the fact
that the Agency's investigation has been "severely impeded"
because Syria has not provided the necessary access to
locations, information, equipment, or materials. The EU
expressed concern that Syria has failed to engage in
substantive discussions with the IAEA concerning the
structure of the destroyed building and certain procurement
activities. Canada, Japan, and Switzerland noted that the
presence of nuclear material of a type not in Syria's
declared inventory underscores the need for the Agency to
pursue the matter. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand joined
the U.S. in expressing concern that the functional
relationship of the three additional sites with Al-Kibar had
still not been answered. Australia further debunked Syria's
arguments that the uranium could not have come from a
facility under construction and Syria's claim that it was
impossible to meet the IAEA's requests for access to debris.
New Zealand expressed disappointment no progress had been
made in the investigation. The EU, Australia, and Japan also
joined the U.S. in calling on Syria to sign and implement the
Additional Protocol.


6. (SBU) Echoing the like-minded statements, Argentina
endorsed the DG's assessment that it is necessary to reach a
complete understanding of the uranium particles found at
Al-Kibar, the images of the site, as well as certain
procurement activities. Argentina said the outstanding
questions underscored the importance of Syria providing
additional information to the Agency and that Syria "needs to
act transparently" by providing access to locations that may
have relation to Al-Kibar and establish modalities to protect
sensitive military information. Similarly, Turkey said that
access to information and locations was needed and the
presence of uranium particles at Al-Kibar requires complete
engagement with Syria.

--------------
Russia Supports DG's Call for Syrian
Cooperation
--------------


UNVIE VIEN 00000441 003 OF 007



7. (SBU) Russia backed the DG's call on Syria to fully
cooperate with the Agency's investigation into the nature of
the Al-Kibar facility. Russia said that questions to Syria
need to proceed calmly, without haste or politicization. In
addition, Russia supported the DG's request for Member
States, including Israel, to share information which could
possibly lead to a conclusion of the issue. The Russian
statement was markedly forward-leaning compared to its
previous focus on Israel's aggression.

--------------
Military Sites Not "Off-Limits"
--------------


8. (SBU) The EU, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan
joined the U.S. in highlighting the DG report's conclusion
that "the military nature of the facility does not preclude
further investigations by the Agency." The EU, New Zealand,
Switzerland, and Turkey (and South Korea under Rule 50)
called on Syria to establish modalities which will allow the
Agency access to relevant information and locations while
protecting sensitive information.


9. (SBU) NAM countries ignored this conclusion from the DG's
report that military sites are not off-limits to the Agency
by continuing to argue that Syria should not be requested to
cooperate beyond its legal obligations. Malaysia stressed
that sovereign rights of each member state must be protected,
that a state is only obligated to comply with its
comprehensive safeguards agreement, and that "anything else
is simply voluntary." Algeria said that Syria should
cooperate "within its framework of commitments." Cuba
dismissed the "insistence that the bombed country go beyond
its legal commitments," adding that Syria has cooperated from
the start. Egypt, speaking in its national capacity,
regretted that the line between what is an obligation and
what is a voluntary measure is becoming continually blurred.
Indonesia under rule 50 asserted that all information related
to the national security of any sovereign country and its
confidentiality has to be protected. Venezuela, also under
Rule 50, said that safeguards agreements laid out the
obligations of member states and that these should not be
altered due to pressure from third parties.

--------------
Canada, Israel Hint at Special Inspections
--------------


10. (SBU) Canada was the only Board member to indirectly
raise the prospect of special inspections. Canada encouraged
the Agency to use all of the "available tools it has in its
toolbox" should Syria's unwillingness to cooperate continue,
a thinly veiled reference to special inspections. Speaking
under Rule 50, Israel also inferred that the IAEA should take
measures to make progress in its investigation.

--------------
NAM Seeks to Keep Focus on Israel
--------------


11. (SBU) NAM (Egypt),Malaysia, Algeria, Cuba, and under
Rule 50 Libya, Indonesia, Venezuela, and Iran once again
focused on Israel's "act of aggression," calling it a
"flagrant violation of the UN charter." Malaysia and Cuba
expressed their concern about the "hypocritical silence" of
the West in that only NAM countries were speaking out against
Israel's "act of aggression," and Cuba called for the Board
to roundly condemn Israel's actions. Iran attributed Western

UNVIE VIEN 00000441 004 OF 007


silence to the influence of "Zionist lobbies." Egypt added
that those who remain silent on Israel's actions would have
been very loud had the situation been reversed. Egypt noted
further that the manner in which the issue was brought to the
IAEA demonstrated a deep lack of confidence in the Agency.
Libya blamed Israel for complicating the Agency's task by
attacking a facility it claims to be nuclear-related and
"thereby challenging and mocking the international
community." Algeria said that a stepping up of efforts in
disarmament and concrete steps towards Middle East Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone would help ease tensions in the region. In
its statement under Rule 50, Israel simply noted that the
references to Israel in the Syria report were inappropriate.


12. (SBU) In a departure from the usual NAM rhetoric, Egypt's
national statement noted that Syria was ignoring the Agency's
requests at the Al-Kibar facility. A weak South African
statement encouraged Syria to continue its cooperation with
the Agency to bring the issue to an early closure. South
Africa called on member states to direct concerns to the IAEA
when it is available and said the unilateral use of force
undermined the spirit and word of the NPT.

--------------
Report is Not Released
--------------


13. (SBU) Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the U.S. asked
for the item to remain on the Agenda and for the report to be
released formally to the public. No consensus was reached on
releasing the report, with Cuba and Egypt opposing the
release.

--------------
Syria Responds
--------------


14. (SBU) Atomic Energy Commission head Ibrahim Othman
delivered Syria's remarks under Rule 50. Othman thanked the
NAM and friendly countries for understanding Syria's
situation and lamented the continued accusations by other
member states despite "all our cooperation." (Note: This was
similar to Iran's expression of gratitude to the NAM under
the Iran agenda item, septel. End Note.) Othman said he was
surprised the IAEA continues to require Syria to show more
cooperation while Syria has since 2008 shown "all manner of
cooperation in keeping with its obligations." Othman noted
that Syria had fulfilled all its obligations by providing
information on the nature of the new and old building at
Al-Kibar, adding that neither of two buildings were related
to nuclear activities.


15. (SBU) Othman noted that Syria exercised self-restraint
after Israel's blatant attack that destroyed a military
installation under construction. Instead of appreciation,
he said, the blame continued with calls for Syria to disclose
information that "we do not have in our possession." Othman
said Syria had afforded Agency inspectors total access to the
Al-Kibar site. Inspectors were able to observe the military
nature of the destroyed site and surrounding buildings,
including the pumps and the water processing plant. Othman
said it was "truly puzzling and surprising" that the IAEA
continues to request plans of those military sites and
requests continued visits of other military sites. He
questioned how Syria could be required to provide this when
it is in a state of war with Israel and closed the issue by
saying "it is not open to discussion and not debatable" but a
matter of security.

UNVIE VIEN 00000441 005 OF 007




16. (SBU) Othman said the Agency should require Israel to 1)
stop international violations and subject Israel to the same
standards applied to other member states, 2) require Israel
to declare all its nuclear bombs and depleted uranium
missiles, and 3) give access to missiles of the type used in
the attack.


17. (SBU) With respect to the debris at the site, Othman
characterized the removal of debris resulting from Israeli
bombing was "something natural;" it was an internal matter
left to Syrian authorities. He reiterated Syria's statement
relayed in the DG report that the request from the Agency was
received late, more than one year after the debris was
disposed.


18. (SBU) Othman rejected linkage by the Agency of the
uranium found at the MNSR with the investigation into
Al-Kibar. He also said that Syria cannot accept that the
IAEA would regard the small amounts of uranium particles as
"nuclear material" that was undeclared in Syria's nuclear
inventory. Syria reiterated its dismay at the continued
leaking of the DG's Syria report, which Othman indicated
contains information that is extremely sensitive to Syria.


19. (SBU) Othman closed by responding to points made during
member state interventions. First he said that it is
surprising to hear statements about Syria's "nuclear program"
and increasing evidence that it is undeclared because such
programs would require scientists and resources Syria did not
have. Lastly, he said that the MNSR is completely known to
Agency and that Syria was just as interested to find out
where the particles of uranium came from that were identified
at the MNSR site. (Comment: The IAEA found anthropogenic
uranium particles in 2008 samples taken at the Miniature
Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) in Damascus, a declared
facility. The uranium was "of a type not declared at the
facility." Syria has cooperated with the Agency's
investigation at the MNSR, and the IAEA performed a Physical
Inventory Verification, PIV, on July 8, 2009, and took
environmental samples at the facility; the results are not
yet in. End comment.)

--------------
U.S. Statement on Syria
--------------


20. (SBU) Madam Chair,

We thank the Director General for his latest report and
commend the Secretariat for its professional pursuit of the
technical investigation in Syria. Syria's ongoing refusal to
cooperate with the IAEA remains of serious concern to the
United States, and, indeed, should concern all supporters of
the Agency's safeguards system and the international
nonproliferation regime. As the Director General notes in
his latest report to the Board, Syrian inaction over the past
year has "severely impeded" the Agency's verification effort.
This Board must not allow any country to hinder the Agency's
ability to meet demonstrably the verification
responsibilities with which it has been charged. We hope
future reports will reflect a decision by Syria to change
course and provide the Agency a full accounting of its past
and present nuclear program, and allow the Agency the access
it has requested to provide confidence that Syria has no
further undeclared nuclear activities.

For over one year, the IAEA has been investigating

UNVIE VIEN 00000441 006 OF 007


Syria's clandestine nuclear activities related to the
destroyed reactor at Dair Alzour. Regrettably, Syria has not
used this time to resolve the serious outstanding questions
about the reactor and associated facilities. Instead, it has
chosen to hinder the Agency's efforts by refusing to allow
inspectors the access the Agency has deemed essential to
perform its verification mission; by failing to provide
information and supporting documentation about the destroyed
facility at Dair Alzour; by failing to address the Agency's
questions about nuclear-related procurement efforts; by
refusing to supply the Agency with information related to
nuclear cooperation with the DPRK; and, by taking steps to
sanitize three additional suspect nuclear-related sites upon
receiving the IAEA's request for access. In addition to the
previously reported clean-up efforts, and as noted in the
Director General's latest report, Syria now claims to have
destroyed all debris, salvage
d equipment and remains of munitions removed from the Dair
Alzour site.

We note with concern that Syria has not yet resolved
questions related to traces of man-made uranium particles
that have been detected at Dair Alzour and at the hot cells
at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR),a declared
nuclear facility in Damascus under IAEA Safeguards. In both
cases, the uranium is "of a type not included in Syria's
declared inventory of nuclear material."

We call on Syria to cooperate fully with the Agency
without delay to address all unresolved questions, including
the presence of the undeclared man-made uranium detected at
the Dair Alzour site as well as inside the hot cells at the
MNSR. The IAEA and its members must understand why such
material - material that was not previously declared to the
IAEA - was detected at two facilities in Syria, one of which
was being constructed clandestinely.

With regard to uranium detected at Dair Alzour, the
Director General reiterates in his latest report the "low
probability" that the anthropogenic natural uranium detected
in the soil at Dair Alzour was introduced by the munitions
used to destroy the facility. We regret that Syria has
refused Agency inspectors access to the debris from the site,
including remnants of the munitions, as a step that would
help the Agency make a conclusive determination.

As reported in the Director General's report, Syria has
provided an initial explanation about the possible origin of
the undeclared uranium detected at the MNSR and allowed the
IAEA to take additional environmental samples during a
physical inventory verification visit on July 8. We are
pleased the Agency was permitted to conduct this visit and
look forward to the results of the environmental samples.

However, allowing the Agency to conduct its mandated
verification work at the MNSR unhindered should not be
misconstrued as cooperating with the Agency on the
investigation into the clandestine reactor at Dair Alzour.
The Agency has requested, since May 2008, to hold substantive
discussions with Syria on the serious questions related to
undeclared nuclear activities at the Dair Alzour and related
sites. It has even offered to show additional satellite
imagery. Unfortunately, Syria continues to rebuff the
Agency's offer.

Madam Chair, Syria's main argument for not cooperating
with the IAEA verification effort is its assertion that,
under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, it is not under

UNVIE VIEN 00000441 007 OF 007


any obligation to provide further information concerning Dair
Alzour or any additional sites because of their military
nature. However, in his most recent report to the Board, the
Director General corrects Syria's misunderstanding of its
safeguards obligations. The Director General clearly states,
and I quote, "There is no limitation in Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreements on Agency access to information,
activities or locations simply because they may be military
related." The fact that the Agency has found particles of
nuclear material of a type which is not in the declared
inventory of Syria underscores the need to pursue this
matter. We urge Syria to accept the Agency's request to
discuss the necessary modalities for providing access to
information and locations that Syria has asserted are
sensitive so as to enable the Agency to advance its mandated
verification work.

When considering the importance of the multiple
outstanding questions, the traces of undeclared uranium and
Syria's claim that the sites' military nature precludes IAEA
visits, the Board should not lose sight of the following:
the configuration and location of the destroyed reactor
suggests that it was not intended for peaceful purposes.
Given the gravity of this issue and the fact that Syria
continues to "seriously impede" the IAEA's verification
efforts, the United States urges all Board members to join us
in demanding that Syria fully cooperate with the IAEA
investigation without delay by granting the IAEA access to
any information, debris and sites needed to complete its
investigation.
The existence of undisclosed nuclear facilities in
Syria and Syria's refusal thus far to cooperate with the
investigation further underline the limitations on the
Agency's ability to fulfill its mission in a country with a
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement but without an Additional
Protocol. This kind of evasiveness led the international
community to develop the Additional Protocol in order to give
the inspectors the tools they need to provide us with the
necessary assurance that a country's declaration is not only
correct, but it is also complete, and its nuclear program is
therefore exclusively for peaceful purposes. We call on
Syria, and indeed on all states that have not yet done so to
sign and implement the Additional Protocol.

The existence of undeclared nuclear activities is a
matter of grave concern to the entire international
community. Therefore, in the spirit of transparency, the
Board should make available to the public the Director
General's report on "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic."

In light of the mounting evidence of a clandestine
nuclear program and the fact that Syria has "severely
impeded" the Agency's verification effort, this issue should
remain on the agenda for the November meeting of the Board of
Governors. We call on the Secretariat to report in writing
before the November meeting with an update on the Agency's
investigation into undeclared nuclear material at the MNSR
and its investigation into clandestine nuclear activities at
the Dair Alzour site. We urge Syria to provide without
further delay whatever access and information the Agency
deems necessary to resolve all outstanding questions.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

End U.S. statement as delivered.
DAVIES