MOVING FORWARD ON THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000044

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO, IO/T, ISN/MNSA, VCI/NA
JCS FOR J5/DDIN
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP, ATSD/NCB/NT, AND DTRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2014
TAGS: AORC KTBT PARM MNUC
SUBJECT: MOVING FORWARD ON THE COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

REF: UNVIE 13

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte, reasons 1.4, b and d.


1. (C) Summary. With the United States one of nine
countries whose ratification is necessary for the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to enter into force, the
new Administration's promise of a change in US policy has
drawn great attention in Vienna. Although good progress has
been made in recent years in the development of the
International Monitoring System (IMS),the "eyes and ears" of
the Treaty, lack of prospects for entry into force of the
Treaty has eroded international support for continuing
efforts on the IMS. There are several short and medium term
steps the U.S. could take even without ratification that
would immediately signal renewed U.S. support of the Treaty,
including re-joining discussions on efforts to promote
ratification and sessions devoted to the On-Site Inspection
regime envisaged by the Treaty, as well as paying the roughly
USD 45 million owed to organization. Hurdles to continued
progress toward completion of the IMS include lack of G77
support, due to the poor prospect of entry into force of the
Treaty, and the lingering issue of a Palestinian request for
observer status in the organization. End Summary.

Ratification and Entry into Force
--------------

2.(C) In Vienna, many countries see the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as an integral piece of the
constellation of international disarmament treaties. The
prospect of U.S. ratification of the CTBT, if closely coupled
with efforts to actually bring the Treaty into force, could
significantly improve the atmosphere in a range of
non-proliferation discussions, including efforts at the IAEA
on Iran and an international fuel bank.


3. (C) Annex II of the CTBT lists 44 states which must ratify
the Treaty before it comes into force. 35 of these countries
have already ratified. Six Annex II states have signed the
Treaty but not yet ratified: the United States, China,
Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, and Israel. Finally three Annex II
states have neither signed nor ratified: India, Pakistan, and
the DPRK. Mission strongly believes that any possible
movement toward U.S. ratification should be accompanied by a
strong effort to bring about ratification by other Annex II
states.


4. (C) Up to this point Iran has been able to pose as a
strong supporter of the Treaty, even though it has not yet
ratified. Since U.S. policy has been that the U.S. does not
support the Treaty and will not move toward ratification, it
has not been possible to call Iran's bluff on this issue. If
a number of outstanding states, particularly Egypt and
Israel, could be persuaded to ratify, Iran would find itself
isolated and forced to answer the question of why it has not
ratified.

The International Monitoring System
--------------


5. (U) The Treaty envisages a verification system comprised
of 321 stations of different sorts around the world, along
with 16 radionuclide laboratories. As of the end of 2008,
235 stations and ten radionuclide laboratories had been
certified. This figure amounted to 73 percent of the primary
IMS stations, 74 percent of the auxiliary seismic stations,
and 63 percent of the radionuclide labs. The remaining
stations will be more difficult to bring on line, for either
political reasons or the challenging physical locations
(Antarctica, for example.)

Possible Short and Medium Term Actions
--------------


6. (U) We offer below a short list of steps the
Administration could take to signal a new approach, even
while awaiting a Congressional decision on ratification.
Mission has already begun to move in this direction,
attending, for example, a recent informal meeting on
ratification where the Ambassador dropped by briefly.

-- Re-engage with On-Site Inspection Activities: The U.S.
does not currently participate in CTBTO activities concerning
the on-site inspection portion of the Treaty, in accordance
with the policy enunciated in 2002. The U.S. has also had a
policy of withholding the portion of its assessment which
would have gone to on-site inspection activities. A quick
decision to re-engage on the on-site inspection activities
would send a strong signal to the international community
that that the U.S. was ready to play an active role in
promoting the Treaty.

-- Re-engage with Article XIV Activities: Article XIV of the
Treaty calls for states signatories to cooperate actively to
promote ratification. It also calls for Article XIV
conferences to be held periodically to assess the progress
toward ratification and consider strategies for moving
ratification forward. The next such conference will be held
in New York in September 2009. Conference organizers chose
New York as the venue with the hope that the Secretary might
be able to attend. Participation by the Secretary would send
a very strong signal of renewed engagement.

-- Take the Lead: Current policy calls for U.S. delegations
at CTBT meetings to keep a low profile. The U.S. delegations
never make national statements, for example. If the U.S.
adopts a policy of support for the Treaty, the U.S. should
once again exert leadership at meetings, instead of passively
defending narrow U.S. interests.

-- Pay Up: The U.S. has been late in the payment of its
assessments, and the Administration has not requested
sufficient funds from Congress. Any new policy of support
for ratification of the CTBT should be accompanied by a clear
effort to pay all U.S. obligations in full and on time. The
U.S. now owes roughly USD 45 million (depending on the Euro
exchange rate) for unpaid 2008 and 2009 assessments.

-- Fund Developing Country Experts: The Preparatory
Commission, relying on extra-budgetary funding, has begun a
program of funding the participation of experts from the G77.
Reftel explains proposed US funding as a way to encourage a
more cooperative attitude from the G77.

-- Consider Contributions: Finally, the U.S. should consider
enhanced support for the Provisional Technical Secretariat
through the use of voluntary contributions and cost-free
experts, as is the case with the International Atomic Energy
Agency, for example.

Short and Medium Term Obstacles: the G77
--------------


7. (C) The G77 has in recent years taken an increasingly
negative view of the CTBT, largely because of lack of U.S.
support for the Treaty and the consequent conclusion that
entry into force of the Treaty was impossible. In addition,
many countries were unhappy that the U.S. pushed for
completion and operation of the International Monitoring
System, while rejecting the Treaty. Some argued that the
U.S. wanted to have its cake and eat it to, remaining aloof
from Treaty obligations while enjoying the benefits of a
world-wide monitoring system.


8. (U) As a result of these concerns and consequent lack of
broad-based support, absent a realistic prospect of entry
into force of the Treaty, progress on the IMS has been
slowed. On the one hand, the budget of the PTS has remained
essentially static for the last several years, despite the
great costs of operating and maintaining the large number of
stations being certified and coming on line. Another result
of lack of broad support for moving ahead with the IMS was
the decision that the IMS would only operate "provisionally,"
pending greater prospect of entry into force of the Treaty.
While "provisional operation" is not well defined, it has
prevented the PTS from moving toward full 24/7 operation, and
it has allowed Iran and the G77 to argue against the need to
continue with the construction and certification of new
stations.


9. (U) As the Secretary stated in her confirmation hearing,
any U.S. decision to ratify the Treaty should be accompanied
by strong efforts to bring the Treaty into force. A
realistic prospect of entry into force would radically change
the atmosphere in meetings and remove rhetorical targets for
countries such as Iran.

Short and Medium Term Obstacles: Palestinian Observership
-------------- --------------


10. (U) In recent sessions of the Preparatory Commission, the
request of Palestine for observer status in the Commission
has taken up an inordinate amount of time and caused much ill
will. Up to this point, the PrepCom has operated as a
consensus organization, but the Palestinian issue threatens
to break this precedent. At the last PrepCom meeting in
November 2008, Egypt was only dissuaded from calling for a
formal vote on the issue when it was persuaded that it would
lose. The U.S. position has been that the Preparatory
Commission is a technical organization which should be kept
free of politics. Since Palestine is not a state and, in any
case, the Treaty does not specify any IMS stations in the
immediate region, it has no reason to be an observer in the
PrepCom.


11. (SBU) The Israelis have told the PrepCom chair that this
is an issue which must be dealt with in capitals. Either the
Palestinian Authority or some country acting on its
behalf--Egypt, for example-- must approach the Israeli
Government to discuss the matter. Neither the Palestinians
nor the Egyptians have been willing to take such a step, and
the stalemate continues to poison the atmosphere in the
Preparatory Commission.


12. (SBU) Mission suggests that the Department might wish to
consider whether resolution of the observership issue could
be used in Middle East talks as a possible confidence
building measure that would bring ancillary benefits in
Vienna.
SCHULTE