ASSESSING EGYPT'S ROLE AT THE IAEA GENERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000437

SIPDIS

FOR T, P, AND IO FROM THE AMBASSADOR. NSC FOR SAMORE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2019
TAGS: PREL MNUC KNNP IS EG
SUBJECT: ASSESSING EGYPT'S ROLE AT THE IAEA GENERAL
CONFERENCE

Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies, Reason 1.5 (D, E)


1. (C) Recognizing that avoiding deadlock would require a
changed approach to the Middle East issues that have hijacked
multiple IAEA General Conferences, I sought to make Egypt the
linchpin of our diplomacy at last week's 150-nation
gathering. I began the process the previous week by making a
point of paying my first bilateral call in Vienna on
Ambassador Ahab Fawzy of Egypt.


2. (C) The gist of my message to him: let's find a new way of
working together, after all the bitterness of the past.
During the Conference itself, to a degree not seen since the
mid-1990's, the United States -- joined by our EU partners --
engaged directly in negotiations between Egypt and Israel
with the goal of building confidence on both sides and
helping to identify a new consensus formula that would
acknowledge the importance of nuclear safeguards and NPT
issues in the Middle East without politicizing the debate or
singling out any one country.


3. (C) Last Thursday, the penultimate day of the General
Conference, after four days of intensive shuttling -- backed
up by repeated, effective, Washington interventions with both
sides -- the Swedish Ambassador and I had hammered out a text
that almost all could support and a universally agreed
procedural way forward on that text. All parties -
especially Egypt and Israel - were quite pleased with this
result. The IAEA General Conference had secured the first
agreed outcome since 2005 on Egypt's "Application of
Safeguards in the Middle East" (MES) resolution.

Egypt Decides to Pile On
--------------


4. (C) Despite our extensive efforts, and the General
Conference's almost unanimous approval of the
Egyptian-authored resolution, Cairo was then unwilling to
exercise leadership with the Arab Group to moderate a
redundant Arab resolution on Israeli nuclear capabilities.
What happened? Egypt's agreement on the Safeguards
Resolution did not include a firm commitment on Egypt's part
to dispense with the Arab Group's "Israeli Nuclear Threat"
resolution (INC),which ultimately passed by a vote of
(49-45-16). The initial, effusive Arab reaction to the
U.S.-led agreement on Middle East Safeguards left us
optimistic that the Arab League initiative could be dealt
with the next day through a Presidential Statement that would
avoid nasty procedural or substantive votes that would
inevitably cleave the non-aligned and western groups.


5. (C) Unfortunately, Egypt was unwilling to moderate the
behavior of Arab hard-liners who subsequently pushed the
Israel Nuclear Capabilities (INC) resolution to a vote, and
then joined in tacky triumphalism by bursting into sustained
applause when the INC resolution passed by just four votes.
Indeed, in an earlier September 18 meeting called by the
General Conference President with the EU and U.S. present,
Egypt's Ambassador joined the Arab League and Lebanon in
claiming they had run out of time to seek a revision of the
Ministerial instruction to press the INC resolution to a vote
and lamenting the inevitable confrontation between us.

The Message for Cairo
--------------


6. (C) The close outcome of the non-binding IAEA vote on the
INC resolution will be of little lasting importance.
However, Egypt's failure of leadership -- even after the U.S.
had worked intensively with the EU and Israel to seek
consensus on Egypt's Middle East Safeguards resolution --
raises questions about Cairo's good faith in this exercise
and should draw a firm rebuke from Washington. Rather than
litigating the events of last week, we should reaffirm the
strong U.S. commitment to rebuilding an environment where the
IAEA can focus on its core technical missions and delegations
can work together to advance shared non-proliferation
objectives. Our work to build consensus on Egypt's
resolution was part of that effort.


7. (C) Both Egypt and Israel have told us they believe the
negotiated Middle East Safeguards resolution provides a
positive starting point for next year's IAEA General
Conference debate. The United States' more active role in
this year's General Conference and our close partnership with
the EU have positioned us well to pursue consensus on these
issues. Looking ahead to this General Conference debate, we
hope (and expect) Egypt will exercise its influence to

discourage the introduction of an Arab League resolution that
covers the same ground and singles out Israel. Shifting the
Arab approach should begin immediately and Egypt will need to
lead this effort. To focus Cairo on this requirement, we
should make clear to Cairo our deep disappointment at Egypt's
unwillingness to use its leadership of the Arab Group and NAM
to avoid a nasty 2009 General Conference confrontation with
Israel.
DAVIES