Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA435
2009-09-22 16:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/IRAN: SEPTEMBER BOARD KEEPS THE SPOTLIGHT ON

Tags:  KNNP AORC IAEA IR 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 11 UNVIE VIENNA 000435 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2034
TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: SEPTEMBER BOARD KEEPS THE SPOTLIGHT ON
IRAN

Classified By: Ambassador GLYN DAVIES for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 11 UNVIE VIENNA 000435

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2034
TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: SEPTEMBER BOARD KEEPS THE SPOTLIGHT ON
IRAN

Classified By: Ambassador GLYN DAVIES for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) The September 7 IAEA Board of Governors
discussion on Iran balanced between praising Tehran's recent
cooperation with the IAEA and noting that more must be done.
Although the usual Iran friendlies highlighted Tehran's
decision to improve safeguards at Natanz and provide access
to the IR-40 reactor at Arak, the other Member States
explained that these were long overdue, obligatory measures.
The majority of Member States called on Iran to meet UNSC and
Board requirements and registered serious concern about
Iran's lack of cooperation on key technical issues, including
possible military dimensions (PMD),suspension, and
implementation of Code 3.1 Modified of the Subsidiary
Arrangement.


2. (SBU) In addition to the core like-minded states,
Argentina and Mexico delivered statements highly critical of
Iran. Twenty-eight of the thirty-five Board Member States
spoke or were spoken for by the EU and NAM, and five states
spoke under Rule 50. Many of the statements expressed regret
that Iran had not suspended uranium enrichment and heavy
water-related activities in violation of UNSCRs and had
instead expanded its centrifuge capabilities. Most Board
members requested additional transparency and cooperation on
the "alleged studies" or PMD issue, and many openly regretted
Iran's continued stonewalling.


3. (SBU) The NAM statement reaffirmed its "principled
positions" on the inalienability of rights, cautioned against
undue pressure and interference with IAEA verification, and
stressed the distinction between "legal" NPT obligations and
voluntary confidence building measures. (Comment: Egypt's
recent assumption of the NAM Chairmanship did not appear to
make any difference in the NAM statement nor in Egypt's
national statement, which in typical fashion praised Iran for
its cooperation and looked past the remaining serious
concerns of the outstanding issues. End comment.) The
Malaysian statement, as incoming Board Chair, was
particularly unhelpful, charging that Iran was being
penalized for its voluntary cooperation and concluding that

the time had come to return to routine safeguards. Malaysia
said the international community should not continue to
indulge in "unsubstantiated allegations" but should instead
turn to more urgent issues of technical cooperation.


4. (SBU) Other NAM state interventions, including by the
Philippines and South Africa, were more balanced and noted
that Iran still needed to meet UNSC obligations. Iranian
Permanent Representative Soltanieh as usual had the last word
on the Iran agenda item and moved even more firmly into the
role of defender of states' rights than he has at previous
Boards. He assured the NAM countries that Iran would not
disappoint them by abandoning their rights and then repeated
past arguments, including Iran's claim that it had answered
all outstanding questions in accordance with the work plan
and thus its file should be returned to consideration as a
routine matter at the IAEA.


5. (SBU) In his opening remarks to the Board meeting and
closing statement on the Iran issue, Director General
ElBaradei emphasized that it was in Tehran's hands to do more
in order for the IAEA to exclude the possibility of military
dimensions to its nuclear program. ElBaradei plainly stated
that "if the (alleged studies) information is real, there is
a high probability that nuclear weaponization activities took
place." He also criticized those Member States that have fed
allegations to the press about the IAEA withholding
information from its reports, noting that "such attempts to
influence the work of the Secretariat and undermine its

UNVIE VIEN 00000435 002 OF 011


independence and objectivity are in violation of Article
VII.F of the IAEA statute. (Comment: The public row over
Israeli and French accusations that the IAEA was withholding
information really backfired in the Board room. Not only did
it provoke ElBaradei, it also made Russia defensive, gave
the NAM an additional talking point, and overshadowed the
DG's helpful statement that the evidence against Iran, if
real, means Iran has undertaken nuclear weapons work. We
know privately from a well-placed senior Secretariat official
that proponents of a rigorous approach toward Iran took pride
in prompting the DG to include the latter statement in his
comments and viewed it as a significant step forward for the
DG on Iran .) End Summary.

--------------
DG Calls on Iran To Do More and
Tells Others to Butt Out
--------------


6. (SBU) Director General (DG) ElBaradei made clear in his
opening statement to the Board that Iran must do more in
order for the IAEA to exclude the possibility of military
dimensions to its nuclear program. In addition to
recognizing Tehran's recent, but obligatory, cooperation at
Natanz and the IR-40 reactor at Arak, ElBaradei specified
that Iran must respond fully to all questions regarding
weaponization studies, implement the Additional Protocol
(AP),and clarify its future intentions concerning its
nuclear program. The DG also used his statement to add to
the August 28 press release about the Safeguards reporting
process and criticize those Member States that have fed
"politically motivated and totally baseless" allegations to
the press about the IAEA withholding information from its
reports. He noted that "such attempts to influence the work
of the Secretariat and undermine its independence and
objectivity are in violation of Article VII.F of the IAEA
statute and should cease forthwith."

--------------
Russia and China Recognize Iran's Cooperation
--------------


7. (C) Russia's statement was notable for its weakness
relative to recent Russian Board statements, and a Russian
advisor admitted that it had been substantially changed by
Governor Berdennikov from the initial draft. We speculate
that the French accusations levied against the Director
General, and strongly condemned by Foreign Minister Lavrov,
were an impetus for Russian revisionism, but there may have
been other reasons for Moscow to pull its punches. After
expressing fullest confidence in the work of the DG, Russia
assailed the allegations of concealment as inadmissible.
Russia noted the steps recommended by the DG on possible
military dimensions (PMD) as being of "great significance" to
restore trust but cited as a matter of concern Member States'
information sharing practices, saying that the DG was
justified in his view that these hampered progress in
verification. While Russia noted Iran's cooperation at
Natanz and Arak, the statement concluded with an appeal for
Iran to comply with UNSC and Board requirements, in
particular, AP implementation and transparency measures to
allay international concerns. Russia noted that there was
"no alternative" to a peaceful and diplomatic settlement.


8. (SBU) China continued to accentuate the positive, noting
that despite some outstanding issues, there had been "gradual
progress" in cooperation over the course of a series of DG
reports. China emphasized a peaceful solution as there was
still an opportunity for a negotiated settlement, and in this
context, noted Iran's positive steps as reported by the DG
and its statements that a new Iranian package was in the
offing. China noted that the P5 1 Political Directors,
meeting in Frankfurt days before, had reaffirmed their
commitment to negotiations and enjoined all parties to step

UNVIE VIEN 00000435 003 OF 011


up diplomatic negotiations. Notably, China made no call on
Iran to cooperate further, nor did it mention UNSC resolution
obligations.

--------------
EU, EU3, and Like-Minded Call
for More Cooperation
--------------


9. (SBU) As EU President, Sweden delivered a solid statement
that strongly regretted the IAEA's inability to provide the
Board with assurances of the peaceful nature of Iran's
nuclear program. While welcoming Iran's recent cooperation
with the IAEA, Sweden explained that this cooperation was
obligatory and long overdue, and noted serious concerns with
Iran's continued refusal to provide substantive responses on
the PMD issues. The EU reminded the Board of its June
request and once again asked the Secretariat to provide an
assessment of PMD. Germany, on behalf of the EU3, described
the number of Iranian failures to meet international
obligations and insisted that substantial issues remained to
be clarified. Germany emphasized that it was "inexcusable"
that no transparency had been provided on PMD, which
continues to lead to doubts in the nature of Iran's nuclear
program. Noting that Iran had been provided sufficient
access to the documentation available to the IAEA to respond
substantively to the PMD questions raised, Germany said that
"it is in Iran's hands and power to overcome the current,
profoundly unsatisfactory situation" and build, not reduce,
confidence.


10. (SBU) Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and
Switzerland all delivered similarly strong statements that
noted it was essential for Iran to promptly and substantively
respond to the IAEA's questions regarding PMD projects and to
meet all Board and UNSC obligations, including suspension, AP
implementation and Code 3.1. Australia remarked that it was
disturbing that Iran had not cooperated on PMD, and noted
that it was critical for the IAEA to clarify these issues and
provide the Board with details so that they do not loose
sight of something so important. Canada noted that is was
"particularly troubling" that there were a number of
remaining issues to be resolved, and that Iran had
demonstrated blatant disregard for the many UNSC and Board
requirements.


11. (SBU) Japan stated that it was "deeply regrettable" that
Iran continues to expand enrichment-related activities,
especially work on new generation centrifuges, and noted that
without changes in its current ways, it would be impossible
to restore confidence in Iran. New Zealand regretted that
Iran's recent cooperation at Natanz and Arak had not extended
to the PMD issues and encouraged Tehran to comply with all
UNSC and Board requirements without delay. Switzerland noted
that although for the first time in over a year, Iran finally
had shown positive signals of cooperation, this observation
had to be qualified because these were obligatory measures
and that no cooperation had been provided on the most
troubling aspects-PMD, AP, and Code 3.1.

--------------
Same Old Turkish Statement
--------------


12. (SBU) Turkey gave what has become a characteristically
equivocal statement on Iran, which welcomed "progress" since
June and favorable cooperation by Iran and looked forward to
"continued momentum of cooperation." The statement
counterbalanced the non-diversion of declared material with
the need for assurances as to undeclared activities and
(helpfully) underlined the importance of addressing
outstanding issues in a transparent manner. Turkey called
for continued dialogue with the IAEA and confidence building
measures and noted that information sharing by Member States

UNVIE VIEN 00000435 004 OF 011


may facilitate this. Although Turkey supported P5 1
negotiations, there was no call for compliance with UNSC
resolutions or Board requirements.

--------------
Latins Note the Importance of
Additional Cooperation
--------------


13. (SBU) Among the non-NAM Latin American countries,
Argentina's strong statement once again stood out as on a par
with the like-minded, followed closely by that of Mexico.
Argentina agreed with the DG's general assessment as to the
lack of substantive progress on the "alleged studies" and
other "essential" information and called for Iran's active
cooperation in providing all forms of access, including to
centrifuge manufacture and R&D facilities. Argentina
expressed "serious" concern over Iran's continued failure to
abide by UNSC resolutions on suspension and Arak, and urged
Iran to build confidence in the peaceful nature of its
nuclear program, citing the Additional Protocol as a
"critical guarantee" in this regard. Notably, there was no
mention of Member States providing documentation, as
Argentina placed the onus of cooperation squarely on Iran.
Mexico began by taking note of improvements in cooperation at
Natanz and Arak but "notwithstanding this" expressed "serious
concern" as to the issue of Code 3.1 modified and UNSC
resolution demands for suspension. Like Argentina, Mexico
said it was "essential" for Iran to re-engage with the IAEA
on PMD issues and urged Iran to cooperate effectively and
without delay, taking all measures to address these
outstanding issues. Mexico further noted that additional
transparency was required of Iran to build confidence.
Mexico reiterated the DG's request to all Member States for
information sharing with Iran, but even this was cast in a
neutral manner.


14. (SBU) By contrast, a tepid Brazilian intervention noted,
as in March and June, that the content of the DG's latest
report was not "distinctive," i.e. no different from previous
reports. The Board was thus not in a position to make any
headway. Brazil called on both Iran and the DG to break the
impasse, placing them on equal footing, and added that
provision of information by Member States would be a positive
step. Only improved dialogue would lead to progress, Brazil
concluded.

--------------
NAM Continues to Support Iran
--------------


15. (SBU) Egypt's assumption of the NAM Chairmanship had no
perceptible impact on the tenor of the NAM statement, which
was as unhelpful as usual and contained no call for Iranian
cooperation. The NAM statement was first under the Iran
agenda item, immediately followed by the strong EU statement.
Egypt, speaking on behalf of the NAM, began with the
customary recitation of "principled positions": inalienable
right to nuclear energy with respect to states' "choices,"
including that of Iran; the IAEA as the sole competent
authority; distinction between legal safeguards obligations
and confidence building measures and calls for a Middle East
NWFZ. Additional emphasis was given this time to protection
of peaceful nuclear facilities from attack or threat of
attack via a comprehensive multilateral instrument, i.e., an
indirect endorsement of Iran's proposal on armed attacks in
the General Conference. The NAM statement welcomed Iran's
"increased" cooperation and proceeded to enumerate all the
positive steps outlined in the DG's report, including
containment and surveillance and unannounced inspections at
Natanz and design information verification at the IR-40
reactor and Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF).


16. (SBU) As with previous NAM Board statements, the only

UNVIE VIEN 00000435 005 OF 011

diplomacy and dialogue.


17. (SBU) The Egyptian national statement was also
unconstructive, beginning with its insistence that Iran
nuclear issues not be dealt with in isolation but in the
context of a Middle East NWFZ and the application of IAEA
safeguards in Israel. Egypt encouraged Iran to "continue to
cooperate fully" with its legal obligations and underlined
the "pitfalls" of asking Iran to do more by reliance on
"unascertained allegations." Further welcoming positive
steps and "a large degree of additional cooperation," Egypt
noted that Iran can extend this cooperation and implement
Code 3.1 modified. Egypt concluded by strongly regretting
the politically-motivated accusations of withholding
information levied against the Secretariat.


18. (SBU) Incoming Board Chair Malaysia also rejected the
unsubstantiated allegations against the Director General.
After making the usual points about NPT rights and legal
obligations vice confidence-building measures, Malaysia
charged that Iran was being penalized for its voluntary
cooperation (a charge also made by Iran in the technical
briefing.) Malaysia asserted that based on the irrefutable
facts (listing only the positive elements),the DG's report
was extremely positive and that Iran had extended full
cooperation in settling all the issues. Malaysia concluded
that the time had now come to return to routine safeguards
and that the international community should not continue to
indulge in "unsubstantiated allegations." Rather the Board
should turn to more urgent issues of technical cooperation.


19. (SBU) Predictably, the Cuban national statement touted
important developments in Iran's cooperation, insisted per
usual, that the work plan had resolved all issues and called
for return of the Iran file to Vienna. Cuba accused those
with geo-political interests of continuing to spotlight Iran
for political reasons, including double standards as regards
Israel, and also denounced demands for suspension as
reflecting those interests. Notably, Cuba did not cite the
U.S. specifically. Joining in the defense of the DG, Cuba
strongly denounced "the new strategy to discredit the
Secretariat" as endangering the Agency.


20. (SBU) Also speaking as non-Board members under Rule 50,
Indonesia and Venezuela hewed to NAM orthodoxy. Indonesia
cited the 2007 work plan as a major achievement and "the
pattern of cooperation" between the IAEA and Iran. In
particular, Indonesia appreciated DIV access to Arak.
Indonesia further appreciated the DG's efforts "under trying
circumstances" and, taking note of challenges to
verification, called on "all parties" to support the DG.
Incoming Board member Venezuela's statement tracked with
Cuba's in concluding that Iran had provided tangible and
substantial efforts since June (enumerating them from the
DG's report) and that it was time to close the dossier.
Venezuela expressed profound regret that some countries with
bellicose and imperialist intent continue to pursue the
"alleged studies" and keep the media show on the road.
Noting that the report contained no new elements in that
regard, Venezuela affirmed that PMD was beyond the mandate of
the IAEA and that Iran's cooperation should be acknowledged.
Venezuela further supported the DG and warned that more

UNVIE VIEN 00000435 006 OF 011


sanctions would cast a shadow on the positive steps Iran has
taken.

-------------- --------------
NAM Moderates - Philippines and South Africa, India
-------------- --------------


21. (SBU) Only two NAM countries speaking in a national
capacity expressed moderate views, the Philippines and South
Africa. (Note: Ecuador, Ghana and Burkina Faso did not take
the floor on this agenda item. End Note.) Associating
itself with the NAM statement, the Philippines welcomed
Iran's cooperation at Natanz and Arak but went on to
underline concerns that Iran had not implemented UNSC
requirements for suspension and over the lack of progress on
PMD issues. The Philippines urged Iran to "continue"
engagement with the Secretariat on the latter and provision
of access, while also enjoining "concerned parties" to
provide information, thus implying an equivalence. The
Philippine statement called for compliance with UNSC
resolutions and AP implementation and looked forward to
diplomatic breakthrough, specifically that Iran will
reciprocate diplomatic initiatives made by the U.S. and
others.


22. (SBU) South Africa began by enumerating all the positive
aspects of the DG report but then noted remaining concerns
and reaffirmed required steps as to mandatory UNSC
resolutions, including suspension. South Africa reiterated
its call on Iran to resolve outstanding issues "in a credible
manner" and implement the AP as well as confidence building
measures and Code 3.1 modified "without delay." The South
African statement also called on Member States to work out
modalities for information sharing with Iran. South Africa
shared the DG's view of media reports on withholding
information as "baseless" and undermining the impartiality of
the Agency. The statement concluded that time was of the
essence in taking advantage of the window of opportunity for
a diplomatic settlement.


23. (SBU) For its part, India delivered another short
statement, not saying much. India expressed confidence in
the Director General, called on all countries to abide by
their commitments, and trusted that Iran would continue
cooperation and transparency and clarify the outstanding
issues. India saw the IAEA as the best forum for this issue
and called for peaceful dialogue. Not to be forgotten, India
also reminded all of the "supply side" of proliferation.

--------------
Other Arabs - Algeria, Libya, Syria
--------------


24. (SBU) Besides Egypt, Algeria was the only other Arab
Board member to take the floor; Iraq and Saudi Arabia were
silent. The Algerian statement was somewhat judicious in
encouraging continuing cooperation by Iran to restore the
confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program, but
made no reference to UNSC resolutions or Board requirements.
Algeria also called for a NWFZ in the Middle East and joined
the chorus of voices expressing confidence in the DG.
Non-Board member Libya, speaking under Rule 50, noted that
all pending issues related to Iran's comprehensive safeguards
had been addressed. Libya then quoted a statement from
President Qadhafi applauding the technical breakthrough that
Iran was able to enrich uranium but also noting "a red line
and a green line" with respect to an atomic bomb vice
peaceful use. The IAEA was the authority to ascertain red or
green, red leading to the UN Security Council. Libya would
not accept development of nuclear weapons, it affirmed.


25. (SBU) Also speaking under Rule 50, Syria for the first
time in the Board room came to Iran's defense. Syria noted
the hundreds of inspection hours spent in Iran failed to

UNVIE VIEN 00000435 007 OF 011


prove a violation or breach of the Statute, and that Iran
would have voluntarily implemented the AP were it not for
unjust actions. Syria regretted the flagrant application of
double standards that allowed Israel impunity, and warned
against repeating past mistakes as in Iraq, while calling on
the previous U.S. administration to apologize for the
suffering inflicted.

--------------
Iran Defends Rights under NPT
--------------


26. (SBU) Iranian Permanent Representative Soltanieh as
usual had the last word on the Iran agenda item and moved
even more firmly into the role of defender of states' rights
than he has at previous Boards. He began his statement "by
assuring the family of the NAM" that Iran would not
disappoint them by abandoning their rights and then repeated
past arguments, including Iran's claim that it had answered
all outstanding questions in accordance with the work plan
and thus its file should be returned to consideration as a
routine matter at the IAEA. Soltanieh likened Iran's case to
Iraq in 2003 when, he claimed, the U.S. mislead the world and
"massacred Iraqis." The U.S. was again making accusations,
but the IAEA has "cleared" the accusations as baseless, he
argued, despite the DG's report and ElBaradei's statements to
the contrary. Since there is currently no way for Iran to
recoup the "damages" from the U.S. actions, Soltanieh said
that he is considering-with likeminded
counterparts-addressing this in Future of the Agency
discussions. Soltanieh also mentioned the Iranian proposal
slated to be handed out later that day and President
Ahmadinejad's statement that Iran is ready to cooperate and
negotiate on peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He mirrored
the language of the P5 1, noting that Iran has opened a
"window of opportunity" and was looking toward negotiations
based on mutual respect. Soltanieh's comments in response to
previous speakers were the shortest in memory. Australia
called out by Iran as having a more balanced statement than
its previous statements and those of "others," surely leaving
the Australians to scratch their heads as they exited the
Board room about what they had said to win Iran's favor.

--------------
DG Gets Final Word, Again
--------------


27. (SBU) Similar to the June Board, DG ElBaradei intervened
at the end of the Iran agenda item to offer his reflection of
the debate just heard on the Iran issue. The emphasis of
ElBaradei's comments was directed at Iran's obligation to
make something happen. He noted that we all need to break
the "log jam," which could not be done by speeches and talks
about formalities, such as the how the work plan was
implemented or not or how the IAEA should be writing its
reports. He called on Iran to implement the AP and Code 3.1,
and said that Tehran was only penalizing itself by not doing
so. ElBaradei explained that although the IAEA has a limited
ability to authenticate the "alleged studies," there are a
number of checkable facts associated with the PMD that Iran
should help clarify. ElBaradei then plainly stated that "if
the information is real, there is a high probability that
nuclear weaponization activities took place."


28. (SBU) ElBaradei also noted the U.S. offer for dialogue
"cannot be refused" and expressed hope for Minister Mottaki's
response to be positive, especially as many opportunities
over the past six years have been lost and this cycle should
not continue. Reiterating his opening statement points on
the IAEA supposedly withholding information from the Board,
ElBaradei stated that the people suggesting this are
obviously "trying to undermine the Agency, essentially
undermining the institution that is absolutely essential to
maintaining international peace and security," and appealed

UNVIE VIEN 00000435 008 OF 011


to those to not hype this issue, as had been done in the case
of Iraq.

--------------
Chair's Summary
--------------


29. (SBU) In her summary, the Chair (Algerian Ambassador
Feroukhi) noted that several Member States welcomed the
increased cooperation between the IAEA and Iran as elaborated
in the latest DG's report, notably with regard to the
improvements in safeguards measures at Natanz and access to
the Arak reactor. Several Members noted these developments
but considered them as long overdue and that it had taken
Iran many months to agree to them. Several Members also
expressed serious concern that that Iran refused to cooperate
with the IAEA and give substantive answers to questions that
need to be clarified in order to exclude the possibility of
there being military dimensions to its nuclear program and
that Iran had not complied with UNSC resolutions and with
previous Board requests. Several Member States noted the
need for Iran to implement the AP and the Code 3.1 and to
resolve the outstanding issues which raise concerns about
PMD. In addition, several Member States requested that the
States that provided the Agency with documentation related to
the "alleged studies" authorize the Agency to share them with
Iran. Also, several Member States expressed concern that
Iran was the only country to build and possibly operate a
nuclear power plant without being party to the relevant
nuclear safety and security conventions. Several members
welcomed the development of a fresh approach by the
international community to establish a dialogue with Iran and
called on Tehran to consider positively the P5 1 offer.


30. (SBU) Several Member States, the Chairwoman continued,
said that they looked forward to safeguards implementation in
Iran being conducted in a routine manner, that undue pressure
or interference in the Agency's verification activities
jeopardized the Agency's credibility, and that they supported
a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

--------------
U.S. Statement
--------------


31. (U) Begin text of U.S. statement:

Madame Chair,
The United States appreciates this latest report on the
implementation of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and compliance
with its UN Security Council obligations. We thank the
Director General and the Secretariat for their continued
impartial and professional efforts in conducting their
verification mission in Iran.

This is my first intervention on the subject of Iran at the
IAEA Board of Governors. So I hope my fellow Board members
will grant me the indulgence of expressing the sincere hope
that this will be the last intervention I must make in the
absence of true progress on the IAEA Iran nuclear file. We
welcome the recent DG report, a report that makes clear why
Iran remains a critical challenge for the Agency and
continues to be a key issue demanding the attention of this
Board.

Unfortunately, the Secretariat is not getting the full and
comprehensive cooperation that it needs from Iran to resolve
these long-outstanding issues. The Agency's investigation is
now entering its sixth year, and still many of the issues
remain unresolved as a result of Iran's refusal to provide
the information and access necessary to address the IAEA's
serious questions, particularly regarding Iran's past nuclear
warhead development program.


UNVIE VIEN 00000435 009 OF 011


In fact, the latest Director General's report describes how,
once again, Iran has missed an opportunity to address the
concerns of the international community with respect to its
nuclear program. We regret that no significant progress has
been made in the IAEA's investigation for over a year, and no
progress at all has been made with respect to Iran's
fulfillment of its UN Security Council, NPT, and IAEA core
obligations to fully cooperate with efforts to verify that
Iran's nuclear program is solely peaceful.

This includes Iran's obligation to suspend uranium enrichment
at Natanz per the requirements of the Security Council. The
media has noted Iran's acceptance of an augmented safeguards
approach at Natanz. However, that step only re-establishes
the minimum-necessary IAEA monitoring at Natanz without
addressing Iran's obligations. In addition, the
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities conducted at this
facility should be suspended per the requirements of the UN
Security Council.

The same can be said of Iran's provision of access to Arak.
The Director General's report indicated that Iran permitted
the IAEA to conduct a Design Information Verification (DIV)
inspection at the Arak reactor. This development is, of
course, welcome. However, access granted after a year of
defiance is not something to be congratulated. Moreover,
Iran's continued refusal to implement Code 3.1 modified of
its Safeguards Agreement, to provide early notification of
new nuclear facilities, disconcertingly suggests that this
access will not be routine or regularized, as required by
Iran's safeguards agreement and subsidiary arrangements, but
rather will be ad hoc and last-minute when politically
expedient. As the Director General noted in his report, Iran
is the only state with significant nuclear activities that
has a comprehensive safeguards agreement in force but is not
implementing the provisions of the revised Code 3.1.
Similarly, over a year ago, the Director General requested
Design Information Verification information for the new power
reactor Iran plans to construct at Darkhovin. And once
again, Iran has refused to provide such information to the
IAEA. The failure to apply Code 3.1 modified is a serious
impediment to the IAEA's ability to properly safeguard and
verify nuclear activities in Iran.

The limits placed by Iran even on this one opportunity to
conduct safeguards at the Arak reactor revealed further the
lack of Iranian cooperation. The report clearly indicates
that, while Iran continues to make significant progress at
Arak, Iran has yet to provide critical, detailed design
information, in particular about the nuclear fuel
characteristics, fuel handling and transfer equipment, and
the nuclear material accountancy and control system. This
information is fundamental to safeguards implementation and
should be provided without delay.

Against this backdrop of limited cooperation, the report
describes both technical progress in Iranian uranium
enrichment and a total stalemate in addressing the IAEA's
serious concerns about Iran's past warhead-related work.
Indeed, this latest report describes that Iran now has, at a
minimum, 1,430 kilograms of low enriched uranium
hexafluoride. Iran is now either very near or in possession
already of sufficient low enriched uranium to produce one
nuclear weapon, if the decision were made to further enrich
it to weapons-grade. This ongoing enrichment activity,
prohibited by three Chapter VII United Nations Security
Council resolutions, moves Iran closer to a dangerous and
destabilizing possible breakout capacity.

Taken in connection with Iran's refusal to engage with the
IAEA regarding its past nuclear warhead-related work, we have
serious concerns that Iran is deliberately attempting, at a
minimum, to preserve a nuclear weapons option. While the
Agency continues to request clarification on the alleged

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studies, the uranium metal document, and the procurement and
nuclear-related R&D activities of military institutes and
companies, as well as the production of nuclear-related
equipment and components by companies belonging to defense
industries, Iran continues to refuse to cooperate. This is
regrettably unproductive. It is also disappointing that over
ten months have gone by and Iran has failed to take what the
Director General calls an important first step in addressing
these long-outstanding issues by providing substantive
answers to the IAEA's questions. What conclusion should the
Board draw from Iran's refusal to provide substantive answers
to the IAEA's questions?

Madame Chair,

It has been nearly six months since the United States joined
its P5 1 partners in offering to negotiate with Iran based on
mutual interests and mutual respect, without preconditions.
The United States and our P5 1 partners have made a
good-faith effort to reach out to Iran and find a diplomatic
resolution to this issue. And while we have seen press
reports that Iran has a new proposal, we have not yet
received any official, substantive response from our Iranian
counterparts. Nonetheless, we would review any proposal
seriously in the spirit of mutual respect and would welcome
the Iranian government's constructive response to the P5 1's
April 2009 invitation to meet face-to-face. Moving forward
with these discussions could begin to bring Iran into
compliance with its international obligations and create
confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear
program.

This is a fresh, new opportunity for Iran to turn the page,
come back to the negotiating table, and prove that it is a
responsible, trustworthy member of the international
community. The pathway to a negotiated solution remains on
the table for Iran and we continue to call on Iran's leaders
to demonstrate genuine commitment to peace and security in
the Middle East and to the international non-proliferation
regime. We have made clear that we do not dispute Iran's
right to a civilian nuclear program, but with that right
comes the responsibility to restore confidence in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's activities and program.
We welcome constructive, honest engagement with our Iranian
counterparts to resolve this issue once and for all.

Madame Chair,

Iran claims that all of the IAEA's concerns have been
addressed. Unfortunately, this is far from the case, as the
latest report and its many predecessors demonstrate. We, as
members of the Board, have a responsibility to demand that
the Secretariat's questions are answered, and to ensure that
we can obtain confidence in the peaceful intent of the
Iranian nuclear program. When a state such as Iran has
violated its safeguards agreement for decades and is known to
have engaged in weapons-related work, it makes this task all
the more vital. When a state such as Iran continues to
violate its obligations, we must respond.

Madame Chair,

My government is committed to a diplomatic resolution of
international concerns over Iran's nuclear program and to the
P5 1 dual track approach. We continue to call on Iran to
seize the opportunity and to respond constructively to the
P5 1 offer on its nuclear program made in April 2009. We are
willing to engage in direct diplomacy based on mutual respect
and interests and seek a willing partner. However, as I have
already stated, with rights come responsibilities.

So we urge Iran to fulfill its international nuclear
obligations and accept the promise of a negotiated and
comprehensive agreement that is in the interest of all

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Iranians. We hope that Iran will not miss this opportunity,
and will take immediate steps to restore international trust
and confidence. We look forward to a time in which Iran is
greeted by this Board as an IAEA member state in good
standing and urge Iran to do what is necessary to make that a
reality.

Thank you, Madame Chair.
End text.
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