Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA43
2009-02-03 12:26:00
SECRET
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA SAFEGUARDS: SUPPORTING NOVEL TECHNOLOGIES

Tags:  AORC ENRG IAEA KNNP TRGY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0004
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0043/01 0341226
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031226Z FEB 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8960
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1093
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0946
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000043 

SIPDIS

ISN/MNSA FOR COCKERHAM; NA-241 FOR O'CONNOR, LAMONTAGNE;
NRC/NMSS FOR KELLY; DOE/OSD FOR ELBERT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2034
TAGS: AORC ENRG IAEA KNNP TRGY
SUBJECT: IAEA SAFEGUARDS: SUPPORTING NOVEL TECHNOLOGIES

Classified By: AMBASSADOR GREGORY L. SCHULTE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
)

This is an action request. Please see para 6.

-------
Summary
-------

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000043

SIPDIS

ISN/MNSA FOR COCKERHAM; NA-241 FOR O'CONNOR, LAMONTAGNE;
NRC/NMSS FOR KELLY; DOE/OSD FOR ELBERT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2034
TAGS: AORC ENRG IAEA KNNP TRGY
SUBJECT: IAEA SAFEGUARDS: SUPPORTING NOVEL TECHNOLOGIES

Classified By: AMBASSADOR GREGORY L. SCHULTE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
)

This is an action request. Please see para 6.

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (S) The IAEA Safeguards Department's Division of Technical
Support, Novel Technologies Unit (NTU) is compiling a
database of all identifiable "indicators and signatures" of
nuclear fuel cycle activity (including for weaponization of
nuclear material). The NTU plans subsequently to undertake a
systematic analysis of possible means for detecting
indicators and signatures of undeclared nuclear activities
and facilities. UNVIE sees strong support of this project as
consistent with the overarching U.S. objective of enabling
the strongest possible safeguards regime. Toward that end,
UNVIE has been closely engaged with NTU personnel to help
shape their effort in ways that are: 1) mindful of the need
to ensure that the IAEA does not inadvertently provide
potential proliferators with a de facto guide to
countermeasures necessary to hide clandestine activities,
and; 2) not at odds with U.S. equities related to U.S.
national technical means (NTM) for detecting covert nuclear
fuel cycle activities. UNVIE has suggested that the NTU
consider technologies/techniques currently available,
identify any gaps/shortcoming in relation to the identified
indicators/signatures, and only then proceed in a prudent
fashion --- in consultation with select member states (e.g.
P5) -- to identify "novel" solutions for finding undeclared
activities. Per para 6, UNVIE requests Department generate
interagency-cleared guidance as soon as possible on
supporting the IAEA's safeguards/novel technologies project
that is appropriate in light of the two concerns identified
above, in a way that is practical and cost effective. End
Summary.

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Safeguards' Plan to Identify and Fill Capability Gaps
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) The Safeguards Department's NTU is taking forward a
project to systematically identify "all" indicators and

signatures of nuclear fuel cycle activity, and then identify
existing tools to find them. The ultimate goal is to
identify where gaps exist for tools or methods to ensure
states' safeguards declarations are correct and complete.
The NTU has begun formulating a database that will be used to
identify and analyze the technical gaps in the IAEA's tool
kit and correlate them with possible technical solutions.
NTU believes a key benefit of its database will be to help
inspectors identify and understand the technical tools that
are already available. On the other hand, where gaps exist
for safeguards tools to identify a given indicator or
signature, the NTU hopes to lead an effort to investigate new
tools, and to determine their feasibility, effectiveness, and
practicality.


3. (C) The planned methodology uses the "Physical Model" of
the nuclear fuel cycle (a DOE-developed reference tool
already in use by the Safeguards Department) as a starting
point for populating the database; the Physical Model already
identifies well-known indicators and signatures. (Note: NTU
defines an "indicator" as something inherent to a particular
fuel cycle activity (e.g., precursors to uranium conversion).
NTU defines "signatures" as something that results from the
nuclear fuel cycle "process" (e.g., gas emissions from spent
fuel reprocessing). Taken together, indicators and
signatures can be in the form of matter, information (e.g.,
open source or intelligence),and emanations. Beyond the
Physical Model, other sources for filling the database will
include inputs from other Safeguards Department support
divisions, as well as Operations divisions and outside
experts.


4. (S) MsnOffs, along with French and UK Mission reps, have
underlined to NTU officers the sensitivities associated with
their work, particularly: 1) the need to ensure that the IAEA
does not inadvertently provide potential proliferators with a
guide to countermeasures necessary to hide clandestine
activities, and; 2) not inadvertently undermining key Member
States' efforts to develop national technical means (NTM) for
detecting covert nuclear activities, means that are better
suited to NTM than to development and deployment by the IAEA.
We have also stressed that the project should not be driven
by merely finding "novel" approaches, but finding the right
approach, which might entail slight modifications to proven,
practical, and existing tools. A rudimentary structure of
the database has been built and designed to be compatible
with Safeguards Information Management Division's IT systems
security and quality and protocols. The database is
currently being developed on a stand-alone system that is
locked in an NTU office. In addition to identification of
nuclear fuel cycle signatures and indicators, NTU will
catalog signatures and indicators of weaponization activities
in the database.


5. (C) NTU has requested select Member State expert
assistance to validate its methodology, populate the
database, and analyze the data. (Note: UNVIE worked with
the French Mission to scuttle an earlier NTU plan to pursue
an open conference, chaired by an NGO, to cast a wide net for
all indicators, signatures, and relevant technologies to find
them.) As a first step, a video conference was held Friday,
January 23, with NTU and P3 (U.S., UK, France) mission and
country experts at which NTU described its goals and methods,
and sought suggestions on the best way to proceed. NTU
expressed eagerness to ensure that P3 Member States would be
comfortable with the design of the methodology and the
security and control of the prospective database. During the
videoconference, Member States' questions focused on the
contents of the database, who would have access, how the
database would be protected, and how NTU envisioned
acquisition of information to populate the database and
conduct analysis of its contents. At the meeting's
conclusion, P3 reps agreed to return to the discussion with
NTU in a follow-on video conference that NTU will seek to
schedule soon.

--------------
Action Request
--------------


6. (C) Action: Mission believes appropriate support to the
NTU effort, while ensuring the two sensitivities outlined
above are effectively addressed, is consistent with the
broader U.S. objective of empowering the strongest possible
IAEA safeguards regime. Mission requests the Department lead
an interagency process to generate guidelines/instructions as
soon as possible for USG support to the IAEA's novel
safeguards technologies project. Ideally, Department may
wish to engage relevant officials and experts at DOE, DOD,
and within the Intelligence Community to identify the scope
of information that could be shared with IAEA/NTU to advance
the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared activities and
facilities-while not undermining U.S. NTM. Mission hopes
that any such identified guidelines, while subject to
periodic review, would provide the basis for relevant
interactions with the Safeguards Department beyond the
immediate NTU project. Mission has little doubt that as
Safeguards officials continue to assess their future needs
for a strong safeguards regime and new technologies, they
will continue to ask occasionally for technical assistance of
a sensitive nature.
SCHULTE