Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA427
2009-09-15 12:05:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/DPRK: BOARD REMAINS CONCERNED OVER NUCLEAR

Tags:  AORC IAEA KN KNNP 
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DE RUEHUNV #0427/01 2581205
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 151205Z SEP 09 ZDK
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0050
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0930
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 1006
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0404
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0796
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1760
UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000427 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

ISN FOR RANA AND MAHAFFEY, IO FOR DETEMPLE, EAP FOR ROQUE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC IAEA KN KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/DPRK: BOARD REMAINS CONCERNED OVER NUCLEAR
ISSUE, SUPPORTIVE OF SIX-PARTY TALKS

-------
Summary
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UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000427

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

ISN FOR RANA AND MAHAFFEY, IO FOR DETEMPLE, EAP FOR ROQUE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC IAEA KN KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/DPRK: BOARD REMAINS CONCERNED OVER NUCLEAR
ISSUE, SUPPORTIVE OF SIX-PARTY TALKS

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) The IAEA September Board of Governors registered
grave concern over the DPRK's escalatory actions,
particularly the September 4 letter to the President of the
UN Security Council announcing the DPRK was in the "final
stage" of enriching uranium and undertaking weaponization of
newly extracted plutonium from the reprocessing of spent fuel
rods from Yongbyon. The Director General's introductory
remarks on North Korea were brief; he reminded Board members
that the IAEA had been unable to carry out any monitoring and
verification activities in the DPRK since it had ceased all
cooperation with the IAEA in April. Twelve statements were
delivered under the Agenda item on the Application of
Safeguards in the DPRK: Six-Party partners, the EU, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, Egypt, Switzerland, Cuba,
Philippines, South Africa, and the Republic of Korea under
Rule 50. All interventions urged North Korea to resume a
dialogue with the international community and return to the
NPT and IAEA Safeguards.
End Summary.

--------------
DG Remarks
--------------


2. (SBU) The Director General has reported on the status of
the implementation of safeguards in the DPRK, as requested by
the Board of Governors, since inspectors were expelled from
Yongbyon in December 2002 (GOV/2003/14). Inspectors returned
to North Korea in July 2007 at the request of the Six Parties
under the February 13, 2007, Initial Actions Agreement. The
IAEA was once again asked to leave North Korea on April 16,
2009 when the DPRK ceased all cooperation with the IAEA.


3. (SBU) In his introductory remarks, the Director General
reminded the Board that the IAEA had been unable to carry out
any monitoring or verification activities in the DPRK since
April. The Director General called on all parties to work
for a comprehensive solution through diplomatic means that
would bring the DPRK back to the NPT and address its security
concerns, humanitarian needs, and other political and
economic requirements.

--------------
Six Parties Express Concern,
Call for Diplomatic Resolution
--------------


4. (SBU) Six-Party members represented on the Board (China,

Russia, Japan, and the U.S.) and South Korea (under Rule 50)
called on DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks. China spoke
first and made a brief statement expressing its concern with
the situation in North Korea and its firm commitment to
achieving denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. China
noted the issue can only be resolved peacefully through
diplomatic efforts and called on the Six Parties to maintain
and use its effective platform. Japan expressed serious
concern over the DPRK's September 4 letter to the President
of the UN Security Council and stated the DPRK's activities
constitute a grave threat to the peace and security of
Northeast Asia and the international community. Japan noted
it is "totally unacceptable" that the DPRK launched a
ballistic missile on July 4 in "flagrant disregard" of UNSCR
1874 and described as equally unacceptable the DPRK's
announcement of its intent to weaponize the whole amount of
newly extracted plutonium and commence uranium enrichment.
South Korea expressed grave concern about the DPRK's decision
to cease cooperation with the IAEA and called on the
international community to fully implement UNSCR 1874.


5. (SBU) Russia made a strong statement that described the
DPRK's nuclear and ballistic missile tests as a "serious
blow" to international efforts to strengthen the
nonproliferation regime and a threat to security and
stability in the region. Russia stated it supports resumption
of IAEA activities in North Korea and pointed out that the
IAEA is the only organization with the proper expertise to
monitor the DPRK's nuclear activities and therefore must play
a central role in the future. Russia noted its support for a

diplomatic resolution to the DPRK nuclear issue and called on
North Korea to return to the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapon
State and return to the Six-Party Talks.

--------------
Support for UNSCR 1874
and the Six Party Talks
--------------


6. (SBU) There was broad support among Board members for the
Six-Party Talks and resuming a dialogue towards a peaceful
resolution. Canada, the EU, Australia, New Zealand,
Switzerland, South Africa, and the Philippines all called for
the DPRK to return to the Six-Party Talks, and several of
these Board members emphasized that North Korea must return
to the negotiating table without preconditions. Canada
called on the DPRK to fulfill all of its commitments made as
part of the Six-Party Talks Joint Statement of September 2005
as well as the October 2007 agreement on Second Phase
Actions. Egypt noted its support of the diplomatic efforts
to address the DPRK nuclear issue and called for similar
diplomatic efforts to be undertaken to address nuclear
concerns in other parts of the world.


7. (SBU) Board members reiterated their support for UNSCR
1874 and called on the DPRK to comply with its obligations
under the resolution to abandon all nuclear weapons and
existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable, and
irreversible manner. Australia noted that UNSCR 1874 sends a
"clear and united signal from the international community
that the DPRK must end its nuclear weapons program."
Australia, along with the EU, Japan, and South Korea
additionally called upon the international community to fully
implement UNSCR 1874.


8. (SBU) Other Board members echoed the Six parties'
expressions of concern with North Korea's September 4 letter
to the President of the UN Security Council announcing it is
in the "final stage" of enriching uranium and undertaking
weaponization of newly extracted plutonium from the
reprocessing spent fuel rods from Yongbyon. Canada noted the
DPRK's actions pose a "grave threat" to regional and
international security and a "serious challenge" to the
nonproliferation regime. The Philippines remarked that North
Korea's provocations "negate forward momentum" and are a
setback for the nonproliferation regime.


9. (SBU) Cuba took the opportunity to raise disarmament,
noting that only the total elimination of nuclear weapons
will guarantee the peace and stability for the entire world.
Cuba lamented the slow progress on disarmament and appealed
to nuclear weapons states to immediately comply with Article
VI of the NPT.


10. (SBU) Comment: Beyond broad expressions of concern,
there really is not much for the IAEA Board or Director
General to say at this point on the DPRK's indigenous
program. So long as the DPRK continues to reject IAEA access
pursuant to Six-Party initiatives, the IAEA focus on DPRK
will shift to continuing to confirm the nature of the
DPRK-supplied facility in Syria, and the IAEA will also
eventually need to consider whether safeguards at the DPRK's
IRT research reactor should be reinstated under
"INFCIRC/66"-type safeguards if it is finally determined that
the DPRK is no longer an NPT party and therefore no longer
subject to NPT-type safeguards.

--------------
U.S. Statement on DPRK
--------------


11. (SBU) Madam Chairwoman,

The international nonproliferation regime faces a critical
challenge from North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.
North Korea's April 5 and July 4 ballistic missile tests and
the May 25 nuclear test, in clear violation of its
obligations under UN Security Council Resolutions, have
seriously threatened international peace and security. North
Korea's actions, as well as its recent provocative
statements, imperil the nonproliferation objectives shared by
the community of responsible nations. This includes its

decision to cease cooperation with the IAEA, expel Agency
monitors and U.S. observers, and its announced intentions to
restart its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and reprocess the
spent fuel - all in contravention of its Six-Party
commitments.

The international community has condemned these actions with
a unified voice through the unanimous adoption of UN Security
Council Resolution 1874. This resolution, like Resolution
1718, demands that North Korea not conduct any additional
nuclear tests or launches using ballistic missile technology.
It also requires North Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons
and existing nuclear programs in a complete, verifiable, and
irreversible manner and immediately cease all related
activities. Furthermore, the resolution demands that the
DPRK return, at an early date, to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and IAEA safeguards and calls
on North Korea to return to the Six-Party Talks without
preconditions.

The unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1874 represents a global
consensus on the imperative to eliminate the DPRK's ability
to pursue nuclear, ballistic missile, and other WMD-related
activities and to prevent proliferation to and from North
Korea. The new measures under this resolution include a
total ban on arms exports from North Korea and a major
expansion of the ban on arms imports, new financial measures,
and enhanced inspection provisions for suspected transfers of
proscribed cargo. Pursuant to UNSCR 1874, the DPRK Sanctions
Committee has also designated a number of individuals,
entities, and goods related to North Korea's nuclear and
ballistic missile programs. It is our belief that effective
implementation of this resolution is imperative to convince
North Korea that its only viable option is a return to
diplomacy and denuclearization.

The United States has been coordinating closely with key
international partners to implement resolution 1874. At the
direction of President Obama and Secretary Clinton, we are
working hard to promote full implementation of these
resolutions and continued vigilance against North Korea's
proliferation and other illicit activities. The United
States urges all states to implement fully Resolutions 1718
and 1874, and commends the efforts of those that have acted
proactively and effectively to enforce the relevant
provisions. We call on all states to be vigilant and
transparent in their dealings with North Korea. These
resolutions, combined with the designations authorized by the
United Nations Sanctions Committee, and the establishment of
a Panel of Experts to monitor implementation, provide a
powerful mechanism to curb North Korea's unacceptable
activities and compel it to commit to denuclearization and
nonproliferation.

The United States calls on North Korea to return without
conditions to the Six Party Talks and honor its commitments
to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. Our policy remains the
same. We will not accept North Korea as a nuclear weapon
state, and we remain committed to the goals of the September
2005 Joint Statement. North Korea must signal that it is
willing to commit to an irreversible process of complete and
verifiable denuclearization. We are open to engaging North
Korea, including bilaterally within the multilateral
framework of the Six-Party Talks. We continue to believe
that the IAEA has an important role to play in this process,
the ultimate objective of which is to return a North Korea
free of nuclear weapons and related programs to the NPT and
IAEA Safeguards - a process through which North Korea can end
its isolation and take its place as a responsible member of
the community of nations. As my President has said, "North
Korea has a pathway to acceptance in the international
community, but it will not find that acceptance unless it
abandons its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and
abides by its international obligations and commitments."

Our firm response to North Korea's actions and our collective
resolve to bring North Korea into compliance with its
obligations and commitments are vital not only to global
peace and security but to the credibility and viability of
the international nonproliferation regime itself.

Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.

DAVIES