Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA418
2009-09-04 16:16:00
CONFIDENTIAL
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/GC: MIDDLE EAST MORASS

Tags:  PREL AORC PARM KNNP XF IAEA IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000418 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR D(S),P, T, S/SANAC, S/SEMEP, IO, ISN, NEA
DOE FOR S1, OIP, NA-20
NSC FOR SAMORE, SCHEINMAN, RYU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2019
TAGS: PREL AORC PARM KNNP XF IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/GC: MIDDLE EAST MORASS

REF: A) UNVIE 413 B) UNVIE 402 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

Summary and Comment
---------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000418

SIPDIS

STATE FOR D(S),P, T, S/SANAC, S/SEMEP, IO, ISN, NEA
DOE FOR S1, OIP, NA-20
NSC FOR SAMORE, SCHEINMAN, RYU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/03/2019
TAGS: PREL AORC PARM KNNP XF IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/GC: MIDDLE EAST MORASS

REF: A) UNVIE 413 B) UNVIE 402 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Glyn Davies for reasons 1.5 (b) and (d)

Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (C) The state of play on Middle East GC issues leading
into the week of the September Board just before the IAEA
General Conference is grim. GC President Macmillan's effort
toward a consensus approach based on elements of a single
resolution is on temporary life support, though she is not
prepared to give up. None of the parties is seriously
engaging with the Presidency; the Arabs are uncompromising,
the Egyptians pay lip service, and Israel is taking a
familiar hardline. Israeli Ambassador Michaeli is asserting
that the point of departure for negotiations should be the
last, 2005, consensus resolution. He has signaled lack of
confidence in the GC President after becoming discomfited by
some of the negotiating language Macmillan floated (and has
since withdrawn in deference to Israel) that would have
implied a MENWFZ could come before peace. Michaeli has since
re-engaged and submitted Israeli suggestions to Macmillan and
Swedish Ambassador Lundborg September 4. We will encourage
Michaeli to stay engaged and reassure him we have his back
covered throughout this process. A Janus-faced Egypt puts on
its best face with the Presidency while taking a hard-line
with U.S. interlocutors and telling Michaeli he betrayed
Egypt's trust last year.


2. (C) The Arab Group is uncompromising in continuing to
insist on the separate Israeli Nuclear Capabilities (INC)
resolution, in accordance with AL Ministerial decisions.
They were "categorical" about this political mandate for a
separate resolution in a September 4 meeting with Macmillan
and characterized it as an issue of regional pride. In a
September 2 meeting with Ambassador Davies, Arab Group
Ambassadors joined by Arab League Multilateral Director
Al-Asad, who will report to the AL Council next week,
appealed for "dialogue" with the Obama Administration and set

the IAEA General Conference issue as a "testing ground" for
the 2010 NPT Revcon. In a September 3 meeting with S/SANAC
Einhorn, Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi took a similar line. He
noted he has no negotiating mandate on the Egyptian Middle
East Safeguards resolution, complained of Israeli
intransigence, and refused any linkage between the MES and
INC resolutions, other than to say consensus this year on the
MES might help lead to flexibility on the INC next year. The
Arabs are fairly cocky about defeating any "no action motion"
(though the like-minded continue to levy this threat) and do
not seem to have any compunction about once again derailing
the General Conference. Macmillan cautioned the Arabs about
the consequences of tabling the INC, the worst not
necessarily being a "no action" motion but killer amendments
to their sacrosanct text on the floor. She reported to
like-minded Ambassadors September 4 that this had not
occurred to the Arabs.


3. (C) There is some relative good news. The EU is too
internally divided to pursue (for the moment) separate track
negotiations with Cairo on the Middle East Safeguards (MES)
resolution delinked from the INC. We have strongly advised
against this course, which would undercut the Presidency's
efforts by allowing Egypt a fall-back option. The EU
Presidency is working closely with Macmillan on conceptual
elements that they are discussing with Egypt and Israel.
Although Macmillan prefers to insert such elements into a
single resolution, if the Arab Group remains obstructionist,
this effort could easily morph into an EU negotiation with
Egypt and Israel on the MES text. Director General ElBaradei
may also be prepared to play a constructive role in reigning
in the Arab Group. In his introductory call on the Director
General September 3, Ambassador Davies enlisted his help with
the Arab Group, which ElBaradei agrees is setting itself up
for another humiliation. The Director General has a vested
interest in ensuring that his last General Conference is not
marred by another Middle East debacle. End Summary and
Comment.

And Then There is the Iranian Agenda Item
--------------


4. (C) Against this backdrop still looms the Iranian
supplemental agenda item on prohibition of armed attacks
against nuclear facilities, and no one has a clear plan of
how to dispose of it. The option of a General Committee
challenge remains the most expedient but it seems
increasingly unlikely that we will have the votes to defeat
it as Russia, Belarus and Cuba have recently been added to
the Committee roster. Canada argues that we should pursue a
challenge, win or lose, in the General Committee for
"demonstration effect." However, the like-minded have cold
feet about calling a Plenary vote should we lose in General
Committee. Macmillan is convinced that even if we win in
General Committee, Iran will call a vote on the agenda in
Plenary, a view also shared by Israeli Ambassador Michaeli.
With NAM support for the agenda item, we could lose such a
vote in Plenary. Iran further intimated to the GC President
that a resolution or text could be introduced under the
nuclear safety agenda item (as was the case inthe 1980s and
1990s) should its supplemental item be blocked.


5. (C) Meanwhile, the P5 1 are divided on the Iranian item.
Russia and China do not yet have instructions but, in a
bilateral conversation with Ambassador, Russian Ambassador
Zmeyevskiy was supportive in principle of the proposed agenda
item and disputed the argument that this is an issue for the
Security Council. In a September 3 P5 1 meeting, Zmeyevskiy
said he thought it would be very difficult to object to a
resolution under this item. Chinese Charge Huang said he has
requested instructions on a preliminary draft of an Iranian
resolution, but noted China was supportive of a resolution on
this topic in 1990. France and Germany signaled support for
blocking the item.


6. (C) Earlier in the week, Macmillan queried DCM about
attempting to talk the Iranians down to a Presidential
Statement, but would not pursue this without prior U.S.
agreement. Having met with Iranian Ambassador Soltinieh
September 3, Macmillan reported that he is still working on
the text of its resolution and seems to be having some
conceptual problems in getting NAM support for the substance.
Some of the NAM are also apparently leaning toward a
Presidential Statement. Like-minded Ambassadors discussed
September 4 the option of a no action motion on the Iranian
agenda item, with mixed feelings. Macmillan cautioned that
"no action" may turn the Iranian item into a cause clbre
for the NAM against the West, even among NAM who are not
favorably disposed toward the substance or Iran. Among the
JUSCANZ, Canada, Australia and the ROK would support a "no
action" motion on the Iranian item but Japan believes it
would be counterproductive to try to block the agenda item.
Canada is also proposing killer amendments to any Iranian
resolution adding references to safeguards, compliance and
calling on states to be parties to legally binding
instruments of which Iran is not a party. (Note: Some of
these suggestions could be subject to points of order as to
relevance. End note).


7. (C) A further option we have not disclosed to the
like-minded (so as to preserve the element of surprise) would
be to launch a pre-emptive strike by tabling a U.S.-sponsored
draft resolution under the armed attacks agenda item before
Iran submits its text. A U.S. draft could be loosely based
on the language of the consensus 1985 GC resolution on armed
attacks, focusing on peaceful development of nuclear energy,
safety and application of safeguards, in addition to some of
the Canadian elements. This would have the effect of
deflating the Iranian gambit, which has at best lukewarm
support among Member States, while aligning ourselves with
the principle as it applies to safeguarded facilities. As
resolutions under the same agenda item are considered in the
order in which they are submitted, it would be imperative to
submit a U.S. draft first. Mission welcomes tactical
guidance on options for dealing with the Iranian agenda item,
recognizing that the fate of this item will influence our
effort to keep a spotlight on Iran's own nuclear activities.
To increase our leverage, we continue to speak of the Iranian
item in tandem with the other Middle East issues, which the
Arabs are anxious to keep separate.

GC Presidency and EU Efforts Falter, For Now
--------------


8. (C) While struggling to keep the idea of a single
consensus resolution alive, GC President Macmillan's efforts
have hit a number of roadblocks, both on the part of Israel
and the Arab League which has been dismissive of her
consensus approach. Rather than draft a single resolution
text, she has sought to distill the three main issues, NPT
universality, compliance and peace process/NWFZ precedence,
which have prevented consensus in the past. Once there is
agreement on these "concepts," consensus formulations could
be slated into a single resolution, or alternatively into the
Egyptian text. Macmillan has met both separately and now
together with Egypt and Israel and with the Arab Group
(Comment: This is likely a tactical retreat on the part of
the Arab Group so as not to be seen as rejecting her good
offices, ref b). Earlier in the week she floated possible
formulations of the three concepts for negotiation, including
the 2008 Algerian amendment on NPT universality, adherence to
"disarmament and non proliferation conventions" vice
compliance, and a re-formulation of the peace process
language. The latter, which recognized efforts toward peace
"including a NWFZ," caused particular Israeli umbrage as to
the issue of precedence. Israeli Ambassador Michaeli
conveyed his unease with Macmillan's efforts to Ambassador
Davies September 2 and insisted that negotiations should
include all that has been added to the Egyptian text since
the last consensus MES resolution in 2005. Having seen this
particular language, Michaeli subsequently complained
bitterly to Nuclear Counselor and publicly to like-minded
counterparts on the margins of a September 3 IAEA meeting.
By her account, Macmillan was distressed by Michaeli's
unhelpful attitude and took pains to explain to him that this
was text for negotiation. Given the Israeli reaction, she
now considered these proposals "dead." Since then, Macmillan
reported September 4 that Israel has come forward with
alternative proposals.


9. (C) In a joint meeting with Israel and Macmillan the same
day, Egypt was forward leaning and willing to work on text,
likely because the language met Egyptian redlines on
compliance and NWFZ vice peace process precedence.
Meanwhile, Michaeli continues to note that Egyptian
Ambassador Fawzi has no mandate to negotiate. Michaeli had a
different take on the meeting relayed to Nuclear Counselor,
though he acknowledged it ended in a boxing match. He and
the Egyptians, joined later by Macmillan, exchanged text
ideas on the compliance language, including a reference to
"commitments, obligations and conventions." Israel seeks to
retain "compliance" and is not supportive of the Algerian
amendment on NPT universality. Michaeli also suggested using
the 2007 MES language on peace process, but Fawzi seemed
disinclined. Lastly, Michaeli sought to delete operative
paras in the MES text that had been imported since 2005 from
UNGA resolutions. For his part, Fawzi aired familiar (and
disingenuous) complaints about not being consulted on the
Israeli amendments last year. Subsequent to this meeting,

Israel submitted its proposals to Macmillan and Swedish
Ambassador Lundborg to broker with Egypt.


10. (C) Even as Egypt has been playing "good cop" with
Macmillan, Fawzi took a harder line in a private meeting with
S/SANAC Einhorn September 3. S/SANAC Einhorn reviewed the
priority President Obama is attaching to improved relations
with Egypt and to NPT issues, and observed that Egypt and the
Arabs seemed headed toward prompting another "psycho drama"
in the GC that would not help them in real efforts to make
progress toward arms control lin the region. Fawzi responded
by claiming again that the GC is an opportunity for President
Obama to make good, and complained about Israeli
intransigence. Fawzi characterized Macmillan's efforts as
"dead" and continued to absolve himself of responsibility for
the INC resolution, other than to hold out hope that
consensus on the MES resolution this year might lead to
flexibility on INC next year. The Egyptians adopted a
similar tone with Ambassador Davies in a separate meeting
with the Arab Group September 3 (para 14 below). Meanwhile,
Macmillan vociferously denied to Msnoff that she was giving
up, and will keep trying as she sees no other way out of this
Middle East morass. She welcomed any suggestions on text and
in the meantime, she and Swedish Ambassador Lundorg had
decided to take a one-day break to let temperatures cool.


11. (C) Although the EU Presidency has been working closely
with Macmillan on formulations of the three main issues,
Lundborg has been inclined toward separate track negotiations
with Cairo on the MES text, in the hopes of generating
Egyptian good will and possible help on the INC. Asked about
"linkage" to the INC in a September 1 meeting with Ambassador
Davies, Lundborg inferred that this would not be explicit,
and acknowledged the risk that Egypt could pocket an agreed
MES text while doing nothing about the INC. In the worst
case scenario, he postulated a no-action motion followed by a
vote on the INC. Despite internal EU divisions, Lundborg
continues to take the lead in brokering text with Egypt and
Israel, working closely with Macmillan. His efforts could
easily morph into a separate EU negotiation with Egypt, if
the Arab Group continues to reject a single resolution.


12. (C) The EU is in disarray with no common position on this
approach. Swedish Msnoff reported an inconclusive CONOPS
meeting in Brussels that morning to like-minded (U.S, Canada,
Australia, Sweden, UK, France and New Zealand) experts
meeting September 2 with NSC Non-Proliferation Director Rexon
Ryu. The UK specified, however, that the EU had a common
position in so far as the INC not being a basis for
consensus, as was relayed in the EU letter to Arab League.
Beyond this, there is disagreement within the EU as to the
advisability of a separate track negotiation with Cairo. The
UK, France and the Netherlands seek linkage to the INC while
many other Europeans see the merit in cooperating with Egypt
as an end in itself, UK Ambassador Smith reported to
Ambassador Davies in a separate meeting September 3. Smith
added that the UK preference to insert a reference to the
Additional Protocol in Egyptian text has elicited European
hand-wringing. In the like-minded session, Australian DCM
also toyed with the idea of a separate track negotiation with
Egypt whereas Canada objected to anything short of a "package
approach," stating that it would not support an EU-agreed MES
text without a package. NSC Director Ryu advised the
like-mined of the whole-scale U.S. diplomatic effort vested
in the 2010 NPT Revcon and the attention this issue has
received at the highest level with Egypt. He supported the
effort toward new consensus in IAEA GC and encouraged the
like-minded to stay united so as to not give Egypt a tactical
advantage. Ryu observed that Egypt should not be given the
impression that there is more than one negotiating track or
an easy fall back, i.e., via a separate deal with the EU.


13. (C) GC President Macmillan also reported on her efforts
to the like-minded, saying that she was still hopeful and
would keep the single resolution idea alive. She had
received no positive feedback as the Arab Group continued to
defer to Ministerial decisions on tabling the INC. They also
reject any PRST. To have any chance, she needed support in
clearing this blockage. Egypt was more willing to engage on
the issues, she reported, but was equivocal in so far as
Fawzi's main concern is to protect an Egyptian text.
Macmillan added that Arab Group confidence in NAM support for
defeating a "no action motion" underlined their desire to
bring the INC to a vote, win or lose. Even countries like
Africa Group Chair Angola, which has close ties to Israel,
predicted solid Africa Group support against no action, she
noted. Still, the UK and others supported keeping the threat
of no action on the table. (Note: Privately, UK Ambassador
Smith was pessimistic about Macmillan's chances for success
but saw her efforts as tactically constructive. End Note.)
Canada observed that "no action" may not be the worst
outcome, worse still would be the collapse of the General
Conference (Note: Canada still predicates tabling a no action
motion on the basis of a reasonable chance of success. End
note). France was likewise pessimistic about the Arab
Group's being unconcerned in its insistence on tabling the
INC. French DCM surmised that creating a big fuss in Vienna
might serve the Arab Group's "real objective" by positioning
themselves for the NPT Revcon.

Arab League Not Ready for Compromise
--------------


14. (C) In a first meeting with the Ambassador September 3,
the Vienna Arab Group (Chair Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Oman,
Jordan, Palestine, Arab League rep) joined by Arab League
Multilateral Director Al-Asad, appealed for a serious
dialogue on the substance of the Israeli Nuclear Capabilities
(INC) draft GC resolution and set this as first test of the
Obama Administration's non-proliferation agenda in advance of
the NPT Revcon. Arab League rep Wehbe opened by highlighting
AL SYG Moussa's personal effort toward moderating the INC
resolution last year (by changing "Threat" to "Capabilities")
and the addition in the current draft of a reference to
President Obama's call for a nuclear weapons-free world.
Al-Asad advised that he would be reporting his Vienna
consultations on this issue to the AL Council of Ministers
meeting in a few days. He hoped that President Obama's
commitment to disarmament and arms control would translate
into real action on NPT universality and rejected the premise
that Israel was being unfairly singled out. Syria stressed
not giving "immunity" to Israel while Oman, by contrast,
framed the issue as a regional one involving not just Israel
but Iran and other non-NPT parties. Jordan also injected
that there were other players in the region, not just Israel.
Arab Ambassadors voiced their disappointment with previous
GC outcomes, and the "psychological trauma" of no-action
motions, which they hoped to avoid.


15. (C) Ambassador Davies sought to portray Vienna issues in
a larger context and underline the President's sincere
commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament as the
centerpiece of his foreign policy. Recognizing the stakes of
a nuclear explosion, he hoped to return to the IAEA's
founding vision of Atoms for Peace. The Ambassador stressed
that Vienna could play a positive role in the process leading
up to the NPT Revcon, including by positive momentum toward
solving these Middle East issues. This would help make
Vienna "relevant." Ambassador Davies encouraged the Arab
Group to give the GC Presidency's efforts a chance so as to
avoid another debacle in the General Conference. He
questioned Arab Group openness to this effort toward a single
resolution and relayed Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi's earlier
comment to him that this was the Presidency's "right."


16. (C) Jordan advised that Vienna reps did not have
decision-making authority on a single resolution given the AL
Ministerial decision to table a separate INC resolution.
Egyptian DCM Sirry was more categorical in stipulating that
there was no room for merging the MES and INC resolutions as
they treated distinct issues. Msnoff noted the convergence
in the substance of the two resolutions, in particular, given
the Algerian amendment to the MES resolution on NPT
universality. (Comment: From the tenor of this discussion,
the Arab Group continues to give the GC President's effort
short shrift, despite having agreed to meet with her again on
September 4. End Comment).


17. (C) Sirry further highlighted the GC Middle East debate
as a first opportunity for the new Administration to
demonstrate its position on nonproliferation issues in the
months leading up to the Revcon. Joining the meeting late,
Egyptian Ambassador Fawzi took a similar hard-line accusing
the U.S. of double-standards in focusing on Iran while
blocking any effort to deal with Israel. Ambassador Davies
argued for a holistic approach to the Middle East via a
single resolution. Syria again injected that holistic meant
stop shielding Israel. Rejecting the argument that Israel
should be named only in tandem with other NPT non-parties,
Al-Asad noted that the 2000 NPT Revcon singled out Israel on
regional issues. He recounted how the Arab League had
modified its INC text four times over the years and appealed
for support but saw no movement from the U.S. Al-Asad
concluded the meeting by again presenting the IAEA GC Middle
East debate as a "testing ground" for the September UNSC
special session on disarmament, the Nuclear Security Summit
and other high-level events leading up to the Revcon.


DAVIES