IAEA/SYRIA: LAYING GROUNDWORK FOR NONCOMPLIANCE?

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000414

SIPDIS

ISN/RA FOR NEPHEW AND DANIEL, IO/T FOR DETEMPLE, NEA FOR
ABELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2034
TAGS: PREL PARM SY KN IAEA KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: LAYING GROUNDWORK FOR NONCOMPLIANCE?

Classified By: DCM GEOFFREY PYATT FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary and Comment: The Director General's report
levies strong criticism of Syria "severely impeding" the
safeguards investigation, and underlines Syria's legal
obligations in this regard; this lays helpful groundwork for
next steps by the Secretariat and/or the Board of Governors.
However, the report is more of "placeholder" for the time
being, putting Syria on "notice" but not yet proposing what
the next steps might be. The IAEA Secretariat is waiting for
the sampling results taken at the Miniature Neutron Source
Reactor (MNSR),which could bolster its case. In the
meantime, there was nothing in the report or the September 1
technical briefing that would take the pressure off Syria.
Undoubtedly, Arabs/NAM will cite gratuitous references to
Israel in the report and continue the "blame Israel"
drumbeat. This does not discount the imperative for Syrian
cooperation clearly conveyed in the report, cooperation which
is not forthcoming to date.


2. (C) Summary and Comment cont'd.: Mission recommends that
our posture in the Board room continue to be wholly
supportive of the safeguards investigation and critical of
Syria's non-responsiveness as undermining the IAEA and
contrary to its obligations. We should dismiss efforts to
deflect blame onto Israel as beside the point, in particular
given the report and technical briefing's repeated assessment
as to the improbability of Israeli munitions being the source
of the uranium found at Al-Kibar. The bottom line is Syria
has a lot of explaining to do. The U.S. and like-minded
should specifically request that the Syria item remain on the
agenda of the November Board. Although this report is
stronger than that for the June Board, there is still the
danger of "Board fatigue" if the investigation goes nowhere.
We will underline that allowing that to happen would be a
serious dereliction of the Board's responsibilities.


3. (SBU) The most cogent point in the Director General's
report, for the first time, putting Syria on notice that
"there is no limitation in comprehensive Safeguards
Agreements on Agency access to information, activities or
locations simply because they may be military related. The
fact that the Agency has found particles of nuclear material
of a type which is not in the declared inventory of Syria
underscores the need to pursue this matter." Prompted by a
question from the U.S., the Secretariat's technical briefing
further debunked the Syrian contention of Israeli munitions
being the source of the uranium. In response, Syrian Atomic
Energy head Ibrahim Othman presented new and unconvincing
theories on the origin of the uranium found at Al Kibar,
offering up the possibility the uranium blew in on a dust
storm from Iraq and also noting that anthropogenic uranium
findings are meaningless as this type of uranium can be found
anywhere, including the IAEA Library. He further provided a
possible explanation on the uranium found at the Miniature
Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) despite the IAEA's sample
results are still pending. Trying to shift the focus to the
U.S., Othman suggested the uranium came from a "Reactor
Experiments" container obtained from the U.S. Mission
appreciates any information regarding such a container that
the U.S. may have shipped to Syria. Othman appears to feel
pressure to deflect the scrutiny, but we continue to find a
willingess among some Member States to ignore the case
regardless of the facts.
End Summary and Comment.


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DG Report: Military Sites Not Off-limits
--------------


4. (SBU) The DG's report on Syria (GOV/2009/56, August 28)
calls attention to Syria's continued refusal to cooperate
with the Agency's investigation into possible undeclared
activities. The questions from previously reported findings
of anthropogenic uranium at the Al-Kibar (Dair Alzour)
facility remain unanswered, with Syria claiming that it has
no obligation to provide more information under its
Safeguards agreement due the military and non-nuclear nature
of the site. Syria, for the past several Board sessions, has
indicated its cooperation will not be at the expense of its
national security (i.e. it will not include access to
military facilities). The IAEA, for the first time, puts
Syria on notice that "there is no limitation in comprehensive
Safeguards Agreements on Agency access to information,
activities or locations simply because they may be military
related. The fact that the Agency has found particles of
nuclear material of a type which is not in the declared
inventory of Syria underscores the need to pursue this
matter."


5. (SBU) The Agency notes its investigation has been
"severely impeded" because of Syria's lack of cooperation and
continues to ask for access to information, access to
locations (including three locations alleged to be
functionally related),and access to the debris removed from
the Al-Kibar site during clean-up activities. Syria
maintains the facility had been a military non-nuclear
installation and that it had no nuclear cooperation with
North Korea. Syria also noted to the Agency that the debris
is gone, and it would be "impossible" to meet the Agency's
request for access. The Agency indicates that Syria has
declined the Agency's "repeated" requests to have substantive
discussions on the nature of the destroyed building. On
procurement, the Agency notes it is not in a position to
confirm Syria's statements regarding the purpose of the
procurement of named equipment and material.


6. (SBU) In contrast to the Al-Kibar investigation, Syria
has cooperated with the Agency's investigation at the MNSR,
the only declared nuclear facility in Syria, following
findings of anthropogenic natural uranium of a type not
declared at the facility. The IAEA performed a Physical
Inventory Verification (PIV) on July 8, 2009, and took
environmental samples at the facility. The Agency awaits the
results.

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Strong Technical Briefing by Secretariat
--------------


7. (SBU) The Secretariat made its case on the need for
Syrian cooperation during the September 1 Technical Briefing.
Max Aparo, Section Head in Safeguards Operations B Division
responsible for Syria, delivered the briefing. While noting
Syria's responses to the Agency's questions, Aparo followed
with the Secretariat's assessments on Syria:

-- Presence of uranium at Al-Kibar (Dair Alzour) may point to
nuclear related activities that require explanation;

-- Low probability that uranium found at Al-Kibar originated
from munitions;

-- Resolution of this issue requires access to information,
locations, equipment and material as requested by the Agency;

-- Based on the information provided, the Agency cannot
confirm Syria's statements regarding the destroyed facility
at Al-Kibar;

-- Features of the destroyed building are similar to what may
be found in connection with a reactor site;

-- Information provided by Syria does not adequately support
its assertions about Al-Kibar.


8. (SBU) Aparo closed the briefing by reiterating that there
is no limitation on Agency access simply because a site is
military-related. For next steps, he said that Syria needed
to provide access, that the Agency stood ready to establish
modalities with Syria to protect sensitive information at
military-related sites. He also asked for Israel and others
to share information and noted the Agency will continue its
investigation into the origin of uranium contamination found
at the MNSR.


9. (SBU) Aparo provided one additional detail regarding the
attempted procurement of barium sulphate. The September DG
Report notes that Syria cancelled its order for barium
sulphate in the October 2007 and that this was unrelated to
the September 2007 destruction of the building at Al-Kibar.
During the briefing, Aparo added that Syria had told the
Agency that the order for barium sulphate was bound for
medical centers but was cancelled because it was determined
that there was enough already available.

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Clearing Up Misconceptions on
Origin of Uranium at Al-Kibar
--------------


10. (SBU) After Aparo's briefing, DCM asked the Secretariat
to clarify its position on the possibility the uranium
particles found at Al-Kibar originated from munitions, as we
had heard from Algerian Board Chair Feroukhi that the Arab
group considered this issue resolved after Syria explained to
the group that the uranium came from Israeli munitions.
Aparo clearly responded that this was not likely as the
uranium found was isotopically natural (not depleted as
expected in munitions) and the anticipated composition that
would include other elements used in munitions were not
found, such as titanium, molybdenum or copper/nickel used in
the coating. Aparo said the munitions would also produce
larger fragments and spherical particles, which did not match
the particles found.

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Syria Struggles to Find New Explanations
for the Uranium Traces at Al-Kibar
--------------


11. (SBU) Syrian Atomic Energy head Ibrahim Othman made an
intervention during the question-answer session of the
technical briefing, during which he presented new theories on
the origin of the uranium found at Al Kibar. He first
suggested the uranium blew into Syria from Iraq during a dust
storm ("as thousands of pounds of depleted uranium have been
thrown there"). Othman then tried to explain that "depleted
uranium" does not mean that every particle is depleted, "some
will be natural." (Comment: The IAEA has identified the
uranium as anthropogenic (man-made/modified) and isotopically
natural (meaning not enriched or depleted. End comment.)
Othman tried to downplay the existence of any anthropogenic
uranium, saying it is ubiquitous and could be found in
London, Japan, and the IAEA Library, for example.


12. (SBU) Lastly, Othman tried to blame the uranium findings
at the MNSR on a "Reactor Experiments" container obtained
from the U.S. (Comment: Othman's explanation on the MNSR
uranium comes a bit prematurely, as the IAEA does not yet
have its results for Syria to counter. End Comment.) We are
unaware of what U.S. origin container Othman was referring to
and would welcome Washington clarification in this regard.
DAVIES