IAEA/GC/MIDDLE EAST: ARAB GROUP REJECTS GC PRESIDENT'S GOOD OFFICES

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000402

SIPDIS

STATE FOR D(S),P, T, S/SANAC, S/SEMEP, IO, ISN, NEA
DOE FOR S1, OIP, NA-20
NSC FOR SAMORE, SCHEINMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2019
TAGS:
PREL, AORC, PARM, KNNP, XF, IAEA
SUBJECT: IAEA/GC/MIDDLE EAST: ARAB GROUP REJECTS GC
PRESIDENT'S GOOD OFFICES

REF: UNVIE 400 (NOTAL) AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: CDA Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (C) The Arab Group (Lebanon and Syria) flatly rejected
General Conference President Macmillan's efforts toward a
consensus single resolution on the Middle East, standing by
the Arab League Ministerial directive for a separate
resolution naming Israel. Although both Egypt and Israel
were more receptive to the GC President's efforts than the
Arab Group, Israel is nervous about where this is leading.
Thus far, we assured Israel, it is leading nowhere with Arab
intransigence wholly to blame. Macmillan has not given up
and appealed for U.S. support of her efforts, including in
Arab Group capitals. The EU is supportive of the GC
President but also inclined to open separate-track
negotiations with Cairo on MES text, which Egypt reportedly
will not share with anyone until introducing it formally at
the opening of the GC. We have advised our closest EU
supporters, UK, Netherlands, and France, that a separate EU
negotiation is premature and a tactical mistake that could
work at cross-purposes with the goal of supporting the GC
President. Meanwhile, the EU is finalizing a response to the
AL SYG letter on the INC which stipulates that a resolution
naming Israel cannot be the basis for consensus. There
remains no clear collective Plan B as to what to do about the
INC should the GC President's efforts fail and should a "no
action motion" also prove impracticable (though we continue
to weigh options, such as killer amendments.)


2. (C) The Arab Group further stressed to Macmillan that the
Iranian agenda item on military strikes against nuclear
facilities be kept separate from the Middle East debate. The
EU and like-minded support a General Committee challenge
though the procedural argument against the Iranian agenda
item has holes. Although we do not yet know the full
composition of the General Committee, the vote outcome may
come down to depending upon a handful of NAM moderates;
killing the agenda item is not assured at this point, with
several committee members sympathetic to the idea that
"freedom of speech" requires the Iranian-authored agenda item
to be heard. NAM Chair Egypt downplayed a NAM letter
supporting the inclusion of the Iranian agenda item but this
may be a complicating factor. Mongolia, a NAM member of the
General Committee, warns that a discussion is unavoidable and
efforts to abort it would deepen mutual antagonism. Even
some close allies are concerned that General Committee
disposition of the item would not be the final word. As with
the INC, we will need to consider carefully Plan B options on
the Iranian agenda item, in the event it is approved by the
General Committee. In the interim, Mission recommends
demarches in Arab Group capitals and Stockholm in support of
the GC President's efforts, as well as outreach to NAM
capitals against the Iranian agenda item. End Summary and
Comment.

Arabs Reject President's Effort
--------------


3. (C) General Conference (GC) President Jennifer Macmillan
(New Zealand) reported to the Western European and Others
Group (WEOG) and privately to Charge August 25 that the Arab
Group had rejected her overture for a consensus text on a
single Middle East resolution out of hand. Privately, she
was disconcerted by her meeting with Arab Group Chair Lebanon
and Syria, the latter of which did most of the talking (and
was quite patronizing by her account). She confided to
Charge that she was taken aback by how strongly the Arabs

adhered to a political position premised on an Arab League
Ministerial directive to table a separate Israeli Nuclear
Capabilities (INC) resolution. They insisted that the point
of the exercise was to name Israel and also rejected peace
process language that "obfuscated" the issue of phasing,
i.e., precedence of NWFZ vice peace process. While Egypt
(not present in the Arab Group meeting),was initially more
open-minded, it had since "fallen in line" according to
Macmillan. She later told the WEOG that Egypt still plans to
refrain from tabling its MES text until the opening day of
the GC, September 14.


4. (C) Macmillan had presented three drafts to the Arabs and
Egypt, also shared with Israel. The first was hybrid MES-INC
text that included both the Israeli idea of reflecting
differences in the preamble and 1995 NPT Revcon resolution
language on all states in the region "that have not yet done
so, without exception" adhering to the NPT, i.e., stopping
short of naming Israel. She proposed alternative formulations
on the peace process "contributing to, inter alia" a WMD free
zone, also derived from the 1995 NPT resolution. The second
draft was a stripped-down version of the fore-going and a
third was premised on the original 2008 Egyptian text but
adding in similar language on the NPT. Macmillan
characterized Israeli Ambassador Michaeli's reaction as
constructive. He intimated to Macmillan that Israel could
probably live with "inviting" (as opposed to "calling upon")
states to join the NPT and the 1995 NPT Revcon language on
the peace process. However, Michaeli took a much harder line
in subsequent exchanges with the Mission, insisting as he has
before (reftel) that everything that went beyond the 2005
Middle East Safeguards (MES) consensus text was not agreed
and would have to be highlighted as such. Michaeli
underlined his fear that Israel not be blamed for failure of
Macmillan's effort. Msnoff reassured Michaeli that to the
contrary, Macmillan blamed Arab rejectionism. (Comment: There
is zero chance of returning to the 2005 MES text per se, and
we believe Michaeli understands this. End comment.)

WEOG Supports President, EU Split on Separate Track
-------------- --------------


5. (C) After meeting with Charge, Macmillan relayed a
sanitized version of the Arab reaction to WEOG. Although she
was disappointed and "recovering," she was not giving up on
her effort. She was not sure how to address the Arab League
political decision on the INC and welcomed any input on
consensus language for a single resolution. Charge seconded
her efforts, encouraged her not to give up, and called for
ratcheting up demarches in capitals . 2008 GC President,
Italian Ambassador Ghisi, also encouraged Macmillan to keep
trying though he was pessimistic, based on his experience
last year, that the Arab League would give up singling out
Israel. However, the President's efforts would help limit
the damage from Middle East disagreements upon other GC
business even in the event of a "no action motion" and could
prove useful to EU negotiations with Egypt on the MES text,
he argued. Ghisi added that the EU must also prepare for a
"Plan B" on dealing with the INC. (Comment: It is clear
from his intervention and discussions with the Swedish EU
Presidency that, while supporting the GC President, some EU
states are already going down the path of negotiating the MES
and INC on separate tracks, i.e. cutting a separate deal with
Cairo. These two efforts could easily work at cross
purposes. In separate conversations the following day,
Mission affirmed to The Netherlands, UK, Germany and France
that it is premature to give up on Macmillan and run to the
Egyptians. End Comment). Meanwhile, the EU is still
finalizing its response to Arab League SYG Moussa on the INC
text. The letter draft circulating within the EU (shared in
confidence with Mission) states that the EU "does not believe

the League's draft, which focuses on a single country, would
command consensus at the General Conference." The EU letter
supports a Middle East WMD-free zone, comprehensive
safeguards, and adherence by all states in the region to the
NPT and CTBT, and refers to the EU statement on Middle East
issues at the NPT Prepcom.


6. (C) Charge also covered these issues in private August 26
with Dutch Ambassador Hamer, who was one of our strongest
allies in last year's debate. Hamer welcomed U.S. efforts to
stiffen the EU line, noting that Sweden, Germany, and
Ireland, among others, had been extremely eager to
accommodate Egypt's concerns last year. He noted that in the
current process, the Netherlands and UK had rejected the
initial draft EU reply to Arab League SYG Amr Moussa on the
INC resolution text, and indicated that the revised reply was
being worked through EU capitals, with Vienna missions
awaiting instructions. Hamer appreciated U.S. efforts to
improve our tactical position but reiterated Dutch red lines
regarding any effort to single out Israel or downplay linkage
to the peace process. He noted that Belgium was unlikely to
repeat its leadership role from last year, and urged further
U.S. contacts in EU capitals to reinforce our message that
the Egyptian and Arab initiatives will not find consensus in
their present forms.

How to Beat the Iranian Resolution?
--------------


7. (C) Macmillan also reported to WEOG August 25 that the
Arab Group is anxious to keep the Iranian-proposed agenda
item on military strikes against nuclear facilities separate
from the Middle East discussion. Charge argued to the group
that the Iranian resolution, a transparent red herring and
distraction, was also inappropriate for the IAEA GC and
should be withdrawn. Failing that, Charge advocated WEOG
help vote down the Iranian agenda item in General Committee,
even at the cost of an agenda fight. This debate needed to
be understood in the wider context of efforts to keep an
international spotlight on Iran's non-compliance issues, he
argued. While fully supportive of an effort to kill the
Iranian item in the General Committee (of which Italy will be
a member),Italian Ambassador Ghisi cautioned that it will be
a trickier issue than the INC. Unlike the INC item, on which
one could argue redundancy, in that there was already a
Middle East agenda item, there was no such procedural
argument with respect to the Iranian agenda item.
Furthermore, in Italy's view, one could not argue that this
was a matter for the UNSC and not the GC since the General
Conference had adopted three previous resolutions on the
subject, Ghisi observed. He added that it may come to a vote
in Plenary and advised that we start lobbying efforts in
capitals. Canada pointed out that the Iranian draft
resolution differed from the previous resolutions. (Comment:
Be that as it may, Ghisi is correct about being on shaky
procedural grounds. French Counselor suggested that we focus
our arguments on the fact that this is an Iranian ploy, and
that the UNSC or UNGA Sixth/Legal Committee is the more
appropriate venue than the General Conference. End Comment).


8. (C) In a potential further complication for our efforts to
defeat the Iranian agenda item in General Committee (or by
Plenary vote),the NAM sent a letter to DG ElBaradei
supporting inclusion of the Iranian agenda item, which the
Iranian press spun as support by 100 NAM states. NAM Chair
Egypt, which signed it on behalf of the NAM, privately
downplayed to us the significance of this letter, and noted
the general NAM position against barring pertinent items from
the agenda. Egyptian Msnoff stressed, however, that there
was no agreement on substance or discussion of an Iranian
text. He was also personally sympathetic to our arguments

against the Iranian ploy. However, with only five of the
required eight vote majority in the 15-member General
Committee assured thus far (U.S., Canada, U.K., Finland,
Italy),NAM moderates such as Singapore or Mongolia (the
latter of which has already told Charge it would not support
blocking the item) and possibly Peru may hold the key swing
votes on the Committee. New Peruvian Ambassador Garcia was
very receptive to our arguments with respect to the Iranian
agenda item in an introductory call on Charge August 25 and
indicated that Peru is a candidate for a GRULAC seat on the
General Committee. (Note: We learned of the NAM letter
subsequently and Garcia had not seemed to be aware of it.
The letter was reportedly introduced at a NAM Plenary and
gaveled through without comment when no one voiced any
objection. End Note).


9. (C) Comment: While a General Committee challenge still
seems to be the most expedient course of action with respect
to the Iranian agenda item, we need to formulate a Plan B for
the likely events that the General Committee votes do not
materialize or Iran makes a further effort in plenary.
Options could include a Plenary vote against the General
Committee recommendation (a risky course),a "no action"
motion on the Iranian agenda item, or a vote on the
resolution. Whatever we do runs the risk of expending
capital we will also need on the Middle East agenda items, so
the sooner we extinguish this, the better. End Comment.
PYATT