HCOC: EU WORKSHOP ON STRENGTHENING THE HAGUE CODE

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000335

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC KSCA ETTC KNNP TSPA
SUBJECT: HCOC: EU WORKSHOP ON STRENGTHENING THE HAGUE CODE
OF CONDUCT, JUNE 26

REF: UNVIE 314


1. Summary: In its role as European Union (EU) President,
the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted a workshop in
Prague on June 26 to promote further enhancement and improved
functioning of the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) against
ballistic missile proliferation. The informal workshop
brought together academics and governmental experts from
nearly 40 countries. The 'Foundation for Strategic Research'
(FSR),a French think tank with experience in implementation
EU decisions, provided presentations and moderated the
workshop discussion. The result of the workshop will be a
"forward-looking" paper from the FSR for subscribing states'
consideration. The EU appreciated the wide participation and
was enthusiastic about the exchange of information. However,
by contrast, there was little direct interaction between
academic and governmental attendees and by the end of the day
about a third of the seats were empty. End summary.

EU Promotion of HCOC
--------------


2. One of the aims of the decision of the Council of Europe
in supporting the HCOC (Decision 2008/974/PESC) was to
promote further enhancement and better functioning of this
organization. The EU views HCOC as an important tool in
preventing and countering ballistic missile proliferation.
The Prague workshop was an awareness-raising event and also
provided a forum for the exchange of ideas on how to enhance
HCOC. Participants included representatives from thirty HCOC
subscribing states, two non-subscribing states (Israel and
Mexico) and two experts from academia and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs.)

Presentations & Discussion
--------------


3. The FSR presented a broad overview of the trends in
ballistic missile (BM) and space launch vehicle (SLV)
programs. (Note: presentation material sent to ISN/MTR. End
Note.) FSR reminded participants that countries can hide
their BM programs behind SLV programs; it is difficult for
outside countries to detect the level of development in a BM
program if a country chooses to hide it. While a country's
BM program can grow out of a SLV program, according to the
FSR Chair, a BM program requires additional skill sets and
further development. Japan, for example, has foregone a BM
program but has an advanced SLV program.


4. The FSR pointed to BM programs as the "tip of the
iceberg" for WMD programs because most countries that possess
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have active BM programs.
Therefore, they contend, HCOC can help identify the tips of
these icebergs, as BM programs must make use of testing for
their development. By observing testing of a subscribing
state, the other states can make a more informed judgment of
the launching county's program.


5. Professor Goetz Neuneck, from the Institute for Peace
Research and Security Policy, as well as other academics
present and the FSR in its presentations, argued that cruise
missiles and even unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) should also
be pre-notified. There is a trend towards small and medium
launch vehicles they noted, and WMD could be added to these
means of delivery as readily as to BMs. The trend to lighter
SLVs brings SLV programs even closer to a country's BM
program.


6. The Chair, summing up the academics' views, spoke of a
"crossroads" in missile controls because the blurring of
lines between the means of delivery could create confusion.
He used the example of country launching an SLV being
misinterpreted by its neighbors as a hostile missile.
Therefore, the Chair concluded, HCOC is a practical tool,
among others, in providing transparency in BM programs: its
implementation and universalization would increase global
security.

Current State of HCOC
--------------


7. The FSR Chair stressed that current HCOC Pre-Launch
Notification (PLN) reporting is poor. Some 80 percent of the
(approx.) 60 BM launches reported in open sources last year
were from the U.S. or Russia. However neither country
currently submits PLNs in HCOC. Of the remaining 20 percent,
only a few come from non-subscribing states. One of the
reasons for this is that developing countries are finding it
simpler to contract SLV business to another country than to
create and maintain a national launch capability.

8. In the session "Implementation of the HCOC: Results
Achieved So Far," HCOC "Annual Declarations" were portrayed
as a good tool to help build confidence and spread
transparency. Last year, about 70 percent of the subscribing
countries submitted an Annual Declaration and this was seen
as a positive confidence building measure (CBM.) Promoting
United Nations (UN) recognition was also seen by the Chair
and the experts as a positive element of increasing awareness
of HCOC because, unless specially prohibited by a UN Security
Council resolution, all counties have the right to a peaceful
BM program and HCOC can thus provide an element of
transparency in states' programs. Bilateral and regional
agreements to promote missile transparency were also
encouraged, as was more general outreach.

Cruise Missiles
--------------


9. On the scope of the HCOC reporting, the expert from the
Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS) shared
that HCOC was one of the reasons non-subscribing states were
focusing on development of cruise missiles (CM) rather than a
BM program. He alleged there are some 13 countries that have
started a CM program since 2004 and some counties are working
on hyper-sonic cruise vehicles, all with a military purpose.
Some of these states, this expert contends, would prefer to
keep their missile development clandestine yet didn't want to
hinder their participation in HCOC if they found it
advantageous in the future. Also, he pointed out, as missile
defenses get better, cruise missiles are needed for states in
addition to BMs. The reasons he gave for this are that CMs
are more accurate and can be used for up to 500 lb. of
payload. And while they are slower then BMs, they are harder
to detect because of point of launch and trajectory and the
'shock value' is the same as delivery from BMs. Other experts
agreed with the MIIS representative that CM programs are
intrinsically linked to BM programs and the two cannot be
separated as is currently the case with HCOC reporting of
only BM programs.


10. France did not see cruise missiles as being incorporated
into the HCOC mechanism in the near future. It took nearly
five years to define "ballistic missiles" and merely defining
"cruise missiles" will take some time. The French
representative pointed out too, with economic incentives,
nothing is being concretely discussed for HCOC adherence. A
more basic reason why countries may choose not to join, the
French participant acknowledged, is some countries don't want
other countries to see their missile development. Yet,
because it is the "responsible thing to do" for a
co-operating country, there is, nonetheless, a great desire
from France for universalization.

Concluding Remarks
--------------


11. The Chair recognized that HCOC was a good starting point
for BM non-proliferation. The United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research expert reflected this view, pointing out
the "demands" of HCOC are almost trivial. By not using the
PLNs and annual declarations, subscribers are wasting a
valuable opportunity. He saw parallels with the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) noting the
OPCW implementation support unit "keeps the ball rolling."
Also, he noted that the India-Pakistan exchange could be used
by HCOC as a good example of regional agreements on missile
transparency.


12. The expert from Chinese Arms Control and Disarmament
Association (CACDA) indicated that the current low reporting
of missile launches through PLNs was not very encouraging.
(Note: Technically CACDA is a NGO but likely to have very
strong PRC government connections. End note.) He asked
whether HCOC had any measures to enforce this requirement and
whether there were any assessment measures to ensure
adherence. He pointed out that missile defense tests involve
multiple counties and that regional issues impact the
perception of threat to any one country. CBMs, on a voluntary
and flexible basis, are to be encouraged. This expert pointed
out that if HCOC showed more flexibility, then more countries
would become subscribers.


13. The Czechs, speaking on behalf of the EU, saw the HCOC
as 'their child' and the EU policy in the HCOC regards PLNs
as a central element of transparency. The EU presidency has
made strong demarches concerning HCOC. The Czech presidency
is encouraged by the change in atmosphere as evidenced by
U.S. President Obama's speech in Prague, even if it contained
nothing specific about HCOC. The hope of the EU is PLNs will
be de-coupled with the implementation of the Russia - U.S.
Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC),as the JDEC is a very
complicated process and is, they believe, "a bilateral
issue". HCOC is not a perfect tool, the Czech representative
emphasized, but it is a start for creating better trust.


14. The Chair pointed out that while the HCOC was "a child
of the EU" in a historical sense, it is now the
responsibility of the 130 subscribing states to help it
through its "teenage growth crisis." Until the HCOC
mechanisms work as they should, the organization will remain
in "crisis". The Chair saw some ideas emerging from the
workshop as practical, but others were contradictory and
needed further debate. He used North Korea (DPRK) as an
example of why a country may want to join HCOC: if the DPRK
wants to be seen as a country in good standing in the
international community it is for them to become an HCOC
subscriber and implement its commitments -- which are not
very difficult. Some 90 HCOC subscribers do not have Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) membership and HCOC could
also be seen as a way to enhance that very important regime.

Follow-up
--------------


15. The I-ECC, an electronic means of communication for the
HCOC, is being developed by the FRS. The EU contends that
such a means of communication will further the objectives of
the HCOC. By September, a pilot system will be discussed
within the EU. Afterwards, a trial version will be made
available for all subscribing states to view and provide
comments. The FRS Chair stressed that at next year's HCOC
annual meeting, the I-ECC will not be presented as a "take it
or leave it" product; rather, it is very much a work in
progress and the EU would welcome comments and suggestions on
the I-ECC proposal.


16. A follow-up workshop will be hosted by a future EU
Presidency. It will focus on the future of HCOC, and feedback
from the Chair's report of the Prague workshop will be taken
into account in shaping that agenda. All subscribing states
will be asked for input.

Comment
--------------


17. The EU continues to make their best case for all HCOC
subscribing states to move to full compliance with the HCOC
"requirements." The use of FRS to research and present the
current state of affairs with BM program and the HCOC as an
organization was well received. However, while the intent to
have an exchange between academics and government experts was
well intended, the actual exchange was formal, at best. The
afternoon session of the workshop was not well attended;
unfortunately, it was in the afternoon when some of the more
interesting exchange took place. The two non-subscribers in
attendance (Mexico and Israel) were not engaged in the
discussions, apparently even on the margins. It is likely the
EU and the FSR will enthusiastically use the results of the
workshop as partial input for their next workshop. The U.S.
position on JDEC implementation before HCOC PLN reporting is
the '800 pound guerrilla' in the room; everyone at this
workshop hope that issue will be resolved so further progress
can be made with HCOC as a CBM.

PYATT