Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA325
2009-07-08 15:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
UNVIE
Cable title:  

ASSURANCE OF NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY: RUSSIAN REVIEW

Tags:  AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY RU IN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0325 1891531
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081531Z JUL 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DOE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9801
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0342
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0109
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0179
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0195
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0397
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0264
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 1450
C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000325 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, IO/T, ISN/NESS, ISN/MNSA
DOE FOR NA-243-GOOREVICH;
NRC FOR JSCHWARTZMAN, MDOANE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2034
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY RU IN
SUBJECT: ASSURANCE OF NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY: RUSSIAN REVIEW
OF IAEA BOARD DISCUSSION

REF: UNVIE 301

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES: GEOFFREY PYATT for reasons 1.4(c) and
(e)

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000325

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, IO/T, ISN/NESS, ISN/MNSA
DOE FOR NA-243-GOOREVICH;
NRC FOR JSCHWARTZMAN, MDOANE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2034
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY RU IN
SUBJECT: ASSURANCE OF NUCLEAR FUEL SUPPLY: RUSSIAN REVIEW
OF IAEA BOARD DISCUSSION

REF: UNVIE 301

Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES: GEOFFREY PYATT for reasons 1.4(c) and
(e)


1. (SBU) In a meeting with Russian Ambassador Zmeyevskiy and
Russian Counselor Karasev on June 30, Charge suggested that
it would be productive to convene soon the supporters of
nuclear fuel assurances to discuss potential next steps,
given the outcome of the June Board meeting (reftel).
Zmeyevskiy agreed that the U.S. and Russia needed to "do
something," but he did not have an "official position" on
future direction. Zmeyevskiy said that it was necessary to
work with others, especially the non-supporters, to avoid a
further North/South rift that could end up affecting all IAEA
issues. He questioned whether it might be possible to invent
some "tactical scheme" that does not spoil the situation.


2. (SBU) Zmeyevskiy noted that there was a split within the
G-77, as not everyone in the group opposes advancing toward
Board action on fuel assurances, but it would be difficult
for the positively disposed developing countries to take an
independent line. Zmeyevskiy suggested that we encourage
G-77 states with a constructive interest in the issue to
reach out to Director General (DG) ElBaradei, as he would
likely be able to reason with and neutralize some of the
non-supporters. Charge responded that even the DG seemed
surprised on how negatively the G-77 had expressed itself on
the issue in the Board; it now appeared the DG is ready to
back off again into passivity. Zmeyevskiy commented that the
pursuit of nuclear fuel assurances was ElBaradei's "baby" and
could become his "monument" after his departure from the
IAEA. Charge agreed and recommended that both Russia and the
U.S. continue to encourage the DG in this direction. In
addition, Charge noted his follow-on conversations with
Egyptian Ambassador Fauzi and South African Ambassador Gumbi
had been more positive than their groups' formal statements
in the Board, and that the supporters needed to treat the
skeptics' questions seriously.


3. (C) Charge expressed his disappointment with India's
unhelpful behavior during the Board's discussion of assurance
of supply, but welcomed Russia's Permanent Representative
Berdennikov's comment that India would not suffer under this
arrangement. Zmeyevskiy responded that Indian Ambassador
Kumar had approached the Russian delegation about
Berdennikov's remark, and noted how it became apparent to him
that Russia and India were talking past each other, which was
part of the problem. Zmeyevskiy said that NPT accession was
not a consdieration for India, since India wants to be
recognized as a nuclear power, and in that context he,
Zmeyevskiy, now understands why India had misinterpreted the
language on eligibility to receive LEU set forth in Russia's
proposal. He also reported that more constructive signals in
capitals had been received, but no action has been taken thus
far. Zmeyevskiy finally questioned whether or not the
advocates of fuel assurance mechanisms would ever get the
support of the G-77, and if we did not, would the approval of
such mechanisms be worthwhile if achieved only in a contested
vote.


4. (SBU) Mission plans July 8 an informal consultation with
Russian colleagues and representatives from states that have
donated to the IAEA's nuclear fuel bank fund, in order to
address eligibility criteria and other substantive issues as
well as tactical next steps.
PYATT