Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA310
2009-06-29 15:46:00
SECRET
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/DG RACE: AMANO EYES NARROW VICTORY WHILE

Tags:  AORC PREL KNNP IAEA SP JA SI SF BE 
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VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0310/01 1801546
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 291546Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9760
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0303
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA PRIORITY 0228
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO PRIORITY 0048
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000310 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D(S),P, T, IO, ISN
PLS PASS SECDEF TRAVEL TEAM FOR D(S) STEINBERG
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
DOE FOR NA-20
NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, CONNERY
NRC FOR DOANE, SCHWARTZMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2019
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA SP JA SI SF BE
SUBJECT: IAEA/DG RACE: AMANO EYES NARROW VICTORY WHILE
PREPARING FOR A THIRD ROUND

REF: A) UNVIE 268 AND PREVIOUS B) TOKYO 1464

Classified By: CDA Geoffrey R. Pyatt for 1.4 reasons b and d

Summary and Comment
---------------------

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000310

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D(S),P, T, IO, ISN
PLS PASS SECDEF TRAVEL TEAM FOR D(S) STEINBERG
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
DOE FOR NA-20
NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, CONNERY
NRC FOR DOANE, SCHWARTZMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/28/2019
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA SP JA SI SF BE
SUBJECT: IAEA/DG RACE: AMANO EYES NARROW VICTORY WHILE
PREPARING FOR A THIRD ROUND

REF: A) UNVIE 268 AND PREVIOUS B) TOKYO 1464

Classified By: CDA Geoffrey R. Pyatt for 1.4 reasons b and d

Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (S) Entering the final days before the July 2-3 balloting,
Japanese DG candidate Yukiya Amano shared the same assessment
of the race on June 29 as he has previously but tempered by
some new concerns. Japan still calculates "around 20"
commitments. Factoring in a 20-30 percent average margin for
error in sec ret ballot UN elections, Japan assesses that
this means Amano has little to no margin and another
stalemate is entirely possible. Japan is also still counting
Mexico and Ireland as undecided. Japan is banking on two
defections from Echavarri (Romania and Germany) once he is
eliminated in the early rounds, and two to three possible
conversions from Minty's camp at least in the final
"confidence" (i.e. leading candidate) vote to secure at least
24 votes (two-thirds of the Board if there are no
abstentions). However, aside from India, Japan has not
received any concrete assurance from core Minty supporters
(despite positive signals from Argentina),and is not
confident the Indian Perm Rep will follow his instructions to
vote for Amano in the "confidence" vote. For its part, South
Africa, disappointed by falling just short of a blocking
third of the vote in the June 9 straw poll, has redoubled
efforts to shore up "soft" supporters and has also approached
New Agenda Coalition partners to support Minty in a
"confidence" vote, (i.e. sixth vote for the second
candidate),though he would still have no chance of getting
24 votes. Although this will have no impact on the outcome,
the Board Chair reported separately June 29 that Slovenian DG
candidate Ernest Petric will tender a withdrawal letter by
June 30.


2. (S) A number of rumors have recently added to Amano's

anxiety. First, there is persistent talk both within the
Secretariat (abetted by DG ElBaradei in press interviews) and
on the part of some countries about the need for "consensus"
and/or speculation that Amano will fall short of the required
two-thirds vote. To counterbalance such rumors, Japan is
stressing that the IAEA will be "in trouble" if the DG
election is not resolved this week and that while consensus
is "desirable," it cannot be an obstacle to appointment of
the Director General. Having failed to reach consensus, the
Board Chair has organized the vote in accordance with the
rules of procedure. Japan also cites the precedent of former
DG Hans Blix's election in 1981 by 23 votes (22 required then
as the Board was smaller); Blix became a superb Director
General serving four terms. Charge fully agreed that the
Secretariat has no business intervening in the election
process; a point we have made repeatedly to DDG-level
interlocutors who also recognize the need for neutrality.


3. (S) Japan's second major concern is that Spain and/or
Russia could seek to force a stalemate in the hopes of
Echavarri emerging as a "consensus" candidate in a third
round. To forestall such rumors, Amano is claiming that some
countries have already encouraged Japan to re-nominate him
for a third round, should it become necessary. Visiting
Japanese Vice FM Minorikawa will also relay this message in
his Vienna lobbying this week. (Comment: While presenting
this as a tactical argument, it was clear from the discussion
that Amano anticipates being re-nominated in the event of a
third round and may have been fishing for U.S. support. End
Comment.) Japan received a "clear no" when it approached
Madrid with a "gentlemen's agreement" to support each other's
candidates in the "confidence" vote, thus increasing
suspicion that Spain may vote tactically for Minty once
Echavarri is eliminated to force a third round. Japan
requests the U.S. and other supporters appeal to Spain, in
particular. Amano qualified Russia as "very worrying" and
repeated rumors that Russia would not support Amano even if
he secures a two-thirds vote. Amano did not have a readout
from the G-8 Ministerial in Trieste, but to date Moscow
remained inexplicably evasive. It was not clear if the
rumors meant that Russia is just trying to dissuade others
from supporting Amano or if Russia would actually follow
through, i.e. by calling for (or getting others to call for)
another vote to re-confirm the result in the "Appointment

Stage" on the afternoon of July 3. (Note: The Board Chair
will call for appointment of the DG by acclamation but anyone
can request a further vote even at this stage. End note.)
Once appointed by the Board, Japan discounts the possibility
of an unprecedented challenge in the IAEA General Conference,
which formally approves the appointment, though Japan is
confident of majority support if this were the case. Charge
advised that if Amano is elected DG, Japan should quickly
reach out to P5 and IBSA countries, all of which have an
institutional stake in the IAEA.


4. (S) Some G-77/NAM also still hold out the hope of drafting
Director General ElBaradei in the event of another stalemate.
Although to date ElBaradei has not expressed any interest in
staying on, a DDG quietly probed Charge about such a
scenario. Amano questioned whether Russia may be open to
"extending" ElBaradei's tenure, but Charge noted the Russian
Governor's frustration with ElBaradei during the June Board
session. While the IAEA Statute stipulates a four-year term
of office for the Director General, under this scenario,
ElBaradei would be elected to a further term on the
understanding that he would step down after a year or two.
Idle talk of such a scenario makes it all the more imperative
to resolve the DG election this week. The Board Chair agreed
with us on the attractiveness of settling the vote this week,
and held out the prospect of completing all balotting on July

2. End Summary and Comment.

Country-by-Country Count
--------------


5. (C) Japan has received "firm" commitments from the
following countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Australian,
Burkina Faso, Canada, Ecuador, Finland, France, Iraq,
Lithuania, New Zealand, The Philippines, the United States,
and Uruguay. Switzerland and Turkey are also "not a problem"
and Amano is also confident of UK support (though the UK does
not disclose its vote). Japan has confirmed The Philippines'
commitment with President Arroyo. Uruguay has also recently
recommitted to Japan. Saudi Arabian support is "firmer" but
not in writing. Japan has worked on Ghana intensively both
in capital and at its Geneva Mission, assessing Ghana to be
"more solid than last time." Burkina Faso has also lobbied
Ghana and other Africa Group members on Japan's behalf.


6. (C) Once Echavarri is eliminated, Romania has assured
Amano of its support; Japan does not believe it can expect
more from Bucharest. Amano requested U.S. help in clarifying
Berlin's intentions as he remains not 100 percent sure that
Germany would defect upon Echavarri's elimination, though MFA
experts expected this to be the case. In a follow-on
conversation today, German Ambassador Luedeking (having just
returned from Berlin) confirmed to Charge that though
uninstructed, if it comes down to an Amano-Minty final, he
"cannot imagine" Germany would do anything other than vote
yes on Amano. Germany wants to bring this long process to an
end, Luedeking noted and concurred that while ElBaradei's
current intention is to retire, he could be talked into
re-entering the race if the July vote produces another
stalemate.


7. (C) Amano is concerned that Mexico, though it voted for
him in the straw poll, remains undecided between Amano and
Echavarri (who is reportedly visiting Mexico City June 29)and
is unsure about Mexico's vote in an Amano-Minty runoff (we
strongly suspect Mexico abstained in March.) Charge relayed
a comment from Mexican Ambassador Diaz that Amano needs to
worry about his perception by the "South" in general.
Ireland is also undecided, and while Amano does not believe
Dublin would support Minty in a runoff, he fears Ireland
could be influenced by the need for "consensus." Ireland is
not likely to be receptive to pressure from big countries,
but Japan may ask for U.S. assistance at the last minute in
securing its vote.


8. (C) Though far from confident about Malaysia's intentions
as a "soft" former Minty supporter, Amano noted that the
Malaysian Ambassador's recent departure left a CDA from a
technical Ministry that is positively inclined to Japan in
charge of its local Mission. The positions of other Minty
supporters (China, Argentina, Brazil, India, Algeria, Egypt
and Cuba) remain unchanged though Japan has appealed for

support in the final "confidence" vote (i.e. Yes/No vote on
"leading candidate") with limited success. Amano
unequivocally ruled out China voting in his favor. Thus far,
Japan has only received a commitment from New Delhi to
support Amano in the "confidence" vote. Charge reported that
NSA Jones had also received good signals in Delhi regarding
the new Congress government's commitment to partnership with
the U.S. However, both Amano and Charge shared concerns
about Indian Perm Rep Kumar disobeying instructions (Comment:
Kumar's performance in the June Board on seeking to block
nuclear fuel banks, despite positive signals from Delhi, does
not give us much assurance. End Comment.) There remains a
possibility of an Argentine "conversion" in the final round.
Following a FM telcon in early June, in which Buenos Aires
promised "to not say 'No'", Argentine Ambassador Curia told
Amano that he was seeking instruction on the "confidence"
vote. Charge reported that the Secretary had spoken to the
Argentine FM last week as we promised.


9. (C) Japan continues to work on Brazil but has not yet
received a clear indication of support in a final confidence
vote. Algeria and Egypt have been unreceptive to Japan's
overtures and Cuba remains difficult. Neither a June 9 call
by FM Nakasone nor a June 22 visit by State Secretary
Hashimoto to Algiers resulted in any positive indication for
the "confidence" vote, notwithstanding the fact that Algerian
Board Chair Feroukhi has a personal stake in the successful
conclusion of the DG election.

Election-Day Scenario
--------------


10. (C) Amano had recently consulted with Board Chair
Feroukhi on election-day procedures but he is disinclined
intervene too much on this aspect. Japan has no issue with
the Secretariat's basic scenario though Feroukhi had not made
final decisions. In a separate discussion with the Board
Chair June 29, Feroukhi inidcated to Charge that she hopes to
compress all the votes into a single day session, as opposed
to holding the elimination rounds and first three rounds July
2 and the "confidence" (or leading candidate) votes on July
3, as originally envisioned. It is not clear whether the
Appointment Stage, in which a new DG is formally appointed
(the Board Chair hopes by acclamation, though another vote
may be called) would be on July 2 or 3rd. Feroukhi also
confirmed that she expects a letter of withdrawal from
Slovenian DG candidate Petric by June 30. Waxing
philopsophical, she fully agreed with Charge that it would
best to conclude the DG election this round rather than
reopening the nomination procedure, which would be likely to
generate multiple new candidates.


11. (S) Since Japan cannot exclude the possibility of a
stalemate, Amano queried the Board Chair's intentions in the
event of a third round. Feroukhi indicated that she would
allow four weeks from the election for nomination of a new
slate by early August. However, Amano was quite perturbed to
hear that in a third round, Feroukhi felt it her
responsibility to seek an early consensus. If consensus is
not possible, she envisioned a vote in the September Board
just prior to the IAEA General Conference. Amano viewed this
emphasis on "consensus" (or a delayed vote) as "risky" for
Japan and as benefiting either Echavarri or the remaining
option of ElBaradei. (Comment: Amano betrayed his intention
to seek re-nomination in a third round. Absent instructions,
Mission has not conveyed U.S. views on a hypothetical Amano
renomination. End comment.)


12. (S) Asked for his assessment of the Board Chair's
performance, Amano adjudged Feroukhi to be rather effective
thus far but was unsure if she would remain neutral in a high
stakes third round, in which the NAM would promote an
ElBaradei or another developing world candidacy. Amano noted
that rumors that Feroukhi has been lobbying behind-the-scenes
for Minty.


PYATT