Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA301
2009-06-24 14:55:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA JUNE BOARD: MOVES FUEL BANKS FORWARD

Tags:  AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY RU IN GR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0301/01 1751455
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 241455Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9726
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 0167
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0385
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0183
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0097
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 1434
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0249
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0330
UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000301 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, IO/T, ISN/NESS, ISN/MNSA
DOE FOR NA-243-GOOREVICH;
NRC FOR JSCHWARTZMAN, MDOANE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY RU IN GR
SUBJECT: IAEA JUNE BOARD: MOVES FUEL BANKS FORWARD

-------
SUMMARY
-------

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000301

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR T, IO/T, ISN/NESS, ISN/MNSA
DOE FOR NA-243-GOOREVICH;
NRC FOR JSCHWARTZMAN, MDOANE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY RU IN GR
SUBJECT: IAEA JUNE BOARD: MOVES FUEL BANKS FORWARD

--------------
SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) In its debut as formal item on the IAEA Board of Governors
agenda, the issue of nuclear fuel assurances concluded with the IAEA
Secretariat empowered to continue developing select proposals and
with the way cleared for continued Board discussions and eventual
Board action. For the first time, the G-77 statement went beyond
rhetoric to raise specific concerns that need to be addressed and
specific changes it thought should be made in the proposals. A
number of G-77 countries expressed interest in the concept of fuel
assurances - and more would have done so if necessary to preserve
the topic for future agendas. While the Board did not take the
recommended decisions on either the Director General's proposal for
an IAEA Fuel Bank or the proposal for a Russian Fuel Reserve, the
Chair's Conclusion provided a clear mandate for work and
consultations to continue in order to articulate views and to
address and allay concerns. Despite repeated UNVIE and Russian
discussions with the Indian Mission regarding their eligibility
concerns, the Indian Ambassador played a particularly unhelpful role
in the debate. And while some press fell for Iran's immediate spin
(a defeat for the West at the hands of the G-77),U.S. delegation
believes time will show that the outcome at this Board laid the
groundwork for long-term success on fuel assurances.


2. (SBU) Mission intends to approach the Secretariat to discuss the
best format for follow-up discussions between potential recipients,
supplier states and the Secretariat. Mission will push for
Secretariat leadership on the issue in hopes of keeping momentum
generated by the June Board discussions and the Board Chair's
intention to sustain a dialog. Mission will continue to seek
opportunities to galvanize support for discussion and further
development of concepts in the run-up to the September Board.
However, not all are happy with the Board debate. A subsequent
conversation with the German Charge Guido Kemerling revealed extreme
German unhappiness with the debate. Kemerling said the German Perm

Mission reported to Berlin that assured supply is dead for at least
a year. This assessment also reflects the views of the German Perm
Rep who said he was deeply unhappy with how the board chair
characterized (and downplayed in his view) the German Multilateral
Enrichment Sanctuary Project (MESP) paper.


--------------
PROPOSALS
--------------


3. (U) The Board had for its consideration three proposals. The
first was a "Proposal for the Establishment of an IAEA Low Enriched
Uranium (LEU) Bank" arising from the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)
challenge grant of USD 50 million. The Board was asked to take note
of the report on the proposal and to request the Director General to
bring for its consideration a detailed proposal for the
establishment of an IAEA LEU fuel bank for assurance of supply. The
second was a "Russian Federation Initiative to Establish a Reserve
of Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) for the Supply of LEU to the IAEA for
its Member States." The Board was asked to take note of the Russian
proposal and request the Director General to bring for its
consideration the draft of an agreement that could be concluded
between the Russian Federation and the IAEA for the supply of LEU to
the IAEA and of a model agreement that could be concluded between
the IAEA and a Member State. The third was a proposal by Germany
for "Establishing an Independent Access to Nuclear Fuel Supply
Services: The Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project (MESP). The
Board was asked to take note of the proposal.

--------------
PRE-BOARD CHATTER
--------------


4. (SBU) A considerable amount of uncertainty accompanied the
discussions in the margins prior to Board debate. Statements of
support from various G-77 countries made in capitals in response to
Washington's demarches seemed to be melting away under pressure from
G-77 hardliners (thought to include Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt
and India). Earlier assurances from G-77 leaders that their
statement would not block progress seemed to be coming unglued.
There was considerable uncertainty about just what the G-77 would
say, even among G-77 members. And overlaid on all this was the
uncertainty about whether or not the U.S., Germany and Russia would
issue a Joint Statement, particularly in view of the Mission
recommendation that it would be counterproductive to our desire to
get the Board to focus on the two concrete fuel bank proposals.


5. (SBU) Confusion and concern ebbed somewhat after a meeting with
the Board chair on Tuesday in which she revealed her intention to
pursue a conclusion modeled after the one from the March Board - no
decision but continue work - and the Secretariat indicated that it
could accept such a decision as a mandate for continued efforts.
When a draft of the G-77 statement surfaced, it became clear that in
addition to a repeat of earlier rhetoric there was a substantial
amount of substantive comment, indicating that the G-77 was now
willing to engage in a debate on the issues and not just put off a
decision. And following Russian reluctance to participate, the idea
of a three party statement dissolved. G-77 Ambassadors urged us to
capitalize on the opportunity their statement presented to at last
begin a substantive conversation on the fuel assurance concept.

--------------
G-77 LEADS IN BOARD
--------------


6. (U) Argentina led off the debate speaking for the G-77 and NAM.
In a break from usual practice, China assured us they would not
associate with the statement. The statement reiterated most of the
same points made in March and previous boards: the need for caution
while addressing thoroughly the associated technical legal and
economic aspects as well as the underlying political dimensions; any
proposal must be in full accordance with the Statute; concerns about
nuclear proliferation must not restrict the rights of States; and
rejection of the notion that the pursuit of any technology should be
discouraged because of alleged sensitivity.


7. (U) While stating the view that "no decision or recommendation
can be made regarding the issue at this stage" the G-77 statement
went on to provide some preliminary ideas and concerns about the
proposals. This was the first evidence of G-77 engagement and
willingness to discuss the issues rather than postpone discussion as
premature.


8. (U) One important point was the view that none of the proposals
provided a proper assurance of supply of nuclear fuel, dealing only
with low enriched uranium. Recipient states' need for a guaranteed
supply of fuel assemblies and fabrication was not addressed by the
proposal. The G-77 also expressed its view that it was important to
address the supply of natural uranium, both from the point of view
of ensuring fuel for the reactors that use natural uranium fuel but
also to address the perception that the real aim of the proposal was
to restrict and discourage States from developing or expanding
national enrichment capabilities rather than providing a viable
assurance of supply. The Group also expressed concerns about the
reliability of the triggering mechanism, both from the point of view
of the supplier misrepresenting the nature of the disruption and of
the supplier seeking to block triggering of the mechanism within the
Agency. The Group also expressed skepticism about the financial
neutrality of the proposals and also about diverting high-level
attention from other important activities. The G-77 also objected
to the eligibility criteria conditioning access to the fuel to
Member States "with respect to which...no specific report relating
to safeguards implementation...is under consideration by the Board
of Governors."


9. (U) With regard to the Fuel Bank proposal, the Group concluded
that the document did not present a coherent and comprehensive
conceptual framework that can form the basis of a more detailed
proposal to be brought to the Board. It also stated that in light
of existing policies on accepting voluntary contributions it was
premature to authorize the Agency to accept any financial pledges
directed to finance the proposed LEU bank. The Group also expressed
the view that it did not consider that the document on the Fuel
Reserve proposal contained a comprehensive framework that can form
the basis for developing draft model agreements. As to the German
proposal, the Group expressed the view that an international
organization such as the IAEA should not administer a commercial
company for the supply of nuclear fuel or enrichment services.
Finally, the Group recommended that any decision regarding the
implementation of the fuel assurance proposals be taken by consensus
by the General Conference.

--------------
THE DG RESPONDS
--------------


10. (U) Following the conclusion of the G-77 Statement, Director
General El Baradei took the unusual step of requesting the floor to
respond (one of four long rebuttal statements the DG made during the
course of the June Board meeting). He emphasized that proposals for
fuel supply were under discussion for 60 years and were firmly
rooted in the Statute, which had envisioned all supply as coming
through the Agency. The issue was whether States believed assurance
of fuel supply was needed, citing the cutoff of Iran in 1979
following the Revolution as the sort of situation that might require
it. The Director General went on to say that he agreed with almost
all of what the G-77 said. He reiterated that the proposal will not
touch rights - the right to develop the fuel cycle, the right to
conduct research and development or the right to transfer
technology.


11. (U) The DG went on to agree that a supply of LEU was not
sufficient and that this is recognized in the Fuel Bank proposal in
a footnote. The Agency needs to work on how to deal with the
question of providing fuel assemblies. He also admitted that the
G-77 had a good point about needing to look at fuel for natural
uranium fueled reactors as well. ElBaradei defended the criteria
for the Fuel Bank as being consistent with the Statute, noting that
Russia applied other limits. He stated that he hoped other
proposals would come forward to ensure that nobody got penalized.
He also stated that the triggering mechanism would be managed by the
DG and that he hoped his successor would not accede to pressure in
how/when it would be applied.


12. (U) ElBaradei made a number of comments about financial
implications. He noted that Russia would fully finance the Fuel
Reserve proposal. He said that he was hopeful of getting the NTI
money, but confirmed that he would not accept a contribution until
the project was approved by the Board. He also mentioned trying to
get the fuel bank in the regular budget. He then indicated that he
expected it to be self-financing, even suggesting that the Agency
might attach a surcharge to benefit Technical Cooperation.


13. (U) The DG emphasized the preliminary nature of the proposals,
his desire for transparency in further development and his welcoming
of additional thoughts and proposals. While mentioning the
authority of the Board to adopt proposals, he first acknowledged
that Board Members might want to send it to the General Conference
and seemed to agree with this approach.

--------------
SUPPORT FROM THE WEST
--------------


14. (U) The statement by the G-77 and NAM and the DG's rebuttal was
followed by a supportive statement from the European Union. The
statement noted that a number of EU members had brought forth
proposals and the EU's 25 million euro contribution to the fuel
bank. The EU also emphasized the nonproliferation benefits of fuel
assurances, while emphasizing that the rights of states would remain
undiminished. The EU statement recognized the Russian proposal and
stated that it looks forward to hearing more about the initiative
from the Secretariat, but did not explicitly endorse the recommended
action. The EU supported taking note of the German proposal and
stated that it was ready to further consider the potential framework
for pursuing the suggested multinational enrichment sanctuary.


15. (U) Russia followed with a statement describing its own
proposal in detail. While describing the broad range of countries
that would be eligible, it also stated its criteria for full scope
safeguards and peaceful uses and security guarantees required by
Russian law. Russia also emphasized the financial aspects of its
proposal, in particular that it would not cost the IAEA anything.
Russia concluded by supporting the recommended action for its own
proposal.

16. (U) Germany followed with a national statement in which it
described, at some length, its multinational enrichment sanctuary
project and how it saw this project as addressing concerns about
rights, the need to control sensitive technology, the absolute
assurance of supply provided by plant ownership, the absence of
interference in the market, and the question of consistency with the
Statute. Germany concluded by stating that it was not seeking an
endorsement of its proposal, but an offer to be taken note of.


17. Following an intervention from Egypt (more below),the United
States delivered its strongly supportive statement (reprinted below)
with a note of thanks to the G-77 for identifying several issues for
discussion. The United Stated supported the recommendations on both
the Fuel Bank Proposal and the Fuel Reserve proposal. It noted its
own unilateral action to create a fuel reserve by downblending high
enriched uranium. The U.S. statement recognized the need for any
proposal to reflect the rights of suppliers to supply in conformity
with its laws and noted provisions in the Russian proposal
reflecting that.


18. (U) Canada later endorsed the recommended actions for all three
proposals, but also raised some issues it felt needed further
elaboration. It asked for a clearer estimate of resource
implications for the Agency and how these would be covered. It
noted that while one state had volunteered to host the fuel bank,
there was no process yet identified to address this question.
Canada also felt that the eligibility criteria and the type of
safeguards agreement required were neither clear nor consistent with
respect to the Russian and Agency proposals. It also pointed out
the need to clarify what other nonproliferation obligations might
attach to the LEU and that the liability requirements differed
between the proposals.


19. (U) Switzerland took note of all three proposals and articulated
aspects that it found attractive in each. It expressed satisfaction
that none questioned the rights of States, and said that the
mechanisms should deal with disruptions to the supply of the initial
core, as well as to reload fuel. Switzerland also expressed concern
that supply of LEU was not enough if a country could not fabricate
the fuel. Switzerland also wanted the DG to provide more
information on the consequences on the human and financial resources
of the Agency.


20. (U) Japan supported the recommended actions on all three
proposals. It also raised some points it thought should be
clarified. With respect to the Fuel bank, Japan identified legal
and financial conditions and liability as areas that required a
careful look. It also thought particularly important the questions
of which country would host the bank, how it would be managed, and
the scope of the host's and Agency's legal and financial
responsibilities. Japan regarded the Russian proposal to be the
most mature and, since it is based on existing facilities and LEU
reserves, a good basis for constructive discussions at Board
meetings to determine how the mechanism would work and to identify
the issues to be further addresses and clarified. Japan also took
note of its own proposal "IAEA Standby Arrangements System for the
Assurance of Nuclear Fuel Supply" and promised to further elaborate
it based on discussions held at the Board meeting, with feedback to
the Board in due course.


21. (U) In another strongly supportive statement, the UK noted the
complementarity of the three proposals before the Board. It took
note of the March 2009 London conference on the International
Nuclear Fuel Cycle as a valuable forum for discussion of fuel
assurances. It also recalled its own Nuclear Fuel Assurance
(formerly known as the Enrichment Bond) and confirmed the UK
intention to bring forward proposals for consideration by the Board
at its next meeting.

--------------
The G-77 Speaks: Parts are
More than the Whole
--------------


22. (U) Thirteen G-77 Board members gave national statements in
addition to associating themselves with the G-77 Statement. Most
expressed at least some support for continuing work. Only Uruguay's
statement reaffirming the right of countries to use nuclear energy
in compliance with the provisions of the NPT had nothing to add.


23. (U) Egypt thanked the DG for his ideas and indicated that they
would contribute to rapprochement within the Board. He noted that
the DGs explanation confirmed the need for earlier consultations
(which Egypt had previously opposed). Egypt's major concern is that
only the Russian proposal makes the NPT a criteria of supply. This
devalues the NPT. Egypt believes that proposals to provide fuel to
non-NPT parties violated the resolutions of the 1995 NPT Review
Conference. IN a back and forth with the Board Chair, Russia then
clarified that it did not consider NPT a condition of supply under
its proposal leading the Egyptian Ambassador to remark that in that
case Egypt disagrees with Russia also. (COMMENT: The Russian
proposal does not actually say that NPT adherence is a supply
criteria. Russia believes that its criteria, an agreement between a
non-nuclear-weapon State and the IAEA requiring safeguards on all
peaceful nuclear activities, would allow supply to India, although
India was not reassured. However, what is clear is that the Russian
proposal would not allow supply to Israel (or Pakistan) which is its
most important consideration. END COMMENT)


24. (U) Malaysia stated that it was ready to engage in discussions
of proposals for nuclear fuel assurances with a view to addressing
the technical, legal, financial and political aspects of the issue.
It noted that none of the proposals offered the transfer of fuel
cycle technology and stated that it would welcome proposals that
did.


25. (U) The major Brazilian concern was the ability to achieve a
credible mechanism for assurance of supply of nuclear fuel without
interfering with the international market. Brazil had inquired
about situations when a State would actually benefit from these fuel
banks/reserves. It made sense to have a reserve that a country
could draw from if there was a fire or the supplier went bankrupt.
But Brazil said it was told (it was not stated by whom) that the
assurances would not apply here. Supply could only take place where
the cutoff was for political conditions, and then only if other
suppliers were unable to supply. It seemed that the only way for a
country to benefit from the reserve was to behave in such a way as
to cause all suppliers to adopt formal or informal sanctions against
it. And if the country lacks its own fuel fabrication plant, the
LEU it gets will be of no avail. The argument that fuel assurances
enhanced nonproliferation by discouraging the development of an
enrichment capability was not relevant if a country could not
benefit from the assurance. He also noted that there had not been a
single case of diversion from a safeguarded enrichment facility.
While Brazil was willing to be constructive, a mechanism to benefit
states without interfering with the market was needed.


26. (U) Mexico expressed direct support for fuel assurance
activities and considered the three proposals complementary. Mexico
believed that the proposals made allowance for points it considered
important - universal participation, ensure access under
nonproliferation standards, not hampering research and development -
but that there were still questions and it looked forward to more
discussions. It felt that it was important for the IAEA to be
involved in proposals.


27. (U) The Philippines started by associating itself with the G-77
and NAM statement, but then proceeded with a strongly supportive
statement with a number of substantive issues it thought needed to
be addressed. It explicitly stated its support for a multilateral
approach to the nuclear fuel cycle with the IAEA having a central
role. It stated the view that the DGs proposal was a step in this
direction and that the Russian proposal complemented it. It
explicitly supported further consultations to help clarify issues.
It noted that "the points raised today should be taken into account
in the detailed proposal that the Director General will prepare"
which was an explicit recognition that the process was moving
forward. It identified a number of areas for further work:
long-term financing for the Fuel Bank that reflects its voluntary
and optional nature and ensures economic sustainability and
commercial competitiveness; triggering conditions; the undertakings
of States that would participate; process and modalities of
selection of a host state, the form and content of legal
instruments; any needed institutional arrangements at the State and
international levels; and ways of securing the physical security of
multilateral facilities. It also wished to ensure that the
resulting mechanism should lead to equal access to fuel and not lead
to monopolistic control by a State or group of States over nuclear
fuel supply.


28. (U) In its national statement, Argentina indicated that it
rejected the notion that parts of the fuel cycle were sensitive,
that it should be possible for a country to be both a supplier and
recipient and that it questioned the term "current market prices."
In looking at the DGs proposal, it did not find sufficient clarity
on liability and responsibility for the fuel, safeguards, physical
protection, third party shipments, the rights of States, and the
role of the Board in authorizing supply. Argentina also had
questions about shipment standards and transit conditions for the
Russian proposal. On the German proposal, Argentina explicitly
stated that it did not share the view of the risk of proliferation.

It also stated that it was not clear how the company might establish
and maintain a buffer stock available to the DG to cover an
interruption of supply.


29. (U) Among the G-77 States, Cuba took a national position most
closely mirroring the group position. But in calling for a full
study of the costs and benefits of the proposals, it acknowledged
the superiority of the Russian proposal in accounting for all costs,
and it seemed to prefer the Russian proposal generally. Cuba also
wanted the proposals to promote fuel fabrication technology.


30. (U) Iraq thanked the DG for his proposal and explanations and
his efforts to find options. It felt the proposals met needs
without compromising rights. It stated that establishing fuel
assurance programs will help States hasten the development of
nuclear power programs with confidence that they can obtain fuel and
such assurances enhanced the NPT regime.


31. (U) In a surprisingly positive statement, South Africa thanked
the DG and Secretariat for its thought-provoking proposal and
welcomed the proposals of other States. It noted that credible
mechanisms for reliable supply of nuclear fuel should involve the
IAEA and welcomed further discussion. It welcomed the move away
from giving up rights and fully supported the statement by President
Obama (quoted by the U.S. delegation) on maintaining rights. South
Africa stated that States should have reliable supply at reasonable
cost and that the IAEA had the obligation to assist underdeveloped
states. South Africa acknowledged that the availability of supply
may convince States not to pursue enrichment but should not impose
unwarranted restrictions and must respect the rights of States.


32. (U) Ghana's statement almost repudiated the G-77 statement in
key respects. It never mentioned associating itself with that
statement, only expressed appreciation for the DGs clarifications.
It recognized fuel assurances as an alternative to expansion of
enrichment and reprocessing. It stated that it had no intention to
be involved in enrichment and reprocessing and found it useful to
have a fuel bank. Ghana observed that the proposals did not deal
with the return of spent fuel or the supply of uranium hexafluoride
to Member States to fabricate fuel (a confusing observation since
that is exactly what is supplied). Ghana stated that the proposals
could benefit from further discussion.

--------------
CHINA AND INDIA
--------------


33. (SBU) China and India were noteworthy in this discussion for
different, and opposite, reasons. China did not associate itself
with the statement of the G-77 and the NAM, which is highly unusual
and usually only occurs when it is protecting its political/nuclear
weapons State status. China encouraged the Board of Governors to
seriously discuss the issue of assurances of supply. It expressed
the hope that the establishment of the relevant mechanism will help
promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and effectively prevent
nuclear proliferation. It also took note of relevant concerns.
China stated its view that in establishing a fuel assurance
mechanism, it was necessary to appropriately deal with the
relationship between non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear
energy to make sure that it is handled equitably, free from
discrimination and respecting countries' rights to make their own
decisions in line with their own conditions. It expressed the hope
that by incorporating different views, the DG and the relevant
countries will submit better proposals in order for the Board to
seek a specific solution that can be universally accepted.
(COMMENT: Throughout the week, it was unclear just how China was
going to come down on this issue. While reaffirming its willingness
to enter into an open and constructive exchange of views, it also
seemed to be huddling frequently with G-77 and NAM members. U.S.
Delegations speculates, based on an examination of the Chinese
statement and the text of the G-77 statement, that the split between
them was due to China's willingness to accept that there was a
nonproliferation issue associated with sensitive technologies and
that fuel assurances, properly constructed, could be part of a
solution. END COMMENT)


34. (U) India, on the other hand, wanted to step back from any
specific proposals and discuss a more general "consensus on certain
basic principles and norms." It suggested that an understanding
might be reached that: recognized the inalienable right of all
Member States to develop all aspects of nuclear technology and that
nothing in any proposal would ever be construed as a restriction on
the sovereign right to develop and run national fuel cycle
capabilities; reaffirmed that all Member States with relevant fuel
cycle capabilities would have the right to participate in all
proposals as a supplier; and clarified that no elements would be
introduced that discriminated between Member States or brought in
extraneous conditions not in the Statute. It closed by reiterating
the need for a cautious approach.

--------------
Rule 50 - More Positive
than Negative
--------------


35. (U) Kazakhstan, in a long statement supporting both the DGs
proposal and the Russian proposal and calling the German proposal
"interesting and deserving attention" called attention to the
declaration of the Head of State of Kazakhstan that in case of an
establishment of an IAEA nuclear fuel bank, Kazakhstan could
consider hosting it on its territory. The Republic of Korea stated
that the time was ripe for a fuel bank and that it supported the
recommended action. It also expressed its hope for more discussion
of the back end of the fuel cycle. Norway expressed its support for
all recommended actions and noted its contribution to the Fuel Bank.
Jordan stated its commitment to launching a nuclear power program
and believed it was appropriate to engage in discussions on fuel
assurance proposals.


36. (U) Austria, while restating its own views against nuclear
power, also indicated its understanding of others' desire for it and
recognized the need to obtain nuclear fuel in an assured and
predictable manner. It recalled its own proposal entitled
"Multilateralisation of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Increasing
Transparency and Sustainable Security, which it proceeded to
describe. Key features include establishment of a new IAEA
information system that would provide a fully comprehensive picture
of the global nuclear industry, including each States capabilities,
activities, and national and trans-national transactions at each
stage of the fuel cycle; the IAEA gradually assuming the role of
virtual broker for all transactions involving nuclear materials and
fuel cycle services; and finally transformation existing fuel cycle
facilities into new forms of regional and multilateral ownership.


37. (U) Libya was less positive, noting that the DGs proposals
needed more clarification in a manner that is open and transparent
and that more discussion and further consultations were needed.
Libya also stated that assurance of supply was needed for supply of
nuclear items.


38. (U) Iran provided the most negative speech of the day. It
pointed out that the issue had been discussed for the last 30 years
but that there was still an absence of trust. It was of the view
that any multilateral proposal for fuel assurances will impinge on
states' rights. Iran felt it was premature to consider the subject
until the question of rights was answered. It also stated that any
criteria beyond the Statute was bound to fail, noting the failure of
the Committee on Assurance of Supply. Iran also supported the need
for any decision to be taken by the General Conference. Iran closed
by noting that any donations and financial assistance has
consequences, implying that those giving the money will want
something from the Agency in return.

--------------
CHAIR'S CONCLUSIONS
--------------


39. (SBU) The Chair proposed a lengthy summing up, ending with the
sense that the Board may continue with its consultations and
discussions on the proposals by the Director General and the Russian
Federation, and the Secretariat will assist in further elaborating a
conceptual framework that could form the basis for developing
detailed proposals that would adequately address the views and
concerns of Member States. The only placard raised was India, which
made multiple interventions. India said complained that the Chair
appeared to be approving the recommendation even though delegations
had said they were, "not in a position to approve." The Indian
Ambassador added that there must be more consultation before
proceeding, to which the Chair replied by re-reading the final
summary paragraph. India reiterated that the findings were "not in
accordance" with the sentiment India had observed. The Chair
acknowledged that member states had called for review of the
concept's political, legal, technical, financial, and strategic
implications, and that she thought the summary captured those
concerns well. India for a third time intervened to say they did
not, and that it "was not ready to proceed on the recommended
action," a sentiment which it thought many member states shared. The
Chair reiterated that her findings did not urge the Director General
to produce a detailed report on the concept. Rather, the findings
took note of issues the Secretariat must clarify. India protested
once more, and the Chair asked India to propose alternative
language, at which point, meeting with silence from India, the Chair
called on Argentina. Argentina noted that it did not want any
specific action taken on the proposals the Board considered, but
reiterated its openness to "all kinds of further proposals and
negotiations." The Chair repeated that the Chair's findings did not
require action on the assurance of supply proposals. Germany
intervened to note its dissatisfaction with the summary, which it
felt did not properly mention its MESP and had a lengthy exchange
with the chair which did not result in any change to the conclusion.
Iran intervened to note that the core issue of the summary's
concluding language was that it called for "discussion," not
"consultation," and that if the Chair replaced the former with the
latter in her summary, the problem would be solved. (Comment: The
clear intent of the Iranian intervention was that eliminating the
reference to discussions in the Board would keep the issue off the
agenda.) The Chair read the revised concluding language, replacing
discussions with "informal discussions." India relented. However,
the UK objected to this change stating that it had found the Board
debate very helpful and that it wanted discussions at the Board,
consultations outside the Board, and any other activity that works
to elaborate, clarify and address issues. Russia seconded the UK
proposal and the Chair assented, without further objection from the
room. (The full text of the Chair's Conclusion is at para 43.)

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


40. (SBU) Despite Iran's short-term success in spinning the press to
believe that the Board outcome was a defeat for the West, the
outcome was positive, met the U.S. objective of enabling further
development of the proposals, and laid the groundwork for long-term
adoption of one or more of them. Russian Ambassador Berdenekov,
who had been very worried early in the week, walked away satisfied
and appreciative of U.S. efforts. The G-77 has begun to engage on
the issue. And a number of G-77 countries were willing to go on
record in support of the concept. The round of demarches before the
Board had the desired effect and UNVIE appreciates this capital
level engagement. Specific issues were identified for further
discussion. This clearly validated the wisdom of bringing proposals
to the Board for discussion, even in the absence of definitive
action on those proposals. The Secretariat believes it has the
mandate it needs for continued work.


41. (SBU) But there is still a long road ahead. Final proposals or
resolving all issues before the September Board meeting, or even
this year, will be difficult, and the upcoming transition of the
Director General will complicate this as well. The supply criteria
issue remains critical, with Egypt demanding NPT adherence, India
and the Director General calling for "Statutory criteria" and others
seeking non-discrimination, but without articulating what form that
would take. As several states observed, it will probably be
necessary to think further about what situations involving supply
interruption the fuel bank/reserve proposals should address. The
combination of the failure of a supplier to be able to supply
according to a pre-existing contract, for whatever reason, and the
failure of the market to be able to step in to provide replacement
supply, for whatever reason, creates an absence of assurance that
may be entirely unrelated to the actions of the recipient State. Is
the Director General's reference to Iran being cut off from supply
after the Revolution and the seizure of the U.S. Embassy the real
"problem" we want to fix? Many of the other issues look difficult
as well, in particular the need to ensure not only the supply of
enriched uranium but the supply of fuel fabrication services.



42. (U) Nevertheless, having engaged the G-77 in identifying the
issues, we can now engage them selectively, including Argentina,
Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, the Philippines and South Africa in a
dialogue to address their concerns. India will need to be handled
separately, in the context of our civil-nuclear relationship. In
the end, many states are likely to agree with us on the supply
criteria - full scope safeguards, adequate physical protection,
liability protections - that are necessary for the fuel assurance
proposals to go forward. We should also begin consulting in more
detail on how our own fuel reserve (which will be bigger that the
Russian fuel reserve and the IAEA Fuel Bank combined) can be
deployed.


--------------
TEXT - Chairperson's
Conclusion
--------------

43. (U) Begin Text.

I have no more speakers on my list. All comments made and views
expressed will be reflected in the summary record of this meeting.
Therefore, I do not intend to sum up in detail.

Several members welcomed the initiative to create a LEU bank under
the auspices of the Agency which would serve as a last resort for
Member States in the event that their supplies were disrupted for
reasons not related to technical or commercial considerations. In
this regard, they expressed appreciation to the Director General and
the Secretariat for the proposal contained in document GOV/2009/30,
entitled "Proposal for the Establishment of an IAEA Low Enriched
Uranium (LEU) Bank" and welcomed the financial pledges towards this
project.

Several members took note of the offer by Kazakhstan to consider
hosting the IAEA LEU bank on its territory.

Several members expressed the view that there was a need for caution
when addressing the different aspects associated with the issue of
the assurances of nuclear fuel supply, and that any proposal in this
regard should be in full accordance with the Statute and take into
consideration the respective legal rights and obligations of Member
States and the principle of non-discrimination.

Several members emphasized that any proposal for the assurances of
supply should not discourage Member States from developing or
expanding their own nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and should not
hamper research, development and international cooperation in the
field of peaceful nuclear activities. They reiterated in this
regard the inalienable right of all States to develop all aspects of
nuclear science and technology for peaceful purposes.

Several members encouraged the Agency to continue pursuing the
proposals on fuel assurances and noted that the rights of Member
States with regard to the establishment or expansion of their own
nuclear fuel cycle capabilities would remain undiminished by the
establishment of multilateral fuel supply mechanisms which would
instead offer additional options for the supply of nuclear fuel.

Several members expressed the view that none of the proposals before
the Board provided a proper assurance of supply of nuclear fuel,
since it simply created a back up mechanism to provide LEU when the
supply of fuel is disrupted for political reasons but did not
provide assurances of fuel fabrication services.

Several members raised diverse technical, financial, political and
legal queries on issues such as the proposition that the development
of an enrichment capability posed a proliferation risk, the
reliability or credibility of the triggering mechanism, the
eligibility criteria, the supply of natural uranium as fuel, and the
financial implications of the proposals.

Several members expressed the view that any decision regarding the
implementation of the proposals should be taken by consensus by the
General Conference.
Several members expressed the view that the proposal as contained in
document GOV/2009/30 could not be a basis for a more detailed
proposal for an IAEA LEU bank to be brought forward for the Board's
consideration. They also expressed the view that it was premature to
authorize the Agency to accept any financial pledges directed to
finance the proposed LEU bank.

Several other members welcomed the proposal for an IAEA LEU bank and
encouraged the Secretariat to continue its work to develop an IAEA
LEU bank for assurance of supply and welcomed the financial pledges
made by some Member States for this purpose.

With regard to the proposal contained in document GOV/2009/31,
entitled "Russian Federation Initiative to Establish a Reserve of
Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) for the Supply of LEU to the IAEA for its
Member States", several members noted the Russian initiative to
establish a reserve of low enriched uranium for supply to the IAEA
Member States in Angarsk. They looked forward to hearing further
details from the Secretariat about the initiative in due course.

Several other members expressed the view that the proposal put
forward by the Russian Federation might entail less financial
burdens, as far as the Agency was concerned, than the proposal for
an IAEA LEU bank. However, they were of the view that the document
did not contain a comprehensive conceptual framework that could form
a basis for developing a draft model agreement that could be
approved by the Board.

With regard to the proposal of Germany, contained in document
GOV/2009/32, entitled "Establishing an Independent Access to Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Services: The Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project
(MESP)", several members expressed their readiness to further
consider the potential framework for pursuing the suggested
multilateral enrichment sanctuary. They looked forward to an
extensive and detailed discussion of the issue with a view to
promoting a multilateral LEU supply mechanism compatible with the
existing market and with the proposed IAEA and Russian LEU
reserves.

Several other members expressed the view that the Agency should not
administer a commercial company for the supply of nuclear fuel or
enrichment services.

The Board noted the Director General's comments on issues raised,
which will also be reflected in the summary records of our
discussion.

Based on the discussion, the sense that I get from listening to the
various speakers is that the Board may continue with its
consultations and discussions on the proposals by the Director
General and the Russian Federation and the Secretariat will assist
in further elaborating a conceptual framework that could form the
basis for developing detailed proposals that would adequately
address the views and concerns of Member States.

Is this summing-up acceptable?

It is so agreed.

End Text.

--------------
U.S. STATEMENT
--------------


42. (U) Begin Text.

Madam Chair,

As part of his Prague speech, President Obama called for the
creation of "a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation" so that
countries, and especially developing countries, can access peaceful
power without increasing the risks of proliferation. In support of
this new approach, our delegation has emphasized the desirability of
establishing a revived "Spirit of Vienna". We believe that the
establishment of one or more international fuel banks, under IAEA
auspices, will be an important element of this new framework.

Over the last few years, many proposals have been put forward to
establish fuel banks or other mechanisms to ensure reliable access
to reactor fuel. Such mechanisms would increase access to peaceful
nuclear energy, by providing States that are acquiring nuclear
energy with access to reactor fuel, as a backup to the international
market. These mechanisms could provide an alternative to expensive
enrichment and reprocessing technologies, which pose proliferation
risks. We believe that the time has come for an open discussion
within the Board, and among Member States more broadly, of
technical, legal and financial aspects of these proposals. We thank
the Group of 77 for identifying several issues for discussion in its
statement under this agenda item, and we look forward to engaging in
an intense and productive dialogue.

The papers prepared by the Secretariat on the Director General's
proposal for the establishment of an IAEA LEU bank and on the
Russian Federation's initiative to establish an LEU reserve for
supply to the IAEA each provide a sound basis for these discussions,
and we thank the Secretariat for the work that went into preparing
them. We support the proposal that the Board request the Director
General to submit detailed proposals for the Board's subsequent
consideration. We would advocate efforts to bring draft texts of the
agreements called for by these papers to the Board by September.

I would note that the United States has already taken practical
measures to make reliable access to nuclear fuel a reality. Our
Congress authorized almost $50 million to help match the Nuclear
Threat Initiative's challenge grant to create a
nuclear fuel reserve for the IAEA. We also welcome pledged
contributions from the European Union, Kuwait, Norway and the United
Arab Emirates. In March, 2008, the United States started
down-blending 17.4 metric tons of highly enriched uranium for a
nuclear fuel reserve in the United States. This work should be
completed by 2010.

During discussion of the various proposals before the Board, we
should keep in mind that the purpose of these proposals is to
expand, not to restrict, access to the peaceful use of nuclear
energy. President Obama declared in Prague that no approach to
nonproliferation "will succeed if it is based on the denial of
rights to nations that play by the rules," He also reaffirmed that
access to peaceful nuclear power "must be the right of every nation
that renounces nuclear weapons, especially developing countries."
The discussion papers on the Director General's proposal and the
Russian proposal both clearly explain that the rights of Member
States, including establishing or expanding their own production
capacity in the nuclear fuel cycle, would remain intact and not be
contravened, infringed, or diminished by these proposals.

Of course the rights and obligations of Member States donating LEU
to a fuel bank must also be respected. In this regard we note that
Article IX C of the Statute contemplates that a Member State's
donation of nuclear material to the Agency will be "in conformity
with its laws." We also note that the Secretariat's paper on the
Russian proposal appears to include provisions aimed at compliance
with the laws of the Russian Federation on export of nuclear
material.

In 2006, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nongovernmental
organization, offered the Agency $50 million to establish a fuel
bank under IAEA auspices, on the condition that $100 million be
raised from other donors, and that the Board adopt a mechanism for
administering the fuel bank. The first of these conditions has been
met, and the Secretariat's paper on the Director General's proposal
for the establishment of an IAEA LEU bank is an important step
towards meeting the second. Approval by the Board of a model
agreement and other details would meet the second condition for the
Nuclear Threat Initiative's grant. In developing the agreement text
and other details for consideration by the Board, we look forward to
consultations among the donors to the Nuclear Threat Initiative
challenge, among other Board members, other suppliers, and potential
beneficiary states. We believe such consultations, among Member
States and with the Secretariat, to be essential and that they need
to be undertaken at an early date for the Board to ultimately take
action.

Madam Chair,

In keeping with the Board's authority under Article XI of the
Statute, these proposals deserve the Board's continued active
consideration, informed by expert views from the Secretariat and all
Member States that wish to contribute to our deliberations.

We are very close to success in establishing two mechanisms that
will help to realize the full economic potential and environmental
contribution of peaceful nuclear energy. We look forward to working
with the Secretariat and Member States in developing, in particular,
the Director General's detailed proposal for an LEU reserve for the
Board's approval.

Thank you.

END TEXT

PYATT