ASSESSING UNODC'S ANTONIO COSTA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 UNVIE VIENNA 000296

WHITE HOUSE FOR ONDCP DIRECTOR KERLIKOWSKE

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL SNAR KCRM UN AF PK
SUBJECT: ASSESSING UNODC'S ANTONIO COSTA

REF: STATE 057099

UNVIE VIEN 00000296 001.3 OF 003


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SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Antonio Costa, Executive Director of the UN
Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC),is scheduled to roll out UNODC's
annual World Drug Report with the Director of the White House Office
of National Drug Control Policy, Gil Kerlikowske on June 24. Costa
is an ambitious and energetic leader of the UNODC who should be
commended for making the UNODC more politically relevant and
operationally effective. Further, he is a strong partner in USG
efforts to combat narco-trafficking in Afghanistan and breaking the
heroin-insurgency link. However, his record as a manager is mixed.
He often fails to consult with member states before launching new
policy or program initiatives. UNODC staff complain privately that
he is largely absent as a manager, but autocratic and micro-managing
when he does get involved. Finally, member states and UNODC
officials all agree that his propensity for dramatic and provocative
public statements does little to advance UNODC's substantive issues.
For the June 24 roll-out, it is entirely possible that Costa's
Public Relations handler could give the event more glitz than
substance. END SUMMARY.

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World Drug Report
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2. (SBU) Every year since 2004, UNODC has released the World Drug
Report, a statistical and analytical study of the production,
trafficking and consumption of controlled substances. Costa is
understandably proud of this document, calling it the most
recognizable "brand" of the UNODC and the "gold standard" of
reporting on drugs. While member states do not always agree with
the conclusions found in the report, USG considers the document a
worthwhile exercise, especially in tracking consumption trends.
(Note: Most recently, EU Member States did not agree with the 2008
Report's assertion that the global drug problem had largely been
contained. End Note.)

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Strategic Visions for
Afghanistan Counternarcotics
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3. (SBU) Costa is a strong USG ally on the issue of
counter-narcotics in Afghanistan. He was an early advocate of food
assistance and visible development assistance to farmers. He has
long argued for the need to break the link between narcotics and
insurgency, calling for ISAF action to destroy trafficking routes
and markets, now a component of our AFPAK strategy. And, like the
USG, he sees Afghan drugs as a regional problem that must be solved
regionally. UNODC adopted this regional approach several years ago,
as evident in its Rainbow Strategy, the Paris Pact initiative
(50-plus partners),and the Triangular Initiative (Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Iran). UNODC recently sent a mission to Pakistan to
identify its needs and to determine how UNODC could better
contribute to solving the regional drug problem in Pakistan. Tasked
by G-8 chair Italy, UNODC will present a paper on a regional
strategy at the June 26 G-8 Ministerial on Afghanistan. Cognizant
that UNODC is uniquely positioned to advance a potential
counter-narcotics dialogue between Iran and the U.S., Costa and his
staff have been diligent in briefing the Mission on its activities
in and on Iran, although that country is still the weakest leg of
the UNODC's regional approach.

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High Marks for Political
and Financial Savvy
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4. (SBU) Costa is an energetic and charismatic leader who deserves
much credit for making UNODC a more relevant agency in the
counter-narcotics field. Arriving in 2002, Costa found a UNODC
beset with problems related to financial and governance
mismanagement, political irrelevancy and largely unfocused mandates.
Seven years later, Costa has transformed UNODC into a dynamic
technical assistance operation that is increasingly recognized
across the USG as an important player on the counter-narcotics
scene-especially in the area of demand reduction and Afghanistan
opium. As a testament to his leadership, voluntary contributions to
UNODC have increased four fold in the past seven years from

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approximately USD 60 million in 2001 to over USD 260 million in

2008. (Note. USG contributed over USD 27 million in 2008. End
note.) UNCAC TOC

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Low Marks for Management
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5. (SBU) However, Costa gets a very mixed review for his management
of UNODC in recent years. Because overhead funds have not kept pace
with program contributions UNODC is currently experiencing a
financial crisis that threatens its ability to continue
implementation of its various mandates. The financial crisis is
also affecting internal UNODC hiring and human resource decisions.
Nearly two dozen Vienna and field-based jobs, have been or will be
cut in the months ahead to make ends meet. Nevertheless, many UNODC
interlocutors have privately complained to Missionoff that Costa is
largely an absent manager on these issues, focusing instead on
travel around the world and on attempting to launch high-profile
initiatives. These interlocutors--many of whom are quite
senior--point to the fact that it took Costa over four months to
brief member states on the crisis as evidence of his disengagement.



6. (SBU) Member states have been unhappy with Costa's persistent
efforts to expand UNODC's mandates, to make policies on his own
rather than to execute member states' policies. This habit was
exemplified by his attempts in 2008 to launch two splashy
initiatives (UN.ARMS on firearms and UN.GRACE on anti-corruption),
which failed because of strenuous member state objection. Costa has
also openly criticized member state and UNODC work to implement the
two prominent global anti-crime conventions - the UN Convention
Against Corruption and the UN Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime -- whereas the U.S. and many other member states
view this work as the cornerstone of the UN's anticrime activities.
Officials within UNODC also find themselves disagreeing with Costa
on issues related to policy and priorities. For example, while
Costa continues to push for the adoption of a Global Plan of Action
to Combat Human Trafficking, his own anti-human trafficking office
is against it. Similarly, Costa's repeated calls for a cybercrime
convention conflict with the private statements of his experts on
the issue, who lament that they "can't control the man." (Note:
USG disagrees with Costa on both issues. End note.) And when Costa
does become involved in an issue, he tends to be very autocratic.


7. (SBU) Costa's energy and enthusiasm often compels him to act in
ways contrary to member states' positions. Many delegations
complain that he forgets that the UNODC is driven by policy
directions from the member states through decisions in the
Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) and the Commission on Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ). Some delegations attribute
this to the fact that he has been the Executive Director for too
long, while others ascribe it to his personality and outlook. For
example, Costa recently wrote an op-ed for the New York Times where
he encouraged the United States to accede to and implement the
Firearms Protocol of UNODC's Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime. UNVIE asked Costa to correct some legal and
factual mistakes found in the draft which he sent to the mission for
comments. We also reminded Costa that he worked for member states,
not the other way around. However, Costa responded that he was "the
conscience of member states" and therefore felt obliged to speak
out, even if his position did not represent member states'consensus.
Mission shares many of these concerns, and continues urging Costa
towards greater prudence.

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No Stranger to the Camera
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8. (SBU) Costa loves publicity. And he loves sound-bites, the more
dramatic the better. Often, however, he is more interested in drama
than in the soundness or consequences of his statements. For
example, in attempting to push for a cybercrime convention, Costa
referred to the internet as a "weapon of mass destruction." When
discussing the changing dynamics of human trafficking, he stated
that "women are the new pimps." His comment to journalist
advocating that we flood Afghanistan with heroin in order to force a
collapse in opium prices and a fall in poppy production was sound
economics but awful policy. He described the extremely divisive
issue of "harm reduction" as a "tempest in a teapot." Such
statements, made with little or no warning to member states, or even
to his own staff (and sometimes not even to his own speechwriter),
certainly serve to provoke reaction, but does not help to advance

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substantive dialogue or decisions. Based on this pattern, we fear
that for the June 24 rollout of the World Drug Report, Costa's PR
handler could well give the event more glitz than substance.


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Looking to Extend His Term
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9. (SBU) Costa's term at UNODC is scheduled to expire in May 2010
but he is privately lobbying member states and the UN Secretary
General (SYG) for an extension to the end of 2011. While he
privately told a senior USG official that the decision to extend his
term is solely in the hands of the SYG, he has taken advantage of
Italy-sponsored international meetings in the last few months to
campaign for his extension. Gianfranco Fini, president of Italy's
Chamber of Deputies (lower house of Parliament),and formerly Deputy
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, is considered to be Costa's
political godfather, and undoubtedly instrumental in Costa's
appointment to the UNODC in 2002. However, Italian influence in
UNODC, previously without parallel (an Italian has held Costa's
position since the mid-1980's),is waning due to cuts in its
international development assistance funds, including an 80 percent
cut in contributions to UNODC. We have also heard speculation within
UNODC that the SYG may want to shake up national monopolies of
senior UN positions. As a matter of general policy on term limits
for senior UN officials, the U.S. does not support an extension of
Costa's term (Reftel). The UK shares our view for the same reasons.
However, the recently departed French Ambassador advocated support
("lest we get someone worse"),and the Italian Mission in Vienna
said Italy would definitely back Costa.

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Comment
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10. (SBU) Costa is a friend of the United States, and has partnered
well with us on our highest priorities in Afghanistan. However, his
energies do need to be channeled carefully. His June 24 visit to
Washington is another opportunity to do so. End Comment.


PYATT