IAEA/SYRIA/BOARD OF GOVERNORS: CONCERN OVER NEW

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000289

NOFORN
SIPDIS

ISN/RA FOR NEPHEW AND DANIEL, IO/T FOR GOLDSTEIN, NEA FOR
MONZ, DAMASCUS FOR POUNDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2034
TAGS: PREL PARM SY KN IAEA KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA/BOARD OF GOVERNORS: CONCERN OVER NEW
URANIUM FINDINGS, HEIGHTENED ATTACKS ON ISRAEL, ISRAEL
VERSUS DG FIREWORKS

REF: UNVIE 00266

Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION GEOFFREY PYATT FOR REASONS 1.4 (
B) AND (D)

--------------
Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (C) Summary: The June Board debate on Syria unfolded along
largely familiar lines with many Board members calling on
Damascus to cooperate with the Agency,s requests, while NAM
and Arab delegations continued to focus on Israel,s
misdeeds, rather than the need for Syrian cooperation. The
debate did little to advance the issue, but was punctuated by
a fiery exchange between Israel and Director General
ElBaradei that detracted from our effort to improve Board
dynamics.


2. (SBU) The NAM &welcomed8 Syrian adherence to legal
obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement
(CSA) while ignoring or downplaying findings of anthropogenic
(man-made) uranium. By contrast, the new uranium findings at
the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) concerned many
like-minded countries. The NAM/Arabs argued the MNSR
findings were a matter for routine safeguards that should not
be connected to the investigation to the Dair Alzour (also
known as Al-Kibar) site. Russia for the first time expressed
concern about the uranium findings, noted they require
explanation, and called for a dispassionate investigation.
Taking its cues from the NAM, Syria focused on Israel and
dismissed uranium findings at the MNSR, noting that the
facility is for university experiments and is fully under
safeguards; for the first time, Syrian Atomic Energy
Commission head Othman explicitly denied Syrian cooperation
with the DPRK in the nuclear field. Iran also spoke in
Syria,s defense under Rule 50, and again requested a General
Conference agenda item on the destruction of the Dair Alzour
facility (Note: A formal written request is required to
submit an agenda item, so Iran's call alone has no practical
effect. End Note.) In all, 21 Statements were delivered
under the Syria Verification Agenda Item, including on behalf
of the European Union and the Non Aligned Movement (read by
Egypt instead of current NAM Chair Cuba),representing 31 of
35 Board members. The only Board members not to speak on
Syria were Brazil, China, Mexico, and Uruguay. Six states
spoke under Rule 50, the Republic of Korea, Israel, Libya,
Indonesia, Iran, and Syria. The Board remains deeply
polarized on the Syrian case, even more so than on Iran. For
example, Saudi Arabia,s public silence on the Iran agenda
item is in stark contrast to its defense of Syria. Mexico,s
potent statement on Iran also offers contrasts with its
silence on Syria.

3. (SBU) The Director General,s appeal, at the end of the
Iran agenda item (septel),for transparency and cooperation
beyond the narrow purview of legal authorities, fell on deaf
NAM and Syrian ears. ElBaradei had called for implementation
of the Additional Protocol (AP) and directly admonished Syria
by saying that &if you want to prove allegations are not
accurate, the best thing to do is to be transparent.8 This
helpful intervention was subsequently overshadowed when
Israel took the floor under the Syrian item to levy an
impassioned admonition to both Syria and the Director
General, whom it openly accused of political bias. Israel
also called upon the DG to take measures the IAEA had
&refrained8 from taking, a thinly veiled reference to a
Special Inspection. The DG, at the conclusion of the Syria
agenda item, excoriated Israel in turn for violating
international law and &preaching8 at the IAEA while
insulting the investigative process with its unresponsiveness
and, noting that he had not shared certain correspondence
received from Israel because he wanted to spare the Board
such &gutter8 talk.


4. (C) Comment: Israel,s statement, which Israeli
Ambassador Michaeli delivered under instructions (Michaeli
shared with Mission his personal reservations about the tack
Israel was taking) largely backfired and distracted from the
focus on Syria's obligations and from the direct approach the
DG had taken earlier to telling Iran it needed to start
cooperating with the IAEA. Even friendly Board members,
while not endorsing ElBaradei,s views, believed the DG's
response should have been expected and that Israel should
have known better. Many questioned whether we had counseled
Israel against this course (which we had). Mission will


monitor closely whether this puerile exchange has any
negative impact on the scope and pace at which ElBaradei is
willing to let his staff press the investigation in Syria,
specifically in regard to any possible consideration of the
special inspection option. End Summary and Comment.

--------------
Syria Should Cooperate
--------------


5. (SBU) The majority of Board members called for Syria to
cooperate with the Agency as requested by the Director
General in his latest report on implementation of Safeguards
in Syria (GOV/2009/36, ref A). Among those focusing on Syrian
cooperation were the EU, Canada, Russia (Syria should show
cooperativeness),Australia, Turkey, New Zealand, Switzerland
(Syria should cooperate totally with the IAEA),Japan,
Argentina, India (called on &all concerned8 parties to
cooperate),and Ghana. Under Rule 50, the Republic of Korea
requested Syria,s full cooperation and Indonesia said the
Agency needs cooperation from all parties concerned. The EU,
Turkey, Argentina, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, ROK
also joined the U.S. in requesting Syria provide the
additional information, documentation, and access to Dair
Alzour, other sites, and the debris as requested by the
Agency. The like-minded continued to highlight concerns.
The EU expressed deep concern that the information provided
by Syria does not adequately support its assertions about the
nature of the Dair Alzour site and does not allow the Agency
to determine the nature of the facility and complete its
assessment. Canada remained deeply concerned about
revelations of undeclared nuclear activities in Syria and
connections with DPRK, and recalled the Agency,s assessment
that the features of the building were not inconsistent with
a nuclear reactor. Australia argued that until Syria
cooperates, the Board cannot be sure of the nature of its
nuclear program. New Zealand regretted that the Agency can
report no progress in the investigation since the previous
meeting of the Board. Japan regretted Syria,s partial
responses to the Agency. ROK also expressed concern about
the inadequate information provided by Syria. The EU,
Australia, and Japan joined us in calling on Syria to sign
and implement the Additional Protocol.


6. (SBU) By contrast, NAM and Arab Board members &welcomed8
ongoing Syrian cooperation to date and argued that
cooperation should not exceed legal obligations under its
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). The NAM statement
read by Egypt rather than NAM Chair Cuba made this point
while noting that information provided by Syria was still
being assessed. South Africa was also among those
&commending8 and encouraging &continued8 cooperation by
Syria. Malaysia called for Syria to continue to show
flexibility and transparency in cooperating with the Agency,
but noted that Syria is &only obliged to comply within its
comprehensive safeguards agreement,8 and &all other
measures are purely voluntary.8 Egypt, in its national
capacity, cautioned that the lines are becoming blurred
between what is a legal obligation and what goes beyond, and
that this line should be made clear. Cuba rejected calls on
Syria to go beyond its obligations, saying it sets a bad
precedent. Algeria and then Libya under Rule 50 encouraged
Syria to cooperate with the Agency pursuant to its CSA
obligations. Libya also &commended8 Syria for its
cooperation to date. Among the NAM, Ghana,s national
statement was notable in encouraging Syrian cooperation and
citing partial and unresponsive answers to the IAEA,s
queries.

--------------
Uranium Findings at Two Syrian Sites
--------------


7. (SBU) Other Board members, largely from among the
like-minded, continued to seek clarification from Syria on
the origin of the anthropogenic uranium found at Dair Alzour
and expressed concern over new findings of anthropogenic
uranium at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR)
facility in Damascus. The EU called into question the
completeness and correctness of Syria,s declaration under
its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) given the
findings of uranium of a type not in Syria,s declared
inventory of nuclear material. The EU and Canada recalled
the Agency,s assessment that there was a low probability
that the uranium particles were introduced by the missiles


used to destroy the building. Canada noted that the findings
of uranium at both sites &further reinforce the immediate
and essential need for Syria to cooperate fully and with
transparency.8 Japan expressed disappointment that little
progress had been made since March with respect to the
uranium findings at Dair Alzour. In addition to the usual
like-minded concerns, Turkey said the uranium findings at the
MNSR need to be better understood within the &totality of
the dossier.8 Argentina sought &a precise comprehension
with regards to the presence of uranium particles at the Dair
Alzour site.8 The ROK also said the findings need to be
understood.


8. (SBU) NAM countries largely downplayed the uranium
findings at Dair Alzour and the MNSR, either by ignoring the
issue in their statements or by disassociating the MNSR
samples from the Dair Alzour investigation. Egypt, on behalf
of the NAM, argued that the MNSR samples were part of routine
safeguards implementation and not connected to the
&alleged8 nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour. Cuba maintained
that there was an &exaggerated connotation8 to the uranium
particles, which should be clarified as part of the Agency,s
routine process, and dismissed speculation connecting uranium
findings at Dair Alzour and the MNSR as groundless. Fellow
NAM troika member Malaysia only mentioned the uranium
particles in the context of its call on Israel to cooperate
with the Agency. Alone among the NAM, Saudi Arabia obliquely
referred to the uranium samples by noting that that the
Agency will continue to deal with samples and information so
the Syria issue could be brought to a conclusion.

--------------
Russian Statement
--------------


9. (SBU) Russia delivered a more balanced statement than in
pervious Boards that for the first time expressed concern
that the uranium findings still require an explanation and
supported a dispassionate investigation by the IAEA.
However, Russia was also careful to stipulate that the
finding of uranium particles is not in itself proof that the
destroyed facility had a nuclear purpose. Russia both
supported the Director General,s appeal for Syria to show
cooperativeness and noted the DG,s request to Israel to
share with the Agency the information that led to the use of
force against the Syrian facility &without giving the Agency
an opportunity to verify the facility before it was
destroyed.8 Russia also sought an explanation of the
serious delay (i.e. by the U.S.) in informing the IAEA after
the fact. (Comment: Although Russia continues to express
reservations about the Syrian dossier, it seems increasingly
swayed by the factual evidence. End Comment.) China, which
has spoken on Syria at the last two Boards, did not deliver
an intervention.

--------------
NAM/Arabs Blame Israel
--------------


10. (SBU) Further illustrating the polarized environment on
this issue in the Board, NAM/Arab interventions focused
almost entirely on Israel,s &aggression8 against Syria
(sic) while giving credence to Syria,s explanation that the
destroyed facility was a military installation. The NAM
statement, as well as individual NAM members (Malaysia,
Egypt, Ecuador, Cuba, and Algeria, as well as Libya,
Indonesia, Iran, and Syria under Rule 50) decried Israel,s
unilateral use of force as a flagrant violation of the UN
Charter. All the Arab delegations and several NAM complained
of double standards with respect to Israel. Malaysia further
observed that no other Member State besides the NAM has
condemned Israel, which Cuba attributed to political
motivations on the part of those turning a deaf ear to
&Israeli aggression.8 Cuba added that the IAEA was the
&victim8 as the destruction of the facility prevented
verification. Iran, under Rule 50, again proposed as it did
in March, adding to the 2009 General Conference agenda an
item on &Consequences of Israel,s military attacks on
Member States to Global Security.8 (Note: Putting this on
the IAEA GC agenda would be an admission that the site was
indeed nuclear-related. In any case, despite Iran,s
bluster, the Secretariat has not received a written request,
required for an agenda item. End Note.) In addition to Middle
East NPT issues, Algeria also referenced progress on broader
disarmament with respect to the CD, CTBT and FMCT in its


statement.


11. (SBU) Several NAM also focused on information sharing.
Egypt further observed that the manner in which the
information was brought to the IAEA is not acceptable and
that it reflects a &deep lack of confidence of the IAEA by
some member states.8 South Africa did not focus on
Israel,s destruction of the facility but supported the DG,s
call for Israeli cooperation as well as for expeditious
sharing of information with the Agency. Ghana and India
associated themselves with the NAM statement, but did not in
a national capacity repeat the criticism of Israel. India
hoped &all8 concerned would respond to the DG,s request.

--------------
Report Not Released
--------------


12. (SBU) The Syria report was not released due to lack of
consensus. Canada,s request that the report be made public,
was seconded by the U.S., Australia and New Zealand. Egypt
objected to the release the Syria report, adding that calls
to do so were politically motivated and in no way furthered
the Agency,s technical mandate. Cuba, India, and Saudi
Arabia also spoke against the release of the report. Iraq
noted that nothing should be published unless authorized
exclusively the Board. (Note: Later in the Board meeting
(septel) the NAM put forward a position that the general
policy of de-restricting Board documents should be predicated
on the consent of the state concerned, i.e. giving states
such as Syria effective veto power over releasing reports.)


13. (SBU) The EU, New Zealand, Japan, and South Africa looked
forward to the DG,s report on Syria at the September Board.

-------------- -
Syria Blames Israel, Downplays Uranium Finding
-------------- -


14. (SBU) Syrian Atomic Energy Chair Ibrahim Othman delivered
the Syria statement as the last speaker under Rule 50.
Othman began by thanking NAM states and friendly countries
for their understanding and support for Syria,s position.
He emphasized that Syria has consistently cooperated with the
Agency and is still cooperating in all areas, &particularly
in the issue at hand.8 Othman noted that on May 12, May 17,
and May 24, 2009, Syria sent written letters providing
replies to all Agency questions, even though the Director
General,s report describes some replies as partial and
repetitive. However, Syria has clarified all replies in
keeping with its obligations under its CSA.


15. (SBU) In a Freudian slip, Othman affirmed that &Israel
has attacked a Syrian nuclear facility,8 and added that
Syria exercised restraint in order to avoid escalation in one
of the most volatile regions in the world. Othman complained
that instead of appreciating Syria, the IAEA asked Syria to
disclose information Syria did not have. He noted that the
Agency inspectors have visually looked at facility at Dair
Alzour, and verified it is a military facility, yet there are
still questions on the nature of the facility. Othman,s
repeated that the facility was military and not related to
nuclear activity. (Comment: Othman,s response
misrepresented the fact that the Agency is seeking the nature
of the facility that was destroyed, not the current facility.
End Comment.)


16. (SBU) Othman stressed that Syria is in a state of war
with Israel, calling Israel an aggressor and occupier of its
territory. He asked &How then are we asked to give info on
our military installations?8 &Why does the international
community not require Israel to produce a list of bombs it
possesses?8 &Why did Israel not allow environmental
sampling of warheads where they are stored to ensure there is
no uranium there?8 He focused on Israel,s non-NPT status
and called on Board members to condemn Israel,s actions
before questioning Syria on issues related to national
security. Othman also noted Israel,s &surprising8 request
to delete sentences referring to its destruction of the Dair
Alzour facility in various reports.


17. (SBU) Othman continued to dismiss IAEA findings of
uranium particles. He noted that the reporting of uranium
found not being of a type included in Syria,s declared
inventory of nuclear material &is grossly unfair and


unjust8 towards Syria. He explained that the Agency found
just a few natural uranium particles that were chemically
processed, and queried whether any state had ever been asked
to include in its inventory contaminated material? Analyses
of environmental samples do not clarify the uranium came from
a reactor, he noted adding that if the reactor was only a few
months away from becoming operational then uranium particles
should be everywhere. Othman further asked if a reactor of
&that kind8 does not need a whole list of material and
equipment, and not just a water pump? He claimed that Syria
has answered all queries and inspectors have observed the
pump feeding, as well as the location and the final
destination of the water in the nearby villages. Despite
this, the IAEA still asked for more clarifications.


18. (SBU) Othman objected to the DG report,s inclusion of
the natural uranium finding in the hot cells at the MNSR
facility and said the linkage to Dair Alzour is unjustified.
He noted that hot cells are close to the neutron source
(MNSR),which has been under the control and inspection of
the IAEA; that the capacity of the MNSR is less than 30
kilowatts-thermal, and that the neutron flow is extremely
limited. He added that the core is also sealed which means
Syria cannot handle its fuel, and &cannot carry out any
irradiation experiments in that core to obtain a high neutron
flow.8 He further specified that the hot cells are made of
lead and are 10 cm thick, and use tongs rather than
manipulators. Othman noted that all Syria can do in this
reactor is a series of basic experiments for university
students in nuclear activation analysis (NAA). Syria is
utilizing this reactor &well8 in such analysis, and that
the reference materials, like most reference materials,
contain uranium. He explained that &concentrations were
higher8 in 2008 than in previous years because Syria seldom
used the hot cells until recently when a number of graduate
students carried out NAA at the facility. Othman said the
Agency had been notified of this work. Othman noted that the
Agency,s periodic inspection (the annual Physical Inventory
Verification) will soon take place. Syria will extend the
Agency all the cooperation needed.


19. (SBU) Othman addressed the issue of North Korea for the
first time at a Board meeting, noting that it was
unacceptable to question linkages to the DPRK in allegations
about Dair Alzour. Syria is an independent country and it
establishes its relations according to its national interests
that should not be questioned. Othman stressed that there
are no activities by any Korean company in Syria in the
nuclear field and that Syria has neither requested nor
established any cooperation with any Korean company in the
regard. Also, Othman noted there is no scientific
cooperation between Syrian and DPRK scientists.


20. (SBU) Othman concluded that Syria has provided all
information available and stressed that it will continue to
cooperate with the Agency to close the file as soon as
possible, although this would not be at the expense of
Syria,s national security. He closed by calling for
establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle
East.

--------------
Israel Accuses DG of Bias on Syria
--------------


21. (SBU) As presaged in his short interventions under the
Annual Report and SIR agenda items, Israeli Ambassador
Michaeli delivered an emotional statement under the Syria
agenda item objecting to references to Israel in the DG,s
report and directly accusing the Director General of bias.
After expressing appreciation for the Secretariat,s work,
Israel,s statement began by deploring Syrian efforts to
hamper the investigation, conceal the facts and cover up
clandestine activities. Israel also noted that cooperation
by the DPRK was not explicitly called for in the report.
Syria,s friends all but admitted the Dair Alzour was a
nuclear site and Israel was confident all issues would be
resolved once Syria met its obligation to cooperate and shed
light on the origin of the anthropogenic uranium particles.
Israel then chastised the Director General to take measures
the IAEA had &refrained from taking8 to fully investigate
the issues, a thinly veiled reference to a special
inspection.


22. (SBU) As in the statements on the Annual Report and SIR,


Israel objected to references in paras 2 and 20 of the Syria
report citing Israel as having destroyed the Dair Alzour
facility, as ¬ in line with the professionalism8 of the
Secretariat and deviating from past practice, in addition to
having nothing to do with the investigation. Michaeli added
that Israel had responded in a timely manner and &in good
faith8 to the Secretariat,s query on uranium munitions and
saw the Director General,s repeated request on this issue as
&redundant.8 If the Director General wanted further
information from Israel, the statement questioned why he had
refused to meet with Israeli officials (representatives of
the Atomic Energy Commission) and called on the DG to
&refrain from political bias8 and publically &lashing8
Israel.


23. (SBU) Israel,s public recrimination of the Director
General, which we had had counseled against, provoked an
equally acerbic response from ElBaradei. Speaking at the
conclusion of the Syria agenda item, the DG regretted the
&distorted8 remarks from Israel and accused Israel of
violating international law as it had done in the 1981 attack
on the Osirak reactor, which had been condemned by the UN
Security Council. He took non-NPT member Israel to task for
&preaching at8 the IAEA for not using all its tools, asking
&Who are you to tell us what to do?8 ElBaradei blamed
Israel for preventing the IAEA investigation in the first
place and pledged to continue to refer to Israel,s bombing
of the facility unless it could be attributed to &an act of
God.8 He characterized Israel,s one line response to the
IAEA,s first letter on uranium munitions as an &insult to
the investigative process8 and further promised to continue
asking about the types of armaments used in the attack.


24. (C) On meeting with Israeli officials, ElBaradei affirmed
that he would meet with Ambassador Michaeli any time but left
it to his technical people to meet with their technical
counterparts. ElBaradei concluded by noting that Israel,s
technical and political people had sent him &cheap8 letters
that he threw in the waste basket rather than share with the
Board, as he would not engage in a &gutter8 debate. He
also would not dignify the accusation of bias with a
response. (Comment: Amb. Michaeli told MsnOff that in
conversation the day before with the DG, Michaeli aired the
complaint about not meeting with Israeli officials from the
Israeli Atomic Energy Commission. Referring to an earlier
press story, Michaeli said that ElBaradei told him he could
not meet with the IAEC because one of the concerned officials
had called for the DG to be "fired.")


25. (S//NF) Speaking privately with DCM after this exchange,
ElBaradei complained that Michaeli had done nothing to
preview this criticism of the DG in a 15 minute conversation
the day before. Mission counseled both sides not to pour
fuel on the fire, but the Israeli Mission and then the IAEA
Secretariat chose to release their statements to the press,
which stirred the debate and could make it harder for Israel
and IAEA to work together, including in important areas such
as Israel's information sharing.

--------------
Chair,s Summary
--------------


26. (SBU) The Board Chair,s summary (posted on the GovAtom
website) recorded the usual like-minded versus NAM points of
view on the Syrian dossier. For example, the summary recalls
the Agency,s assessment of low probability of the uranium
originating from munitions while in the next sentence noting
that &some8 viewed Israeli responses as unconvincing. It
includes NAM references to Israeli use of force and notes
that the Director General,s remarks would be included in the
summary record.

--------------
U.S. Statement on Syria
--------------


27. (SBU) Below is the text of the U.S. Statement on Syria as
delivered:

Madame Chair,

Syria,s ongoing refusal to cooperate with the IAEA
remains of serious concern to the United States and, indeed,
should concern all supporters of the Agency,s safeguards


system and the international nonproliferation regime. As the
Director General noted in his introductory statement, there
are revived hopes for a new era of arms control. Such an era
would depend on an IAEA that can demonstrably meet the
verifications challenges placed before it.

We thank the Director General for his latest report and
applaud the Secretariat,s professionalism in pursuing the
technical investigation in Syria. We hope future reports
will reflect a decision by Syria to change course and provide
the Agency a full accounting of its nuclear program,
especially any undeclared nuclear activities.

Over one year has passed since the IAEA began
investigating Syria,s clandestine nuclear activities related
to the destroyed reactor at Dair Alzour. Regrettably, Syria
has not used this time to resolve the lingering questions
about the reactor and associated facilities. Instead, it has
chosen to hinder the Agency,s efforts by refusing to allow
inspectors the access the Agency has deemed essential to
perform its verification mission; by failing to provide
information and supporting documentation about the destroyed
facility at Dair Alzour; by failing to address the Agency,s
questions about nuclear-related procurement efforts; and, of
greatest concern, by taking steps to sanitize three
additional suspected nuclear-related sites upon receiving the
IAEA,s request for access. As noted in the Director
General,s latest report to the Board, the Agency has
requested, since May 2008, to hold substantive discussions
with Syria on these issues and has even offered to share all
of its satellite imagery with Syria. Unfortunately, Syria
has thus far rebuffed the Agency,s offer.

Due to Syria,s non-cooperation, the Agency has yet to
resolve the existing concerns and many unanswered questions
related to the Dair Alzour facility. Instead, the Agency,s
list of questions is growing. We note with concern that the
Director General,s latest report reveals that new,
additional traces of anthropogenic (or man-made) uranium
particles have been detected at a second location, a reactor
under IAEA safeguards, in Syria. According to the report,
routine environmental samples taken at the Miniature Neutron
Source Reactor (MNSR) in Damascus revealed the presence of
man-made natural uranium inside the hot cells. As with the
uranium previously detected at the Dair Alzour site, the
uranium detected at the MNSR is &of a type not included in
Syria,s declared inventory of nuclear material.8
Unfortunately, Syria,s June 1 response to the Agency,s
request for an explanation was no more forthcoming than
Syria,s responses to other IAEA requests related to the
investigation.

We call on Syria to cooperate fully with the Agency
without delay to address all unresolved questions, including
the presence of the undeclared man-made uranium detected at
the Dair Alzour site and inside the hot cells at the MNSR.
We must understand why such material ) material that was not
previously declared to the IAEA ) was detected at two
facilities in Syria, one of which was being constructed
clandestinely.

Given the gravity of this issue and Syria,s refusal to
allow the IAEA to complete its mandated verification
activities, the United States urges all Board members to join
us in demanding that Syria fully cooperate with the IAEA
investigation without delay by granting the IAEA access to
any information, debris and sites needed to complete its
investigation. In his latest report to the Board, the
Director General says that &in order for the Agency to
complete its assessment, Syria needs to be more cooperative
and transparent.8 Such cooperation will go a long way in
providing assurance to the international community of Syria's
peaceful intentions.

The existence of undisclosed nuclear facilities in
Syria and Syria,s refusal thus far to cooperate with the
investigation further underline the limitations on the
Agency,s ability to fulfill its mission in a country with a
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement but without an Additional
Protocol. This kind of evasiveness led the international
community to develop the Additional Protocol in order to give
the inspectors the tools they need to provide us with the
assurances we require that a country,s declaration is not
only correct, but is also complete, and its nuclear program
is therefore exclusively for peaceful purposes. We call on


Syria and all states that have not yet done so, to sign and
implement the Additional Protocol.

Our goal with regard to Syria is transparency and the
Board should show the way by making available to the public
the Director General,s reports on the Implementation of the
NPT Safeguards in the Syrian Arab Republic as the existence
of undeclared nuclear activities is a matter of international
concern. We again urge Syria to provide without further
delay whatever access and information the Agency deems
necessary to resolve the outstanding questions.

Thank you.
SCHULTE