Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA286
2009-06-19 06:42:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/ELBARADEI UNPLUGGED: DIRECTOR GENERAL'S

Tags:  AORC ENRG MNUC IR IAEA PREL PINR KNNP KN SY 
pdf how-to read a cable
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9640
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000286 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC ENRG MNUC IR IAEA PREL PINR KNNP KN SY
SUBJECT: IAEA/ELBARADEI UNPLUGGED: DIRECTOR GENERAL'S
BOARD INTERVENTION CHASTISES IRAN, REFLECTS ON NPT

-------------------
Summary and Comment
-------------------

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 UNVIE VIENNA 000286

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC ENRG MNUC IR IAEA PREL PINR KNNP KN SY
SUBJECT: IAEA/ELBARADEI UNPLUGGED: DIRECTOR GENERAL'S
BOARD INTERVENTION CHASTISES IRAN, REFLECTS ON NPT

--------------
Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (SBU) In a wide-ranging intervention following Iranian
Ambassador Soltanieh's customary diatribe at the conclusion
of the Iran agenda item at the ongoing IAEA Board of
Governors meeting, Director General (DG) ElBaradei took Iran
to task amid the DG's "general reflections" on the health and
well being of the NPT regime.. ElBaradei's off-the-cuff
remarks, delivered in the tone of a private appeal to Iran,
demonstrated his increasing propensity to speak as a free
agent in the twilight of his tenure as Director General, but
it also highlighted willingness to spotlight Iranian
intransigence despite the outreached hand of the United
States. In particular, he rejected Soltanieh's assertion
that the world is hearing the same old statements from those
who claim to speak of "change," a clear reference to the
United States. Speaking in his stream-of -consciousness
style , ElBaradei weaved in reflections on lessons learned
from the DPRK that underlined the need for dialogue with
Iran and on other nuclear non
proliferation issues. The Director General appealed to Iran
to seize the opportunity for engagement as he did in his
introductory remarks, acknowledged the "gridlock" on the
Iranian nuclear file (for which he largely blamed Iran) and
insisted that the reason the Iran item is on the agenda of
the Board "is because I put it there," in response to Iran's
arguments that it be removed. While we may disagree with
several elements of ElBaradei's intervention, which took on
the character and tone of a "lecture" by the Nobel Laureate
to the Board, he effectively put Iran on the defensive and
threw Soltanieh off his game. Setting aside some of the
overblown statements on familiar themes (for example,
claiming the 2007 Iran work plan was successful in removing
all questions about Iran's enrichment program and declaring
he'd be "delighted" if the documents indicating nuclear

weapons work in Iran were fake as in Iraq),ElBaradei made
clear that issue before the Board were important issues "of
war and peace" and Iran was only punishing itself by refusing
to engage in a substantive discussion with him. He also
helpfully urged Iran to consider a "freeze -for- freeze" (an
idea for which he took personal credit advocating for three
years),and noted that Iran has no commercial need for
enrichment. The Director General extended his injunction
for cooperation to Syria, including beyond strictly legal
obligations by applying the Additional Protocol. The overall
message of ElBaradei's lecture to Iran was to "end the kabuki
dance," as he put it and move forward.


2. (SBU) Regarding other verification matters, ElBaradei
remarked that the North Korean nuclear issue was an
illustration of "how not to deal with verification issues,"
and showed that issues improved during periods of dialogue.
He also addressed Syria, noting that it was in Syria's best
interest to cooperate with the IAEA on it investigation at
the destroyed facility at Dair Alzour. ElBaradei expressed
hope for the future of the NPT, given President Obama and
Medvedev's statements on the elimination of global nuclear
weapons, and advocated for the universalization of the
Additional Protocol and a multinational approach to the
nuclear fuel cycle. In addition, ElBaradei complained about
the limitations the IAEA has with regard to access to
satellite imagery, lack of independent capability to validate
on environmental sample results, and an underfunded budget.
End Summary and Comment.

--------------
DG's Tutorial/Lessons-Learned on DPRK:
"Dialogue the Only Way"
--------------


3. (SBU) Before addressing the Iran issue, the DG used a
simplified (and not altogether accurate) history of the DPRK
case to undergird his coming argument for a solution in Iran.
ElBaradei noted that the DPRK issue had been before the
IAEA and Board for 17 years. He said this case illustrated
"how not to deal with verification issues." The DG said he
saw the situation go from bad to worse and drew out the
correlation that during periods of dialogue North Korea's
nuclear ambitions were contained, such as during the Agreed
Framework. The DG observed that during periods of no
dialogue, such as after the inspectors were kicked out in
2003, there was more fissile material extracted for weapons
and a nuclear test. The situation got better during the
dialogue of the Six Party Talks, but now this has ended and
North Korea has conducted another nuclear test and announced
a uranium enrichment program. Undoubtedly with Iran in mind,
the DG said "we need to talk to each other, not at each
other" and that we "need to find a solution rather than call

UNVIE VIEN 00000286 002 OF 004


each other names," and that "dialogue is the only solution."


4. (SBU) Continuing his tutorial, he asserted that "we need
to reflect on what is the right track." He said there is a
sense of cynicism about the NPT because of the perception
that it is not being "implemented in a balanced way." But
now, the situation has "completely changed." Presidents
Obama and Medvedev have agreed to work toward a nuclear-free
world, which makes realistic the hope that the NPT can now
start to be implemented in a "wholesome way" that will reach
the "NPT's ultimate goal of disarmament." To buttress the
case for such hope, the DG cited new attitudes toward the
FMCT and CTBTO, as well as work towards smaller nuclear
arsenals. He concluded this portion of his comments by
expressing the view that the world should not consist of
"haves and have-nots."


--------------
DG Addresses Iran Issue Head On
--------------


5. (SBU) In an unusual intervention, Director General (DG)
ElBaradei concluded the Iran agenda item (to be reported
Septel) at the Board of Governors meeting on June 17 by
offering what he called "general reflections" on several IAEA
and NPT-related issues. He touched on Iran, DPRK, Syria,
budget, fuel assurances, and the need for strengthened
safeguards (Additional Protocol, transparency),but the
central target of his interjection was Iran. He clearly put
the onus on Tehran to take advantage of the "new engagement"
opportunity. At times, ElBaradei addressed the Iran issue
as if he were having a private, closed-door conversation with
Iranian officials and was clearly looking directly at
Ambassador Soltanieh. Responding to Soltanieh's claim that
the Board is hearing the same message from the U.S. and
others that has previously heard, the DG acknowledged that
indeed there has been much repetition over the past 4 years,
but he noted and regretted that such repetition arises from
the fact that the situation in Iran is in gridlock.


6. (SBU) ElBaradei explained that the "confidence deficit"
about Iran began when Tehran failed to report the import of
nuclear material as well as enrichment-related experiments
that had been performed at the Kalaye Electric workshop. He
said these failures created problems for both the IAEA and
the international community and caused the Iran nuclear file
to be treated as "non-routine." Responding to Iran and NAM
requests to remove the Iran issue as an agenda item from the
Board meetings, ElBaradei emphasized that he was the one to
put the issue on the agenda, that he would continue to do so,
and that it was "no one else's business."

--------------
The Four Pillars
--------------


7. (SBU) Addressing Iran's argument that its nuclear file
was illegally referred to the UNSC, ElBaradei described four
pillars to the NPT regime-the IAEA, the UNSC, multilateral
dialogue, and bilateral dialogue-all of which must work
together to address and resolve issues, including Iran.
ElBaradei expressed the view that recently the UNSC has shown
used "sticks" through the adoption of sanctions, but that
more must be done to move away from this pattern; the UNSC is
also supposed to be a place for solving issues through
dialogue. He argued that when there is dialogue, only then,
will there be movement on the issues.

--------------
Work Plan Not So Bad
--------------


8. (SBU) Recalling that the IAEA received a great deal of
criticism over the Iran "work plan" adopted in August 2007,
ElBaradei claimed that the IAEA accomplished a major
achievement-through the "work plan"-with regard to Iran's
uranium enrichment program. He said that even the UNSC
"paid tribute" to the IAEA's success. (Comment: This
observation conveniently ignores the fact that, as the DG has
reported several times, the IAEA is not in position to offer
any assurances about the absence of undeclared uranium
enrichment activities in Iran.)


9. (SBU) ElBaradei also appealed to Iran to implement the
Additional Protocol (AP) and Code 3.1. He told Iran that
setting aside UNSC requirements and obligations, the IAEA
needs Iran to implement the AP so that the IAEA can make sure
"things don't happen as they did in the past." Directing his
comments directly to Soltanieh, the DG argued that Iran

UNVIE VIEN 00000286 003 OF 004


should implement the AP and Code 3.1 if they hope to build
confidence.

--------------
"Freeze-for- Freeze" and "New Air "from
Washington"
--------------


10. (SBU) Stating that Iran's uranium enrichment-related
activities were at the crux of it problems, ElBaradei
emphasized to Iran that no one was questioning its rights to
peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and noted how suspension
would help build confidence. Recalling how he has been
championing the "freeze - for-freeze" idea for severall years
ElBaradei cited the "new air from Washington," there was no
need for Iran to continue to rush to build enrichment
capabilities, especially since the world already knows Iran
has the technology to do so. He said that "no one loses
anything" with a "freeze-for- freeze," especially since Iran
has no immediate need for commercial enrichment. He also
said that Iran is only penalizing itself, and this rut cannot
continue, especially as "people are starting to make fun of
the situation."

--------------
Need to Share the "Alleged Studies"
Documents
--------------


11. (SBU) With regard to the "alleged studies"-the green
salt diagram, the missile re-entry vehicle design, and the
high explosives work-ElBaradei commented that the IAEA has
shared "some" of the information it has, but not "all."
ElBaradei noted that he understands the sensitivities with
"sources and methods," but Iran at least deserves copies of
the material for "due process." Pointing to DDG Safeguards
Olli Heinonen and Ops B Director Herman Nackaerts, ElBaradei
explained that there was enough substance in the "alleged
studies" information to make "these guys" concerned, so Iran
must engage in substantive discussions on this matter "of war
and peace." He said that he would be "delighted" if the
documents were "fake" as in the case of Iraq, but the IAEA
needs Iran's help in getting to the bottom of the issue. He
also noted that while the 16 U.S. intelligence agencies
concluded that Iran stopped its weapons program in 2003,
"others" (NFI) do not agree, and the "IAEA just does not
know." Again directing his gaze at Soltanieh, he said, "you
need to talk to me, and you have not done that."

--------------
In Syria's Best Interest to Cooperate
--------------


12. (SBU) On Syria, the DG recalled some Member States have
said that the IAEA should not go beyond the obligations of
the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). (Comment:
During the Syria agenda item that followed, a number of NAM
countries reiterated that countries should not be asked to
cooperate beyond their legal safeguards obligations. End
Comment). The DG agreed that the authorities under the CSA
are limited and then spoke directly to Syria saying "if you
want to prove allegations are not accurate, the best thing to
do is to be transparent" and added that it is in Syria's best
interest to do so. ElBaradei indicated that he has deplored
Israel "more than once," noting that , "not many of you did,
I did." In spite of this, he said that Syria also has an
obligation and he hoped that the the issue of legalities
would not result in this issue never being removed from the
Board's agenda.

--------------
IAEA's Limits
--------------


13. (SBU) In addition to explaining why both Iran and Syria
need to extend additional transparency to the IAEA, ElBaradei
commented that the IAEA has limited authorities and lack of
independence when it comes to acquiring satellite imagery and
validating environmental sampling. The DG referred to the
ongoing budget debate and thanked the U.S. specifically for
its leadership and for the recent 10 million USD increase in
voluntary funding.

--------------
The Need for Universalization of the
Additional Protocol
--------------


14. (SBU) ElBaradei explained-using the Iraq example-that
without the AP, the IAEA has no credible verification

UNVIE VIEN 00000286 004 OF 004


mechanisms to provide assurances of the absence of undeclared
nuclear material and activities in any given country, and
that it is regrettable that currently there are over 100
countries with a CSA, but no AP. He said he cannot say a
country is "absolutely clean" without the AP.

--------------
Fuel Assurances and Multinational Approach
--------------


15. (SBU) ElBaradei noted that unfortunately more and more
countries are seeking or are at least interested in their own
uranium enrichment and reprocessing capabilities; he said a
multinational approach is needed and the Russian
International Enrichment Center (with commercial
participation by other states) was a first step in the right
direction. He noted that as more states develop enrichment,
we will have more states with a "1-2 month security margin"
(a reference to short breakout timelines for
enrichment-capable states). The DG continued, "It is up to
you if that is the kind of world you want."

--------------
Don't Tell Us How to Do Our Job
--------------


16. (SBU) In closing, ElBaradei responded to the EU,
Australia, and Canada's calls for either a briefing or an
annex in the next DG's report on Iran that would include the
IAEA's assessment on possible military dimensions (PMD) (to
be reported in Septel). He emphasized that the IAEA writes
its own reports and it is the Secretariat's business as to
what is or is not included, "we are not co-managing
safeguards." He then asked Heinonen if he had anything to
add. Heinonen responded that the IAEA will carefully study
the EU and Australian suggestions, especially on the
outstanding issues, and will respond as appropriate in a
timely manner. ElBaradei then concluded by announcing that
his interjection was not meant to provoke discussion or
comment. (Comment: Thus discouraged, no one save Soltanieh
responded. Careful to note that he was not "commenting," he
just wanted the Board to bear in mind that before the issue
was referred to the UNSC, Iran was able to cooperate more.
Once referred to UNSC, the Iranian Majles passed a law
forbidding AP cooperation and Iran stopped implementing Code
3.1)
SCHULTE