Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA282
2009-06-18 06:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/IRAN: SAFEGUARDS TECHNICAL BRIEFING STRESSES

Tags:  KNNP AORC IAEA IR 
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VZCZCXRO1859
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHTRO
DE RUEHUNV #0282/01 1690627
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 180627Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9596
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 UNVIE VIENNA 000282 

SENSITIVE
NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2024
TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: SAFEGUARDS TECHNICAL BRIEFING STRESSES
STATUS QUO: NO NEW COOPERATION FROM IRAN

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Geoffrey Pyatt for reasons 1.4(b
) and (d)

-------
Summary
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 UNVIE VIENNA 000282

SENSITIVE
NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2024
TAGS: KNNP AORC IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: SAFEGUARDS TECHNICAL BRIEFING STRESSES
STATUS QUO: NO NEW COOPERATION FROM IRAN

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Geoffrey Pyatt for reasons 1.4(b
) and (d)

--------------
Summary
--------------


1. (SBU) On June 10, Ops B Director Herman Nackaerts
provided Member States a technical briefing on the Director
General's (DG) June 5 report on Iran. The briefing largely
repeated the points covered in the report, but also offered
more details on safeguards implementation at the Natanz
centrifuge complex. Nackaerts restated that Iran has not
offered any cooperation on possible military dimensions
(PMD),has not suspended enrichment- and heavy water-related
activities, has not implemented the Additional Protocol (AP)
or Code 3.1 (early provision of design information for
nuclear facilities),and has not provided design information
verification (DIV) access to the IR-40 Heavy Water Research
Reactor at Arak as required under Iran's Safeguards
Agreement.


2. (SBU) Several questions were asked during the question
and answer session about the containment and surveillance
measures at Natanz, Iran's cooperation on PMD issues, and
uranium conversion operations. Iran again used this
opportunity to claim it was cooperating with the IAEA as
required by its comprehensive safeguards agreement and to
criticize the IAEA's handling of the investigation. End
Summary.

--------------
Safeguards Implementation at Natanz
--------------


3. (SBU) While summarizing Iran's centrifuge cascade
operations at both the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) and Pilot
FEP (PFEP) at Natanz-which included the same information as
contained in the DG's June 5 report-Nackaerts noted that the
number of centrifuges in operation was based on the
assumption that 164 centrifuge machines were actually
operating in each cascade, since the IAEA does not have any
information on "crashed" or nonfunctioning machines (see
septel for more details on such machines). Nackaerts also
noted that all the low enriched uranium material-both product
and tails-from the PFEP operations, which involved single
centrifuges and small cascades, were being recombined and

generally recycled as feed material.


4. (SBU) In addition, Nackaerts noted that there were three
current implementation issues for the Natanz centrifuge
complex-the need for improvements to the operator's nuclear
material accountancy system, the need to strengthen
containment and surveillance measures because of the
increasing centrifuge numbers, and the need to ensure
unannounced inspection objectives can be met at all times
(notwithstanding Iran's security drills)-all of which
currently were under discussion with the Iranians. Nackaerts
described Safeguards Implementation at both the FEP and PFEP
as involving containment and surveillance over unclear
material cylinders, centrifuge cascade areas, and feed and
withdrawal areas. Nackaerts said the current safeguards
approach includes monthly nuclear material balancing;
calibration and use of load cells; unannounced access to all
plant areas; surveillance of feed and withdrawal areas,
passivation areas, and cascade areas; sealing of cylinders
and autoclaves; regular environmental sampling for new and
installed centrifuges; one-physical inventory verification
(PIV),twelve interim inventory verification/design
information verification (IIV/DIV),and twelve-unannounced
inspections per year; as well as destructive and
nondestructive analysis of all cylinders containing nuclear
material according to a sampling plan.

--------------
Fuel for the IR-40
--------------


5. (SBU) Nackaerts reported that process lines for the
production of fuel elements at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant
(FMP) at Esfahan were complete, and that the IAEA had
verified the fuel assembly that Iran displayed during the
National Nuclear Day in April. He said that Iran has
produced a total of 23 fuel rods to date, of which 18 were
used in the fuel assembly.

-------------- --------------
Nothing New on Possible Military Dimensions (PMD)
-------------- --------------

UNVIE VIEN 00000282 002 OF 003




6. (SBU) Nackaerts reiterated that no/no progress had been
made on PMD issues and that Iran needs to provide substantive
information, and access to relevant documentation,
locations, and individuals. Noting that Iran has had
sufficient access to the documentation regarding
weaponization-related activities, Nackaerts also repeated the
DG's call on Member States to work out new modalities with
the IAEA so that copies of the documentation can be provided
to Iran. He said the next steps for dealing with PMD issues
are for Iran to answer all outstanding questions
simultaneously and not in a piecemeal fashion.

--------------
Questions and Answers
--------------


7. (SBU) After Nackaerts' presentation, Germany, France,
the U.K., the U.S., and Albania asked questions. Iran made
its usual claim that it had cooperated with the IAEA and
lived up to all of its obligations. Germany asked if the
IAEA had access to Hall B at the FEP in Natanz; what the
enrichment level was for the LEU product at the PFEP; for a
description of the IAEA's discussions with Iran on the "three
current implementation issues" as noted in the briefing,
especially if Iran was cooperating; and if any progress had
been made with the plan that the IAEA spelled out in the
September 2008 DG's report for dealing with the PMD issues.
Nackaerts replied that inspectors do have access to Hall B,
but that there is nothing there yet to inspect; the uranium
fed into centrifuges at PFEP (both product and tails) is
recombined and sometimes re-fed, and that the IAEA does not
know the current enrichment levels for the product at the
PFEP. (Comment: Mission assumes the enrichment levels are
very low, at most 5 percent or below, otherwise IAEA
environmental sampling would reveal higher-level enrichment.)
Nackaerts also said that some additional containment and
surveillance measures the IAEA has recommended for Natanz are
already in place, and others are still being worked out, but
that Iran is cooperating so far. He stressed again that
there has been no progress with anything related to PMD for
approximately the last year.


8. (SBU) France asked if Iran had provided any additional
information on PMD issues that are not particularly "military
sensitive", such as its conventional work-airbags-with
exploding bridge wires (EBW); and if it was "unusual" for a
country to use low enriched uranium (LEU) as targets for
irradiation (for radioisotope production). Nackaerts
responded that Iran has not provided any additional
information about work with EBWs, and that the IAEA wants to
deal with all PMD issues simultaneously, and not in a
"one-at-a-time fashion" as before under the previous
IAEA-Iran "work plan." Nackaerts said the IAEA requested
additional from Iran as to why it was irradiating targets
using LEU, and is fully satisfied with Iran's response; the
IAEA accepts Iran's view that one can achieve better results
for these experiments by irradiating LEU targets. Responding
to France's question about the total amount of uranium
hexafluoride (UF6) produced at the Uranium Conversion
Facility (UCF) at Esfahan and how much material had been
moved to Natanz, Nackaerts said the IAEA will report the
exact numbers once the IAEA has the final results from the
last PIV.


9. (C) The U.K. asked if there had been any other problems
or issues with unannounced inspections at Natanz, other than
the already reported issue arising from an unannounced
inspection request during a security drill. Nackaerts
replied that there had been no other problems and had
received good cooperation from the Iranians. (Comment: A UK
Msnoff privately told UNVIE Msnoff that he had been told that
Iran had caused trouble on another unannounced inspection,
but did not have any more specifics. In a separate
conversation, DDG/Safeguards Heinonen said he was not
particularly concerned about the security drill issue and
said he thought it could have been better handled by his own
team in a way that preserved the integrity of the inspection
while not generating a "fuss" with Iran.). Following up on
Germany's question about the Containment and Surveillance
measures at Natanz, the U.S. asked how the IAEA monitors
centrifuge machines, rotors, and other equipment that breaks
down at Natanz, especially in light of the fact that
centrifuge numbers continue to grow (and by implication so
does the number of failed machines). The U.S. asked what
happens to this equipment, where it goes, and how it is
monitored. Nackaerts said that all centrifuge machines in
contact with UF6 have to be accounted for and remain under
Safeguards. He reported that there is a storage place in

UNVIE VIEN 00000282 003.2 OF 003


Natanz where such items go until they are dismantled and
decontaminated, but once the dismantlement and
decontamination take place, the IAEA does not know where the
items go, and where/if they are reused in any way. The U.S.
also asked if Iran has moved any domestically produced
yellowcake to the UCF or notified the IAEA of its intention
to do so. Nackaerts replied that he has no additional
information regarding use of domestic uranium resources,
except for the couple of very small samples that had been
brought to the UCF for laboratory testing and analysis some
time ago.


10. (SBU) Albania asked if Iran had provided the IAEA with
any new design information, fuel loading system information,
or start-up dates for the IR-40 reactor, especially since
Iran has completed a fuel assembly at the FMP. Nackaerts
responded that the last information the IAEA received from
Iran about the IR-40 was in January 2007. At that time Iran
claimed a start-up date of 2013 and included design drawings
and flow charts, but nothing on fuel assembly procedures and
equipment.

--------------
Iran's Speeches and Interjections
--------------


11. (C) Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh spoke last after the
Member States had asked their questions. Echoing past
themes, his statement asserted that the IAEA did not need
access to the IR-40 reactor, the IAEA has not lived up to its
part of the 2007 Work Plan on PMD/Alleged Studies issues
because Iran has not been provided copies of documentation,
and that it was unacceptable that the IAEA wants access to
military people and top secret information on its ballistic
missile program. DDG Safeguards Olli Heinonen responded to
Soltanieh's speech, stating the IAEA does not agree with his
comments and provided specific examples of how Iran has
caused this investigation process to drag out over the past
year. Ambassador Soltanieh repeated that the "laptop" was a
fabrication, criticized IAEA official Chris Hutchinson by
name (claiming he does not have the appropriate expertise and
makes inapprorpriate, non-nuclear-related inquiries),and
declared the IAEA's insistence on access to Top Secret
Military information was damaging the IAEA's relationship
with Iran. (Comment: Heinonen, Nackaerts, and Ops B Section
Head Max Aparo did not attempt to hide their disdain for
Soltanieh's comments during his speech; they grinned, shook
heads, and rolled eyes.)
SCHULTE