Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA276
2009-06-15 14:32:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNVIE
Cable title:  

CODEL LOWEY AND WAXMAN,S VISIT WITH IAEA AND CTBTO

Tags:  AORC MNUC PREL TRGY IR IAEA KNNP SY KN 
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 UNVIE VIENNA 000276 

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TAGS: AORC MNUC PREL TRGY IR IAEA KNNP SY KN
SUBJECT: CODEL LOWEY AND WAXMAN,S VISIT WITH IAEA AND CTBTO

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Summary
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 UNVIE VIENNA 000276

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC MNUC PREL TRGY IR IAEA KNNP SY KN
SUBJECT: CODEL LOWEY AND WAXMAN,S VISIT WITH IAEA AND CTBTO

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Summary
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1. (SBU) Congresswoman Nita Lowey (D-NY) and Congressman
Henry Waxman (D-CA) challenged IAEA DG ElBaradei's assessment
of the threat Iran poses to Israel in a May 26 private
meeting. ElBaradei used the opportunity to reiterate his
views about international fuel banks, explain the IAEA's
authority on weaponization-related issues, complain about the
IAEA's lack of and limits placed on funding, and express
criticism of what he sees as past U.S. policy failures on
Iran, DPRK, and Syria. In a separate meeting, Tibor Toth,
Executive Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat
of the CTBTO, explained the role of the CTBTO's verification
and monitoring system and encouraged the U.S. ratification
and entry into force of the Treaty. End Summary.

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DG ElBaradei Repeats Same Lines
from Press Interviews
--------------


2. (U) During a meeting with Congresswoman Lowey and
Congressman Waxman on May 26, IAEA Director General (DG)
ElBaradei and DDG Management David Waller discussed the
IAEA's role in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and
current verification issues. ElBaradei largely repeated
similar points from his recent strand of press interviews.
He said that more countries are becoming interested in
nuclear power and the IAEA is there to help them achieve it
in a safe and secure manner, recognizing that one way to
strengthen the NPT was through a multinational fuel cycle and
fuel bank. ElBaradei noted that an international fuel bank
would make it difficult for countries to justify having their
own nuclear fuel cycle program. ElBaradei welcomed President
Obama's comments about nuclear disarmament in Prague.


3. (SBU) Regarding nuclear verification in Iran, ElBaradei
made some provocative comments, noting that the IAEA was
wrongly criticized for "missing it", bwhen in fact, Tehran's
construction of the Natanz centrifuge complex had not been a
violation of its safeguards agreement since Iran was not
within 180 days of introducing nuclear material. ElBaradei

also stated that he did not believe Iran really had intended
to "hide" the Natanz facility since it was so large. He
argued that the trouble started when Iran "breached" its
safeguards obligations by not reporting some past experiments
with nuclear material. Downplaying that Tehran "may have"
conducted some "studies" in the past, ElBaradei said that the
IAEA does not see a nuclear weapons program in Iran today and
that he doubts Iran will cooperate further with the IAEA on
outstanding issues until it has a broader policy dialogue
with the U.S.


4. (SBU) ElBaradei criticized U.S. policy for failing on
Iran, but indicated he has hope for the U.S. with its new
"willingness for openness," and implored the U.S. to make
some kind of "grand bargain" for a win/win outcome. He
believes Iran wants nuclear technology for respect, energy,
and an "insurance policy" to be seen as a regional power and
to be recognized by the U.S. He noted that this issue will
take time, and it is important for both Iran and the U.S. to
realize they need each other, especially on issues related to
Afghanistan, Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinians, etc.


5. (SBU) Responding to Congresswoman Lowey's questions
about the IAEA's authority to monitor/investigate
weaponization-related activities, ElBaradei said that the
IAEA's authority is limited to those activities involving
nuclear material, which excludes delivery systems and
weaponization activities. He then said the Additional
Protocol (AP) would essentially allow the IAEA to go
everywhere, although the IAEA cannot make guarantees on the
absence of covert activities. Both Lowey and Congressman
Waxman asked if there were other mechanisms that would help
the IAEA perform or broaden its verification duties.
ElBaradei used this opening to complain about how
"shamefully unfunded" the IAEA was; how Member States put
conditions on funding for nuclear security ; how the IAEA
needs to have a new environmental sampling laboratory; and
how the IAEA needs access to satellite imagery.


6. (SBU) Lowey asked what one should do about a country
-Iran-that wants to annihilate Israel. ElBaradei replied
that although he knows Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad says a
lot of offensive things, he personally does not speak Farsi
and is not sure that Ahmadi-Nejad's comments were translated
correctly. Waxman asked if Iran having a nuclear weapon
would drive others in the Middle East to pursue such
capabilities. ElBaradei responded that he did not think so,

UNVIE VIEN 00000276 002 OF 002


since Iran would not use a nuclear weapon on a neighbor.
Lowey then commented that officials in Egypt, UAE, Saudi
Arabia, and Jordan have all expressed concern during meetings
with her over Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. ElBaradei
explained that he was much more worried about the Taliban
being so close to Islamabad, since Pakistan actually does
have nuclear weapons. Responding to Waxman's question about
Iran's desire for nuclear weapons, ElBaradei stated that his
gut feeling was Iran would like to have nuclear weapons
technology, but would sit on it, as "Japan and Brazil" did.
Waxman then noted the importance and/or fear that other
countries would have if Iran was a "virtual" nuclear weapons
state. ElBaradei replied that was why it is important to
negotiate, using both pressure and incentives, and have a
tight inspection regime. He said the U.S. a generation ago
achieved a paradigm-break with China and should do so now
with Iran.


7. (SBU) ElBaradei also criticized the U.S. for
"mismanaging" the North Korean nuclear issue, commenting that
North Korea has the "trump card"-nuclear weapons-and will use
it to gain concessions. Unlike Iran, ElBaradei stated that
North Korea could be bought off, and that the international
community should not allow the "human tragedy"-the starving
people-to continue, especially since the targeted sanctions
have not hurt the regime.


8. (SBU) Waxman asked ElBaradei why he was so critical of
Israel and the U.S. for Israel's attack on the Syrian nuclear
reactor, given that Israel and Syria still are in a state of
war. ElBaradei replied that he does not support the use of
unilateral force, and the IAEA should have been given a
chance to do its job, but now the IAEA is stuck an
"impossible task" of ascertaining what the Syrians were
constructing. Waxman asked what the IAEA would have done it
if had been informed of the Syrian activities before the
attack. ElBaradei said the IAEA would have gone to the
Syrians first, gotten cooperation, and confirmed whether or
not Syria was building a reactor.

-------------- --
DPRK Example to Explain CTBTO Monitoring System
-------------- --


9. (SBU) The Codel also met with Ambassador Tibor Toth,
Executive Secretary of the Provisional Technical Secretariat
of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization
(CTBTO),on May 26. Toth explained the functioning of the
International Monitoring System (IMS),the verification
system of the CTBT, using the recent alleged nuclear test by
the DPRK as an example of how the system functioned. Toth
stressed the improvements made in the system in the last ten
years and noted the importance of continued U.S. engagement
on the technical side. He also spoke of the importance of
U.S. ratification to catalyze the entry into force of the
Treaty. The Codel toured the Operations Center of the PTS,
where all IMS stations are continuously monitored.


10. (U) Note: The CODEL had the opportunity to review this
message.
SCHULTE