Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA270
2009-06-10 14:00:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA GIVES SOME INSIGHT INTO THE NEW 2010-2013 NUCLEAR

Tags:  AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0270/01 1611400
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 101400Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9568
RHMCSUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEANFA/NRC WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000270 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA, ISN/NESS, ISN/RA
NA-20 BAKER/LOONEY/, NA-20.1 KOONTZ
NA-21 BIENIAWSKI/SHEELY/ILIOPULOS/STAPLES/CUMMINS, NA-25
HUIZENGA/VOLGER, NA-243-GOOREVICH/BRUNNS; NA-241 O'CONNOR,
LAMONTAGNE
NRC FOR OIP - HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY

SUBJECT: IAEA GIVES SOME INSIGHT INTO THE NEW 2010-2013 NUCLEAR
SECURITY PLAN

REF: (A) UNVIE 143 (B) UNVIE 65 (C) UNVIE 74

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000270

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR IO/T, ISN/MNSA, ISN/NESS, ISN/RA
NA-20 BAKER/LOONEY/, NA-20.1 KOONTZ
NA-21 BIENIAWSKI/SHEELY/ILIOPULOS/STAPLES/CUMMINS, NA-25
HUIZENGA/VOLGER, NA-243-GOOREVICH/BRUNNS; NA-241 O'CONNOR,
LAMONTAGNE
NRC FOR OIP - HENDERSON, SCHWARTZMAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC KNNP IAEA ENRG TRGY

SUBJECT: IAEA GIVES SOME INSIGHT INTO THE NEW 2010-2013 NUCLEAR
SECURITY PLAN

REF: (A) UNVIE 143 (B) UNVIE 65 (C) UNVIE 74


1. (SBU)SUMMARY: The IAEA Office of Nuclear Security (ONS) is
making a good faith effort to involve Member States in developing
the next Nuclear Security Plan (NSP) for 2010 - 2013. A draft
outline discussed initially June 4 and 5 follows the new
organization structure ONS put forward in the draft IAEA budget for
2010-2011 (REF A-C). The plan outline has a regional focus;
however, it needs to be updated with more detail and emphasis on
IAEA's role in nuclear security over the long term. Ambassador
conveyed to ONS chief Nilsson and representatives of major donor
states June 5 that ONS must define its "niche" in global nuclear
security activities with a succinct statement of mission, must build
Member State "ownership" of the program by emphasizing its
geographic reach, and must make the case for financial resources to
retain good staff and sustain their work. End Summary.


2. (SBU)On June 5, several key sponsors of the Nuclear Security Fund
attended a meeting convened by the Secretariat, to discuss the
outline draft of the Nuclear Security Plan for 2010-2013. The
meeting was chaired by Office of Nuclear Security Director, Anita
Nilsson. Nilsson stressed that the plan puts emphasis on the need
for a capability to deal with nuclear security at the regional and
international levels - not just at the state level - and that it
should be a long-term, and not an ad-hoc, effort. Nilsson also
underscored the insufficient set of internationally accepted
guidelines when it comes to nuclear security. Consistent with the
Director General's program and budget proposal for 2010-11, the ONS
plan is structured into four program areas: a comprehensive
information platform for monitoring and communications; the
establishment of global nuclear security regions, an area which also
includes R&D; nuclear services packages that follow a modular
approach, i.e. can be put together by individual states as they see

fit; and risk reduction. The goal of the plan is that ONS can
better tailor its services to the circumstances and needs in
recipient countries.

U.S. PRIORITIES
--------------

3. (SBU)In response to Ms. Nilsson's presentation, Ambassador
Schulte identified three prerequisites for the success of the NSP.
Firstly, he said ONS had to identify how the IAEA nuclear security
program is part of a broader international effort that includes the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and UNSCR 1540, border
training through UNODC and the OSCE, and other elements. The IAEA's
comparative advantage lay in propagating a global nuclear security
culture, including through cooperation in training programs and the
issuance of guidance documents, as well as supporting efforts
towards sustainability. Ambassador Schulte stressed that the NSP
should not be too ambitious or broad in its aims and that the role
of the IAEA should be defined more clearly. He questioned the
Agency's need to include security-specific R&D and noted that
providing detection equipment was a task that certain Member States
were likely to be have vastly more resources for than would the
IAEA. Second, he urged member-state ownership beyond the group of
donors; and finally, it is important for the IAEA to have resources,
in the regular budget, in order to avoid unpredictability.


4. (SBU) Ambassador indicated that the NSP should reinforce the
message that Nuclear Security is a core function benefitting all
Member States. Expanding the sense of program "ownership" beyond
major donors to the low-income states (G-77 plus some in Eastern
Europe) receiving 75 percent of ONS program activity was crucial.
He advocated associating ONS activity with the Global Partnership
and emphasizing nuclear security as an essential context and
confidence-builder for both disarmament and the expansion of
peaceful uses. The plan must reflect that services and benefits are
available to all. Thirdly, in terms of the resources, Ambassador
cautioned member states that the only way to avoid unpredictability
for the plan is through "a real increase in the Agency budget."

MEMBER STATES COMMENT ON PRIORITIES AND PLAN STRUCTURE
-------------- --------------

5. (SBU)Germany expressed its readiness to "fully cooperate" in the
development of the NSP. Echoing statements by the U.S., Germany
urged that the Secretariat give donors feedback on where their
contributions are needed the most. New Zealand stressed that
transportation security deserves special attention, and mentioned
that the lack of comprehensive inventories of material in some
Pacific and Asian countries, for example, can be a hurdle to
achieving long-term nuclear security.



6. (SBU)The United Kingdom promised more detailed comments once
London reviews the document. In the meantime, it proposed that
smart indicators be built into the reporting stage of the process,
so as to have a clear picture of the progress before the final
assessment. The U.S. seconded this recommendation and added that
this should also apply to the sustainability aspect of the plan.
Likewise, Canada expressed support for the U.S. emphasis on ONS
fitting itself into broader international efforts. On format,
Canada suggested that the Plan's section C, on drivers, be expanded
to include, among others, the international threat environment, and
that there be more linkage between sections F, on providing nuclear
security, and G, on risk reduction and security improvement.


7. (SBU)In reply to Germany's request for more details about the
proposed Nuclear Security Support Centers, Nilsson described these
as centers of excellence that would fulfill three purposes:
technical backup for, among others, instrument maintenance and
assistance with readings; coordination of national development of
objectives and processes in countries with larger-magnitude
programs; and boosting capacity/attaining economies of scale at a
regional level in areas such as nuclear forensics for which
individual nations may lack means.

THE NEXT STEPS
--------------


8. (SBU) This meeting was the first IAEA consultation on the NSP.
A second informal consultation, based on a more detailed draft plan,
is expected to take place at the end of June, after which the
Nuclear Security Advisory Group (AdSec) would be extended an
invitation to provide input. An open-ended meeting with a larger
audience will take place by the end of July. The document presented
at that meeting will be a near-final version of the NSP. The final
document will be available in the beginning of August, so that it
may be discussed in the General Conference.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (SBU) A more comprehensive NSP should be available within a
couple weeks for USG comment. As ONS proceeds in drafting, the
Mission will focus on working with ONS to ensure the plan reflects
USG priorities and a clearly defined and delimited role for the IAEA
within global nuclear security efforts.

SCHULTE