Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09UNVIEVIENNA268
2009-06-09 13:25:00
SECRET
UNVIE
Cable title:  

IAEA/DG RACE: AMANO MAKES A STRONG SHOWING IN

Tags:  AORC PREL KNNP IAEA SP JA SI SF BE 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0268/01 1601325
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 091325Z JUN 09
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9565
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0228
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA IMMEDIATE 0153
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO IMMEDIATE 0046
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000268 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D(S),P, T, IO, ISN
PLS PASS SECDEF TRAVEL TEAM FOR D(S) STEINBERG
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
DOE FOR NA-20
NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, CONNERY
NRC FOR DOANE, SCHWARTZMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA SP JA SI SF BE
SUBJECT: IAEA/DG RACE: AMANO MAKES A STRONG SHOWING IN
STRAW POLL BUT VICTORY NOT IN HAND

REF: A) UNVIE 260 AND PREVIOUS B) STATE 58951

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary and Comment
--------------------

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000268

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR D(S),P, T, IO, ISN
PLS PASS SECDEF TRAVEL TEAM FOR D(S) STEINBERG
PARIS ALSO FOR USOECD
DOE FOR NA-20
NSC FOR SCHEINMAN, CONNERY
NRC FOR DOANE, SCHWARTZMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019
TAGS: AORC PREL KNNP IAEA SP JA SI SF BE
SUBJECT: IAEA/DG RACE: AMANO MAKES A STRONG SHOWING IN
STRAW POLL BUT VICTORY NOT IN HAND

REF: A) UNVIE 260 AND PREVIOUS B) STATE 58951

Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (S) The results of the June 9 informal straw poll -- Amano
20, Minty 11, Echavarri 4, and Poncelet and Petric both 0 --
place Amano in good stead for the formal vote, which the
Board Chair announced would be held over a two-day session on
July 2-3. Certainly, the momentum is with Amano and many
Board members are impressed by his better-than-expected
showing, even outdoing our most optimistic predictions.
However, Minty's likewise better-than-expected show also
rings a cautionary note. Although Amano is buoyed by the
result, he needs to focus on the fact that he had not yet
converted any of the "Minty 12," a reality Amano recognized
in a telcon with Ambassador Schulte after the vote. We
suspect that Malaysia, the Philippines and Saudi Arabia stuck
with Minty in the non-binding poll despite putative
commitments to Amano, though they may yet support him in the
formal vote. The one defector from the Minty 12, probably
Russia, likely supported Echavarri in the straw poll. If
none of the 12 "convert" to Amano in the formal vote, Minty
will retain his "blocking third" of the 35-member Board, and
thus prevent Amano from getting the required two-thirds
support to be appointed Director General.


2. (S) It will be incumbent on Amano in the next few weeks to
redouble efforts to convert Minty supporters, in particular.
In addition to the three putative conversions, Russia, India
and Brazil will be key targets that may be swayed by their
long term interests in the IAEA. On the margins of the straw
poll, Brazilian DCM reported that a Lula-Aso telcon this week
had gone very well (better than anticipated) and Brazil would
likely support Amano in the event Minty backs out. Amano,

while upbeat, recognizes that Minty's strong showing means
tough work ahead. He estimated that India, Argentina, Egypt
and Cuba could shift in the final "leading candidate" vote.
Japan will share a list of suggested targets for U.S.
lobbying after analyzing the straw poll results. Meanwhile,
Echavarri's tally was less than what Amano had expected. His
relatively weak showing indicates that Echavarri will likely
be eliminated in the formal voting. We suspect that his four
votes included Spain, Romania, Russia and Mexico (or perhaps
Germany, as Japan suspects) but can only confirm the first
two. None of the others would disclose their secret ballot
vote when informally canvassed after the poll. Echavarri
supporters, including Spain, should be encouraged to support
Amano after Echavarri is eliminated as expected. It would be
optimal if Echavarri could peel off a couple more Minty
supporters in the coming weeks so as to be a "back-up"
option. (Note: In the event of a stalemate, the slate of
nominations would be re-opened for another four weeks. End
note). Amano's strong showing in the straw poll makes it
unlikely for Echavarri to have much of an impact on Amano
supporters. Finally, as for Petric and Poncelet, the former
has already indicated to Ambassador Schulte he will withdraw.
Mission seeks guidance on whether to approach Belgium (see
para 6).


3. (SBU) At the conclusion of the straw poll, the Board Chair
announced that a Special Session to conduct the election will
be held on July 2-3, thus putting an end to all speculation
about dates. She indicated that she had come under much
pressure during consultations with candidates and Board
members and appears to have taken our advice on setting an
election date upon the conclusion of the straw poll. The
two-day election process will begin with the formal
elimination round on the morning of July 2, followed by up to
six rounds of voting in the runoff. End Summary and Comment.

A Cautionary Note
--------------


4. (S) Insofar as the non-binding poll is predictive, an
Amano-Minty rematch is likely in the final runoff after the
elimination rounds of formal voting but so too is the
possibility of continued stalemate. Minty retained his core
support in the informal poll -- 11 of his "blocking" 12
votes. The sole defector from the original Minty camp,
probably Russia, likely went to Echavarri. In short, Amano
does not seem to have converted any of the "Minty 12" at
least in the non-binding poll notwithstanding commitments of
support from Malaysia, Philippines and Saudi Arabia, which
were among the twelve. (Comment: Since it is unlikely that
any Amano votes converted to Minty, these are likely the
three culprits, but we cannot confirm how countries voted in
the secret ballot. End comment). Of course, Minty
supporters that have putatively committed to Amano may have
felt less bound by their commitments in the informal poll
than they would be in the formal vote, i.e. their conversion
may yet happen. If it does not, and if Russia shifts back to
Minty after Echavarri is likely eliminated, Minty could once
again block Amano from getting to 24 (two-thirds of the
35-member Board).

Winnowing the Field
--------------


5. (SBU) Ambassador Schulte met with an angry Ernest Petric
immediately after the straw poll, who said that he would
advise his government to drop his candidacy following the
result as he wanted nothing further to do with the Agency.
Petric was angry with everyone except the U.S., whose vote he
understood based on our relationship with Japan, and thanked
us for our openness. He acknowledged Ambassador Schulte's
friendly warning weeks ago that he may not get any votes.
Petric was angry with Europe for not providing him any
support (he had expected at least Albania) despite having
encouraged him to stay in the race. He questioned the
meaning of "Europe" if almost all the Europeans voted for
Japan. Petric was also angry with the NAM for sticking with
Minty, a losing candidate, rather than supporting him as a
possible consensus candidate. Lastly, he was angry with
Japan for running a "dirty campaign" and estimated that Amano
would be incapable of running the Agency effectively and
start his tenure with a fractured Board. Ambassador Schulte
strongly discouraged such accusations and encouraged Petric
to support the good of the Agency, the importance of which
Petric wholly acknowledged.


6. (SBU) Belgian candidate Poncelet was not present for the
straw poll and the Belgian Mission seemed stoic about the
result, dismissing this as "only the first round." The Board
Chair told Ambassador Schulte previously that Poncelet,
unlike Echavarri and Petric, had not ruled out withdrawing
after the straw poll. Guidance request: Mission requests
guidance as to whether Ambassador Schulte should approach
Belgian MFA Disarmament Director Bauens, whom he knows
personally, about Poncelet's intentions. Alternatively, the
Department may wish to approach the Belgian government to
encourage Poncelet's withdrawal and expedite the process of
concluding the election.



SCHULTE