IAEA/SYRIA: SECRETARIAT STILL SEEKING COOPERATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000266

SIPDIS

ISN/RA FOR NEPHEW AND DANIEL, IO/T FOR DETEMPLE, NEA FOR
MONZ, CIA FOR HORIO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2034
TAGS: PREL PARM SY KN IAEA KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: SECRETARIAT STILL SEEKING COOPERATION
FROM SYRIA; NEW URANIUM CONTAMINATION FOUND AT DECLARED
FACILITY

REF: UNVIE 00071

Classified By: AMBASSADOR GREGORY L. SCHULTE FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D
)

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Summary
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1. (SBU) The Director General's report on nuclear safeguards
implementation in Syria, issued in the run-up to the June
15-19, 2009 Board of Governors meeting, concludes that "Syria
needs to be more cooperative and transparent." The report
indicates that Syria has not adequately responded to the
IAEA's questions and requests. The new development in the
Syria investigation is the finding of anthropogenic
(man-made) natural uranium particles (from 2008 samples)
taken at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) in
Damascus. The uranium was "of a type not declared at the
facility," and the IAEA has not yet received a response from
Syria that addresses the presence and origin of the
anthropogenic uranium.


2. (C) The Director General continues to muddy the waters by
again focusing on Israel in the Syria investigation, despite
the "all clear" in the DG's March 2009 Board report (reftel),
in which the IAEA concluded that there is a "low probability
that the uranium was introduced by the use of missiles as the
isotopic and chemical composition and the morphology of the
particles are all inconsistent with what would be expected
from the use of uranium based munitions." We expect the DG's
resuscitation of the question about a "munitions origin" for
the uranium at Al-Kibar (referred to by the IAEA as Dair
Alzour) will provide ample fodder for Syria and its allies to
attack Israel's lack of cooperation, vice Syria's lack of
cooperation. Secretariat contacts tell us this mention arose
from ElBaradei's sensitivity to Arab and Iranian complaints
that debate at the last board focused on Syria with "nary a
mention of the country that bombed the reactor."


3. (SBU) The DG's Syria report provides a strong basis for
calling Syria to account for its continued failure to
cooperate with the IAEA investigation. The catalogue of IAEA
requests that have gone unanswered clearly indicate that
Syria is blocking the investigation, and the finding of more
uranium should also raise concern. The only negative aspect
of the DG's report is the gratuitous request for further
information from Israel about the use of uranium in
munitions. This is clearly a red-herrinQT8a"Qpogenic uranium
has been discovered hundreds of miles from the Al-Kibar site.
End Summary.

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IAEA Needs Syrian Cooperation
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4. (SBU) The IAEA Director General's Report on the
Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian
Arab Republic (GOV/2009/36),issued June 5, 2009, concludes
that "Syria needs to be more cooperative and transparent."
The report, issued prior to the upcoming June 15-19 Board of
Governors (BOG) meeting, indicates that Syria has not
adequately responded to the IAEA's questions and requests.


5. (SBU) With regards to the Al-Kibar site and the uranium
contamination identified at the site, the only progress made
by the Agency in its investigation since the March 2009 BOG
is an exchange of letters with Syria that resulted in no new
information or supporting documentation. The report
indicates that "the information provided by Syria to date
does not enable the Agency to determine the nature of the
facility." In particularly harsh language, the Director
General notes in his report that "it is clearly in Syria's
interest to render to the Agency the necessary cooperation
and transparency if it wishes the Agency to be able to
corroborate its assertion about the nature of the Dair Alzour
(Al-Kibar) site."


6. (SBU) The DG report notes the Agency has yet to receive
further access to Al-Kibar and other locations where debris
and equipment from the site were taken. In an April 21
letter, the IAEA again asked Syria to share the results of


any assessments that it may have performed regarding the
materials used during, or resulting from, the bombing. Syria
responded (in a letter dated May 24) by reiterating its
earlier statements concerning the nature of the Al-Kibar
installations, the water pumping infrastructure and
procurement activities, and its statement regarding
cooperation with entities from DPRK. The letter "did not
include any of the supporting documentation requested by the
Agency." The IAEA sent a final letter on June 4 reiterating
its request for access and information.


7. (SBU) The report notes that Syria sent two letters to the
Agency (dated 17 April and May 12),not to answer the
Agency's questions but to question the "correctness of
certain statements contained in reports, technical briefings
and communications of the Agency." No additional information
is provided on Syria's specific questions but the Agency
subsequently reaffirmed to Syria the correctness of its
statements and communications provided comments on the points
raised by Syria.

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New Uranium Contamination
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8. (SBU) The significant new development since the March 2009
BOG is the finding of anthropogenic (man-made) natural
uranium particles in 2008 samples taken at the Miniature
Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) in Damascus, a declared
facility. The uranium was "of a type not declared at the
facility." In correspondence with Syria on the matter, the
report notes that Syria does not address the presence and
origin of the anthropogenic uranium. The IAEA indicates that
further analysis is required by the Agency to determine
whether a connection exists between these particles and the
uranium particles found at the Al-Kibar site. (Comment: The
finding of unexplained uranium at a locale other than the
bombed reactor site makes the Syrian claim that uranium at
Al-Kibar was introduced via Israeli bombs less compelling.
It will also be difficult for Syria to dodge the Agency's
questions since the uranium was found at a declared nuclear
facility under Agency safeguards. End Comment.)


9. (SBU) The report notes that the presence and origin of the
uranium particles, as well as those found at the Al-Kibar
sites "needs to be understood by the Agency."

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DG "Equally" Seeks Israeli Cooperation
--------------


10. (SBU) The Director General again focuses on Israel in the
Syria investigation, by "equally" calling on Israel to
cooperate with the Agency. The IAEA sent a May 20 letter to
Israel requesting "specific information concerning its
statements about whether the munitions used in the
destruction of the building at Dair Alzour (Al-Kibar) could
have been the source of the uranium particles found on the
site." This is in spite of the Agency's stated assessment
that there is a "low probability that the uranium particles
found at the Dair Alzour (Al-Kibar) site were introduced by
use of the missiles used to destroy the building on that
site," and in spite of the reported absence of progress
toward substantiating Syria's explanation. (Comment: The DG
Report for the March 2009 Board meeting added that that the
judgment of a low probability for a munitions origin was due
to the isotopic and chemical composition and the morphology
of the particles, which are all inconsistent with what would
be expected from the use of uranium based munitions.)


11. (C) Speaking privately June 8 with DCM, ElBaradei's
chief of staff, Antoine van Dongen, acknowledged that
reference to Israel and inquiry into depleted uranium
munitions were "distractions" from the important issue of
Syrian non-cooperation. He admitted that ElBaradei had
inserted the Israel issue due to a personal sense that "his"
constituents were antagonized that the Secretariat was
devoting so much attention to Syrian actions with "nary a
mention of the country that bombed the reactor."

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Information Sharing
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12. (SBU) The Director General in the current report repeats
his call for States that may possess relevant information to
make such information available to the Agency and to agree to


the Agency's sharing of such information with Syria.
Interestingly, the report indicates that Syria has to date
declined to have substantive discussions with the Agency, at
which the Agency has offered to share all of its satellite
imagery, and imagery provided by other Member States.

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Outlook for June Board Meeting
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13. (SBU) Syria is listed for the third time as an Agenda
item under Nuclear Verification. The DG's Syria report
provides a strong basis for calling Syria to account for its
continued failure to cooperate with the IAEA investigation.
The catalogue of IAEA requests that have gone unanswered
clearly indicate that Syria is blocking the investigation,
and the finding of more uranium should also raise concern.
The only negative aspect of the DG's report is the gratuitous
request for further information from Israel about the use of
uranium in munitions. This is clearly a red herring, added
by ElBaradei to inject "balance"; we expect Syria will
continue to hide behind NAM statements focused on Israel.
The U.S. should express regret over the nominally "equal"
treatment of Israel and Syria, citing the expert analysis of
the "low probability" of contamination and the fact that
anthropogenic uranium has been discovered hundreds of miles
from the Al-Kibar site.
SCHULTE